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Gauhati High Court · body

1990 DIGILAW 139 (GAU)

Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Indrajit Dutta Choudhury and Another

1990-07-10

B.P.SARAF

body1990
The only question of law involved in this second appeal is whether the provisions of section 80, Civil Procedure Code would apply to the Oil and Natural Gas Commission. The facts giving rise to this appeal are very brief. The respondent, as plaintiff, filed a suit in the Court of the Munsiff, Silchar against the Oil and Natural Gas Commission (shortly, 'the ONGC'). His case was that he was appointed as Assistant Grade III by the Joint Manager of the ONGC. He filed his joining report on 30. 10. 75, but he was not allowed to join and ultimately his appointment was cancelled by letter dated 2. 2. 76. Aggrieved thereby the plaintiff riled a suit for declaration that the cancellation of his appointment was illegal. The suit was contested by the ONGC on the ground, inter alia, that it was barred by limitation the same having been filed beyond three years from the date when the right to sue first accrued. The contention of the plaintiff was that he came to know about the cancellation of his appointment only on 2. 2. 76 and brought the suit on 2.4. 79 after service of notice under section 80 CPC on the defendants. His case was that the suit was governed by Article 59 of the Limitation Act and that the limitation began to run from the date of the knowledge of the cancellation of the appointment, which was 2. 2. 76. It was contended that the ONGC being a Government and defendant No. 2, the Joint Manager thereof being a Public Officer, in computing the period of limitation for the suit the period of notice under section 80 CPC has to be excluded, and if that was done the suit filed in the instant case on 2. 4.79 was just within time: The learned Munsiff held that ONGC was not Government and, as such, section 80 CPC notice was not necessary and, therefore, the question of exclusion of the ^period of such notice, as contemplated by section 19 of the Limitation Act did not arise. It was also held that the case was governed by Article 58 of the Limitation Act and, as the right to sue accrued on 31.10.75, the suit filed on 2. 4.79 being beyond the period of three years was barred by limitation. On appeal, the judgment of the learned Muasiff was reversed. It was also held that the case was governed by Article 58 of the Limitation Act and, as the right to sue accrued on 31.10.75, the suit filed on 2. 4.79 being beyond the period of three years was barred by limitation. On appeal, the judgment of the learned Muasiff was reversed. It was held the ONGC was Government and its employees are public servants and that section 80 CPC notice was necessary for filing a suit against the ONGC or its employees. It was also held that the case of the plaintiff was governed by Article 59 of the Limitation Act and so the limitation commenced from the date of knowledge of the Cancellation of the appointment which was 2. 2. 76. The suit filed on 2. 4. 79 was, therefore held to be within time after excluding the period of notice under section 80 CPC. The decision of the trial Court was reversed and the appeal allowed. The ONGC has filed this appeal against this appellate order. Its contention is that neither the ONGC is Government nor its employees are Public Officers within the meaning of clause (17) of section 2 of the CPC and, as such, the provision of section 80 CPC does not apply to a suit filed against the ONGC or its employees. Before 1 examine this legal issue, it may be expedient to mention that in the instant case even if the contention of the plaintiff that Article 59 applies and the limitation runs from the date of his knowledge of the letter of cancellation of appointment, which according to him was 2. 2. 76, the suit will be barred by limitation if notice under section 80 CPC is held to be not necessary because in that case exclusion of time under section 15 of the Limitation Act will not be available and the suit having been filed beyond 3 years from 2.2.76 will be barred by limitation. Section 80 CPC contemplates a notice in case of a suit against the Government or against a Public Officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such Public Officer in his official capacity. The first question is whether Oil and Natural Gas Commission is Government within the meaning of section 80 CPC. Section 80 CPC contemplates a notice in case of a suit against the Government or against a Public Officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such Public Officer in his official capacity. The first question is whether Oil and Natural Gas Commission is Government within the meaning of section 80 CPC. The Oil and Natural Gas Commission has been established under the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959 (hereinafter, referred to as 'the ONGC Act') as a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal. It was established for the development of petroleum resources and the production and sale of petroleum and petroleum products. Sub-section (2) of section 3 of the ONGC Act specifically provides that it shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to contract and shall by the said name sue and be sued. It is clear from the aforesaid provision that ONGC is a separate legal entity having a juristic personality capable of being sued as such. Therefore, a suit against the ONGC cannot be said to be a suit against the Government of India, and in that view of the matter section 80 (PC will have no application to a suit filed against ONGC. Learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. S. R. Bhattacharjee, however, submits that the ONGC being fully owned by the Government, it has to be treated as "Government" and relies in this connection on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh vs. Bhagatram, AIR 1975 SC 1331 . I have considered the submission. In Sukhdev Singh, supra, the Supreme Court interpreted Article 12 of the Constitution and it was in that context that it held that ONG3 was covered by the expression "other authorities" used in Article 12. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case did not hold that ONGC was "Government". The said decision, therefore, has no application to interpretation of section 80 CPC. I may now turn to the next point whether the Joint Manager of the ONGC is Public Officer within the meaning of section 80 CPC. A 'Public Officer' has been denned in clause (17) of section 2 of the C. P. C. and only persons specified in the said clause shall be deemed to be Public Officers for the purpose of CPC and none else. A 'Public Officer' has been denned in clause (17) of section 2 of the C. P. C. and only persons specified in the said clause shall be deemed to be Public Officers for the purpose of CPC and none else. From a reading of the various clauses of the said definition it is clear that officers of statutory corporations like ONGC are not covered by clause (17) of section 2 CPC. In that view of the matter the Joint Manager of the ONGC is not a Public Officer for the purpose of section 80 CPC. It may be observed that section 80 of the CPC speaks of 'Public Officer' as defined in clause (17) of section 2 to mean only the classes of officers specified therein which does not include the employees of a statutory corporation like ONGC. It should not be confused with 'public servant' as defined in section 21 of the Indian Penal Code which specifically means, inter alia, every person in the service of a corporation established by or under a Central or State Act or a Government Company. It is, therefore, clear that no notice under section 80 CPC was required for filing the present suit. In that view of the matter, the period of such notice cannot be excluded in computing the period of limitation. Admittedly the suit in the instant case was filed two months' after the expiry of three years' period of limitation computed from the date of knowledge of the order of cancellation of appoint­ment. It was, thus barred by limitation. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the learned first appellate Court was not correct in holding that the provision of section 80 CPC applied to the instant case that the suit was within time. The impugned appellate judgment dated 30. 3. 82 is, therefore, set aside. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The suit is barred by limitation. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, 1 make no order as to cost.