JUDGMENT B. C. CHAKRABARTI (Chairman). - The short question involved in these two cases is whether sweetmeat was exigible to sales tax even prior to the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, pursuant to which certain goods, sales of which were generally exempt under section 5(2)(a)(vi) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, were included in Schedule I of the Act. 2. The case of the applicants may be briefly put thus : The applicants have been carrying on the business of selling sweetmeats since 1361 (RN-696 of 1989) and 1350 B.S. (RN-2 of 1990). They obtained license from the municipality to carry on the trade. Under a misconception of law they got themselves registered and paid sales tax for some years from the inception of business. There being, however, no provision in the Act that sweetmeats are taxable, the applicant and some others filed a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution challenging the demand, being C.R. 7395 (U) of 1985. Subsequently, the applicants received notices of demand arising out of several cases in connection with the proceedings initiated by the Commercial Tax Officer, Serampore Charge under sections 11 and 14 of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (for short "the BFST Act"). This put them to enquiry and they came to know to their surprise that the writ application was dismissed for default on April 5, 1988. The present applications have, however, been filed on the cause of action arising from the service of notices for the period from 1389 to first quarter of 1392 B.S. The demand, made presumably under section 5(1)(e) of the BFST Act, is unauthorised and hit by article 265 of the Constitution. It is, therefore, prayed that section 5(1)(e) of the Act be declared ultra vires the Constitution, that the previous collections were un-authorised and for quashing the notices. 3. The applications are opposed on the grounds that sweetmeats were, prior to 1987, taxable under entry 7 of Schedule I of that Act, that the exemption under entry 101 could be claimed from 1987 in view of the amended provisions and that the demand is neither hit by article 265 of the Constitution nor the provisions of section 5(1)(e) are ultra vires the Constitution. 4. Before coming to consider the rival contentions of the parties, it may be convenient to bear in mind the relevant provisions of law. 4. Before coming to consider the rival contentions of the parties, it may be convenient to bear in mind the relevant provisions of law. The rate of tax payable by a dealer on his turnover is prescribed in section 5 of the Act. Different rates of tax are prescribed for defiant specified items of goods enumerated in different sub-clauses. Then clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 5 provides : "(e) eight per centum of such part of his taxable turnover as represents sales of goods other than those referred to in clauses (a), (aa), (aaa), (b), (bb), (bbb), (c), (cc), (cc-i), (ccc), (cccc), (d) and (dd)." No tax is payable under the Act on the sale of goods specified in the first column of Schedule I subject to the conditions and exceptions, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the second column thereof. Item 7 of Schedule I as it stood prior to April 1, 1985, was as under : 1 2 "7. Cooked foods, other than Except when sold in cakes, pastries, biscuits and sealed containers." sweetmeats, sold at one time to a person at a price of not more than ten rupees. This item has been omitted with effect from April 1, 1985 by section 4(11)(a) of the West Bengal Act 5 of 1985. Entry 101 of the same Schedule as it now stands, is as follows : 1 2 "101. Sweetmeats, other than cakes, Except when sold in pastries and biscuits, but sealed containers." including curds This item was made tax-free with effect from June 1, 1987, in terms of section 2(18)(b) of the West Bengal Act 5 of 1987. 5. The position, therefore, is that sweetmeats except when sold in sealed containers became tax-free from June 1, 1987. Prior to that the exemption was not available. 6. Since the applicants have challenged the legality of the demand for tax in view of the provisions of article 265 of the Constitution, we set out below the said article in order to appreciate the contention urged on behalf of the applicants. It is as follows : "265. No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law." 7. The grievance of the applicants firstly, is that the demand for tax on the basis of the residuary provisions contained in section 5(1)(e) is vague and indefinite, and not warranted by law. It is as follows : "265. No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law." 7. The grievance of the applicants firstly, is that the demand for tax on the basis of the residuary provisions contained in section 5(1)(e) is vague and indefinite, and not warranted by law. In substance, the contention is that tax demanded on an unspecified item is tax not authorised by law. The "authority of law" contemplated by article 265 means a valid law which means that the tax proposed to be levied is within the legislative competence of the Legislature to tax, that the law must be validly enacted, that it must not be a colourable use of, or fraud upon the legislative power to tax, that the tax must not violate a fundamental right such as that in article 14, article 19 and that the law must not contravene any specific provision of the Constitution. 