THAKKER, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition is filed by the petitioner-Beat Guard who has been ordered to be dismissed from service by the impugned order dated 16/06/1990 passed by the Deputy Conservator of Forest, Vyara, resondent No. 1 herein. ( 2 ) THE short facts as stated in the petition are that the petitioner is an Adivasi and a native of Varjakhan village of Vyara Taluka. He was appointed as a Beat Guard on 18/12/1961. He worked as Depot guard, Anaval from 1966 to 1970. From village Anaval, he was order of the to be transferred to Varjakhan i. e. , his native place. It is the case of the petitioner that he had made a representation to the Divisional Forest officer, Valsad which has been annexed to the petition as Annexure a on 11/12/1970 that he may not be transferred to his native place in view of the circumstances mentioned in the said representation. However, in the affidavit-in-reply, it is the case of the respondents that they have not received such representation. It appears that some illicit cutting of trees took place from the forest area in which the petitioner was serving and chargesheet was issued to him in December 1971, he was held guilty and punishment of dismissal was imposed on him, by the disciplinary authority, namely, divisional Forest Officer, Valsad. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority i. e. Conservator of Forest, Surat Circle, Surat and the above penalty was reduced to the reduction of the petitioner to the minimum of his pay scale as Beat Guard for a period of seven years. ( 3 ) AGAIN, in connection with the illicit cutting of 692 trees detected in September 1972, the proceedings were initiated against the petitioner. A statement was recorded on 23/09/1972, wherein he had admitted that it was mistake on his part which would not be reported in future and that he would try to get back the materials which had been illegally cut off. In respect of that incident, final order was passed on 31/05/1977 and a minor penalty was imposed and the petitioner was continued on the basic pay for a future period of three years. ( 4 ) THE petitioner was also charge-sheeted on 12/08/1976 and two allegations have been levelled against him that he had remained unauthorisedly absent and there was negligence in his work. ( 4 ) THE petitioner was also charge-sheeted on 12/08/1976 and two allegations have been levelled against him that he had remained unauthorisedly absent and there was negligence in his work. It was alleged that illegal cutting of 707 trees took place because of negligence and carelessness on his part. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 14/11/1977, wherein he had stated that there was no sufficient evidence to hold the petitioner guilty for remaining absent. However, with regard to illegal cutting of trees and negligence, it was established against him. The disciplinary authority agreed with the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer and issued second notice which was necessary at the relevant time under Rule 10 (4) of the gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) 10/02/1978 which was replied by the petitioner immediately on 13/02/1978. The impugned order dismissing the petitioner from service was passed on 16/06/1980 against which the present petition is filed. ( 5 ) MR. S. M. Mazgaonkar, appearing for Mr. S. N. Shelat, has raised the following contentions : (1) For the purpose of deciding the present case, the earlier or subsequent misconduct and the order could not have been taken into consideration by the first respondent and on that ground, the impugned order required to be quashed. (2) The subsequent default was based merely on the so called admission of the petitioner and since there was no independent evidence it was required to be ignored. (3) There is undue and unreasonable delay in initiating the proceedings against the petitioner inasmuch as the incident took place in September 1972 while the charge-sheet was issued in August 1976 and again there is delay in passing the impugned order in that the second show causenotice was issued in February 1978 but the final order was passed in June 1980. (4) The impugned order goes beyond the show cause notice. By the notice annexure e dated F 10/02/1978, the petitioner was asked to show cause as to why his services should not be terminated while in fact an order of dismissal has been passed. ( 6 ) SO far as the first contention is concerned, it is no doubt true that in the present departmental proceedings the fact of prior as well as subsequent inquiry has been taken into account. ( 6 ) SO far as the first contention is concerned, it is no doubt true that in the present departmental proceedings the fact of prior as well as subsequent inquiry has been taken into account. However, it is clear from the record that out of three inquiries, two inquiries were already over. The first inquiry was over and the petitioner was dismissed from service which punishment was reduced in appeal. Similarly the third inquiry was also over in view of the admission made by the petitioner. In these circumstances, in my opinion, it cannot be said that the fact relating to other inquiries cannot be taken into account particularly when final orders were passed which the petitioner had never challenged. ( 7 ) THE second contention also does not require much discussion because the petitioner has admitted that there was mistake on his part and that he