ORDER T.N. Singh, J. 1. In this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, two orders are challenged. One was passed in an Execution Proceeding, on 5-12-1986, by learned Civil Judge, Class I, Dabra, and the other, on 18-2-1989, in revision, by the learned Fourth Additional District Judge, Gwalior, confirming that order. Those orders had common source in the application of respondent filed on 12-8-1985 in the Execution proceeding (Annexure R/1 of the return), claiming discharge from the decretal debt in terms of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Gramin Rin Vimukti Adhiniyam, 1982, for short, the Adhiniyam. 2. Before us, those orders are challenged on the ground of jurisdictional incompetence of the courts concerned. In regard to facts, therefore, suffice to say this much only that the petitioner had obtained a decree for a sum of Rs. 5,660/- against the respondent for which execution was levied. That decree was passed in a suit instituted in 1980. As per Annexure 11, the respondent had made an application in that suit on 1-1-1981 for "permission to defend the suit" and in that application, one of the pleas raised was that the plaintiff (herein petitioner) was not entitled to claim interest of Rs. 1,800/- on loan advanced for Rs. 3,500/-. It is not necessary to refer to the other pleas or even the defence set up because in his application, Annexure R-1 the respondent also stated that the judgment and decree was ex parte and were that copy of the judgment was not filed by the decree-holder in the execution case. However, the same, plea of excessive interest (raised in Annexure-11) was reiterated in Annexure R/1, submitting that post-decree interest was not awarded and that otherwise too, interest was wrongly claimed. In support of his claim for "discharge" under the Adhiniyam, he stated in the said application that he was of Lohar (blacksmith) caste and that his vocation was repairing of tools and implements used by villagers and that he did carpenter's work in villages on wages. 3. Respondent's counsel Shri Naik reminded us of the limitations of our jurisdiction and stressed that findings of fact reached by two Courts below are immune to our scrutiny. Counsel cited Mamti Bala Rout, AIR 1974 SC 2051 , Babhutmal Raichand Oswal, AIR 1975 SC 1297 and S. P. Deshmukh, AIR 1977 SC 1985 . 3. Respondent's counsel Shri Naik reminded us of the limitations of our jurisdiction and stressed that findings of fact reached by two Courts below are immune to our scrutiny. Counsel cited Mamti Bala Rout, AIR 1974 SC 2051 , Babhutmal Raichand Oswal, AIR 1975 SC 1297 and S. P. Deshmukh, AIR 1977 SC 1985 . That is a valid and unexceptional proposition and there is no dispute with that. Both courts have reached categorically the conclusive finding that respondent was a resident of Dabra town and that he was engaged in Dabra as also in villages in making and repairing wooden implements used in agriculture. In allowing respondent's application (Annexure R/1) and dismissing the Execution application of the petitioner, both Courts based their decision on the interpretation of the relevant statutory provision. They have taken the view that to be a "rural artisan" as defined in section 2(k) of the Adhiniyam, one need not actually live or reside in a rural area and that it would suffice if such a person did not hold any agricultural land, like the respondent. We are, therefore, required to interpret the relevant provision of the two courts below. On their "finality", we reserve comments. It is necessary, however, to examine not only if law was correctly interpreted in holding that respondent was a "rural artisan" but if courts below had jurisdiction to decide his application (Annexure R-1) and allow his claim that he was "wholly discharged" of the decretal debt. 4. We have to decide first the question, whether the courts below were debarred from deciding petitioner's claim of being a "rual artisan" in view of the provisions, mainly of sections 3(b) and 7 of the Adhiniyam. 4. We have to decide first the question, whether the courts below were debarred from deciding petitioner's claim of being a "rual artisan" in view of the provisions, mainly of sections 3(b) and 7 of the Adhiniyam. We take up first that question and extract clauses (a), (b), (c) and (e) of section 3, followed by section 7 in extenso: "(a) every debt advanced before the 16th August 1982 including the amount of interest, if any, and which is payable by (i) a marginal farmer; (ii) a landless agricultural labourer; (iii) a rural artisan; (iv) a small farmer; to creditor shall be deemed to be wholly discharged; (b) no civil court having jurisdiction shall entertain any suit or proceeding against a debtor specified in clause (a) for the recovery of his debt; (c) all proceedings in execution of any decree for money or proceedings for making final any preliminary decree for foreclosure or sale or proceedings in execution of any final decree for sale against a debtor specified in clause (a) for the recovery of his debt shall stand withdrawn and all property of the said debtor under attachment in any such proceedings shall forthwith be released; (e) all suits and proceedings pending against a debtor specified in clause (a) for the recovery of debt shall abate. 7. Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court. - No Civil Court shall have any jurisdiction to entertain, or decide any question in respect of a debt to which provisions of this Act apply". 5. For interpreting aforequoted provisions, it is necessary to refer to the definition of the term "debt" given in section 2(d). It refers, inclusively to "all liabilities owing to a creditor in cash or kind, secured or unsecured, payable under a decree or order of Civil Court or otherwise and subsisting on the 15th August, 1981 whether due or not due". The word "decree" used in the definition is evidently related to the expression "other instrument having force of law", used in section 3 so as to embrace a decree A decretal debt subsisting on 15-8-1981 being also a debt advanced before 16-8-1982, would be deemed to be "wholly discharged" under section 3(a); additionally, however, a "Civil Court" is prevented by clauses (b) and (c), from entertaining or continuing any pending proceeding in regard to such a debt. Any proceeding in regard to execution of a decree, pending on the date of commencement of the Adhiniyam, must "stand withdrawn" as per clause (c); also debarred is the competence to "entertain" such proceedings instituted in any civil court having jurisdiction otherwise to entertain the same. 6. The valid and apparent logic for debarring civil Court's jurisdiction in the manner contemplated under clauses (b) and (c), is provided by the fact that a debt which has been "discharged" statutorily is an unenforceable debt. It is for this reason indeed, that bar against the civil courts in regard to such a debt operates not only under clauses (b) and (c) but also under clause (e), contemplating abatement of "all suits and proceedings pending" against the statutory debtor named in section 3(a). Further, precaution is taken by the Legislature under section 7 to buttress the rigour of the bar by expressly contemplating exclusion of jurisdiction "to entertain or decide any question" in respect of the statutory debt. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word "discharge" is said to mean, inter alia, "the act of freeing from obligation, liability or restraint, exoneration....". In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 26A, among other meanings of the word are mentioned- "To absolve, or acquit, as of an obligation, claim etc.; to acquit or free from debt" etc. The wide amplitude of exclusion of jurisdiction contemplated under section 7 is signified by the adjective "any" qualifying the word "question". Legislature intends to debar Civil. Courts from pronouncing on grounds urged in support of the "discharge" claimed in any proceeding before it. 7. We have to keep in view the doctrine of presumption against exclusion of civil court's jurisdiction as that cannot be ignored. But, the scope of exclusion has to be derived from the words used by the Legislature and in that connection, it is necessary to refer to the definition of the term "Civil Court" in section 2(b). The importance of that definition lies in its inclusive nature but reference to the provisions of M. P. Civil Courts Act is obviously indispensible. In section 3 of that Act, "Civil Courts" ordained and functioning in the State of Madhya Pradesh are enumerated and named as the Court of District Judge, Additional District Judge, Civil Judge Class I and Civil Judge Class II. In section 3 of that Act, "Civil Courts" ordained and functioning in the State of Madhya Pradesh are enumerated and named as the Court of District Judge, Additional District Judge, Civil Judge Class I and Civil Judge Class II. Section 5 of the said Act, vests power in the State Government to establish any "Civil Court" and the territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions of the different Civil Courts are to be determined with reference to sections 4, 6 and 7 of the Act. Reference, in this connection may be also made to the provisions of section 2 [clauses (4), (8) and (14)], 3, 5(2), 7 and 8, Civil Procedure Code. In regard to small causes Courts, provisions are made in sections 7 and 8 and other provisions referred also lend support to the view that a "Civil Court" contemplated under Civil Procedure Code is a Court competent to try suits and proceedings of civil nature and such courts form a hierarchy with the High Court at the apex in any State. When any matter is triable or determinable in any other manner by any other forum, exclusion of civil court's jurisdiction in regard to such matters is expressly contemplated under section 4, Civil Procedure Code. Besides, section 9, Civil Procedure Code, in express terms, provides for exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts when jurisdiction in respect of any matter is "either expressly or impliedly barred". 8. As held in Sudhir Chandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel Co., AIR 1984 SC 1064 , the jurisdiction of a Civil Court, amongst others, is determined by the nature of relief claimed. Accordingly, if the decretal debt is statutorily discharged and no relief in that regard has to be claimed in a Civil Court, either by the statutory debtor or the creditor, ouster of jurisdiction under section 9, Civil Procedure Code has to be presumed. The Constitution Bench, in the celebrated Dhulabhai's case, 1969 MPLJ 1, AIR 1969 SC 78 , has summed up succinctly the tests of exclusion of Civil Court's jurisdiction. It has been held that when there is express bar of jurisdiction, an examination may be made of the scheme of the particular Act and adequacy or sufficiency of remedies provided may be relevant; But, that is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. It has been held that when there is express bar of jurisdiction, an examination may be made of the scheme of the particular Act and adequacy or sufficiency of remedies provided may be relevant; But, that is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Such exclusionary provision, their Lordships observed, "exclude those cases where the provisions of particular Act have not been complied with or the special Tribunal contemplated thereunder has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principle of judicial procedure." In Raja Ramkumar Bhargava's case, AIR 1988 SC 752 , it has been observed that whenever a right, not pre-existing in Common Law, is created by a statute and that statute itself provided the machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy being created uno flatu and finality being intended to the result of the statutory proceeding, then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision, the Civil Court's jurisdiction is impliedly barred. 9. Reference is necessary, therefore, to the provisions of sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Adhiniyam. According to section 4(1), "no creditor shall accept any payment against any claim for a debt which has been discharged under the Act." As per sub-section (2), "whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to one year or fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or both", section 8 empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Adhiniyam. Section 6 deserves to be extracted in extenso: "6. Authorities who may be specified for implementing the provisions of this Act. - The State Government may confer such powers and impose such duties on a Collector as may be necessary to ensure that the provisions of this Act are properly carried out and the Collector may specify an officer or officers subordinate to him, who shall exercise all or any of the powers and perform all or any of the duties so conferred or imposed and determine the local limits within which such powers or duties shall be carried out by the officer or officers so specified". (Ephasis added). As per clause (f) of section 5, "any debt which represents the price of goods purchased by a debtor" is also excepted; other types of excepted "liabilities" are indicated in clauses (a) to (d). (Ephasis added). As per clause (f) of section 5, "any debt which represents the price of goods purchased by a debtor" is also excepted; other types of excepted "liabilities" are indicated in clauses (a) to (d). Clause (e) specifies creditors, the debt owed to whom is not "deemed'" discharged. Rules have been framed and section 8 of the Adhiniyam of which Rule 3 contemplates information to be supplied by the statutory debtor for the purpose of the inquiry to be made under Rule 4 by the Collector. Rule 3 evidently shifts on him the burden of establishing his claim to invoke the benefit contemplated under the Adhiniyam. 10. Because Collector's inquiry and decision culminate in initiation of prosecution contemplated under section 4, the scope of that may be examined. There is a clear prohibition categorically inscribed therein against the creditor, that he cannot "accept any payment against any debts which have been discharged under this Act". The prohibition being directed against the creditor it follows, a priori, that the creditor is debarred from taking any step in regard to the payment of the "discharged" debt. Both voluntary and involuntary payments by the statutory debtor are interdicted by section 4. Any demand by the creditor in any manner, made on the debtor for payment of the said debt, falls within the mischief of section 4. Because, the debt according to section 3 is deemed as "wholly discharged", implying that payment thereof cannot be demanded. It appears clear that the metis rea of the , offence contemplated under section 4 consists not only of the act of acceptance of the payment of the debt but also its demand. Section 4 is in two parts and both are mutually exclusive. That is so contemplated to enable charge to be framed under two different heads. While clause (i) of section 4 deals with "payment"; clause (ii) deals