JUDGMENT T.N. Singh, J. 1. Appellant has been charged and convicted for murder of her two sons, Bhoopsingh aged 9 years and Chulli, aged 4 years. She has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life. 2. The occurrence took place on 12-7-1982 and in that regard F.I.R. was lodged by P.W. 1, Samanta, appellant's husband's elder brother. That we have carefully perused. Because, defence counsel, Shri G. K. Pandey, has drawn our attention to the evidence of D.Ws. 1 and 2, Ramnarayan and Mohan. Counsel has complained that prosecution did not discharge its duty justly and fairly and the trial Court has similarly defaulted. That submission is made because material is disclosed in the F.I.R. (Ex. P-2) and in the evidence of D.Ws. suggesting that the appellant was not a normal person. Whether she was insane or the occurrence took place during lucid interval was the question to which Court ought to have addressed itself but that has not been in this case. Prosecution's duty-lapse is more grave as in the very inception of investigation material had come in Ex. P-2 about abnormal behaviour and conduct of the appellant; instances galore have been cited in the F.I.R. itself that she was not a normal person. That she used to have severe fits of insanity from time to time flying into controllable rage are matters which are disclosed in the F.I.R. 3. We are required, however, to examine whether appellant is entitled to plead diminished liability and we appreciated assistance rendered by Shri Govind Singh, Government Advocate, in that regard. Counsel has read out passage from Modi's Medical Jurisprudence, 20th Edn. from pages 417 et seq., pinpointing at page 420. Modi has suggested cases and circumstances in which Explanation (1) of section 300, Indian Penal Code can be availed. Even in cases where the accused is not adjudged insane, the question to be considered is indeed of loss of "Power of self control" envisaged under Explanation (1) and that has to be examined with reference to circumstances of each case. 4. On perusing the F.I.R. we have got an inkling of the background of the mental status of the appellant at the time of occurrence. From time to time she used to leave the matrimonial home and such escapades case too frequent and protracted. Sometimes she used to decamp with valuables and cash and would not come back for days together. On perusing the F.I.R. we have got an inkling of the background of the mental status of the appellant at the time of occurrence. From time to time she used to leave the matrimonial home and such escapades case too frequent and protracted. Sometimes she used to decamp with valuables and cash and would not come back for days together. That is stated in the F.I.R. Lastly, before the occurrence, she had to be brought back from her parental home on 10-7-1982 by her husband and she was not at all happy with that. It is complained that she came alone and empty handed while her husband expected her to retrieve the lost money and articles which she had taken with her. He had also expected someone from paternal home to accompany her so that She could be tamed. None came; and nothing came with her. 5. There, was an interval of only single day between her return to home and the incident. She had come in the late night of 10-7-1982 and occurrence took place in the early morning of 12-7-1982. There is sufficient material to presume that she was agitated and she was not in normal and healthy state of mind. The occurrence also, as pictured in the F.I.R., puts up a bizarre scenario. There were persons at the site when the appellant lost the power of self control; when she was giving a bath to her three children, flying into fit of rage she threw all three of them into the nearby well from which water was drawn. We do not know why others including appellant's own mother-in-law and brother-in-law did nothing to obstruct her or otherwise rationalise the situation. The appellant is entitled to presumption in the facts and circumstances of the case that circumstancial compulsions were such which pointed to her loss of power of self control and those were related to her forced return from her paternal home. There is lawful justification for that plea to be entertained and allowed because of prosecution's failure and Court's ignorance of its own duty in regard to the materials which had already come on record before it, namely, Ex. P-2 and evidence of D.Ws. 1 and 2. 6. The conviction of the appellant under section 302, Indian Penal Code, in our view, is not sustainable in law. P-2 and evidence of D.Ws. 1 and 2. 6. The conviction of the appellant under section 302, Indian Penal Code, in our view, is not sustainable in law. We are not at all satisfied that the appellant acted voluntarily with the intention to cause such fatal injuries to the two deceased sons as would have caused their death. We have no evidence before us to suggest that the water in the well was so deep that the children would have drowned and there was no chance of recovery. At best the appellant can be held liable for culpable homicide and not amounting to murder. It has to be noted that of the three children thrown in the well one did survive. 7. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant under section 302, Indian Penal Code is set aside and she is convicted under section 304, Part I, Indian Penal Code. She has already suffered sentence of 7 1/2 years. In our view, that justified her being let out to enjoy liberty and accordingly, we. direct her to be set at liberty forthwith. The sentence is reduced to the period already undergone.