JUDGMENT : R.C. Patnaik, J. - Do proceedings commenced under the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967, a temporary Act, when it was in force, ipso facto terminate on its lapsing with effect from 4-5-1988? This is the short but interesting question that arises for consideration in this batch of writ applications. 2. It has been argued by the counsel for the Petitioners that the Act being a temporary one, all proceedings initiated before the Act lapsed, cannot be proceeded with and must also lapse on the expiry of the temporary Act. Section 5 of the Orissa General Clauses Act, 1937 (the same as Section 6 of the General Clauses Act) has no application since the Act was not repealed but was allowed to lapse. Hence, the consequences that ensue on application of Section 5 of the Orissa General Clauses Act are out of question. It is, on the other hand contended by the counsel for the opposite parties that a bald and general contention as urged aforesaid is untenable. The consequence would depend upon the construction of the temporary statute. 3. The statement of the law contained in various authorities may now be called: Craies: As a general rule, and unless it contains some special provision to the contrary, after a temporary Act has expired, no proceedings can be taken upon it, and it ceases to have any further effect. The classic observations of Parke B. in Steavenson v. Oliver, (1841) 151 E.R. 1042, which have been approved and followed by all Courts following the anglosaxon principles are as under: There is a difference between temporary statutes and statutes which are repealed; the latter (except so far as they relate to transactions already completed under them) become as if they had never existed; but with respect to the former, the extent of the restrictions imposed, and the duration of the provisions, are matters of construction. The facts of the case are quite interesting. Section 4 of 6 Geo.4, c. 133 enacted that every person who held a commission as surgeon in the army should be entitled to practise as an apothecary without having passed the usual examination. The Act being temporary expired on August 1, 1826. The question that arose was if the person who under the Act was entitled to practise as apothecary would lose his right after August 1, 1826. The Act being temporary expired on August 1, 1826. The question that arose was if the person who under the Act was entitled to practise as apothecary would lose his right after August 1, 1826. Lord Abinger, C.B. said: It is by no means a consequence of an Act of Parliament expiring that rights acquired under it should likewise expire. The Act provides that persons who hold such commissions should be entitled to practise as apothecaries, and we cannot engraft on the statute a new qualification limiting that enactment. In Wicks v. Director of Public Prosecution, (1947) A.C. 362, for acts committed against the Emergency Powers Act, 1939 during the currency of the Act, trial took place in May, 1946 after the expiration of the Act on February 24, 1946. The House of Lords held that the language of Section 11(3) was wide enough to make the provisions of the statute operate in respect of any act done before its expiration; therefore, its expiration did not affect the liability to punishment under the statute or the prosecution for the purpose of inflicting that punishment. The House of Lords in Wicks v. Director of Public Prosecution relied upon and referred to the observation of Parke B and Lord Abinger C.B. in Steavenson v. Oliver (supra). Wicks case is the current leading authority which has been referred to in numerous decisions of the Supreme Court where similar or identical questions were raised (See Gopi Chand Vs. The Delhi Administration, ; State of Orissa Vs. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, and M/s. Rayala Corporation v. The Director of Encroachment, AIR 1970 S.C. 494 ). In Bhupendra's case (supra) while endorsing the views statea in Craies and Wick's case, Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) observed: In our opinion, it would not be reasonable to hold that the general rule about the effect of the expiration of a temporary Act is inflexible and admits of no exceptions. It is true for instance that offences committed against temporary Acts must be prosecuted and punished before the Act expires. If a prosecution has not ended before that day, as a result of the termination of the Act, it will ipso facto terminate. But is that an inflexible and universal rule? It is true for instance that offences committed against temporary Acts must be prosecuted and punished before the Act expires. If a prosecution has not ended before that day, as a result of the termination of the Act, it will ipso facto terminate. But is that an inflexible and universal rule? In our opinion, what the effect of the expiration of a temporary Act would be must depend upon the nature of the right or obligation) resulting from the provisions of the temporary Act and upon their character whether the said right and liability are enduring or not. and referred to Parke B's observations in Steavenson's case. Having noticed the general rule and the exceptions, an enquiry should be directed by way of an examination of the temporary Act which expired on 4-5-1988. Section 1(4) of the Orissa House Rent Control Act reads as under: It shall cease to have effect on the 4th day of May, 1988 except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration thereof and Section 5 of the Orissa General Clauses Act, 1937 (Orissa Act 1 of 1937) shall apply upon the expiry of this Act as if it had then been repealed by an Orissa Act. On a reading of Sub-section (4) of Section 1, it is clear that the Legislature doubly ensured that proceedings should continue despite the expiry by enacting the provisions except in respect of things done or omitted to be done before the expiration thereof and also reinforcing the intention by applying the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Orissa General Clauses Act as if the expiration of the Act was by way of repeal by an Orissa Act. An identical provision as contained in Section 1(4) of the Orissa House Rent Control Act is found in Section 1(3) of the Emergency Risks (Factories) Insurance Act (Central Act 63 of 1962) which was to remain in force during the period of operation of the proclamation of emergency issued on 26-10-1962. It provided that 'its expiry shall not affect anything done or omitted to be done before such