Judgement JUDGMENT:- This is plaintiffs appeal against the judgment and decree dated 12-3-1976 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, West Tripura, Agartala whereby the plaintiffs appeal against the judgment and decree dated 22-6-1972 passed by the learned Munsiff, Khowai, West Tripura was dismissed. 2. The plaintiff-appellant had filed the suit for declaration of title and possession over the suit land as raiyat and for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from entering the land in suit, on the allegations that the plaintiffs father had taken korta settlement of the land about forty years back from the father of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 late Abani Dhar who was the tenant of the land and had paid rent regularly. After the death of Abani Dhar, the plaintiff continued to pay rent to the defendant No.3. The plaintiff was recorded as korfa (under raiyat) under the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 the raiyats, who had not applied for reservation of the land for their personal cultivation under Section 100(2) of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the plaintiff, the underraiyat, was extended the benefit under Section 120 of the Act and became raiyat. The defendants 2 and 3 in collusion with the defendant No.1 had not cleared the land revenue and the certificate proceeding was taken in which fraudulently and with material irregularity without the knowledge of the plaintiff auction sale was held and the defendant No.1 had obtained raiyat right of defendants Nos. 2 and 3. The plaintiff had challenged the said certificate proceedings but in the meanwhile the defendant No.1 had instituted proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure hereinafter referred as the Code which terminated with an order in favour of the defendant No.1. Hence the suit was filed. 3. The defendant No.1 contested the suit. It was denied that the plaintiffs father was a korfa and had acquired any rights in the land. It was pleaded that the land belonged to the father of the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 and on their failure to clear the land revenue their right was sold in auction and was purchased by the defendant No.1 who had obtained possession of the land. Subsequently there was proceeding under Section 145 of the Code which ended in his favour. 4. 2 and 3 and on their failure to clear the land revenue their right was sold in auction and was purchased by the defendant No.1 who had obtained possession of the land. Subsequently there was proceeding under Section 145 of the Code which ended in his favour. 4. The learned trial Court framed necessary issues and held that the plaintiff had been under-raiyat and became raiyat in the land in suit but it was also held that he was not in possession and accordingly under the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, the relief of declaration could not be granted. The suit was dismissed. In appeal by the plaintiff, the learned appellate Court below held that the plaintiff was never an under-raiyat and had not become raiyat of the land in suit. The appeal was dismissed. 5. Aggrieved, the plaintiff has come in appeal and Shri Deb Barma, his learned counsel, has strenuously, contended that in view of Ext. A-l the order dated 28-12-1966, passed by the Revenue Authority in proceeding under Section 120 of the Act; the plaintiff had acquired right as raiyat, and since no redress against the order was sought by the defendant No.1 who as party in the said proceeding, it had become final. The plaintiffs right as raiyat in the land was conclusively established and the finding of the learned appellate Court below to the contrary was perverse. Shri D. Biswas, learned counsel for the respondent, defendant No.l has submitted that the order Ext. A-1 was not conclusive on the question raised and that the finding of fact recorded by the learned appellate Court below on due consideration of the entire evidence produced by the parties including Ext. A-1, Ext. A-2, Khatian and Ext. A-3 copy of order in certificate proceeding produced by the plaintiff, could not be considered perverse or unsustainable and the question cannot be reopened in this second appeal. 6. I have considered the submissions, for the parties and the materials on record. 7. The finding of fact-recorded by the learned appellate Court below was that the plaintiff had no right in the land in suit and hence unless it could be shown to be perverse or untenable in evidence on record, it cannot The reopened in this second appeal. 8. The learned trial Court had on the basis of Ext. 7. The finding of fact-recorded by the learned appellate Court below was that the plaintiff had no right in the land in suit and hence unless it could be shown to be perverse or untenable in evidence on record, it cannot The reopened in this second appeal. 