8. It is argued on behalf of the applicants that there is no presumption about tax and unless expressly provided for, the demand becomes unlawful. The specific grievance is that sweetmeats not being specially provided for in any of the sub-clauses of section 5(1), it could not be demanded with the aid of the residuary clause. In support of the contention, reference was made to the case of Central India Spinning and Weaving and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Committee, reported in [1958] SCJ 604. In particular, our attention was drawn to a passage from Crawford on Statutory Constructions. There it is observed that statutes levying taxes or duties upon citizens will not be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used, nor will their operation be enlarged so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out and all questions of doubt must be resolved in favour of the citizen. This was a case where the Supreme Court was considering the interpretation of the word "terminal tax". Our attention was also drawn to certain observations in the case of Director of Inspection of Income-tax (Investigation) v. Pooran Mall & Sons reported in [1974] 96 ITR 390 (SC); AIR 1975 SC 67. Reference was particularly made to para 7 of the report (at page 396 of ITR) where the oft-quoted observations of Rowlatt, J. in the case of Cape Brandy Syndicate [1921] 1 KB 64 have been quoted. Reference was particularly made to para 7 of the report (at page 396 of ITR) where the oft-quoted observations of Rowlatt, J. in the case of Cape Brandy Syndicate [1921] 1 KB 64 have been quoted. It is said : "In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied". Reference was also made to the case of Tobacco Manufacturers v. State of Bihar, reported in [1950] 1 STC 282 (Pat); AIR 1950 Pat 450 . In that case one of the points for consideration was whether the expression "sale" as defined, would include "agreement to sell". In that context, certain general observations were made to the effect that a taxing statute must be construed strictly and if an assessee gets an advantage which the Legislature may not have intended, but which he is entitled to on the construction of the statute, the court should not deprive him of that advantage. 9. These propositions of law are well-settled but we fail to see how this helps the applicants. The applicants are not sought to be brought within the net of taxation by implication or with the aid of any presumption. The demand is made at the general rate of 8 per cent as provided in section 5(1)(e). The fact that specific rates for specific items have been prescribed in other sub-clauses of the section, does not mean that levy of tax on any item other than those is unauthorised. The scheme of the Act is to provide specific rates for certain specified items, and then prescribe a general rate for all other goods subject, however, to the exceptions contemplated by section 6 and Schedule I. This does not render the residuary clause invalid or violative of article 265 of the Constitution. It is inconceivable that every item under the sun, in order to be brought within the tax net must have to be individually mentioned. It is inconceivable that every item under the sun, in order to be brought within the tax net must have to be individually mentioned. It is an accepted mode of legislative enactment to prescribe for specific items and then lay down a general provision to cover other items not so specifically mentioned, provided adequate safeguards are there so that powers to include or exclude any item from the residuary clause, are not left to the discretion of the authority. In the instant Act such safeguards are contained in section 6 and the enumeration of the different categories of goods contemplated by that section in Schedule I. Consequently, we are unable to say that the levy of tax prior to June 1, 1987 is not authorised by law. It was not contained that the Act itself was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact. It is not the case of the applicants that the levy of tax is violative of article 14 or 19 of the Constitution. All that need be seen is whether the goods in question is an exempted item under Schedule I. If not, there is no escape from the liability. 10. We have indicated above what the definition of the item under exemption was prior to 1987 and what the position now is. Previously, under item 7, cooked foods other than sweetmeats, subject to the specification in column 2, were exempt. In other words, sweetmeats sold at a particular price and not in containers, were not exempt. Item 101, however, makes it exempt with effect from June 1, 1987. In regard to that also it was argued that the entry as fashioned, makes it inconsistent with reference to other entries. Item 101 speaks of sweetmeats other than cakes, pastries and biscuits and it is pointed out that specific provision has been made for exemption of biscuits in item 74. Therefore, it was argued that while under item 74 biscuits are exempt, it is not exempt under item 101. Item 74 while exempting biscuits, makes it clear by the entry in column 2 that it is not available to biscuits manufactured or processed in a factory as defined in the Factories Act, 1948. Therefore, the biscuit, referred to in item 74, is not the same item as referred to in item 101. 