KIRPAL, J. (Oral. ). ( 1 ) AFTER the promulgation of Delhi Rentcontrol (Amendment) Act, 1988 whereby some provisions wereincorporated into the Delhi Rent Control Act, this is the second round of litigation which has come up before this Bench. In an earlier case of Shri B. M. Chanana Vs. Union of Indiaand Others; 1989 (4) Delhi Lawyer 246, (1) we had decided thevalidity of Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D as well as interpretedsection 14-C of the Act. The present bunch of writ petitionswhich ha? come up for hearing before us again pertains to thesame provisions. ( 2 ) THE present writ petition deals with the vires and the interpretation of Section 14-D of the Act. As there were a numberof writ petitions pending in this court and in view of the factthat a lerge number of litigants were likely to be affected wepermitted various counsels who so desired, to appear and addressarguments on all facts with regard to the interpretation and validity of the said provisions. ( 3 ) FOR the purpose of appreciating various issues which areinvolved with regard to the interpretation of Section 14-D ofthe Act it is necessary to, by way of illustration, refer to the factsof the prevent writ petition. ( 4 ) THE peitioner is the tenant in respect of a residentialhouse of which respondent No. 3 is the landlady The premi-ses in question at Delhi, which were tenanted to the petitioner,were let out to hiir. by the landlady s husband on 11-2-1976. According to the averments made in the writ petition the husband of respondent No. 3 died on 24-7-1977 and thereafter therespondent No. 3 became the landlady. It is contended thatthe landlady has been residing at Jaipur alongwith her husband and, now, with her son. It appears that respondent No. 3had filed a petition for eviction of the petitioner under Section 14 (1) (e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, before the Additionalrent Controller, Delhi. The ground for filing tile eviction petition was that the landlady wanted to shift to Delhi from Jaipur. Vide order dated 5-5-1987 the Additional Rent Controllerdismissed the eviction petition inter alia holding that the landlady was permanently settled at Jaipur where she owns her ownhouse and that her contention that she wanted to live in thesuit premises was not true and the intention of the landlady appeared to be only to enhance the rate of rent. Vide order dated 5-5-1987 the Additional Rent Controllerdismissed the eviction petition inter alia holding that the landlady was permanently settled at Jaipur where she owns her ownhouse and that her contention that she wanted to live in thesuit premises was not true and the intention of the landlady appeared to be only to enhance the rate of rent. No appeal againstthe said dismissal of the eviction petition is stated to have beenfiled. ( 5 ) AFTER the promulgation of the Amendment Act the landlady filed a fresh petition under Section-14d read with Section25-Q of Delhi Rent Control Act. In this petition it was interalia stated that the premises in question had been let out tothe petitioner herein for residential purposes and that her husband had expired on 24-7-1977 and the widow required thetenanted permises for her own residence and she wanted tolive in Delhi and she had no other house in Delhi. ( 6 ) AFTER the summons were issued an application was filedby the petitioner herein praying for leave to defend the eviction petition. It was inter alia contended that the land ladywanted to increase the rent, secondly she did not bonafiderequire the premises in question. It was also submitted that thepremises in question were let for residential-cum-commercialpurpose and. therefore, the petition under Section 14-D was notmaintainable. ( 7 ) THE Additional Rent Controller vide his order dated25-8-1989 came to the conclusion that no triable issue had beenraised by the petitioner. He was of the view that it was notnecessary to consider whether the premises were bonafide required by the landlady or not because Section 14-D did notuse the word bonafide . With regard to the dismissal of theearlier petition the Additional Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the two provisions i. e. Section 14 (l) (e) and Sec. tion 14-D were separate and gave rise to independent causesof action and therefore the dismissal of the earlier applicationunder Section 14 (1 ) (e) was not relevant. He was of the opinion that the only requirement of Section 14-D was to see thatthe landlady must be a widow and that the premises must havebeen let out by her and thirdly they must be needed by her forher own residence. He also came to the conclusion that it washighly improbable to believe that the landlady would not shiftto Delhi. He also came to the conclusion that it washighly improbable to believe that the landlady would not shiftto Delhi. With regard to the nature of the premises the Additional Rent Controller held that even if the premises ware letfor residential-cum-commercial purpose Section 14-D wouldstill be applicable. Leave to defend having been refused anorder of eviction was passed against the petitioner. ( 8 ) THE petitioner has, in this writ petition, as already indicated herein above, sought to challenge the validity of Section14-D and has also raised a number of contentions with regardto the correct interpretation of the said provision. While dealing with this provision we have also had the benefit of arguments of other counsel who are appearing in similar writ petitions involving the interpretation of Section 14-D. We proposeto deal with all the major conventions, raised by various counsel. in this judgment ( 9 ) WITH regard to the validity of Section 14-D the matterstands concluded by the afoseraid judgment in B. M. Chanana scase (supra ). While construing Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-Dthis court held that, like Sections 14-A, 14-B and 14-C the provisions of Section 14-D were not violative of Article 14 of theconstitution. After referring to the object for which the saidprovisions were incorporated in Delhi Rent Control Act it washeld that a reasonable classification had been made having anintelligible defferertia with relation to the object sought to beachieved. It was contended in Chanana s case that Section 14-Cdid not contain any guidline and was vague and was therefore. liable to be struck down. This court referred to the dicision ofmadhya Pradesh High Court in the case of B. Johnson v. C. S. Naidu ( AIR 1986 MP 72 ) (2) Which dealt with a similar provision contained in the Madhya Pradesh Rent Control Act andalso to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Winfred Rossvs. Ivy Fonesca; ( AIR 1984 SC 458 ) (3) and Shivram Anandshroor v. Radhabai Shantaram; (1984) (1) RCR 599) (4) andcome to the conclusion that the said provisions were valid. ( 10 ) SECTION 14-D was not interpreted in B. M. Chanana scase (supra) and therefore, it has been contended before usthat Section 14-D does not contain any guideline, and thereforethe same should be struck down. ( 10 ) SECTION 14-D was not interpreted in B. M. Chanana scase (supra) and therefore, it has been contended before usthat Section 14-D does not contain any guideline, and thereforethe same should be struck down. In this connection it is submitted that whereas in Sections 14-B and 14-C there is a period oflimitation prescribed within which an application for eviction canbe filed. Section 14-D on the other hand, does not provide forany period of limitation and unless Section 14-D is read downthe validity of the same ought not to be upheld. ( 11 ) RELYING upon the decision of the Supreme Court in thecase of Trilok Chand v. H. B. Munshi; (1969) 2 SCR 824 (5),it was submitted that on the ground of laches the court can evenrefuse to grant relief where there is a violation of fundamental rights and therefore, on the ground of delay norelief should be granted under Section 14-D. According to the learned counsel the right to file an applicationunder Section 14-D arose with the landlady becoming a widowand her requiring the premises in question. If a person had become a widow a number of years ago and she sleeps over herright then she should not be permitted to take advantage ofsection 14-D and file an application for eviction on the groundthat she requires the premises for herself. ( 12 ) THE provisions of Section 14-D, according to learned (founsel for the petitioner, are stated to be analogous to Section14 (l) (e ). Assuming this to be so, though presently we will haveto examine the correctness of this submission, even under Section 14 (l) (e) there is no period of limitation prescribed for alandlord to file an application for ejectment. The right to filean application under Section 14-D arises in case of a widow notbecause of the death of her husband but arises as and whenthere is a requirement for the house in question. In other words,the cause of action which would enable a widow to file an applicationunder Section 14-D is not her widowhood but is herrequirement for the house. If the landlady requires the premisesfor her own residence and if she fulfils the other conditions contained in Section 14-D and she happens to be a widow then thelaw provides that she can take recourse to Section 14-D insteadof filing an application under Section 14 (l) (e ). If the landlady requires the premisesfor her own residence and if she fulfils the other conditions contained in Section 14-D and she happens to be a widow then thelaw provides that she can take recourse to Section 14-D insteadof filing an application under Section 14 (l) (e ). The requirement of the premises may arise immediately after a person becomes a widow or may arise after a number of years. Merelybecause application has been filed tor ejectment under Section14-D long after a person has become a widow cannot be aground for holding that the application is belated. Furthermore,the mere fact that such an application dan be filed long aftera person has become a widow cannot be a valid reason forholding that Section 14-D is ultravires. As we have already observed, just as in Section 14 (l) (e) there is no time limit prescribed similarly in Section 14-D also no period of limitation hasbeen prescribed and the landlady is entitled to move an application under that provision as and when she requires the premises for her residence. ( 13 ) ON the interpretation of Section 14-D it was firstly submitted that the said provision applies only in a case where thelandlady is not 3 widow at the time when the premises hadbeen let out to the tenant. In