will try to get back the materials illegally cut. As a matter of fact, due to the endeavour of the petitioner, the materials have been found out. Mr. Mazgaonkar heavily relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Natwarbhai S. Makwana v. Union Bank of India and Ors. , reported in 1984 GLH 791 , wherein this Court has taken the view that in departmental inquiry, mere admission on the part of the delinquent should not be regarded as sufficient proof of misconduct and that ordinarily on admission alone of the deliquent officer, no punishment should be imposed. However, I am of the opinion that in the instant case, the said judgment cannot be pressed into service by the petitioner. As mentioned above, the said inquiry was over, the petitioner was punished and he accepted the order of punishment, has not filed any appeal, or revision against the said order and it has therefore, become final. ( 8 ) THE third contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, also cannot be upheld. Affidavit-in-reply has been filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 3 factors have been pointed out for the purpose of explanation of delay. It is stated that pursuant to the first inquiry, the petitioner was dismissed from service and he was out of employment. It was only because of the fact that his appeal was allowed that he was reinstated in service. 1 and 3 factors have been pointed out for the purpose of explanation of delay. It is stated that pursuant to the first inquiry, the petitioner was dismissed from service and he was out of employment. It was only because of the fact that his appeal was allowed that he was reinstated in service. It is also stated that Unai range was changed due to re-organisation of the Divisions which was subsequently attached to Vyara Division and in these circumstances some time was taken. Finally it is stated that the petitioner himself had remained absent for sufficient long time from December 3, 197 4/03/1975 and again from 14/05/197 5/07/1975. In these circumstances, there cannot be said to be delay in initiating inquiry and issuing any chargesheet in August 1976. It appears that there is some delay even after issuance of the second show cause notice, but from the record it is clear that even after the reply to the second show cause notice by the petitioner on 13/02/1978, the petitioner has filed some replies/representations and thereafter the impugned order was passed in June, 1980. There cannot be said to be an unreasonable delay on the part of the authorities so as to vitiate the action. ( 9 ) AS far as the last contention is concerned, the petition requires to be allowed. As is clear, the second show cause notice Annexure a has been issued pursuant to the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. In the said show cause notice the petitioner was asked to show cause as to why his services should not be terminated (ltufhebtkande Aqxt fub l fhjt ). The petitioner was never asked to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from sevice. Now, the translation of the expression "to dismiss" would never mean "aqxt fhjt" but "chhv fhjt". Thus, the petitioner was never called upon to show cause why the final and extreme penalty should not be imposed on him. If that is position, Mr. Mazgaonkar, is right in contending that the impugned order travels beyond the show cause notice and to that extent, the order is bad on two grounds. Thus, the petitioner was never called upon to show cause why the final and extreme penalty should not be imposed on him. If that is position, Mr. Mazgaonkar, is right in contending that the impugned order travels beyond the show cause notice and to that extent, the order is bad on two grounds. Firstly, that the disciplinary authority exceeded in its power and jurisdiction in awarding punishment and in taking action for which the petitioner was never called upon to show cause and secondly, it is violative of the principles of natural justice, since no reasonable opportunity of being heard as laid down in Rule 10 (4) of the Rules has been afforded to him. Thought the point is very clear, Mr. Mazgaonkar relied on two decisions of this Court for the said purpose. In G. F. Joshi v. C. C. Doctor and Ors. Special Civil Application No. 1802 of 1973 decided by the single judge of this Court (P. D. Desai, J. as he then was) on 21/11/1977 and Sardarsing Devising v. D. S. P. , Himatnagar and Ors. , Special Civil application No. 197 of 1979 decided on 5/07/1985 (A. M. Ahmadi, J. as he then was) [reported in 1985 (2) GLR 1368 ]. In the former case, the notice was issued to the delinquent under the present Rules. However, different punishment was imposed and this Court took the view that the order of penalty was illegal and vitiated because of two reasons mentioned above. Similar view was taken by the learned single Judge in the later case also. In that case, the petitioner was called upon to show cause why he should not be removed from service in English language while in Gujarati he was asked to show cause why he should not be dismissed (chhv fhjt ). Thereafter, by final order he was dismissed from service which was challenged in this Court. The contention of the petitioner that he should not have been dismissed from service in view of the show cause notice was upheld by the Court and the order of dismissal was set aside. Mr. Mazgaonkar is right in contending that his case is on a stronger footing. The contention