THAKKER, J. ( 1 ) A short but interesting question of law arises in the present petition as to whether the provisions of Sec. 27 of the Gujarat Rural Debtors relief Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") could be applicable in the present case. ( 2 ) THE short facts giving rise to the present petition are that the petitioner-Firm which was holding a licence of money-lending, advanced a loan of Rs. 6,000. 00 on 22/07/1975 to the first respondent who was Mochi by caste for the purpose of business of shoe-making at Jambusar. He executed a promissory note in favour of the petitioner-Firm, but did not repay the amount and the petitioner was constrained to file Civil Suit at jambusar wherein ultimately a compromise decree was passed on 10/08/1977 for Rs. 5,000. 00 which were required to be paid by the first respondent in four equal instalments of Rs. 1250. 00 each. The first respondent paid the first instalment of Rs. 1250. 00 on 1/06/1978 but * for a writ for quashing the order passed by the Debt Settlement Officer, Jambusar and confirmed by the Appellate Officer and District Refgistrar of Co-op. Socieities. (Only a part of the Judgment approved for reporting is published.) thereafter he did not pay amount. Meanwhile on March 9, he filed an application under Sec. 6 of the Act before the Debt Settlement Officer stating therein that he is a debtor within the meaning of Sec. 2 (d) of the Act and that he should be discharged from the payment of the debt. The Debt Settlement Officer, jambusar, District Bharuch vide his order dated 13/07/1979, allowed the application and held that the applicant-first respondent herein can be said to be rural Labourer within the meaning of the Act, and therefore, in accordance with the provision of the Act, the entire debt is required to be discharged. Against the said order the present petitioner preferred appeal before the Appellate Officer and District Registrar, Co-operative Societies (Rural Debts) being Appeal No. 1962 of 1979 and the Appellate Authority dismissed the said appeal and confirmed the order passed by the Debt Settlement Officer. The said order is challenged by filing the present petition. Mr. J. M. Patel, appearing for the petitioner mainly raised the two contentions. The said order is challenged by filing the present petition. Mr. J. M. Patel, appearing for the petitioner mainly raised the two contentions. Firstly, he has contended that the authorities below have committed error of law apparent on the face of the record in coming to the conclusion that the first respondent can be said to be rural Labourer within the meaning of the Act and the provision of the Act would be applicable to him. Secondly, he has contended that, in any case, even if the provisions of the Act are applicable to the instant case, the debt in question is exempted under Sec. 27 of the Act, and therefore, he is entitled to the payment and the order requires to be quashed and set aside. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. So far as the second contention is concerned, the relevant provision of sec. 27 of the Act reads as under : "27. Nothing in this Act shall affect the debts and other liabilities of any debtor falling under any of the following matters, namely :. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (h) any sum due from a debtor - (i) by way of price for goods, essential for the maintenance of the debtor and his wife, children and any other dependent residing with him,. . . . . . . . . . . . " 5. Mr. Patel contended that even if the provisions of the Act are applicable in case of the first respondent, the sum in question is due from him which is essential for the maintenance of the debtor as well as his family members, and therefore, the said debt can be said to be exempted and the first respondent is bound to pay the amount. I am afraid, I cannot accept the said contention raised by Mr. Patel. Looking to Sec. 27 (h) (i) quoted above, it is clear that the phrase on which the reliance is placed by Mr. Patel, cannot be read in isolation and ignoring the phrase which preceded it. I am afraid, I cannot accept the said contention raised by Mr. Patel. Looking to Sec. 27 (h) (i) quoted above, it is clear that the phrase on which the reliance is placed by Mr. Patel, cannot be read in isolation and ignoring the phrase which preceded it. Reading clause 8 (h) (i) as a whole, it becomes clear that it would apply only in a case wherein the sum is due from a debtor by way of price for goods essential for the maintenance of the debtor, his wife or family members. Thus, as per the legislative mandate, such debt must be by way of price of goods and for that purpose only. If the debt does not fall within the four corners of the said provision, there is no question of applicability of the clause. It is only when the above condition is satisfied that the next question arises whether such debt by way of price for goods is essential for the maintenance of the debtor and his family members. Therefore, the above clause cannot be pressed into service by a money-lender like the petitioner-Firm. It would apply only in case of price of goods and not in case of loan or advance. Therefore, even the said contention of Mr. Patel also cannot be accepted. 6. In view of my findings above, I do not find any substance in the petition. I, therefore, hold that there cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record committed by the authorities below which calls for my interference under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India and the petition requires to be dismissed. (Rest of the Judgment is not material for the Reports.) .