The Commissioner of Excise of Assam invited on July 31, 1989 tenders for supply of rectified Spirit Grade I inter alia for three Warehouses, one at Jorhat, the second at Nazira and the third at Tinsukia. A large number of penons submitted tenders. The tenders were opened on September 15 and were scrutinised and in suitable cases the Excise Commissioner with his recommendation tenderer the papers to the State Government for settlement. The State at first decided the rates for each of the Warehouses and later identified the persons who should supply liquor to the Warehouses. In Memo No. 133/89/28 on May 15, 1990 Jorhat Warehouse was settled in favour of Niren Sarma for the period June 1, 1990 to May 31. 1993. In Memo No. 130/89/38 dated June 1, 1990 for Nazira Warehouse the settlement was made with a firm called M/S R. P. Associates for the period June 16, 1990 to June 15, 1993. As respects Tinsukia Warehouse in Memo No. Ex.129/89/20 dated May 14, 1990 the settlement was made with Pradip Kumar Dutta for the period June 1, 1990 to May 31, 1993. The three orders of the State Government are assailed in the group of above five writ petitions. Civil Rule 1095/90 is by Ajoy Dutta and Civil Rule 1136/90 is by Bangshidhar Bargohain, the two assail the order affecting Jorhat Warehouse. Ajoy Dutta in Civil Rule 1082/90 and Bangshidhar Bangshidhar in Civil Rule 1137/90 assail the settlement made of Nazira Warehouse. The settlement for Tinsukia is assailed in Civil Rule 1156/90 by Kuladhar Dutta. The three persons in whose favour the settlements are made resist the writ petitions on more or less similar grounds as that of the State Government, therefore, all the five petitions are considered in one common judgment. The settlement is made under Excise Act 1 of 1910, Assam Excise Rules of 1945 and under Executive Instructions. It is necessary to mention the character of liquor business under our Constitution at the outset. Article 47 of the Constitution recites the State can enforce prohibition. Because of the Directive Principle in Article 47, the Supreme Court in AIR 1951 SC 318 , State of Bombay vs. F. N. Balsara held a citizen has no fundamental right to trade in liquor. Besides from ancient times liquor is considered dangerous and harmful to health therefore the State created a monopoly in its favour. Because of the Directive Principle in Article 47, the Supreme Court in AIR 1951 SC 318 , State of Bombay vs. F. N. Balsara held a citizen has no fundamental right to trade in liquor. Besides from ancient times liquor is considered dangerous and harmful to health therefore the State created a monopoly in its favour. In view of these two aspects the Supreme Court held it would be "antithetical" if Courts recognise a right in favour of a citizen. In AIR 1975 SC 360 , Nashirwar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, some cases holding to the contrary all were considered and overturned. Thus the petitioners and those with whom the settlement is made none of the persons therefore can claim any right or fundamental right in the business of liquor. In this connection a contention is raised at the inception as respects one of the conditions incorporated in the invitation to the advertisement on July 31, 1989. In that the State reserved right to alter the location of the Warehouses and in such a contingency of alteration" no person will be heard to complain. The tenders to contain names of persons, firm or company to be furnished. The persons in whose favour the settlement is made perforce of necessity to take over the existing vats apparatus as prescribed in Rule 102 of Rules. The Government reserved the right to accept or reject or reduce the tender amount without disclosing the reasons. The spirit supplied must be of Gul Mahua or of Molasses. The liquor supplied to conform to ISI standard. The liquor to be transported in approved vehicles. The contention that is raised based on the above conditions principally by those in whose favour the settlement was made is that the writ petitioners have not questioned the legality, validity or propriety of conditions in all the five writ petitions, therefore, the State Government have unrestricted right either to accept, reduce or reject tenders. The petitioners cannot he heard to complain whatever be their complaint. This plea was raised to hold the State can act in any manner they liked. The learned Advocate General for the State Government we must mention did not put it in so a high tone as the settlement holders have advanced the argument. We cannot accept the contention in such wide terms as it is propounded. This plea was raised to hold the State can act in any manner they liked. The learned Advocate General for the State Government we must mention did not put it in so a high tone as the settlement holders have advanced the argument. We cannot accept the contention in such wide terms as it is propounded. The power of the State emanates under section 19 of the Excise Act 1 of 1910 and under Rules 91, 93 and 98 of the 1945 Rules. The State Government may supplement these provisions by Executive Instructions to effectuate the Rules. The State cannot prescribe unto themselves power beyond that which is warranted under the statute