Judgment :- 1. Out of the 3 Original Petitions, only O.P.No.2984/88 survives for decision on merits and accordingly I am dealing with that as the main case. 2. Petitioner purchased a land in R.S.38/1 of Kodiyeri Village in 1978. When the purchase was made it was a paddy land. She reclaimed the land and started construction of a residential house. To the west of this property is situate an item of property owned by petitioner's husband in which he has constructed and is running a theatre called 'Pankaj Talkies'. Sree Jagannath Temple, which was established by Sree Narayana Guru in 1906, is situate a kilometre away from the petitioner's property. The above temple is managed by 4th respondent Yogam. The 5th respondent is the President of the Yogam. The petitioner alleges that the 5th respondent is the owner of a theatre situate nearby and that there is business rivalry between him and petitioner's husband as the establishment of Pankaj Theatre affected his cinema business. The 5th respondent started harassing the petitioner and her husband ever since the establishment of Pankaj Theatre by adopting various means. He persuaded the authorities to initiate proceedings under the Land Utilisation Order, but ultimately the Assistant Collector by his proceedings dated 18-2-1985 granted permission to the petitioner to construct buildings in the property. Accordingly she constructed a residential building and a row of shop buildings consisting of 5 shop rooms by the side of the Main Road. 3. As part of the festival in the Jagannath Temple, a Pallivetta (Royal Hunt) will be performed on the penultimate day of the festival every year. It will be performed at a place situate to the south of the petitioner's property. The deity will be taken out on an elephant in procession to the place where the Pallivetta is performed and the procession together with other rituals will take an hour. According to the petitioner there is no fixed route as such through which procession passes from the Main Road to the Thara where the Pallivetta is performed. After purchasing the proper by the petitioner left a passage of 10 feet wide on the eastern side of her property for access to the place to the south of her property where Pallivetta is usually performed. After purchasing the proper by the petitioner left a passage of 10 feet wide on the eastern side of her property for access to the place to the south of her property where Pallivetta is usually performed. But the 5th respondent in order to harass the petitioner insisted that the procession should be taken out through the western side of the petitioner's property and according to him it is through that portion the procession was passing from time immemorial. Petitioner filed O.S. No.33/83 before the Munsiffs Court, Tellicherry for a permanent injunction restraining respondents 4 and 5 and their men from entering the property and demolishing the compound wall from her property. The said suit was filed before the Pallivetta day in 1983. The 4th respondent-Yogam also filed a suit, O.S.No.315/53, for a declaration that the Sree Jagannatha Temple has an easementary right of way through the petitioner's property for taking out the Pallivetta procession. A person claiming to be a devotee of the temple filed O.S.No.370/88 for the very same declaration. There is a stiff fight between the petitioner and respondents 4 and 5 regarding the existence of the passage through the petitioner's property. Various interlocutory orders were passed by the trial court for the conduct of the Pallivetta procession every year, which were challenged before this Court and the Supreme Court. By 29-5-1985 the petitioner had completed the construction of the shop rooms, on which date the parties were directed to maintain 'status quo' as on that day. In the guise of the interim order 'by the District Court, respondents 4 and 5 even demolished a portion of the westernmost shop room and a hole was made in the southern wall through which the Pallivetta procession was taken out in one year as per the direction contained in an interim order passed by this Court. Ultimately the suits were decided in favour of the 4th respondent during the pendency of these Original Petitions by judgment and decree dated 29-1-1990. By the above decree the Munsiff, Tellicherry declared that Sree Jagannath Temple has acquired by prescription an easementary right of way to a width of 12 feet to take Pallivetta procession through the petitioner's property. Ultimately the suits were decided in favour of the 4th respondent during the pendency of these Original Petitions by judgment and decree dated 29-1-1990. By the above decree the Munsiff, Tellicherry declared that Sree Jagannath Temple has acquired by prescription an easementary right of way to a width of 12 feet to take Pallivetta procession through the petitioner's property. An injunction restraining the petitioner and her husband from interfering with the above right, and a mandatory injunction directing them to remove and demolish the shop rooms to the extent it blocks the 12 feet way on or before 20-2-1990 were also granted. Petitioner has filed an appeal against f the above decree and it is pending. 4. While the parties were pursuing their stiff light before the civil court, proceedings were initiated for acquiring the portion of the petitioner's property over which respondents 4 and 5 claimed a right of easement for the benefit of the Sree Jagannath Temple. On 11-5-1983 the President of the 4th respondent-Yogam submitted a requisition for acquisition of land measuring 2 cents belonging to the petitioner for providing passage to the place of Pallivetta, to the District Collector. It was forwarded to Tahsildar on 12-5-83 and a joint inspection was conducted by the Tahsildar and temple authorities. On measurement it was found that the, land necessary is 6.25 cents. So on 2-3-1984 a revised requisition was sent by the 4th respondent. When the petitioner came to know of the move of the 4th respondent, she objected to the same by filing a petition dated 2-6-83 stating that it is unnecessary and there is an alternate