with such acts of the creditor as his refusal to redeliver possession to the debtor of the property pledged or mortgaged by him. The elaborate special procedure has to be regarded as inbuilt safeguard against false claims for "deemed discharge" of debts. The object underlying the special procedure is apparent. Anyone claiming to be statutory debtor, eligible to avail benefit of the Adhiniyam, has to follow those provisions. The elaborate special procedure has to be regarded as inbuilt safeguard against false claims for "deemed discharge" of debts. The object underlying the special procedure is apparent. Anyone claiming to be statutory debtor, eligible to avail benefit of the Adhiniyam, has to follow those provisions. It is made clear to him that the Adhiniyam does not create any presumption in his favour and it does not jeopardise generally enforcement of all kinds of debts against all and sundry. 11. A bit of legislative history may be sampled to seek further assurance for the view taken. In the statement of objects and reasons of the bill it is stated that the Adhiniyam carries further constitutional enterprise undertaken earlier, in M. P. Gramin Rin Vimukti Tatha Rin Sthagan Niyam, 1975; Debts of small farmers were suspended upto 15-10-1982 and in order to give more benefits to the same class of persons for "discharge" of debt advanced after 16-10-1975 and upto 15-8-1982 an Ordinance (M. P. Gram Rin Vimukti Adhyadesh, 1982) was promulgated on 15-2-1982. Prior to said 1975 Adhiniyam, there came on statute book M.P. Anusuchit Jan Jati Rini Sahayata Adhiniyam, 1987 and thereunder provision was made for "Debt Relief Court". Both 1975 and 1982 Adhiniyams include the said Court within the definition of "Civil Court" of the two Adhiniyams. That Special Court could grant only such reliefs as of reduction of interest and capital and preparation of scheme of repayment and transfer of debtor's property. The two Adhiniyams of 1975 and 1982 made a quantum-leap by discharging debts not only of a member of scheduled tribes but of other as well. Emphasis has always been on the need to relieve those who had been actually exploited in the rural area. Bona fide loan transactions made with other persons living in the rural area were not touched as persons not belonging to the weaker section and not reduced economically to subsistence level were not in need of constitutional protection. For the "rural indebtedness" of designated class of persons to be wiped out, graduated means were enacted in 1975 and 1982, in the two Adhiniyams. For the "rural indebtedness" of designated class of persons to be wiped out, graduated means were enacted in 1975 and 1982, in the two Adhiniyams. We extract clause (k) of section 2 of 1982 Adhiniyam as we have to consider the case of that class of persons in this matter: "(k)"rural artisan" means a person who does not hold any agricultural land and - (i) Whose principal means of livelihood is production or repair of traditional tools, implements and other articles or things used for agriculture or purposes ancillary thereto in a rural area; or (ii) Who normally earns his livelihood by practising a craft either by his own labour or by the labour of a member or members of his family in a rural area;" Others of that class are "landless agricultural labourer", "marginal farmer", "small farmer", defined in clauses (a), (g) and (i) respectively. They are referred to in the long title itself of 1975 Adhiniyam. 12. Under section 6 of the Adhiniyam and Rule 4 of the "Niyam" framed thereunder, Collector having been constituted as the Special Tribunal to entertain and decide any question raised in respect of the statutory debt or discharge thereof under the Adhiniyam, he is supposed to make an inter parte enquiry under Rule 6 for his "prima facie" satisfaction to decide whether complaint has to be lodged for prosecution against the offending creditor. Indeed, as per Dhulabhai's case (supra), Collector's decision in the enquiry would be open to challenge if he had not acted in conformity with fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Determination of the claim of the debtor as to his "discharge" would rather be made at two forums. Collector's view would be tentative as his satisfaction has to be "prima facie" but the final decision that would be rendered by the Magistrate cannot but be in full conformity with judicial procedure. The two-tier tribunal at the forum of the Collector and Magistrate has been devised obviously to serve a dual purpose. Small debtors, supposed to" be benefited by the Adhiniyam, being either a marginal farmer or a landless labourer or a rural artisan or a small farmer, were to be spared the ordeal of a long-drawn legal battle in Civil Courts. On the other hand, the provisions of the Adhiniyam are supposed to act in terrorem against any creditor violating the mandate of sections 3 and 4 of the Adhiniyam. On the other hand, the provisions of the Adhiniyam are supposed to act in terrorem against any creditor violating the mandate of sections 3 and 4 of the Adhiniyam. If he claims any payment of a debt statutorily discharged under section 3, he shall do so at his own peril as he has to face the risk of prosecution and punishment. If this view is not taken, genuine creditors may suffer and non-genuine debtors who are not. supposed to be benefited by the Adhiniyam are likely to prosper. 