of the petitioner that he should not have been dismissed from service in view of the show cause notice was upheld by the Court and the order of dismissal was set aside. Mr. Mazgaonkar is right in contending that his case is on a stronger footing. In this instant case, show cause notice has been issued only in the language (Gujarati) and the petitioner was asked to show cause why his services should not be terminated which can never mean that he was asked to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. Therefore, the second respondent has exceeded its authority in passing the order of dismissal and has also violated the principles of natural justice in not granting reasonable opportunity before taking the impugned action. Therefore, the petition requires to be allowed and the impugned order requires to be quashed and set aside. ( 10 ) THEN comes the question of reinstatement of the petitioner and also of back wages to be awarded to him. As held by me in the case of mahendrakumar Veerabhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat and Ors. , Special Civil application No. 2140 of 1986, decided on 31/08/1990 and 1st september, 1990 [reportorted in 1991 (1) GLR 179 ] ordinary rule is that whenever an action of the employer is quashed and set aside, the employee is entitled to reinstatment with full back wages. In the instant case, however miss Doshit relied upon certain facts and prayed that this is not a fit case wherein the petitioner should be awarded back wages and even if I am of the opinion that the petitioner is entitled to back wages, he should not be awarded full back wages. She had drawn my attention to the fact that in the instant case, even though twice the petitioner was punished, he had not improved himself. Again, the misconduct with which the petitioner was charged, cannot be said to be of a trivial nature and even according to the note filed by the Advocate for the petitioner, for fixing early date of hearing it was stated that the petitioner was earning his livelihood by doing petty work as agricultural labourer as may be available to him. It is true that the petitioner had to undertake some work as casual labourer for the purpose of maintaining him as well as his family. It is true that the petitioner had to undertake some work as casual labourer for the purpose of maintaining him as well as his family. This, therefore, cannot be said to be a clinching circumstances against the petitioner. As a matter of fact in Mahendrakumar Makwanas case (supra) I have considered the said aspect with reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in A. L. Kalara v. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1361 . However, Miss Doshit is right in submitting that this is the third incident in which the petitioner was punished. Actually, he was dismissed from service in connection with the first incident, but the appeal filed by him was partly allowed by the appellate authority and he was reinstated by imposing minor penalty. Even in the second incident, he had admitted charges levelled against him and again a minor penalty was imposed. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, this is not a fit case wherein the petitioner would be entitled to full back wages. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the ends of justice would be met with if the respondents are directed to pay 50% back wages to the petitioner. ( 11 ) LASTLY, it was urged by Mr. Mazgaonkar, that in view of the fact that about more than 10 years have passed, that in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, I should direct the respondent authorities to close the imquiry. Miss Doshit for the respondents again emphasising above two factors submitted that this is not a fit case wherein I should exercise my powers under Art. 226 of the constitution by directing the respondents-authorities not to proceed with the inquiry. I think that the contention is well founded. Even prior to the present incident, twice the petitioner was punished. Even the incident in question cannot be said to be of a negligible one. It is the duty of the beat Guard to protect the forest and there should not be any negligence in the discharge of his duties. If such incidents take place, it is always open to the respondent-authorities to take appropriate proceedings against the employee. Even the incident in question cannot be said to be of a negligible one. It is the duty of the beat Guard to protect the forest and there should not be any negligence in the discharge of his duties. If such incidents take place, it is always open to the respondent-authorities to take appropriate proceedings against the employee. The normal rule is that the stage from which the principles of natural justice are violated, the inquiry should proceed further from that stage and after observing the principles of natural justice, final order can be passed in accordance with law. In my opinion, this is not an exceptional case in which I should exercise my powers under Art. 226 of the Constitutional by preventing the authorities from taking normal course and hence the said prayer is rejected. ( 12 ) IN the result, this petition is partly allowed and the rule is accordingly made absolute to the above extent with no order as to costs. It is, however, made clear that the respondent authorities are at liberty to pass an appropriate order in accordance with law after affording reasonable opportunity to the petitioner. .