pathway. She was informed by a letter dated 17-11-1983 that she can raise all her objections after the publication of notice under S.3 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act. Subsequently a notification under S.3 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act was published on 24-4-1984 to which the petitioner filed her objections on 22-5-1984. An enquiry was conducted on 24-9-84. In the meantime, the petitioner had obtained I a stay of dispossession from the Government which was later vacated by order dated 24-10-1986. The petitioner challenged the validity of the Land Acquisition proceedings by filing O.P.No.9879/86 before this Court. Though originally the entire proceedings were stayed by this Court, later the stay order was modified and it was limited to passing of the award and dispossessing the petitioner. The petitioner challenged the validity of the Land Acquisition proceedings by filing O.P.No.9879/86 before this Court. Though originally the entire proceedings were stayed by this Court, later the stay order was modified and it was limited to passing of the award and dispossessing the petitioner. It was also made clear in the order that the petitioner will be entitled to raise whatever objections she wanted before the Land Acquisition Officer. In that a counter-affidavit was filed stating that the Government had accorded sanction under S.39 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, by Order dated 23-10-1986. Thereupon the petitioner filed an application for amending the Original Petition by adding a prayer to quash the same. But in spite of the modification of the stay order by this Court, no further steps were taken in pursuance to the notification under S.4. It is the admitted case of all parties that the above Land Acquisition proceedings lapsed as no declaration under S.6 of the Central Act was made within the period provided in the proviso thereto and that O.P.No.9879/86 has become infructuous. 5. Now we come to the third stage of the case. While matters stood as stated before, the petitioner was served with a notice dated 22-3-1988, under S.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which is the law now applicable in the State. In that notice it is stated that 0.0288 hectares of land in Sy.No.38/1 of Kodiyeri Village belonging to the petitioner "is needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose, to wit, for providing passage to Pallivetta procession of Sree Jagannath Temple, Tellicherry". The notice also mentions that the Board of Revenue in their order No.4193/88/LRC 4 dated 14-2-1988 has directed under S.17(4) of the Act that in view of the urgency of the case, the provisions of S.5A shall not apply to the case. The petitioner has produced the above notice as Ext.P15. Petitioner is challenging the Land Acquisition proceedings initiated by Ext.P15 in this O.P. mainly on the following grounds: (i) Ext. P15 is issued with mala fide intention to vindicate the animosity and vengeance of the 5th respondent against the petitioner and not for any public purpose. It is further intended to circumvent the order of this Court by which it was directed that the petitioner will be given an opportunity to file objections. P15 is issued with mala fide intention to vindicate the animosity and vengeance of the 5th respondent against the petitioner and not for any public purpose. It is further intended to circumvent the order of this Court by which it was directed that the petitioner will be given an opportunity to file objections. (ii) Sree Jagannath Temple and 4th respondent is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and is a company as defined in S.3(e) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is an admitted case (as could be seen from the counter-affidavit filed in O.P.9879/86) that the entire compensation is to be paid by the company and no portion of the compensation is paid out of public revenue or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. In these circumstances, the acquisition is not for a public purpose, but for a company. The acquisition in this case being for a company, such acquisition must be for one of the purposes mentioned in S.40 of the Land Acquisition Act. The purpose mentioned in Ext. P15 will not satisfy any of the requirements mentioned in that section. No previous consent of the appropriate Government or Board of Revenue is obtained as contemplated under S.39 of the Act. (iii) The acquisition in this case being for a company as defined in S.3(e) of the Act and not for a'public purpose', the invocation of the urgency provisions as provided for in S.17(4) of the Act is without jurisdiction and hence Ext.P15, the composite notification under S.4 read with S.17(4) of the Act is liable to be quashed. 6. Respondents 1 to 3 have filed a counter-affidavit in which it is admitted that the acquisition proceedings challenged in O.P. 9879/86 have lapsed. The fact that the whole compensation for the acquisition is to be paid by Sree Jagannath temple which is a company as defined in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is not disputed. It is further stated that in the previous acquisition proceedings, Government had, as per letter No.12753/ B2/86/RD dated 23-10-86 accorded sanction to proceed with the acquisition which is sufficient compliance with S.39 of the Land Acquisition Act. In the S.5A enquiry conducted by the Tahsildar in the previous proceedings, all the objections of the petitioner were considered and overruled. It is further stated that in the previous acquisition proceedings, Government had, as per letter No.12753/ B2/86/RD dated 23-10-86 accorded sanction to proceed with the acquisition which is sufficient compliance with S.39 of the Land Acquisition Act. In the S.5A enquiry conducted by the Tahsildar in the previous proceedings, all the objections of the petitioner were considered and overruled. In order to provide a pathway for the Pallivetta procession, the land proposed to be needed is absolutely necessary and it is a bona fide public purpose. Any change of route of the procession will wound the religious feelings, of the worshippers. The allegation that it was initiated due to the influence of the 5th respondent is denied and it is stated that the notification was issued after satisfying that it is necessary for a bona fide public purpose. The alternate route suggested by the petitioner cannot be made use of, since it is through the land proposed to be acquired that the procession passes traditionally. The urgency provision was invoked in order to make available the land to the temple authorities in March, 1988 when the Pallivetta procession had to take place. Now that the land could not be taken possession of within that time, any objection filed by the petitioner will be considered by the Land Acquisition Officer. 