JUDGMENT P. C. Balakrishna Menon, C J.—The plaintiff appeals against the dismissal of his suit by the lower appellate court in reversal of the decree passed by the trial court. The suit is for recovery of Rs. 8,160 due under Ex. P-l pronote executed by the first defendant as power of attorney holder of Rattan Singh and others. Ex. P-l pronote is dated 10-6-1970 and was for a consideration of Rs, 6,000. The first defendant as power of attorney holder of the aforesaid Rattan Singh and others had executed a sale-deed Ex. P-2 conveying immovable property to defendants No. 2 to 8 for a consideration of Rs. 10,000. Out of the aforesaid consideration a sum of Rs. 6,000 was reserved with the vendee for discharge of the amount duo to the plaintiff under the pronote Ex. P-l. 2. The first defendant raised a contention that in executing the pronote he was acting as an agent of Rattan Singh and others and he is, therefore, not liable to discharge the debt. Defendants No. 2 to 8 raised a contention that the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree against them on the strength of Ex. P-l. 3. The principals on whose behalf the first defendant had executed the pronote are not parties to the suit. 4. The trial court granted a decree for recovery of the amount due under the pronote against the first defendant alone and the suit was dismissed as against defendants 2 to 8. In appeal by the first defendant the lower appellate Court has dismissed the suit in its entirety setting aside the decree against the first defendant passed by the trial court. 5. A reading of Ex P-l pronote clearly shows that the first defendant was acting as an agent of Rattan Singh and others and the borrowing was also on their behalf. The first defendant has not undertaken any personal liability for the discharge of the debt under the promissory note. As per section 230 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, an agent is not personally bound by the contract entered by him on behalf of the principal in the absence of a contract to the contrary. A contract to the contrary would be presumed only in such cases: 1. Where the contract was made by an agent for the sale or purchase of goods for a merchant resident abroad ; 2. A contract to the contrary would be presumed only in such cases: 1. Where the contract was made by an agent for the sale or purchase of goods for a merchant resident abroad ; 2. Where the agent does not disclose the name of his principal; and 3. Where the principal, though disclosed, cannot be sued. 6. The present case does not fall under any of the categories where a contract to the contrary can be presumed. The pronote discloses the names of the principals on whose behalf the amount is borrowed and the document is executed. The lower appellate court was, therefore, perfectly correct in holding that the first defendant is not personally liable under the pronote Ex. P-l. 7. There is no privity of contract or privity of estate between the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 8 They had by Ex. P-2 sale-deed in their favour executed by the first defendant as agent of Rattan Singh and others, undertaken to discharge the liability under Ex. P-l and they have committed default in regard to that undertaking. That would give rise to a cause of action by the principals of the first defendant to sue defendants 2 to 8, but the plaintiff who has neither privity of contract nor privity of estate with defendants 2 to 8, is not entitled to sue them for recovery of the amount due under the promissory note. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, I see no merit in this second appeal. It is accordingly dismissed, No costs. Appeal dismissed-