or exercise any power de hors the 1945 Rules. The contention of the settlement holders if accepted enables the State Government to issue Executive Instruction which may over-reach the statutory provisions, therefore, such a power in the State Government cannot be countenanced. The contention therefore is rejected. The writ petitions filed as respects Jorhat Warehouse are two in number. Civil Rule 1095/90 is filed by Ajoy Dutta who in his tender submitted rate at Rs. 11.38. Civil Rule 1136/90 is filed by Bangshidhar Bargohain who offered rate at Rs. 9.50 p. Niren Sarma in whose favour the settlement is made offered Rs. 11.07 in his tender. The State in unequivocal terms represented that no negotiations were made with any tenderer including with Niren Sarma. The importance of negotiation under Act 1 of 1910 and Rules of 1945 is discussed in AIR 1972 SC 2281 , M/S. Produce Exchange Corporation Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Excise, Assam & others though the principles laid in that case have no application on the facts of these cases. Bangshidhar Bargohain in the instant case is not found unsuitable by the authorities. He is not disqualified. Ajoy Dutta is found not unsuitable. H; is not disqualified. Niren Sarma is found not unsuit­able and not disqualified. The State Government avers the tenders were scrutinised by the Excise Commissioner. He did not recommend any tenderer for acceptance to the State Government as respects Jorhat Warehouse. Niren Sarnia in whose favour the settlement is made (it is not necessary to state in detail bow it came about) he accepted to supply the liquor at Rs. 9.50 p., the rate which was offered by Bangshidhar Bargohain. This result requires an explanation or elucidation from the State Government. Niren Sarnia in whose favour the settlement is made (it is not necessary to state in detail bow it came about) he accepted to supply the liquor at Rs. 9.50 p., the rate which was offered by Bangshidhar Bargohain. This result requires an explanation or elucidation from the State Government. The State Government averred that they considered various factors and held the rate of Rs. 9.50 p. is a viable rate for Jorhat Warehouse. The State Government however have not stated what those factors are. The rate of Rs. 9.50 p. was offered by Baagshidhar Bargohain yet the settlement was not made with him, required to be explained as he is not disqualified. He was suitable as he was held not unsuitable. The State avers in this regard the writ petitioners are not the ones who have experience, all the tenderers have the experience. The Government on a comparative suitability, experience, financial soundness, business performance and from the stand point of records of these tenderers readied the decision and enter the settlement with Niren Sarma. As respects Ajoy Dutta it is averred he is the son of Kuladhar Dutta. The father among the two supplied liquor to a Warehouse between 1987-90. A foreign liquor licence it is averred was granted to a firm of M/S. Kuladhar Dutta &. Sons in which Ajoy Dutta is one of the partners. A faint attempt was made to show these grants or settlements disqualified Ajoy Dutta. In our jurisprudence a firm is different from individuals. Father and son have independent status. The corporate bodies are separate entities in law, therefore, grants made in favour of father of a tenderer ordinarily is not a relevant circumstance against a son. So what is attempted to show as disqualification has no legs to stand in law. The precise question at issue is how Niren Sarma was offered the settlement when his offer was Rs 11.07 p. with the rate of Bangshidhar Bargohain (Rs. 9.50). The learned Advocate General was asked in vain to unravel facts leading to the decision. The question of discrimination in the above circumstances is also raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. It is accepted the States have the exclusive right to trade in liquor still the States cannot act as they please in the matter of giving largess. The learned Advocate General was asked in vain to unravel facts leading to the decision. The question of discrimination in the above circumstances is also raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. It is accepted the States have the exclusive right to trade in liquor still the States cannot act as they please in the matter of giving largess. The State in our set up suffers constraints and cannot act arbitrarily, capriciously or in an unreasonable manner. In AIR 1979 SC 1628 , Ramana Dayara Shetty vs. international Airport Authority of India it was held that in selecting persons for largess the State cannot "choose" persons or claim unfettered discretion in selecting persons. In AIR 1978 SC 597 , Smt. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India it was held the State cannot discriminate among persons who "are similarly circumstanced" (para 39). This was reiterated in AIR 1980 SC 1992 M/S Kasturilal Lakshmi Reddy vs. State of J. & K. and directed to follow a “norm” and their decisions should be reasonable decisions. In the absence of any explanation we cannot hold the decision reached for Jorhat Warehouse is a reasoned decision. In an Allahabad case a Single Judge of that Court referred to two cases of the Supreme Court of America in 29 Lawyers Edition 145 and 32 Lawyers Edition 968. The passage in the former case is s 'The United States does not and cannot hold property, as a monarch may, for private or personal purposes. All the property and revenues of the United States must be held and applied, as all taxes, duties, imposts and excises must be laid and collected, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States". The passage in the latter case reads: "In the present case, the United States hold the title to the property in question, as it holds all other property, for public purposes and not for private purposes". The learned Single Judge having cited the passages held-"The obligation to hold property for public purpose is inherent in all democratic Constitutions. The passage in the latter case reads: "In the present case, the United States hold the title to the property in question, as it holds all other property, for public purposes and not for private purposes". The learned Single Judge having cited the passages held-"The obligation to hold property for public purpose is inherent in all democratic Constitutions. The property held as such, has to be administered in a way, so as not to enrich a particular category of persons to the detriment of other citizens, and also in such a manner as to ensure that the maximum possible benefit accrues to the revenues of the State." We with respect adopt the reasoning and conclusion reached in that case as correct in law. To sum up- Bangshidhar Bargohain offered the rate of Rs. 9,50 p. That rate is found viable by the State. He is not disqualified. There is no reason shown why the settlement is not granted to him. The other two writ petitions relate to Nazira Warehouse (Civil Rule 1082/90 and Civil Rule 1137/90). The Civil Rule 1082/90 is filed by Ajoy Dutta. He offered Rs. 10.61 p. Civil Rule 1137/90 is filed by Baugshidhar Bargohain. He offered Rs. 9.50 p. and it is settled in favour of the firm M/S. R. P. Associates who offered Rs. 11.59. In this case the State Government stated the rate of Rs. 9.50 is viable and therefore the settlement was made with the firm M/S. R.P. Associates. There a fortiori circumstance in this case is that the Excise Commissioner recommended Bangshidhar Bargohain for settlement. The importance of such a recommendation was considered by this Court in the case of 1989 (2) GLR 146 [1989 (2) GLJ 146], Knladhar Dutta vs. State of Assam & others. In that case this Court held ordinarily the Government should not reject the recommendation of the Commissioner without any reason. In this case there is no reason shown why the recommendation in favour of Bangshidhar Bargohain is rejected. If the firm M/S. R. P. Associates offered Rs. 11.59 why the settlement is made with such a firm at the rate of Rs. 9.50 ignoring Banghidhar Bargohain who offered the rate of Rs. 9.50 p. It is not necessary to repeat the reasons recorded in the case of Jorhat. For like reasons the impugned settlement made as respects Nazira Warehouse also cannot be sustained in law. 11.59 why the settlement is made with such a firm at the rate of Rs. 9.50 ignoring Banghidhar Bargohain who offered the rate of Rs. 9.50 p. It is not necessary to repeat the reasons recorded in the case of Jorhat. For like reasons the impugned settlement made as respects Nazira Warehouse also cannot be sustained in law. In the case of Tinsukia Warehouse the settlement was made with Pradip Kumar Dutta. His rate was Rs. 10.70. Kuladhar Dutta is the writ petitioner in Civil Rule 1156/90. His rate is Rs. 10.71 p. One of the persons Vijoy Kumar Jasrasaria offered Rs- 9.50 p. for this Warehouse. He was not a party respondent in the case. He on his own filed an application to be impleaded as party respondent in the case. Learned counsel for Pradip Kumar Dutta vehemently opposed the application. The question of adding a party in a petition under Article 226 is not governed by Order 3 Rule 10 of the C. P. C. where proper tests are laid to determine whether those that are to be impleaded are proper and necessary parties. In a writ petition it is for the Court to permit any person to be impleaded though there are certain constraints as regards the pleas that can be raised by persons who are impleaded which are not relevant for discussion in these cases. Vijoy Kumar Jasrasaria is therefore ordered to be impleaded. Ha is not shown disqualified or found unsuitable. The public policy and the rules of law requires that the State Govern­ment should state as to why the rate tenderer by Vijoy Kumar Jasrasaria was rejected for settlement. As in the eases of Jorhat and Nazira Warehouses the State did not offer any explanation for Tinsukia Warehouse settlement. Therefore the settlement order in favour of Pradip Kumar Dutta is quashed. The State Government is ordered to consider de novo the settlements of the three Warehouses under Excise Act No. 1 of 1910 and 1945 Rules and pass appropriate orders within two weeks of the receipt of this order by the State Government. We further direct the status quo as on today to be continued till the decision is reached by the State Government. The five writ petitions are allowed as indicated above. No costs.