JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J.—This appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs-appellants challenging the judgment and decree passed on August 10, 1979, by the Additional District Judge, Mandi allowing the appeal of defendants-respondents and thereby setting aside the judgment and decree passed on June 26, 1972 by the Senior Sub-Judge, Mandi, decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs-appellants. 2. The plaintiffs instituted a suit for grant of decree for possession*of the suit land on the allegations that the land was originally owned by Paddu. On his death, the estate was enjoyed by his widow Smt. Achri as a limited owner, who, on December 7, 1950, by executing^ a deed of sale sold the suit land in favour of Keshav and Titia defendants. The sale was challenged by the plaintiffs as reversioners of Paddu by instituting a suit claiming a decree for declaration that the sale was invalid for want of legal necessity and consideration The suit was dismissed but the learned Additional District Judge, Mandi, on November 25, 1958 granted a decree in favour of the plaintiffs declaring the sole to be null and void on their rights. 3. Smt. Achri died in the year 1969 and on May 4, 1970, suit for possession was filed by the plaintiffs, out of which the present appeal has arisen. 4 The suit was contested by the defendants in which Keshav defendant No. 1 took up a plea that he was a tenant on the suit land at the time when it was sold to him and Titia and as such plaintiffs were not entitled to the actual delivery of possession. The suit was decreed by the trial Court repelling the contention of the defendants. An appeal was preferred by defendants before the lower appellate Court. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was set aside holding the defendant-Keshav to be a tenant at the time of sale of the property by Smt. Achri in favour of defendants. It also came to the conclusion that Keshav was a tenant in possession of the suit land in the year 1948-49 and he never relinquished possession and continued to hold the property as a tenant till the date of sale, where after he occupied the property as one of the owners alongwith Titia. It also came to the conclusion that Keshav was a tenant in possession of the suit land in the year 1948-49 and he never relinquished possession and continued to hold the property as a tenant till the date of sale, where after he occupied the property as one of the owners alongwith Titia. The lower appellate Court also concluded that on coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) Smt Achri became full and absolute owner and Keshav stepped into her rights and as such the decree which had obtained by the plaintiffs in a suit for declaration ceased to be inoperative. 5. The plaintiffs have filed the present appeal challenging the judgement and decree passed by the lower appellate Court. It has been urged on behalf of the appellants before me that there is no evidence on record to show that Keshav was in occupation of the property as a tenant at the time when on December 7, 1950, the property was sold by Smt. Achri in his and in favour of Titia-defendants, It has further been argued that Smt, Acbri having sold the property on December 7, 1950, she was not possessed of the property on coming into force of the Act and held no estate on that date, therefore, there is no question of enlargement of the estate in accordance with the provisions of section 14 (1) of the Act. Another argument put forward on behalf of he appellant is that even if Keshav is held to be a tenant in occupation of the property as on the date of sale, the tenancy rights held by him stood determined in accordance with the provisions of section ill (d\ of the Transfer of Property Act as the lessor rights of a tenant stood merged in the higher rights of ownership acquired by him and as such the Se Stoned on November 25, 1958 had full force and the plaintiffs were entitled for the grant of decree for possession. 6. 6. Learned Counsel for the respondents has repelled the arguments advanced^ the learned Counsel for the appellants by urging that there is Efficient evidence on record to show that Keshav was already in occupation of the property before the sale as a tenant and there is no evidence on record to show that he was ever evicted by due process of law and ^resumption has to be raised that he continued to occupy the property till the date of sale and merely because he acquired 3/4th share in the owner ship rights on the basis of deed of sale, it cannot be held that the tenancy rights stood merged in the ownership rights. 7. I have considered the arguments addressed on behalf of both the parties and have also gone through the records. I find much force in the arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellants on the question of tenancy rights of Keshav determining by his acquiring ownership rights on the basis of deed of sale. Once this question is decided, there will be no need to consider the other arguments addressed at the Bar. 8. The defendants contested the suit by urging that Keshav was in occupation of the property under Paddu and on his death continued to occupy the property as a tenant under Smt Achri and he was a tenant in occupation as on the date of sale. The sale which was effected by Smt. Achri was challenged by the plaintiffs as reversioners of Paddu being invalid for want of legal necessity and consideration but the defendants supported the sale in their favour by urging that it was a legal and valid sale and was for lawful consideration. Even in the instant suit, defendants have not challenged the legality and the validity of the sale. For determining the question, which has been posed, the defendants have to be taken by their words that Keshav was in occupation of the property as a tenant on the date of sale and he acquired the interest of owner, i, e., lessor meaning thereby that the property stood vested in the defendants. Keshav acquired major fraction of the share being 3/4th in the entire property. Keshav acquired major fraction of the share being 3/4th in the entire property. Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act provides for the contingencies when a lease of immovable property determines and subsection (d) thereof provides that a lease of immovable property determines in case the interest of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property becomes vested at the same time in one person in the same right. The entire property which Keshav claims to be in his occupation as tenant was purchased by him on the basis of document Ex. P-A, which is a registered deed of sale and from the date of sale the interest of lessor became vested in him. It is not a fraction of share which stood vested in him. It can be said to be a merger of lessor interest in the higher interest as tenancy is only a right to enjoy possession of the property. On acquiring of the rights of ownership, the tenancy rights held by Keshav not only stood determined but also stood extinguished, as a person cannot be both lessor and lessee at the same time. The owner normally has the right to use and enjoy the thing owned, the right to manage it, i. e,, the right to decide how it shall be used and right to the income from it. The owner has a liberty to use the thing. A tenancy is that form of encumbrance which consists in a right to the possession and use of property owned by some other person. It is the out-come of the separation of ownership and possession. This also follows from the definition of expression lease given in section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act as meaning a transfer of a right to enjoy the property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised. The right to enjoy the property is carved out by ownership and conveyed to the lessee. Upon the lessee acquiring the ownership itself in the property his right to retain enjoyment thereof in the capacity as a lessee evidently loses its identity. 9. The right to enjoy the property is carved out by ownership and conveyed to the lessee. Upon the lessee acquiring the ownership itself in the property his right to retain enjoyment thereof in the capacity as a lessee evidently loses its identity. 9. In Badri Narain Jha and others v. Rameshwar Dayal Singh and others, AIR 1951 SC 386, it was pointed out that if the lessor purchases the lessees interest, the lease is extinguished as the same man cannot at the same time be both a landlord and a tenant. As Keshav acquired rights of the landlord, namely, Smt Achri alongwith Titia, therefore, it has to be held that whatever rights Keshav had in the property prior to the sale, the same stood determined and merged in the ownership rights. In view of this legal position, it cannot be said that the rights which Keshav held in the property prior to the sale and which stood extinguished on execution of deed of sale in his favour would revive at any subsequent stage so as to entitle him to resist the suit of the plaintiff for the grant of decree for actual possession. 10. The lower appellate Court was not right in holding that the limited estate held by Smt. Achri stood enlarged on coming into force of the Act. Smt Achri was not m actual possession of the property as it was in actual occupation of Keshav as a tentant. Even in the deed of sale Ex. PA there is no mention that Smt. Achri over put the transfers possession of the property. The sale-deed was executed on December 7, 1950, on the basis of which Smt. Achri transferred all her right, title and interest and in view of the sale of her rights, Smt. Achri cannot be said to be possessed of the property on coming into force of the Act and as such there is no question of enlargement of the estate or applicability of section 14(1) of the Act. 11. In view of the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. Parties to bear their own costs of the appeal. Appeal allowed.