7. The 5th respondent has filed a counter-affidavit on his own behalf and on behalf of the 4th respondent-Yogam. He denied any personal animosity between him and the petitioner and according to him the suits were filed only to establish the easement right of the temple over the petitioner's property. He further alleged that the theatre belonging to his wife is situate 5 Kms away from Pankaj Theatre and in Tellicherry Municipality and there are two other theatres in between his wife's theatre and 'Pankaj Theatre'. He alleged that the pallivetta procession is being taken out through a particular portion of the petitioner's property traditionally for a long number of years and through a particular route which has not been changed from the very inception. The route if changed to suit the convenience of the petitioner will wound the religious feelings of thousands of devotees of the temple. In these circumstances, the alternate pathway will not serve any purpose which has only a width of 3 feet and not 10 feet as contended by the petitioner. The route if changed to suit the convenience of the petitioner will wound the religious feelings of thousands of devotees of the temple. In these circumstances, the alternate pathway will not serve any purpose which has only a width of 3 feet and not 10 feet as contended by the petitioner. The pendency of the suits will not affect the validity of acquisition proceedings, and they were initiated in furtherance of a public purpose, namely to have the Pallivetta procession conducted through the traditional route. In 1988 the urgency provisions were invoked in order to make available the land to the temple authorities before the Pallivetta day which fell in March, 1988. All the statutory requirements have been complied with and the O.P. is without any merit. 8. Before I proceed further, I wish to make it clear that the question as to whether the 4th respondent or the Sree Jagannath Temple has any easementary right over the petitioner's property is a matter to be governed by the decision of the civil court where it is pending and nothing mentioned in this judgment shall be taken as an expression of opinion by me on that dispute. 9. The question to be considered in this writ petition is as to whether the Land Acquisition proceedings initiated as per Ext.P15 notification under S.4 read with S.17(4) of the Act is in any way vitiated on any of the grounds alleged by the petitioner. The acquisition proceedings are governed by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Act 68/84 and by the Land Acquisition (Kerala) Amendment Act. Sree Jagannath Temple is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and therefore is a company as defined in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (See S.3(e)). The whole-compensation is to be paid by the company and no portion of it is paid out of public revenues or any fund controlled or managed by a local authority. The question as to whether acquisition of a land is for a public purpose or for a company is now well-settled by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court, starting from Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay (AIR 1960 SC 1203) and ending with R.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1962 SC 764 at 767). The question as to whether acquisition of a land is for a public purpose or for a company is now well-settled by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court, starting from Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay (AIR 1960 SC 1203) and ending with R.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1962 SC 764 at 767). The following dictum laid down in AIR 1962 SC 764 at 767 was quoted with approval by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. P. N. Talukdar (AIR 1965 SC 646):- "In one case, the notification under S.6 will say that the acquisition is for a public purpose, in the other case the notification will say that it is for a company. The proviso to S.6(1) shows that where the acquisition is for a public purpose, the compensation has to be paid wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. Where however the acquisition is for a company, the compensation would be paid wholly by the company. Though therefore this distinction is there where the acquisition is either for a public purpose or for a company, there is not a complete dichotomy between acquisitions for the two purposes and it cannot be maintained that where the acquisition is primarily for a company it must always be preceded by action under Part VII and compensation must always be paid wholly by the company. A third class of cases is possible where the acquisition may be primarily for a company but it may also be at the same time for a public purpose and the whole or part of the compensation may be paid out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by local authority. A third class of cases is possible where the acquisition may be primarily for a company but it may also be at the same time for a public purpose and the whole or part of the compensation may be paid out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by local authority. In such a case though the acquisition may look as if it is primarily for a company it will be covered by that part of S.6 which lays down that acquisition may be made for a public purpose if the whole or part of the compensation is to be paid out of the public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority." In the present case it is an admitted fact that the entire compensation for the acquisition is to be paid by the 4th respondent which is a company under the Land Acquisition Act and not out of public revenues as contemplated under the proviso. So it has to be held that the acquisition is for a company and not for a public purpose. If the acquisition is for the purpose of a company, it can be done only after complying with the provisions contained in Part VII of the Act, and the relevant Sections are S.39 to 42. 