JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - Aggrieved by the permission granted u/s 302 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Code') to the informant to engage a counsel of her choice to conduct the prosecution, the accused persons have filed this application for revision. 2. The said permission was granted in G.R. Case No. 121 of 1988 pending trial in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Berhampur. On the basis of First Information Report lodged by one Jyotirani Panda (opposite party No. 2, described also as 'informant'), alleging acts of cruelty and demand of dowry by her husband and in-laws, on 4-2-1988 in Baidyanathpur Police Station investigation was undertaken and charge-sheet against five persons (including the three Petitioners) was submitted u/s 498A/34, Indian Penal Code (in short 'IPC') and Sections 4 and 6A of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (in short the Dowry Act). After the charge-sheet was submitted, a petition was filed by the informant u/s 302 of the Code seeking permission of the Court to engage a counsel of her choice to prosecute the accused person Section Objections to the petition were filed by the accused persons and the Assistant Public Prosecutor resisting such prayer. The counsel for the parties and the Asst. Public Prosecutor were heard in the matter. On consideration of the rival contentions, the learned Magistrate allowed the petition granting permission to the informant to engage a counsel of her choice to conduct the prosecution. The same has been assailed here. 3. The main thrust of argument of learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners is that circumstances were not made out to warrant - grant of permission as done, particularly when the learned Magistrate has observed that the State is taking interest and no special ground is sought for by the Petitioner to invoke the discretionary power of the Court to induct a private counsel abdicating the Asst. Public. Prosecutor from his place. It is also contended that the power u/s 302 of the Code is to be sparingly used and unless compelling reason are indicated, such permission is not to be granted as a matter of course. On behalf of the informant (O.P. No. 2), it has been submitted that there has been a proper exercise of jurisdiction. Prosecutor from his place. It is also contended that the power u/s 302 of the Code is to be sparingly used and unless compelling reason are indicated, such permission is not to be granted as a matter of course. On behalf of the informant (O.P. No. 2), it has been submitted that there has been a proper exercise of jurisdiction. The discussions made by the learned trying Magistrate clearly indicate that the permission was granted after due consideration of all relevant material Section the points raised require careful consideration. At this stage it would be appropriate to quote the provisions of Sections 301 and 302 of the Code, which read as follows: 301. Appearance by Public Prosecutor. (1) The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case may appear and plead without any written authority before any Court in which that case is under inquiry, trial or appeal. (2) If in any such case any private person instructs a pleader to prosecute any person in any Court, the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case shall conduct the prosecution, and the pleader so instructed shall act therein under the directions of the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, and may "with the permission of the Court, submit written arguments after" the evidence is closed in the case. 302. Permission to conduct prosecution. (1) Any Magistrate inquiring into or trying a case may permit the prosecution to be conducted by any person other than a police officer below the rank of Inspector, but no person, other than the Advocate General, or Government Advocate or a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, shall be entitled to do so without such permission: Provided that no police officer shall be permitted to conduct the prosecution if he has taken any part in the investigation into the offence with respect to which the accused is being prosecuted. (2) Any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader. Section 301 relates to appearance by Public Prosecutor, while Section 302 deals with permission to conduct prosecution. (2) Any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader. Section 301 relates to appearance by Public Prosecutor, while Section 302 deals with permission to conduct prosecution. The underlying object of enacting Section 301 appears to be that when the State undertakes a case, the rights of the complainant become subordinate to that of the State, so that the counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant has no right of audience, unless permitted in that behalf by the Public Prosecutor appearing for the State. With the permission of the Court he may submit written arguments to the Court, irrespective of arguments of the Public-Prosecutor or his consent in this behalf. While Section 301(2) lays down that a lawyer engaged by the complainant can only act under the directions of the Public Prosecutor, Section 302 empowers the Magistrate to permit not only the complainant himself or his lawyer but also any other person, subject to the exceptions specified to be in independent charge of the case. This was the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another. It may be indicated here that a prosecution conducted by a counsel engaged and briefed by the complainant informant, and not by the Public Prosecutor, has to be held as violative of Section 225 of the Code, if it relates to a trial before the Court of Session. It is clear from Sections 24 and 301 that a pleader privately engaged cannot plead although he can act under the directions of the Public Prosecutor u/s 301. Section 2(u) indicates that the expression 'Public Prosecutor' means any person appointed u/s 24 and includes any person acting under the directions of the Public Prosecutor Section 2(u) read with Section 301 eads to the inevitable conclusion that any person engaged and briefed by a private person to instruct the Public Prosecutor can only so instruct and act under the directions of the Public Prosecutor while the Prosecution shall be conducted by the Public Prosecution himself. The pleader is to act under directions of the Public Prosecutor and is not entitled to conduct. the prosecution in preference to the Public Prosecutor. The pleader is to act under directions of the Public Prosecutor and is not entitled to conduct. the prosecution in preference to the Public Prosecutor. The provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 302 are wide enough to empower a trying Magistrate to permit any person to conduct the prosecution but such permission is not to be granted indiscriminately and discretion has to be exercised after considering the relevant circumstances of the case. An advocate privately engaged to-represent the complainant should have no other place than that of one strictly subordinate to the officer who prosecutes on behalf of the State, for the State stands not necessarily for a conviction, but for justice. As indicated above, the provisions of Section 302(1) are wide enough to empower the trying Magistrate to permit any person to conduct the prosecution, but a question may arise whether any person who is an absolute stranger and has no connection in the remotest degree with the prosecution can be permitted to do so. That is where the Court's responsibility to exercise the power conferred judiciously comes into play. 4. Judged in this background, it is to be seen whether the learned Magistrate has exercised her jurisdiction after due consideration of the relevant materials. She has assigned some reasons for grant of permission. Though she has observed that the State was taking proper interest and no specific ground to invoke the discretionary powers has been assigned, it is neither a case of absolute absence of reasons in support of the learned Magistrate's conclusion. Insufficiency of reason is not always a ground for interference while exercising the revisional jurisdiction. In an appropriate clause even though there is an error of law interference is not to be made unless it has occasioned a failure of justice. (See Mahendra Pratap Singh Vs. Sarju Singh and Another Pranab Kumar Mitra Vs. The State of West Bengal and Another, ). While in an appeal the Appellant has a statutary right to demand adjudication in revision the Petitioner can merely bring the matter to the notice of the Court which may not interfere unless there has been substantial injustice. The broad consideration for interference in the revisional jurisdiction is to ensure that justice is done, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Mahendra (supra). The broad consideration for interference in the revisional jurisdiction is to ensure that justice is done, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Mahendra (supra). The trial Court has endorsed the faith of the informant that her interest, would be best served if the prosecution is conducted by a lawyer of her choice. The State has not, questioned the correctness of the impugned order and no material has been placed before me by the Petitioner to show as to how they are prejudiced by the order. The order impugned does not suffer from any manifest illegal exercise of jurisdiction, and this is not a case of flagrant miscarriage of justice to warrant interference. The revision is accordingly dismissed. Revision dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed