Judgment SATYESHWAR ROY, J. 1. Defendant is the appellant. The respondents filed the suit for eviction of the appellant from a building on the ground of default in paying the rent from April 1973. Prayer was also made for decree for arrear of rent. The suit was decreed by the trial Court. On appeal filed by the appellant the same was affirmed by the lower appellate Court. 2. At the time of admission of this appeal, the following substantial question of law was formulated : "Whether the finding of the Court below that as the appellant remitted the rent in advance, i.e. before it became due, he was defaulter in payment of rent within the meaning of law can be upheld." That was the only question which was pressed during the hearing of the appeal. 3. The default alleged was non-payment of rent from March, 1978 to May, 1978. Prayer was also made for eviction on the ground of personal necessity. The trial Court negatived the second ground. 4. On the question of default the appellant brought on record money order coupons and money order receipts. The case which was proved by the appellant was that the rent for the months of March, April, and May, 1978 was remitted on 4-4-1978. 5. The trial Court on the basis of the decision in Ujial Singh and Sons V/s. Rajendra Kr. Kedia; AIR 1986 Pat 162 , held that as the rent for April and May, 1978 had not become due on 4-4-1978, the respondents were entitled to refuse to accept the money order. It held that the appellant had become defaulter within the meaning of law for non-payment of rent from March, 1978 to May, 1978. This was confirmed by the lower appellate Court. 6. At the time of admission of the appeal, it was observed that the case of Ujjal Singh (supra) required re-consideration by a larger Bench. This appeal, therefore, was listed before a Division Bench. 7. From the judgment of Ujjal Singh (supra) it appeared that rent of June and July, 1966 was sent by money order in July and the landlord refused to accept the same. It was held by the learned Single Judge that the rent of July, 1966 had not become lawfully payable by the tenant to the landlord and the landlord was, therefore, entitled to refuse to accept the same. 8. It was held by the learned Single Judge that the rent of July, 1966 had not become lawfully payable by the tenant to the landlord and the landlord was, therefore, entitled to refuse to accept the same. 8. On behalf of the appellant, it was submitted that payment of rent in advance during the continuance of the tenancy was not prohibited under any of the sections of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977 (the Act) and, therefore, tender of rent by money order by the appellant for the months of April and May, in April, 1978 along with the rent of March, 1978 was a valid tender of rent. On behalf of the respondents with reference to Sec. 3 of the Act it was submitted that to receive rent for more than one month in advance is prohibited, and the respondents were entitled to refuse to accept the rent of April to May, 1978 sent by money order on 4-4-1978. So far rent of March, 1978 was concerned, as it was sent along with the rent of April and May. 1978, the respondents were not paid the rent for March, 1978 by the postal peon. 9. Relevant portion of Sec. 11(1)(d) of the Act reads as follows: "11. Eviction of tenants.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947) and to those of S.18 where a tenancy is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by the Court on one or more of the following grounds:- (a) to (c) ................ (d) where the amount of two months rents, lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by the contract or in the absence of such contract, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with sec. 16." Sec. 3 of the Act reads as follows:- "3. 16." Sec. 3 of the Act reads as follows:- "3. Premium, salami, fine or advance of more than one months rent not to be claimed or received.- It shall not be lawful for any person to claim or receive, in consideration of the grant, renewal or continuance of a tenancy of any building, the payment of any premium, salami, fine or any other like sum in addition to the rent or payment of any sum exceeding one months rent of such building as rent, in advance." 10 It was not in controversy between the parties that the respondents were entitled to remit the rent by money order and if the remittance was valid, they were not defaulters within the meaning of S.11(1)(d) of the Act. 11. It was not the case of either of the parties that one of the consideration for the continuance of the tenancy was that the tenant would pay in advance rent of more than one month. If rent is paid in advance for more than one month and received by the landlord, which payment and receipt are not condition for continuance of the tenancy, sec. 3 is not attracted. Whether Sec. 3 has been violated by a landlord will depend on the facts of each case. sec. 3 of the Act has been engrafted to protect a tenant from greedy landlord. In Mohd. Selimuddin V/s. Misri Lal, 1986 Pat LJR (SC) 13 : ( AIR 1986 SC 1019 ), it was observed by the Supreme Court with reference to Sec. 3 as follows:- "One cannot conceive of greater judicial sin of treating the oppressor and the oppressed on a part or that of rewarding the oppressor and punishing the oppressed whilst administering the law designed to protect the oppressed. We would be guilty of committing the sin if we uphold the view that the tenant who advances a loan to the landlord in order to secure the tenancy (in violation to the prohibition to do so embodied in the statute enacted for his benefit) is in pari delicto, and that the Court will not assist the tenant in claiming adjustment of the loan amount against the landlords claim for rent." 12. It cannot be held that tender of rent of April and May in April by the appellant was not a valid tender as it is prohibited under Sec. 3 of the Act; therefore, the respondents were not entitled to refuse to accept the money order. The learned single Judge in Ujwal Singh (supra) held that rent of July, 1978 was not "lawfully payable" in June, 1978 within the meaning of Sec. 11(1)(d) as it was not due. "Lawfully" in S.11(1)(d) means that the rent is not lawfully payable because it contravenes any provision of the Act and not because it has not become due. He further held that neither in S.11 (1)(d) nor in Sec. 13 of the Act enables a tenant to send rent in advance. The question is not whether the provisions of the Act gives the right to the tenant, it is whether there is any bar in law. No provision of the Act bars a tenant to pay rent in advance of more than a month, if that is not a consideration for continuance of the tenancy. The law laid down in Ujwal Singh (supra) cannot be said to be a good law and it is accordingly overruled. 13. It must, therefore, be held that tender of rent by the appellant by money order for March to May, 1978 in April was valid tender in law and the Courts below could not have passed the decree for his eviction. 14. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of both the Courts below are set aside and the suit is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 15. B.P. SINGH, J. :- I agree. Appeal allowed