10. The contentions of counsel for the petitioner are mentioned in para.5 of the petition. I shall first consider the question as to whether the respondents have jurisdiction to dispense with the enquiry under S.SA if the acquisition is for a company. In this context it is relevant to quote the relevant provisions of the Act which give power to acquire land for a'public purpose' or for 'a company'. S.4(1) and 6(1) read as follows: "4. In this context it is relevant to quote the relevant provisions of the Act which give power to acquire land for a'public purpose' or for 'a company'. S.4(1) and 6(1) read as follows: "4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon.--(1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government or to the Board of Revenue or to the Collector that land in any locality in the State of Kerala or within the jurisdiction of the Collector is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the notification)." "6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose.--(1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate Government or the Board of Revenue is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under S.5-A, sub-sec.(2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders or of the Secretary of the Board of Revenue, as the case may be, and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under S.4, sub-sec.(1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under S.5 A, sub-sec.(2):" - (Underlining is mine) These Sections make it clear that there is a distinction between an acquisition for a public purpose and that for a company. It is also relevant to note the definition of public purpose given in the Land Acquisition Act before and after the 1984 Amendment. It is also relevant to note the definition of public purpose given in the Land Acquisition Act before and after the 1984 Amendment. Before the 1984 amendment the definition of public purpose as contained in S.3(f) was as follows: "(f) the expression "public purpose" includes the provision of village sites in districts in which the appropriate Government shall have declared by notification in the Official Gazette that it is customary for the Government to make such provision; " This definition was amended by the 1984 amendment and a wider inclusive definition was provided for in S.3(f). But it provides that it "does not include acquisition of land for Companies". From the amended definition it is clear that an acquisition for a company cannot be treated as one for a public purpose, and the distinction between the two types of acquisition is made very clear. 11. The power to dispense with an enquiry under S.SA is contained in S.17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act which gives power to the appropriate Government or the Board of Revenue in the cases of lands to which the provisions of sub-section (1) or subsection (2) are applicable, to direct that the provisions of S.SA shall not apply. It is clear from S.17(4) that only in the case of any land to which the provisions of sub-sections (1) or (2) of S.17 are applicable, the enquiry under S.5A can be dispensed with. S.17(2) is not relevant in the circumstances of this case. S.17(1) as amended by the 1984 amendment provides as follows:- "17. Special powers in cases of urgency.-(1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government or the District Collector so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in S.9, sub-sec.(1) take possession of any land needed for a public purpose. Such land shall 'thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances." (Underlining is mine) That sub-section authorises the appropriate Government or District Collector and gives power to take possession of any land needed for a public purpose in certain circumstances even before an award has been made. Significantly the authority can take possession only of any land needed for a public purpose under this sub-section. The words "of any land needed for a company" are absent in S.17(1). Significantly the authority can take possession only of any land needed for a public purpose under this sub-section. The words "of any land needed for a company" are absent in S.17(1). In this connection it is pertinent to note that before the 1984 amendment S.17(1) contained a provision for taking advance possession of any land which is needed for a company also. S.17(1) before the amendment read as follows:- "17. Special powers in cases of urgency.-(1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in S.9, sub-sec.(1), take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purposes or for a Company. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances." It can thus be seen that the words "needed for a company" were specifically omitted by the 1984 Amendment from which it is absolutely clear that S.17(1) will not be applicable if the acquisition is for a company. If an acquisition for a company will not come within the purview of S.17(1), it cannot come under S.17(4) also, for, S.17(4) authorises the appropriate authority to direct that the provisions of S.5 A shall not apply only in cases of lands to which sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of S.17 is applicable. As the acquisition in this case is for a company, S.17 (1) and (2) cannot apply and consequently the appropriate authority had no jurisdiction to invoke the power under S.17(4) and dispense with an enquiry under S.5A. In this view of the matter, Ext.P15 notification is liable to be quashed. 