order to examine this it is necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 14-D. The said provision is as under :- SECTION 14-D : "right to recover immediate possession of premises toaccrue to a widow- (1) Where the landlord is a widow and the premiseslet out by her, or by her husband, are requiredby her for her own residence, she may applyto the Controller for recovering the immediatepossession of such premises. (2) Where the landlord referred to in sub-section (1)has let out more than one premises, it shall beopen to her to make an application under that sub-section in respect of any one of the premises chosen by her. " IT was submitted by Shri Sehgal and Shri Sawhney on behalfof the respondents, that there is no need to read Section 14-Din a manner other than in which it is stated. The Section neednot be read up or read down. " IT was submitted by Shri Sehgal and Shri Sawhney on behalfof the respondents, that there is no need to read Section 14-Din a manner other than in which it is stated. The Section neednot be read up or read down. The contention of the learnedcounsel was that Section 14-D does not state that the premisesshould have been let out only when the husband was alive Thepremises could have been let out by the widow herself or couldhave been let out by her husband when he was alive. ( 14 ) IN our opinion Section 14-D can apply to only such acase where the premises were let out at the time when the husband of the landlady was alive. If the contention of Mr. Sehgaland Mr. Sahni is correct it would not have been necessary touse the words let out by her, or by her husband in Sec. 14-D. The contention of these counsel essentially would have the effectof taking the cases of widow landladies out of the purview ofsection 14-D. This was certainly not the intention of thelegislature. The intention of the Legislature was that with aview to give benefit to certain class of persons special provisionshould be enacted and this was done with the promulgationof Sections 14-B, 14-C, and 14-D. While interpreting Section14-C we had, in Chanana s case (supra), come to the conclusion that Section 14-C will apply where the premises have beenlet out by a Government employee prior to his retirement andnot after he had retired. Similarly Section 14-13 would applyto a case where the premises have been let out prior to the landlady becoming a widow, and not thereafter. The reason forthis is obvious. The landlady may suddenly become a widowand may have urgent need for the premises in question. Itwas, therefore, necessary to provide for a situation wherespeedy relief can be granted. The use of the expression immediate possession in Section 14-D clearly indicates that the saidprovision is to apply where the widow is in urgent need of premises for her residence. When an unexpected event like thedeath of her husband occurs, a need for residence may ariseimmediately or after sometime. Section 14-D is meant to caterto such situations where such a need arises. When an unexpected event like thedeath of her husband occurs, a need for residence may ariseimmediately or after sometime. Section 14-D is meant to caterto such situations where such a need arises. On the otherhand when a widow lets out the premises after the death of herhusband, she is aware that her right to get back the premiseswill depend upon her being able to bring about a successfulaction under Section 14 of the Act. If she bonafide requiresthe premises she will have to apply under Section l4 (l) (e ). Therefore, it is not as if a widow, who requires the premisesfor her residence after they had been let out by her after herhusband s death, is without any remedy. Ths remedy of sucha widow is not under Section 14-D but is Section l4 (l) (e ). The provision of Sub-Section (2) of Section 14-D also seemsto indicate that the right which was to be exercised under Section 14-D was meant to be exercised only once. Under subsection (1) she has to choose, it she has let out more than onepremises, as to which premises she wants. Once that option. has been exercised her right to invoke Section 14-D wouldcome to an end. If. on the other hand, the contention of Shrisehgal is accepted and it is held that Section 14-D applies to. a widow who lets out the premises even after she becomes awidow then it would mean that Section 14 (2) cannot be giveneffect to. That could certainly not be the intention of thelegislature. Once; in a life time chance was given to the landladies falling under Section 14-D and it is evident from Section14 (2) of the Act. ( 15 ) OUT attention was also drawn to the decision of a Singlebench Judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in thecase of Radhabai V. Arjundas; ( AIR 1989 MP 73 ) (6) insupport of the contention that a similar provision in the Madhyapradesh Act to Section 14-D of the Delhi Act applied evenwhere the premises were let out by a widow after she had become a widow. In that case the learned Single Judge came tothe conclusion that the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Actwere meant for widows and no distinction could be drawn withreference to the tenancy in question being prior or subsequentto her widowhood. In that case the learned Single Judge came tothe conclusion that