expiry and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 shall apply upon the expiry of this Act as if it were repealed by a Central Act." Interpretation of this provision fell for consideration before various High Courts and ultimately before the Supreme Court. The various High Courts followed the observation of Simon, J. in (1947) 1 All.E.R. 205, namely, Parliament did not intend Sub-section (3) to expiry with the rest of the Act, and that its presence in the statute preserves the right to prosecute after the date of expiry (See Union of India New Delhi and Others Vs. Thammana Sitaramanjaneyulu and Others Eastern Bihar Divisional Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Others Vs. The Chief Enforcement Officer Government of India and Others, and Marikar Motors Ltd. Vs. The Chief Enforcement Officer, Emergency Risks Insurance Scheme, Madras and Another, ). The view taken in Thammana's case (supra) has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Amadalavalasa Cooperative Agricultural and Industrial Society Ltd. and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, . In Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. Vs. The Union of India and Another the views of the various High Courts were summarised by observing: ...If Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is made applicable to the temporary Act, action taken before the expiry of the Act, cannot only be continued, but even fresh action can be initiated under the Act in respect of contravention made while it was in force. It was said in Rayala Corporation's case (supra) that if the principles of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act was made applicable, a legal proceeding could be initiated even after the repeal of the Act in respect of an offence committed during the time when the Act was in force. In Eastern Bihar Divisional Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Others Vs. The Chief Enforcement Officer Government of India and Others, has been analysed and it has been stated: The Supreme Court has thus made it clear that new and fresh proceedings, after the expiry of a-temporary Act, can be initiated if the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act are made applicable, or the Act itself provides for such a provision.... Reliance was placed on M.S. Shivananda Vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Others, to urge that the proceedings would not continue after the expiry of the temporary Act. There, however, the saving clause was worded as under: 31.(2). Notwithstanding such repeal: (i) anything done or any action taken under the said Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act. There, however, the saving clause was worded as under: 31.(2). Notwithstanding such repeal: (i) anything done or any action taken under the said Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act. In that connection, the Supreme Court considered the distinction between what was and what was not a right preserved by the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and observed that the distinction was of great fineness: What is unaffected by the repeal of a statute is a right acquired or accrued under it and not a mere hope or expectation of or liberty to apply for acquiring a right, and referred with approval to the observations of Lord Morris in Director of Public Works v. Ho Po Sang, 1961 (2) All.E.R. 721 (P.C.): It may be, therefore, that under some repealed enactment, a right has been given, but that, in respect of it, some investigation or legal proceeding is necessary. The right is then unaffected and preserved. It will be preserved even if a process of quantification is necessary. But there is a manifest distinction between an investigation in respect of a right and an investigation which is to decide whether some right should be or should not be given. On a repeal the former is preserved by the Interpretation Act. 'The latter is not. and further observed that the object of Section 31(2)(1) was to preserve only the things done and action taken under the repealed Ordinance, and not the rights and privileges acquired and accrued on the one side and the corresponding obligation or liability incurred on the other side so that if no right acquired under the repealed Ordinance was preserved, there was no question of any liability being enforced and the clause was unlike the usual saving clause which preserved unaffected by the repeal, not only things done under the repealed enactment but also the rights acquired thereunder. 4. Hence, having regard to the provisions contained in Section 1(4) of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, Shivananda's case (supra) rather supports the view, namely, that rights accrued can be enforced. 4. Hence, having regard to the provisions contained in Section 1(4) of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, Shivananda's case (supra) rather supports the view, namely, that rights accrued can be enforced. By reason of the application of Section 5 of the Orissa General Clauses, Act, if the right was acquired and liability incurred when the temporary Act was in force, all the provisions of the Act would continue in force for the purposes of enforcing the liability incurred when the Act was in force and any investigation, legal proceeding, remedy, may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the Act had not expired (See Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, ). A Division Bench of this Court of which one of us (R.C. Patnaik, J.) was a party had also taken a view in Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. Parsuram, 59 (1985) C.L.T. 444, that the intention of the legislature was to save the rights and obligations which had already accrued under the Act even after its expiry. 5. Having noticed, the general principles, the exceptions and the principles that can be culled from the authorities-old and new-we hold that the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the House Rent Control Act, 1967, which elapsed on 4-5-1988, authorise institution, continuance and enforcement for the purpose of enforcing rights and liabilities acquired or accrued when the Act was in force and there is no substance in the contention that the proceeding should terminate on the expiry of the Act. 6. In the result, all the writ applications are dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. K.P. Mohapatra, J. I agree. Writ applications dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed