JUDGMENT R.P.Singh J. 1. By means of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the order passed by the Additional District Judge, Azamgarh dismissing the appeal and upholding the order passed by the prescribed Authority allowing the application of the landlord in proceedings under section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The facts of the case, briefly, are that the petitioner is a tenant of the accommodation in dispute situate in Mohalla Kurmi Tola in the city of Azamgarh of which respondent no. 3 is the landlord. Respondent no. 3 moved an application for eviction of the petitioner in proceedings under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act on the ground that the accommodation in his possession to accommodate the members of his family is wholly inadequate on account of the increase in the number of the members of family and further that the relations between his wife and daughter-in-law are very strained and differences have arisen disturbing the mental peace bf his family members on account of which it has become necessary for him to provide a separate accommodation to his son and daughter-in-law and other family members and hence the need for the disputed accommondation in possession of the petitioner is bona fide and genuine and greater hardship would be caused if the accommodation is not released in his favour. It was further pleaded by the landlord that the husband of the petitioner has already- built another residential building in the same city and hence the petitioner can easily shift to the new house built by her husband as such the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise any objection to the landlord's application for release. THE application moved by the landlord was contested by the petitioner on the gound that the need of the landlord is not bona fide or genuine and that she is living in the accommodation in dispute since long. It was also contended that her relations with her husband are strained and hence they have not been living together and she cannot live in the house built by her husband and further that greater hardship would be caused if she is evicted from the accommodation in dispute. It was also contended that her relations with her husband are strained and hence they have not been living together and she cannot live in the house built by her husband and further that greater hardship would be caused if she is evicted from the accommodation in dispute. Heard Sri Prabodh Gaur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri K. M. Dayal, Senior Advocate, for the respondent-land lord. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the need of the landlord respondent no. 3 is not bona fide and genuine and that there is sufficient accommodation in possession of the landlord to accommodate his family members. Secondly, it was contended that the relations between the petitioner and her husband are strained and hence the petitioner is not living with her husband and cannot shift to the newly constructed house of her husband and hence Explanation (i) to section 21 (1) of the Act is not applicable in the present case and respondents no. I and 2 have wrongly held that Explanation (i) to section 21 (1) is applicable in the present case and on this ground has not examined the comparative hardship that may be caused to the petitioner as a result of her eviction from the disputed accommodation 4. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that respondents no. 1 and 2, on appraisal of the evidence on record, have recorded a finding that the need of the landlord for the disputed accommodation is bona fide and genuine and it not not open to the petitioner to challenge this finding on the question of bona fide need of the parties in writ jurisdiction specially when the same has been reached after appraisal of the evidence on record. LEARNED counsel further contended that since the husband of the petitioner has admittedly built another accommodation in the same city and respondents no. 1 and 2 have disbelieved the case of the tenant that her relations with her husband are strained and hence the husband and wife would be deemed, under the law, to be normally residing together and as such Explanation (i) to section 21 (1) of the Act is applicable in the present case. 1 and 2 have disbelieved the case of the tenant that her relations with her husband are strained and hence the husband and wife would be deemed, under the law, to be normally residing together and as such Explanation (i) to section 21 (1) of the Act is applicable in the present case. As regards first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the question of bona fide need of the landlord for the disputed accommodation, on perusal of the orders passed by respondents no. 1 and 2, I find that they have appraised the evidence on record in arriving at the conclusion that the need of the landlord for the disputed accommodation is bona fide and genuine. It has been clearly set out by the landlord in his application moved before the Prescribed Authority, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure 'I' to the writ petition, that now total number of the members of his family has increased to 20 and hence the accommodation in his possession to accommodate 20 members in his family is wholly indequate and hence his need for additional accommodation is pressing and bona fide. It has also been clearly stated in his application that the relations between his wife, and his daughter-in-law are strained and hence the mental peace of the members of his family are very much disturbed and it has become necessary for him to provide a separate accommodation to his son and daughter-in-law in order to maintain peace in the family. Respondents no. 1 and 2 both have applied their mind to the evidence led by the landlord respondent no. 3 on the question of his bona fide need for additional accommodation and after appraisal of the evidence on record have held that the need of the landlord for the accommodation in dispute is bona fide and genuine. In the case of Dr. J. D. Tiwari v. II Addl. District Judge, Allahabad reported in 1982 (1) ARC 81, it was obserbed by Honourable R. M. Sahai, J. As follows :- "Strained relations between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law and between wives of brother is not anunusual feature of our society. Where differences arise, the mental peace of male members is disturbed, cannot be disputed. It, therefore, may furnish a reasonable ground for allowing an application for release of an independent accommodation. Where differences arise, the mental peace of male members is disturbed, cannot be disputed. It, therefore, may furnish a reasonable ground for allowing an application for release of an independent accommodation. The landlord may not have the luxury of selecting accommodation but inability to live with brother's family due to differences between brother's wife and mother-in-law and daughter-in-law is certainly a ground on which he may seek eviction of his own house occupied by a tenant." 5. In view of the law laid down above, it is clear that respondents no. 1 and 2 have rightly taken into consideration the strained relations in the family of the landlord as a ground for holding that the need of the landlord for the disputed accommodation is bona fide and genuine. The finding arrived at by respondents no. 1 and 2 concurrently, on appraisal of the evidence on record, cannot be disturbed by this Court in writ jurisdiction. IN the case of Harbansh Lai v. Jag Mohan Sarad, AIR 1986 SC 302 , the Supreme Court observed that there is no sanction enabling the High Court to re-appraise the evidence without sufficient reason in law and reach findings of fact contrary to those rendered by subordinate court and when the High Court proceeds to do so, it acts plainly in excess of its powers. 