13. Legislature's intention cannot be to subject a genuine, honest and unaffected creditor to be saddled with the burden of facing or pursuing civil as also criminal jeopardy by absolving the debtor of the burden to establish that the provisions of the Adhiniyam were applicable to him and the "deemed discharge" of the debt could be validly claimed by him. The Adhiniyam is, indisputably, a piece of expropriatory legislation. Such a statute has to be strictly construed; and in a manner that expropriated owner is not saddled with any extended burden in any manner as is not expressly contemplated. A similar legislation came up. for exposition of the Apex Court in K. Hutchi Gowder, AIR 1965 SC 577 for construing certain provisions of Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act. Their Lordships observed that the scope of the relief had to be "necessarily confined to that given by the Act expressly or by necessary implication" because the Act was an expropriatory measure and it was not permissible for the Court to rely upon supposed policy of Legislature to apply to those who may have been supposedly "over burdened" with debts beyond those contemplated. Strict construction of expropriatory statute was stressed also in Gujarat Electricity Board's case, AIR 1969 SC 267 holding invalid in that case the notice of take-over of the undertaking of the licensee holding that the power had to be exercised strictly in accordance with the law and in the manner prescribed; and in no other way. Motibhai Thullabhai Patel's case, AIR 1970 SC 829 was in regard to confiscation wherein it was held that though no person could be permitted to benefit by a wrongful act, such goods were only liable to be confiscated as were permitted statutorily in express terms as it was not permissible to courts to extend the scope of the relevant provision by reading words into that. In the instant case, therefore, to vest in any Civil Court the power to decide "any question" in contravention of section 7 would be impermissible and indeed for the additional reason that the scheme and object of the Act herein discussed support this view. 14. Each of the two Courts below being "Civil Courts" contemplated under section 2(b) of the Adhiniyam, they had no jurisdiction to entertain and pronounce on "any question" raised in respondent's application, Annexure-R-1, in regard to plea that the decretal debt in respect of which execution was levied had been "discharged" under the Adhiniyam. The Courts below had no jurisdiction to grant declaration prayed by the respondent that his debt be deemed discharged under the Adhiniyam by making inquiry into the facts alleged in that regard in the application. For that inquiry, as held above, the Adhiniyam has provided the special forum of "Collector" and special procedure has also been provided in that the person claiming to be a statutory debtor has to make an application to the Collector complaining against the demand made on him for payment of the debt which had been "wholly discharged" under the Adhiniyam. Respondent's application was essentially a complaint against the petitioner that she was enforcing such a discharged debt in violation of section 4. That complaint could be entertained and decided only by the Collector. 15. For the reasons aforesaid we are compelled to reach the conclusion that the two Courts below exceeded their jurisdiction in entertaining and deciding Respondent's application, Annexure R-1. They also acted without jurisdiction, therefore, in refusing to allow the petitioner to pursue the execution proceedings. Unless and until it has been validly determined in accordance with the provisions of the Adhiniyam that she had levied execution of a debt which had been "wholly discharged" under the Adhiniyam, the Executing Court was bound to allow her to continue the proceedings. It would have been open to that Court to deal and decide other objections already raised, and those which could be otherwise raised by the judgment-debtor (respondent) accepting the decretal debt to be a debt to which the provisions of the Adhiniyam did not apply. That has not been done by the Executing Court and the Revisional Court has unfortunately confirmed the decision of the Court below. 16. That has not been done by the Executing Court and the Revisional Court has unfortunately confirmed the decision of the Court below. 16. In the premises aforesaid it is not necessary at all to deal with the finding and conclusion of the two Courts below that the respondent was "rural artisan" because the Courts below had no jurisdiction to decide that question. Their finding in that regard being without jurisdiction shall be treated as non est in law. If the respondent resorts to special I procedure envisaged under the Adhiniyam and the relevant Niyam (Rule 4 et. seq.) a proper decision in that regard can be, and shall be, rendered by the Collector. 