JUDGMENT:- G. G. Sohaai, C. J. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner bas prayed that the order dated 10th January, 1990 (Annexure 2') passed by the State Government transferring the petitioner from the post of Secretary, Bihar School Examination Board, be quashed. 2. The material facts giving rise to this application, briefly, arc as follows;- The Bihar School Examination Board (hereinafter referred to as' the Board') is a body incorporated under Section 3 of the Bihar School Examination Board Act, 1952, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). By the notification dated 9th September, 1988, the petitioner, an officer in the Bihar Education Service h the cadre of Senior Selection Grade Grant officer, was posted as the Secretary of the Board. The petitioner avers that though under the Act, and the rules framed there under, the appointment of a Secretary of the Board i9 for a fixed period of three years unless he is removed, al contemplated by the Act, the petitioner has been illegally transferred by the order dated 10th January, 1290 (Annexure 2) as Additional Director, Patna cum Magadh Pramandal, and that respondent No.4, who is not qualified to be appointed as Secretary of the Board, is being appointed to that post. The petitioner has, therefore prayed that the order of transfer be quashed. 3. Learned counsel (or the petitioner contended that the order of transfer was malafide as the petitioner refused to oblige the Minister-in-Charge in certain matters and that the transfer of the petitioner was in breach of the Act, and the rules made there under. It was also contended that respondent no. 4 was not qualified to hold the post of Secretary but he has happened to be related to the Minister in-Charge he was being appointed to hold the post of Secretary of the Board. In reply it was contended that the appointment of the petitioner to the post of Secretary was temporary until further orders and, therefore the transfer could not be held to be illegal. It was also contended on behalf of respondent no. 4 that the posting of the petitioner as Secretary of the Board was a purely interim arrangement and as soon as a suitable person was found the petitioner was transferred. 4. It was also contended on behalf of respondent no. 4 that the posting of the petitioner as Secretary of the Board was a purely interim arrangement and as soon as a suitable person was found the petitioner was transferred. 4. Before I proceed to appreciate the contentions advanced on behalf of the parties, it would be useful to refer to the relevant provision of the Act, and the Rules framed there under. The Board is a body corporate incorporated under section 3 of the Act. The Secretary is an Officer of the Board who is appointed under Section 9A of the Act, which reads as under- "9A. Appointment of Secretary and his removal-(1) The State Government shall appoint one of the officers possessing such qualifications and such terms and conditions and for such period as may be prescribed to be the whole time Secretary of the Board. (2) The State Government may remove the Secretary, at any time, if he refuses to Act, or is unable to Act, or acts• in a manner which the State Government considers prejudicial to the interest of the Board: Provided that before passing such orders of removal the State Government shall give a reasonable opportunity to the Secretary to show cause why he should not be removed." Under the Bihar School Examination Board Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules,) the qualification of the Secretary and the terms and conditions of his office are prescribed by Rule 4 which is as follows:- "4. Qualification of the Secretary to the Board and the terms and conditions of his office- (1) The appointment of the Secretary to the Board, who shall be a whole time Officer, shall be made by the State Government from amongst their officers belonging to the cadre of Class I of the Bihar Educational Service, possessing at least five years of teaching, inspecting or administrative experience. (2) The term of office of the secretary shall be three years, on the expiry of which he shall be eligible for reappointment to that office for further periods not exceeding three years in aggregate provided that the officer, so appointed, shall cease to hold office on reaching the age of superannuation unless he is granted reemployment by the state Government. (3) In addition to the pay and allowances, admissible to him as a member of Class I of the Bihar Educational Service, the Secretary shall be paid a special pay of Rs. 150/- per month and shall be provided by the Board with a suitable rent free house for his residence. He shall be paid travelling allowance, in accordance with the Rules applicable to Government servants of his class. (4) During the period he works as the secretary, he shall be treated to be on deputation on foreign service terms and the Board shall make necessary contributions to wards his leave pension." From a perusal of the aforesaid provisions it is clear that the term of office of the secretary when he is first appointed to that post, is three years unless he is removed in the manner laid down by sub section (2) of section 9A of the Act, or he reaches the age of superannuation during the period of three years. It is not the case of the respondents that the petitioner has reached the age of superannuation or that he has been removed. The short question for consideration is whether in these circumstances the order of transfer of the petitioner before he has completed the statutory term of the office of the secretary can be sustained in law. 5. It is well settled that courts should not normally interfere with the order of transfer of a Government servant unless it is shown to be contrary to some provisions of law or is mala fide. Section 9A of the Act, and Rule 4 of the Rules lay down in unambiguous terms that the appointment to the office of the Secretary shall be for a fixed period of throe years. If before the expiry of that term, a person, who has been appointed to that post, is asked to relinquish that office and is transferred to some other post, thon such order cannot be sustained in law. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the appointment of the petitioner to the post of secretary being temporary, purely as an interim measure, he could not claim the protection of the tenure specified for that post under the Rules. The contention cannot be upheld. There is no provision or power in the Act, and the Rules which empowers the State Government to make a temporary appointment. The contention cannot be upheld. There is no provision or power in the Act, and the Rules which empowers the State Government to make a temporary appointment. When a statutory provision provides that an Act, shall be done in a particular manner, then it is implicit that the said Act, shall be done in that manner and in no other manner what so ever. The Rules framed under the Act, lay down that the term of office of a person appointed as Secretary shall be three years. No provision of the Act, or the Rules was brought to our notice to indicate that any power is conferred on the State' Government to make any appointment in breach of Rule 4 of the Rules. The statutory purpose of prescribing a fixed term for the post of a secretary is to enable that person to function fearlessly. That purpose would be frustrated if it is held that despite rule 4 of the Rules the State has power to appoint a person as a Secretary temporarily in violation of the provision of the Act, and the Rules. Once a person is appointed as a secretary of the Board, he shall, as laid down by the Act, and the Rules, hold office for three years unless he is removed or he reaches the age of superannuation. The Act, does not envisages temporary appointment to the post of secretary. The order dated 10th January, 1990, (Annexure 2) transferring the petitioner from the post of secretary of the Board cannot, there fore, be sustained in law. In this view of the matter, the question as to whether respondent No. 4 is or is not qualified to be appointed to the post of secretary does not arise and I refrain from expressing any opinion in that behalf. C. For all these reasons, this petition is allowed to this extent that the order dated 10th January 1990, (Annexure 2) is quashed. In the circumstances of the cage patties shall bear their own costs of this petition. B. N. Sinha, J. I agree Allowed in Part.