the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Actwere meant for widows and no distinction could be drawn withreference to the tenancy in question being prior or subsequentto her widowhood. We, however, find ourselves unable toagree with this conclusion firstly because the judgment does notgive any reason for coming to the aforesaid conclusion andsecondly because, in our opinion. Section 14-D is analogousto Section 14-C and just as the premises had to be let out bythe landlord when he was in government service, for Section14-C to apply, similarly Section 14-D was meant for those caseswhere the premise? had been let out when I he husband of thewidow was alive. ( 16 ) IT was then contended that the word required in Section 14-D should be construed as bonafide required by thelandlady. In support of this a reference was made to Section14 (l) (e) in which this expression appears. Section 14 (l) (e)reads as follows :- SECTION 14 (1) (e) : "that the premises let for residential purposes are required bone fide by the landlord for occupation asa residence for himself or for any member of hisfamily dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord such person hasno other reasonably suitable residential accommodation;" ( 17 ) THE Legislature, when it enacted Section 14-D, wasaware of the provisions of Section 14 (l) (e ). We find it difficult to accept that Section 14-D should be so construed so asif it incorporate therein the provisions of Section 14 (l) (e ). This, in fact, would be the result if the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners are accepted, It was submittedbefore us that in order to invoke the provisions of Section 14-Dnot only should the premises be required bonafide but the landlady should also be the owner of the premises and the premisesshould be such which were let only for residential purposes. ( 18 ) PROVISIONS of Section 14 (l) (e) can be invoked successfully if the landlord is able to show as follows :- (1) Premises were let for residential purposes; (2) The premises are required bonafide by him foroccupation as a residence for himself or any member of the family dependent on him; (3) He is the owner thereof, or the premises are required for the benefit of the person for whom the landlord is holding the premises; and (4) That the landlord has no other suitable residentialaccommodation. WHEN we examine Section 14-D we find that the word bona fide is missing. Similarly Section 14-D does not state thatthe premises should have been let for residential purpose. Alsoabsent in Section 14-D is the requirement that the landlordshould be the owner of the premises or that he has no otherreasonably suitable residential accommodation. There is forcein the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents thatwhen there is a different language used in the same Statute thecourt ought to presume that the intention of the Legislaturewas that the piovisions of Section 14-D were not to be construed in the manner in which Section 14 has been interpreted. It was submitted by Shri Chandiok that the heading of Section25-B states that the special procedure prescribed by Chapteriii-A is for application for eviction on the ground of bonafiderequirement. It was, therefore, contended that the word required in Section 14-D must mean bonafide requirement. Weare unable to agree with this -Submission. Section 25-B (1)privides for application under Section 14-A, 14-B, 14-C and14-D to be filed in accordance with the procedure specified inthe said Section. Merely because in the heading of Section25-B the word bonafide requirement has been specified doesnot mean that this word has to be read into Section 14-D. Unless we are compelled to, no words should be added to orsubtracted from the substantive provision like Section 14-D. To add the words bonafide required in Section 14-D would betrying to make the provisions of Section 14-D similar to Section14 (l) (e ). This was certainly not the intention of the Legislature. ( 19 ) EVEN if the word bonafide is not used in Section 14-Dthe question would still arise as to what is the meaning of theword required . In the case of Bega Begum Vs. This was certainly not the intention of the Legislature. ( 19 ) EVEN if the word bonafide is not used in Section 14-Dthe question would still arise as to what is the meaning of theword required . In the case of Bega Begum Vs. Abdul Ahadkhan; ( AIR 1979 SC 272 ) (7), the words reasonable requirement occurring in Jandk Houses and Shops Rent Control Actwas being construed. It was held by the Supreme Court thatthe use of these words undoubtedly postulated that there mustbe an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. In this connection the Supreme Court held as under :- "the distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make eventhe genuine need as nothing but a desire as thehigh Court has done in this case. It seems to usthat the connotation of the term need or requirement should not be artificially extended nor itslanguage so unduly stretched or strained so as tomake it impossible or extremely difficult for thelandlord to get a decree for eviction. Such acourse would defeat the very purpose of the Actwhich affords the facility of eviction of the tenantto the landlord on certain specified grounds. Thisappears