11. Item 74 while exempting biscuits, makes it clear by the entry in column 2 that it is not available to biscuits manufactured or processed in a factory as defined in the Factories Act, 1948. Therefore, the biscuit, referred to in item 74, is not the same item as referred to in item 101. 11. It was then argued upon a reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment of 1987, that the item sweetmeat was considered to be an item generally exempt. The Statement of Objects and Reasons reads as if the object was "to transfer to Schedule I goods sales of which were previously exempt generally under section 5(2)(a)(vi) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941". A reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons or the preamble of a statute may sometimes be necessary in order to resolve an apparent ambiguity so that a meaningful and effective construction may be put to the statute as a whole. But, as has been observed in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition, page 7) that the importance of preamble as an aid to construction is constantly declining because modern statutes do hardly have any preambles. The same observations may be made in regard to the Statement of Objects and Reasons. They are too often drawn up in a half-hearted and casual manner. In some cases, the statements are so perfunctory that hardly any assistance can be had upon reference to it. This apart, the statement refers to sales under section 5(2)(a)(vi) which speaks of "such other sales as may be prescribed". The prescription is in rule 3. Tax-free goods are classified under two heads, namely, (1) sales of goods included in Schedule I [section 5(2)(a)(i)] and (2) other sales as prescribed under rule 3 [section 5(2)(a)(vi)]. That being the general scheme of the Act, the statement relied on by the applicants cannot be the sole guiding factor in determining whether sweetmeats were always exempt. The language of erstwhile item 7 and the present item 101 of Schedule I makes it abundantly clear that sales of sweetmeats were tax-free only with effect from June 1, 1987. Therefore, even if the Statement of Objects and Reasons casts some doubt (which we do not think it does) that doubt stands repelled by the clear language used in effecting the amendment. Therefore, even if the Statement of Objects and Reasons casts some doubt (which we do not think it does) that doubt stands repelled by the clear language used in effecting the amendment. Then again, the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the amendment in 1987 could not be utilised for interpreting the provisions as they stood prior to amendment. 12. The respondents have made specific reference to the fact that the applicants got themselves registered and had been actually paying sales tax all along prior to the filing of the writ petition in the High Court, which was allowed to be dismissed for default. The dismissal of that application for default cannot be a sufficient ground for throwing out the present applications. They are founded on different causes of action arising from subsequent notices served on them. 13. The fact that the applicants had previously paid sales tax does not mean that they must continue to do so even where the levy is unauthorised. The learned Advocate for the applicants referred to the decision in the case of Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. State of Orissa, reported in [1957] 8 STC 749 (Orissa); AIR 1957 Orissa 240. That was a case relating to a claim for refund of tax unauthorisedly collected. This decision does not directly help the applicants. But the general principle of law does. There is no question of estoppel or waiver. A general agreement between the parties pursuant to which tax is levied and paid, would not bind the assessee if the demand itself is not authorised by law. On the facts, however, we find that the levy and payment were not unauthorised. Therefore, the allegation of payment under a misconception of law is not supported by the materials on record. 14. Hence, upon a consideration of all the pros and cons of the matter, we do not find any substance or merit in the applications. The sales subsequent to June 1, 1987 are exempt. But there is the liability for the period prior to that and the notices relating to such periods are not liable to be quashed. There is no question of refund. 15. The applications, therefore, fail and are hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. P. C. BANERJI (Technical Member). - I agree. L. N. RAY (Judicial Member).- I agree. Applications dismissed.