6. In the result, there are no merits in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner on this point. Now coming to the second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Explanation (i) to section 21 (I) of the Act is not applicable in the present case, it would be necessary to quote the relevant portion of section 21 of the Act which reads thus :- "21. Now coming to the second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Explanation (i) to section 21 (I) of the Act is not applicable in the present case, it would be necessary to quote the relevant portion of section 21 of the Act which reads thus :- "21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant.- (1) The Prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists namely- (a) that the building is bona fide required either in its existing from or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust ; Provided also that the prescribed authority shall, except in cases provided for in the Explanation, take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application and for that purpose shall have regard to such factors as may be prescribed. Explanation.- In the case of a residential building : (i) where the tenant or any member of his family (who has been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on him) has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition of a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application under this sub-section shall be entertained; 7. The scheme of section 21 is that a landlord can apply for release of the accommodation in his favour on fulfilling the statutory conditions. THE landlord has to establish his bona fide need for the accommodation. Under the proviso, the Prescribed Authority is bound to compare the likely hardship of the landlord and tenant except in cases provided for in the Explanation. THE landlord has to establish his bona fide need for the accommodation. Under the proviso, the Prescribed Authority is bound to compare the likely hardship of the landlord and tenant except in cases provided for in the Explanation. THE first Explanation says that where the tenant or any member of his family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state a residential building in the same city, no objection by the tenant against an application under this section shall be entertained. Thus in cases where the Explanation applies, the tenant is barred from raising any objection to the landlord's application and the Prescribed Authority is exempt from comparing the hardship of the landlord with that of the tenant. 8. In the present case, it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that as relations between the petitioner and her husband are strained, they are not normally residing together and hence it is contended that Explanation (i) to section 21 (1) is not applicable in the present case. However, it is not the case of the petitioner that there is any divorce between the husband and wife. Hence I have to examine the finding recorded .by respondents no. 1 and 2 on the question of strained relations between the petitioner and her husband. From a perusal of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority I find that the Prescribed Authority, after the appraisal of the evidence on record, has disbelieved the case set up by the petitioner of her strained relations with her husband. The Prescribed Authority has held that he is not satisfied from the mere verbal objection of the petitioner regarding her strained relations with her husband and hence the Prescribed Authority has clearly disbelieved the case of the petitioner about her strained relations with her husband. The Addl. District Judge, in appeal, also has disbelieved the case of the strained relations and observed that the case of the tenant that her relations with her husband is strained cannot be believed and that no case for divorce has been taken by the petitioner. Hence, after disbelieving the case of strained relations between the petitioner and her husband, respondents no. District Judge, in appeal, also has disbelieved the case of the strained relations and observed that the case of the tenant that her relations with her husband is strained cannot be believed and that no case for divorce has been taken by the petitioner. Hence, after disbelieving the case of strained relations between the petitioner and her husband, respondents no. 1 and 2 have held that in view of the fact that admittedly the husband of the petitioner has built a house within the municipal limits of Azamgarh city, Explanation (i) to section 21 (1) of the Act would be applicable. There is a presumption in law that the husband and wife would normally be residing together and once the case set up by the petitioner about her strained relations with her husband is disbelieved, the wife and husband would be deemed under the law to be living together. Mere fact that the husband of the petitioner is at present posted outside Azamgarh in the course of his employment will not mean that Explanation (i) to section 21 (1) of the Act will not be applicable. The petitioner is admittedly a tenant of the disputed accommodation at Azamgarh and her husband has built another accommodation in the city of Azamgarh and hence, in my opinion, the respondents no. 1 and 2 have rightly held that Explanation (i) to section 21 (1) is applicable in the present case and hence they are not required to go into the comparative hardship of the parties. The intention behind Explanation (i) to section 21 (1) of the Act seems to be that in case the husband or the wife or any member of the family builds another accommodation in the same city, then if the Prescribed Authority finds that the need of the landlord for the accommodation in possession of his tenant is bona fide and genuine, in that case, the tenant would not be entitled to raise any objection to the application filed by the landlord for the release of the accommodation under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act and as such the tenant is barred from raising any such objection. Hence, the respondents no. 1 and 2 have not committed any manifest error in holding that explanation (i) to section 21 (1) of the Act is applicable in the present case. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. Hence, the respondents no. 1 and 2 have not committed any manifest error in holding that explanation (i) to section 21 (1) of the Act is applicable in the present case. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. There is no order as to costs. 9. In the end, learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that sometime may be allowed to the petitioner to vacate the disputed accommodation arid handover peaceful possession of the same to the landlord, respondent no. 3. IN case, the petitioner files an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority within six weeks from today that she shall vacate the disputed accommodation and handover peaceful possession of the same by 31st May, 1990, the petitioner shall not be evicted from the disputed accommodation till 31st May, 1990. IN case the undertaking, as stated above, is not given by the petitioner, within six weeks from today, it will be open to the respondents to evict the petitioner forthwith in accordance with law. Petition dismissed.