8. The learned trial Court had on the basis of Ext. A-1 held that the plaintiff had the right of raiyat, even though it said that the relevant documents were not produced and there was no explanation for their nonproduction. However, the presumption of correctness of Ext. A-1 was made on the basis of finding. The trial Court also held that the plaintiffs oral evidence on possession was not reliable and plaintiff was not in possession. 9. The learned appellate Court below has duly considered Exts. A-1, A-2 and A-3 the documents produced by the plaintiff and held that Ext. A-1 could not be considered to establish the right claimed by the plaintiff. The learned appellate Court below having considered the entire evidence produced, the finding could not be considered perverse. Whether the view taken was not tenable in law may be seen Ext. A-2 was prepared on the basis of Ext. A-1 which show that the Revenue Authority on 20-12-1966 had taken suo motu action which he could under the provision of Section 120 of the Act as if other requirements before action could be initiated, existed. The order Ext. A-1 dated 26-12-66, made under Section 126 of the Act, was not conclusive and final. There is nothing in the Act as may lead to the conclusion that the order so made was final and could not be questioned or rebutted. Shri Deb Barma, learned counsel for the appellant has referred to Sections 44, 46A and 188 to contend that the Civil Court could not go against the order Ext. A-1. No such contention appears to have been raised before the Courts below. However, in Section 44 in Chapter V Land Records contemplated exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities for preparation of record of rights on issue of notification for settlement operations and hence on its basis the order Ext. A-1 could not be considered final and conclusive. Section 46A of the Act by amendment made much after Ext. A-1 was passed, provided for maintenance of register of Bargaddars as defined in Section 2(b) also by amendment in 1974. Ext. A-1 could not be considered final and conclusive. Section 46A of the Act by amendment made much after Ext. A-1 was passed, provided for maintenance of register of Bargaddars as defined in Section 2(b) also by amendment in 1974. Ext. A-I therefore could, at best before the plaintiff only an order for record of rights and could be presumed to be correct but it is settled law that such presumption of correctness could be rebutted and there could be no conclusiveness or finality to it, like any entries in the record of rights. 10. The provisions of Section 188 provide " No suit or other proceeding shall, unless otherwise expressly provided in this Act, lie or be instituted in any civil Court with respect to any matter arising under and provided for by this Act." This provision does not in any manner help the plaintiff-appellant, who himself had filed the suit for declaration of his right as raiyat. 11. I have not found any provision on the basis of which view could be taken that Ext. A-1 was final and conclusive. The learned appellate Court below has considered the entire evidence including Ext. A-1 and accordingly it should not be said that the finding was unsustainable in evidence on record. 12. It may be noted that auction sale of the land in suit was held on 7-6-1966. The bid money was deposited on 7-6-66 Ext. B-5. The certificate of sale was issued to the defendant No.1 and order for delivery of possession Ext. B-6 was made on 15-12-66. The possession was delivered to the defendant No.1 on 16-1-67 as per Ext. B-7. It appears from the order Ext. B-9 that on 24-3-67 the plaintiff made an application for setting aside the sale, which prayer was rejected. On apprehension of breach of peace due to dispute over the land the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had made the order Ext. B-12 on 6-11-87 and the suit land was attached on 14-12-67 Ext.B-12(1). By order Ext. B-1 dated 17-9-68 the proceeding terminated in favour of the defendant No.1. The Sessions Judge had upheld the order. The plaintiff, therefore, had filed the suit. 13. The appellate Court below has considered the entire evidence and held that the plaintiff-appellant has no right as claimed. The finding of fact not being perverse and unsustainable in evidence on record cannot be reopened in second appeal. The Sessions Judge had upheld the order. The plaintiff, therefore, had filed the suit. 13. The appellate Court below has considered the entire evidence and held that the plaintiff-appellant has no right as claimed. The finding of fact not being perverse and unsustainable in evidence on record cannot be reopened in second appeal. The appeal is therefore dismissed. 14. Immediately after the judgment was delivered learned counsel for the appellant orally prays for leave to appeal to Supreme Court. In my opinion, no substantial question of law of general importance as may require to be considered by the Supreme Court is invalid. The prayer is rejected. Appeal dismissed.