THAKKER, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition is filed by the petitioner against the order passed by the State Government-respondent No. 1 herein on 12/12/1979 by which two increments of the petitioner without future effect are ordered to be stopped. ( 2 ) IT is the case of the petitioner that he was serving as an extra aval Karkoon in the Office of the Mamlatdar, Gandhinagar in the year 1970; that by virtue of his duty as an Aval Karkoon he has certified an entry in respect of land bearing Survey No. 203 of Village Valsad in Gandhinagar District on 11/06/1970. The petitioner certified an entry in respect of a new tenure land. He was informed by the Talati immediately thereafter that a proceeding regarding the breach of conditions of new tenure was pending against the petitioner and that notice to the tenant of the said land with respect to entry or certification thereof was not given. The petitioner thereupon erased and cancelled the endorsement by which he has certified the entry made by him after he was appraised of the above fact by the Talati. The said correction was made by the petitioner on the same day, i. e. , on 11/06/1970 in the Register. On 5/01/1977 a memorandum was issued to the petitioner by which two charges have been levelled against him alleging that he has committed misconduct in performance of his duties by tampering with the Government record and by making correction in the entry in the revenue record. The petitioner was, therefore, called upon to submit his explanation as to why any of the penalties specified in Rale 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") be not imposed on him. The petitioner submitted detailed reply on 11/03/1978 contending that the charges levelled against him were without foundation, that he had acted bona fide in making correction of mistake which was administrative in nature and there was no question of taking any disciplinary proceedings. It appears that the authorities were not satisfied about the explanation submitted by the petitioner and inquiry was instituted against the petitioner to enquire into the charges levelled against him. It appears that the authorities were not satisfied about the explanation submitted by the petitioner and inquiry was instituted against the petitioner to enquire into the charges levelled against him. The Enquiry Officer after examining the witnesses and considering the oral and documentary evidence produced before him submitted a report on 18/09/1979 and found that the charges levelled against the petitioner were not proved. In other words, the petitioner was exonerated from both the charges levelled against him by the enquiry Officer. The first respondent, however, differed and disagreed with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer but without issuing any notice to the petitioner and/or affording any opportunity of being heard reached a decision on 4/12/1979 and pased an order on 12/12/1979 which is impugned in the present petition stating therein that the Government did not agree with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer with regard to the charge no. 2 though it agreed with the findings regarding charge No. 1 and passed the impugned order directing that two annual increments of the petitioner without any future effect are stopped. ( 3 ) MR. H. B. Shah who appeared for the petitioner contended that the impugned order requires to be quashed and set aside inter alia on the grounds that; (i) it is violative of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as even though the petitioner was exonerated by the Enquiry Officer, the Government differed from the said findings and without giving any opportunity of being heard and without observing principles of natural justice held the petitioner guilty which cannot be done; (ii) that the reasons which are required to be recorded by the government have not been recorded. On both these grounds, the order requires to be quashed and set aside. ( 4 ) MISS Doshit who appeared on behalf of the respondent repudiated the above contentions by submitting that what is required to be done by the government is to follow the provisions of the Rules which has been done in the instant case. According to her, there is no question of violation of principles of natural justice de hors the provisions of the Rules and the contention of the petitioner is not well founded. Regarding recording of reasons, she has submitted that reasons have been recorded if decision taken by the Government on 4/12/1979 is properly perused. According to her, there is no question of violation of principles of natural justice de hors the provisions of the Rules and the contention of the petitioner is not well founded. Regarding recording of reasons, she has submitted that reasons have been recorded if decision taken by the Government on 4/12/1979 is properly perused. Therefore, even with regard to the second contention, the petitioner cannot succeed. ( 5 ) LOOKING to the decision of the Government, dated 4/12/1979, it clearly appears that the reasons have been recorded by the Government for disagreeing with the view taken by the Enquiry Officer and to come to an independent conclusion. To that extent the contention raised by Miss Doshit requires to be upheld, however, the wider and more important question is; whether the disciplinary authority can come to a different conclusion than the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer without giving an opportunity to the delinquent and without observing principles of natural justice ? ( 6 ) IT is the case of the petitioner which has not been controverted by the respondent, that after he was exonerated by the Enquiry Officer on 18/09/1979, he was neither issued any notice nor an opportunity of hearing was afforded to him by the disciplinary authoritythe government-before reaching to the final conclusion of guilt of December 4, 1979. It is the contention of the petitioner that the finding recorded by the disciplinary authority on 4/12/1979 without observing the principles of natural justice is contrary to law, ultra vires, null and void. In this connection, Advocates appearing for the parties drew my attention to certain judgments. Now it is well settled that where exercise of power results in civil consequences, unless the statute specifically rules out or excludes, the principles of natural justice would apply. It is not permissible to interpret any statutory instrument so as to exclude natural justice unless the language of the instrument leaves no option to the Court. In other words, procedural fairness embodying natural justice is implied whenever action is taken affecting the rights of the parties. As observed by Hegde, J. in the leading case of a. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1970 SC 150 principles of natural justice supplement the law of the land and do not supplant them. In other words, procedural fairness embodying natural justice is implied whenever action is taken affecting the rights of the parties. As observed by Hegde, J. in the leading case of a. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1970 SC 150 principles of natural justice supplement the law of the land and do not supplant them. If there is any statutory provision compelling the authorities to observe the principles of natural justice, those principles are required to be observed because it is legislative mandate, but even in absence of such a provision, there is always a presumption that those principles should be observed if the action which is sought to be taken adversely affects the rights of the parties. In the well known case of Olga Tellis v. Municipal Corporation of Bombay, reported in AIR 1986 SC 180 , the validity of Sec. 314 of the bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 was challenged inter alia on the ground that the said section which provides for removal of encroachment without notice was arbitrary and ultra vires Art. 14 of the constitution being violative of the principles of natural justice. The Supreme court was called upon to decide the constitutional validity of said provision and while upholding the constitutional validity of Sec. 314, the Court observed that there is no compulsion on the part of the Commissioner to remove encroachment without notice but the provision is merely an enabling one and unless there are extraordinary or exceptional circumstances, principles of natural justice should be observed. From the above judgment, it clearly appears that not only where there is no express provision for complying with the principles of natural justice that they are required to be followed, but even in cases where there is exclusion of such principles by legislative process, the approach of the Court would be to construe the legislative provisions by importing the principles of natural justice rather than excluding those principles in which case such a provision may be held to be arbitrary and unconstitutional being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 7 ) IT is also well settled that as far as possible, pre-decisional hearing should be afforded to the party. Only in exceptional cases of a compelling nature, the authorities may decide the matter by providing a post-decisional hearing. ( 7 ) IT is also well settled that as far as possible, pre-decisional hearing should be afforded to the party. Only in exceptional cases of a compelling nature, the authorities may decide the matter by providing a post-decisional hearing. Again, if the principles of natural justice are not observed, the decision is void ab initio and it is not necessary for the petitioner to establish that by such a decision prejudice has been caused to him. In S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, reported in AIR 1981 SC 136 , the Court has observed that "if ill comes from a person who has denied justice that person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. " ( 8 ) IT is not necessary to repeat theabove principles by multiplying the authorities. In the instant case, as stated above, the petitioner was exonerated by the Enquiry Officer and without issuing any notice, asking for any explanation or affording reasonable opportunity of being heard, the finding of guilt has been recorded by the disciplinary authority and the order was passed to that effect on 4/12/1979. Miss Doshit is right in contending that the provisions of the Rules have been followed. She has submitted that Rule 6 of the Rules provides for two types of penalties-minor penalties and major penalties. So far as the major penalties enumerated in Rule 6 (4) to (8) are concerned, detailed procedure as laid down in Rule 9 is required to be followed. However, such a procedure is not contemplated for minor penalties enumerated in Rule 6 (1) to (3 ). The instant case falls within Rule 6 (2) (withholding of increment ). Miss doshit, however, forgets the fact that the impugned order is consequential and is passed on the basis of the findings recorded by the Government on 4/12/1979. ( 9 ) IN Narayan Mishra v. State of Orissa, reported in 1969 (3) SLR 357 (SC) the Departmental Inquiry was instituted against the delinquent on several charges. The delinquent official was exonerated from some of the charges but found guilty of other charges. The disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and held the official guilty of the charges for which he was exonerated by the Enquiry Officer but no notice or opportunity was afforded to the delinquent official and the order of removal was passed. The disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and held the official guilty of the charges for which he was exonerated by the Enquiry Officer but no notice or opportunity was afforded to the delinquent official and the order of removal was passed. The said order was set aside being violative of the principles of natural justice. ( 10 ) ALMOST an identical question arose in the case of Mahesh Prakash v. Union of India in Special Civil Application No. 4362 of 1984 decided by S. L. Talati, J. , on 20/09/1984. There the petitioner was serving as an inspector in Railway Protection Force at Happa. A charge-sheet was issued against him and he was exonerated by the Enquiry Officer. The disciplinary authority issued a notice to the delinquent official to show cause as to why a particular punishment should not be imposed on him since he was found guilty. Thus, though for the purpose of quantum of punishments, a notice was issued and the official was asked to show cause what punishmnt could not be imposed on him, but before recording a finding that he was guilty, neither any notice was issued nor an opportunity was afforded. The second show cause notice was challenged in this Court contending that the notice was without power, authority and jurisdiction since before recording guilt, an opportunity ought to have been afforded to him. The said contention was upheld by this Court and the notice was ordered to be quashed and set aside. ( 11 ) I am of the opinion that the facts of the present case are identical and in the instant case also, the ratio laid down in Mahesh Prakashs case (supra) applies with equal force. Whether the procedure for imposing penalties laid down in the Rules is followed or not is immaterial because since prior to imposition of the penalty, an important stage had come, i. e. to decide whether there were sufficient grounds with the disciplinary authority to disagree with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. In my opinion, it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to observe the principles of natural justice and without observing those principles no finding of guilt can be recorded. In my opinion, it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to observe the principles of natural justice and without observing those principles no finding of guilt can be recorded. In that view of the matter, the impugned order passed by the respondent requires to be quashed and set aside being violative of the principles of natural justice and fair play. ( 12 ) IN the result the petitioner requires to be allowed and the order passed at Annexure a by the first respondent is hereby quashed and set aside. The petitioner would be entitled to all the benefits which otherwise he would have earned but for the impugned order. Mr. Shah, at this stage, prayed that in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case including the fact that the incident is of 1970 and the inquiry started before about 14 years that in the exercise of the extraordinary powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution. I may direct the respondent not to hold fresh enquiry against the petitioner. He has also submitted that apart from the fact that the petitioner was exonerated by the enquiry Officer, the allegations were also not serious inasmuch as even according to the Government, he had corrected the revenue record bona fide but he had no authority to do so. However, as a general rule, if there is violation of principles of natural justice, all subsequent proceedings from that stage are required to be quashed allowing the authorities to take an action in accordance with law and by observing those principles and I do not want to deviate from that normal rule. It is, however, for the Government to decide whether looking to the allegations as well as the delay which has been caused, it would be in the interest of justice to start proceedings afresh against the petitioner. ( 13 ) IN the result the petition is allowed and rule is made absolute to the above extent with no order as to costs. .