Judgment :- 1. The petitioner herein is the respondent in O.P. No 2 of 1982. C.R.P. 4191 of 1981 arises out of the order passed in O.P. 2 of 1982. C.R.P. 4679 of 1984 arises out of the judgment and decree rendered in C.M.A. 4 of 1984. It remains to be seen that as against the order in O.P. 2 of 1982, the petitioner herein filed, an appeal C.M.A. 4 of 1984, before the District Judge, Pudukottai, but that was dismissed on the ground that the appeal is not maintainable. It is thereafter C.R.P. 4679 of 1984 was filed. Both these revisions arose out of the order passed in O.P. 2 of 1982. One Sheik Mohamed alias S. Mohamed filed an application under S. 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, praying to pass a decree in accordance with the award. In O.P. 2 of 1982 the case of the petitioner is as under. The respondent in the said petition is the elder brother of the petitioner. They owned properties in common as co-owners and after the death of their mother, the respondent was in manag-ment of all the properties. According to the petitioner, he was demanding partition and possession of his share but his brother was evasive and as such the petitioner complained about the matter to the important people of the place who were interested in the family. On their mediation, there was a reference to arbitration and both the petitioner and the respondent executed a muchilika on 17 8-1981, in favour of 11 arbitrators. The said arbitrators after taking statements from the parties and after examining them and other witnessess of the place, passed an award on 25-10-1981, effecting a division of the family properties and allotting the same seperately to each one of them. According to the petitioner, the award is fair and reasonable and has been passed without any bias. 2. In the petition, it is stated that the arbitrators called the respondent to appear before them on 27-101981 to sign the award but his brother did not turn up and this petitioner alone appeared. Meanwhile sincs the respondents wife issued a false notice charging them with mala fides , they intimated the fact of the passing of the award to the parties concerned by a notice dated 10-11-1981. It was received by the petitioner, in O P. 2 of 1984 on 12-11-1981. Meanwhile sincs the respondents wife issued a false notice charging them with mala fides , they intimated the fact of the passing of the award to the parties concerned by a notice dated 10-11-1981. It was received by the petitioner, in O P. 2 of 1984 on 12-11-1981. According to the petitioner the award passed is a valid one which is binding on the respondent. The award was also registered on 30-10-1981. A typed copy was handed over to the petitioner in O.P. 2 of 1982 on 27-10-1982. It is on the basis of these averments, the court passed the decree in terms of the award in O.P. 2 of 1982. 3. It is against this decree passed in O.P. 2 of 1982, both these revision petitions were filed by the petitioner herein. Before this Court, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the award passed by the Subordinate Judge, Pudukottai, is not sustainable in law since the judgment and decree passed in O.P. 2 of 1982 is barred by limitation. According to the learned counsel in view of the provisions contained in Art. 119 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the award should have been passed within 30 days from the date of service of the notice of the award. In the present case, the learned counsel pointed out that the award was passed on 25-10-1981, and the copy of the award was received by the respondent herein on 27-10 1981 and the same was registered on 31-101981. Tne arbitrators gave notice of passing of the award on 10-11-1981 and the notice was alleged to have been received by the respondent herein on 12 11-1981. The present O P. 2 of 1982 was filed on 4-12-1981 In the petition filed to pass a decree it was stated that since 12-12-1981 and 13 12-1981 happened to be holidays, this petition was filed on 14-12-1981 in time The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner herein contended that in any event, the decree passed by the Court below is out of time, since the copy of the award was received by the respondent herein on 27-10-1981 itself The learned counsel also pointed out that for having received the notice on 12-11-1981, no proof was filed. Even according to the respondent herein a typed copy of the award was said to have been handed over to him on 27-10 1981. Even according to the respondent herein a typed copy of the award was said to have been handed over to him on 27-10 1981. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner was not aware of the passing of the award at least even on that date, i.e, 27-10-1981. According to the learned counsel, if the notice was alleged to have been sent on 10-11 1981, normally it would have have reached one day after it was sent In that event the respondent herein would have received the copy of the award on 11-11-1981. In the notice dated 10-11-1981 issued to the respondent it is stated that a copy is also sent to the petitioner. For all these reasons, it was submitted that the decree passed by the lower court is out of time as per the provisions continued in Art 119 of the Limitation Act, 1963 In support of his contemn n, the learned connsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon a decision reported in Parasramka Commercial Co. v. Union of India , wherein the Supreme Court held that the notice need not be in the form of a separate a letter. It is sufficient if it is in writing and intimate clearly that the award has been made and signed. Another decision relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner was that reported in Nilakanda v. Kasinath 2 . In that decision, the Supreme Court held that when the Legislature used the word ‘notice’, it must be presumed to have borne in mind that it means not only a formal intimation but also an informal one. The learned counsel further submitted that when the decree passed is out off time, such a decree is not sustainable in view of the provisions contained in S. 3 of the Limitation Act 1963. In support of this contention the learned counsel relied upon a decision reported in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee . According to this decision, if the decree is passed after the prescribed period of limitation, such a decree is not sustainable. In support of this contention the learned counsel relied upon a decision reported in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee . According to this decision, if the decree is passed after the prescribed period of limitation, such a decree is not sustainable. Considering the facts that a true copy of the award was handed over to the respondent herein on 27-10-1982, and no evidence was adduced to show that the respondent herein received the copy of the award on 12-11 1981, in the light of the judicial pronouncements cited supra, I am of the opinion that the decree passed by the court below is out of time. In that view, of the matter, the judgment and decree rendered by the court below is set aside and the revision filed by the petitioner in C.R.P. 4191 of 1984 is allowed and consequently C.R.P 4679 for 1984 will become redundant and therefore dismissed as infructuous. 4. In the result C.R.P. 4191 of 1984 is allowed and C.R.P. 4679 of 1984 stands dismissed as infructuous. There will be no order as to costs. These revision petitions were disposed of on 9-2-1990 On being mentioned these revisions were again heard on 12 2-1990 The learned counsel Mr. G. Subramaniam appearing for the petitioner raised various contentions. But all those contentions are contrary to what is contained in the petition O.P. 2 of 1982. Therefore, those contentions are not acceptable. Accordingly, the order passed on 9-2-1990 will prevail without any modification.