12. Counsel for the respondents contended before me that no fresh enquiry under S.40 or S.5A is necessary in this case as there is already a S.5A enquiry in the previous land acquisition proceedings and previous sanction of the Government was obtained under S.39 of the Land Acquisition Act. For reasons more than one, this contention cannot be accepted. First of all, the previous proceedings have admittedly lapsed by not issuing a S.6 declaration within the specified time. Acquisition proceedings have been started de novo and a fresh S.4 notification has been published. In such a case, before making a declaration under S.6, the provisions of S.40 or S.5A have to be complied with. First of all, the previous proceedings have admittedly lapsed by not issuing a S.6 declaration within the specified time. Acquisition proceedings have been started de novo and a fresh S.4 notification has been published. In such a case, before making a declaration under S.6, the provisions of S.40 or S.5A have to be complied with. When fresh proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act are initiated, all the formalities and legal requirements which are necessary under Law before making a declaration under S.6 have to be complied with. It is further clear from the counter-affidavit that before granting the previous sanction the petitioner was not given an opportunity to take part in the enquiry. The above view taken by me is supported by the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Chaturbhai (AIR 1975 SC 629) wherein in Para.18 and 20 in an identical situation their Lordships observed: "18. The Land Acquisition (Gujarat Unification and Amendment) Act, 1963 which amended S.39 of the Central Act enacted that the provisions of S.4 to 37 inclusive of the Act shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any Company, unless there is previous consent of the State Government or the Company shall have executed the agreement. On behalf of the State it was said that the agreement in the year 1961 would suffice. This is only to be stated to be rejected because the notification, under S.4 of the Act was cancelled by the State on 28 September, 1965. Thereafter fresh proceedings started. Further, the agreement in the year 1961 did not survive because a fresh agreement was made on 13 January, 1969, which was published on 18th January, 1969." "20. In the present case, the enquiry under R.4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules was held before the notifications under S.4 and 6 of the Act were issued in the year 1965. The enquiry pursuant to the notifications in the year 1961 and previous to the fresh notifications in 1965 is of no effect in law for two principal reasons. First, the 1961 notification was cancelled, and therefore, all steps taken thereunder became ineffective. The enquiry pursuant to the notifications in the year 1961 and previous to the fresh notifications in 1965 is of no effect in law for two principal reasons. First, the 1961 notification was cancelled, and therefore, all steps taken thereunder became ineffective. Second, the enquiry under R.4 in 1961 was held without giving opportunity to the landowner respondent, and, therefore, the enquiry is invalid in law." Moreover, from the counter-affidavit it is seen that the enquiry under S.5 A in the previous proceedings was conducted only to find out whether there was a public purpose or not and it was not an enquiry as contemplated under S.40 of the Act. For the aforesaid reasons, the previous sanction or the previous enquiry held under S.5 A in the previous proceedings cannot be a Substitute for the enquiry to be made before making a declaration under S.6 at present. 13. Counsel for the respondents contended that even if this Court finds that the invocation of the urgency clause is bad, it is not necessary that the whole notification must be quashed as it is a composite one under S.4 read with S.17(4). I cannot accept this contention. A notification merely under S.4 is different in its consequences from a notification coupled with S.17(4). If the notification is under S.4 alone, any person interested in any land will be entitled to object to the acquisition within 30 days from the date of publication of the notification and the notification will have to provide for the persons interested to file their objections. In this case, the notification being a composite one, no such provision is made and no opportunity is given to any interested persons to object to the acquisition. The form of the notification also will be different if it is solely under S.4 without invoking the provisions of S.17(4). In that view I have no hesitation to hold that Ext.P15 being a composite notification has to be quashed in whole and cannot be served as one under S.4 and another under S.17(4). As Ext.P15 is liable to be quashed on this sole ground, I am not expressing any opinion on the other contentions raised by the petitioner against Ext.P15. 14. The notification challenged in O.P.9879/86 has admittedly lapsed and therefore the Original Petition has become infructuous and it is not necessary to go into the merits of the same. As Ext.P15 is liable to be quashed on this sole ground, I am not expressing any opinion on the other contentions raised by the petitioner against Ext.P15. 14. The notification challenged in O.P.9879/86 has admittedly lapsed and therefore the Original Petition has become infructuous and it is not necessary to go into the merits of the same. It is accordingly dismissed as infructuous. 15. O.P.No.1468/88 is for granting immediate police protection to Pankaj Theatre and the shop rooms belonging to the petitioner, In R.S.38/1. But counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of the interim order passed in that case no further relief is necessary at present. Accordingly O.P.No.1468/88 is also dismissed as infructuous. 16. In the result, I allow O.P.No.2984/88 and quash Ext.P15 notification (dated 22-3-1988) under S.4 read with S.17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. There will be no order as to costs.