17. On the interpretation of the term "rural artisan" defined in section 2(k), the view expressed by the two Courts below is wholly erroneous and about that we have to say a few words. They have held that the "rural artisan" need not live or reside in the rural area. That is not correct. The; word "rural" is an adjective, qualifying the noun "artisan". In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.77, the root of the word "rural" is given -"it is related to the Latin word "rus" and "ruris", meaning the "country". It is said that the word means something "belonging to or characteristic of the country", as distinguished from a city or town. One of the meanings of the word, which is given in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary is more relevant. In connection with persons the adjective "rural", it is stated, means living in the country. Indeed, the long title of the Adhiniyam is very clear, speakin.g of "relief from indebtedness in rural areas". The different ingredients of the definition of the term "rural artisan" must be read in their entirety to have a composite view of Legislature's intention. Why it is that he need not hold any agricultural land ? It indicates that he is supposed to reside in the rural area and yet is bereft of any agricultural holding and that he earns his livelihood in the manner described in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of Clause.(k). 18. Legislature has taken care to define the term "rural area" also to make its intention clear that any person residing in an area within the limits of Municipal Corporation, Municipal Council, a Town Committee, Cantonment Board, notified area, committee etc. 18. Legislature has taken care to define the term "rural area" also to make its intention clear that any person residing in an area within the limits of Municipal Corporation, Municipal Council, a Town Committee, Cantonment Board, notified area, committee etc. would not be regarded as a person living in "rural area". Thus, if a person lives in any of those defined areas he cannot be "rural artisan". In sub-clause (ii) of clause (k) of section 2, in very categorical term practising a craft by person concerned "in a rural area" is contemplated and that too with the help of members of his family only. It is true, clause (i) is not that categorical and leaves room for some ambiguity. That may have confounded the Courts below. That can, however, to be resolved easily by resorting to the maximi noscitur a sociis and the course directed by the Apex Court recently in Kehar Singh's case, AIR 1988 SC 1883 and other decisions as well. Law settled is that even for deriving the meaning of any particular provision, those of the entire enactment as also its object and purpose must be kept in view. The reasonable view of clause (i), according to us, would be that it concerns cases of not only production or repair of traditional tools etc. which are used in rural area but of production or repair being undertaken in rural area. Because, the means of livelihood is supposed to be earned in the rural area. In both clauses (i) and (ii), the same expression "in rural area" has been juxtaposed with the expression "who normally earns his livelihood". We cannot also ignore that a "rural artisan" belongs to that common class of persons of which other members are "marginal farmer", "landless agricultural labourer" and "small farmers" whose debts, as per section 2(a), are deemed wholly discharged. The other persons of each class are expressly required in terms of respective definitions, to carry on their agricultural vocation in a rural area. 19. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders, Annexures 10 and 13 passed by two Courts below are quashed. Execution levied by the petitioner shall be deemed to be pending and proceedings in that regard shall continue. However, it shall be open to the respondent to raise therein any other objection as is not hit by section 7 of the Adhiniyam. The impugned orders, Annexures 10 and 13 passed by two Courts below are quashed. Execution levied by the petitioner shall be deemed to be pending and proceedings in that regard shall continue. However, it shall be open to the respondent to raise therein any other objection as is not hit by section 7 of the Adhiniyam. It shall also be open to him, if so advised, to apply to Collector in terms of Rule 4 of the Niyam to initiate prosecution against the petitioner under section 4 of the Adhiniyam. If such an application is made by him and if that is accepted for inquiry by the Collector it would then also be open to him to pray to the Executing Court for stay of further proceedings therein until disposal of his application by the Collector. 20. The petition is accordingly disposed of in terms of the above direction. There shall be no order as to costs.