to us to be the general scheme of all therent Control Acts, prevalent in other States in thecountry. This Court has considered the import ofthe word requirement and pointed out that itmerely connotes that there should be an element ofneed. " V. S. Deshpande, J. (as he then was) in Lalit Kumar Vijay V. Saroj Kumari; (1969 R. C. J. 545) (8), held that the word required as used in Section 14 (l) (e) of the Act meant thatthe premises are needed by the landlord. This need was tobe judged as an objective fact by the Rent Control Authority. The need was to be based on hard reality and it was not a question of sentiment or desire not based on reality. With regardto the use of the word bonafide , occurring in Section 14 (l) (e),the learned Judge observed that the same bad two-foldmeaning, firstly that the need must be genuine one and not afrivolous one and secondly that the landlord was not motivatedby extraneous consideration in trying to recover the possessionfrom the tenant on a higher rent. With regardto the use of the word bonafide , occurring in Section 14 (l) (e),the learned Judge observed that the same bad two-foldmeaning, firstly that the need must be genuine one and not afrivolous one and secondly that the landlord was not motivatedby extraneous consideration in trying to recover the possessionfrom the tenant on a higher rent. The learned counsel alsodrew our attention to the meaning of the word required inwords and Phrases, Volume 4, page 314, which again providesthat the word required would mean need. ( 20 ) FROM the aforesaid it is evident that the word required in Section 14-D must mean something more than a mere desireof the landlord to live in the premises in question. The words required by her must mean that the premises are needed byher for her residence. Whether the need exists or not is thequestion of fact which will have to be determined by the Rentcontroller while dealing with an application under Section 14-Dof the Act. We may here observe that the delay in bringingabout an action under Section 14-D, without any plausible explanation, may be a relevant consideration for the Rent Controller while deciding whether the premises are required by thelandlady or not. If an action has been brought for any mala fide or extraneous reason then again it may be that the Rentcontroller would justifiably come to the conclusion that thepremises in question are not required by her. Be that as itmay, it is clear that once the landlady is able to show that thepremises are required by her for her own residence and she fulfils the other conditions of Section 14-D then an order for recovery of possession would be passed in her favour. ( 21 ) IT was also contended by Shri Chandiok that if a widowis living in a part of the accommodation and she has a residence for herself then Section 14-D would be inapplicable. Weare unable to agree with bald proposition. Section 14-D clearly states that if the tenanted premises are requrired by the widowfor her own use. Section 14-D would apply. It is immaterial,for deciding this issue, whether the widow is on the street or isliving in a rented accommodation or is living in a part of thetenanted premises. Weare unable to agree with bald proposition. Section 14-D clearly states that if the tenanted premises are requrired by the widowfor her own use. Section 14-D would apply. It is immaterial,for deciding this issue, whether the widow is on the street or isliving in a rented accommodation or is living in a part of thetenanted premises. It is possible that when the widow is livingin a part of the tenanted premises the Rent Controller maycome to the conclusion that she does not require the tenantedpremises for her own use. What has to be seen is the needof the widow as opposed to desire. If the need exists thenthere would be no justification in non-suiting her merely becauseshe is living in part of the tenanted premises. Learned counselfor the petitioner referred to the case of S. P. Jain V. Krishanmohan; ( AIR 1987 SC 222 ) (9) and contended that it hadbeen held in that case that if portion of the premises are in,occupation of the landlord and can be used separately then thelandlord is not entitled to take recourse to the urgency provisions of Section 25-B of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulationsof Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. In this case thesupreme Court while dealing with the requirement of a retiredarmy officer observed as follows :- "it has to be borne in mind that in this case the issue isnot whether the premises is sufficiently comfortableor whether the portion in question was sufficientlycomfortable for dwelling or residence of the appellant or a party but the question is whether the houseor the portion can be separately considered to bedwelled in. If the portion in the occupation of theappellant could not be separately dwelled in by theappellant, it was only then that the extraordinaryprovisions of Ss. 24-A, 24-B and 24-C could beresorted to. Otherwise the owner or the landlordis entitled to take recourse to other provisions ofrent Art contending that the premises in questionis reasonably required bonafide for the landlord suse but in the situation like the present the landlord was not entitled to take recourse to the urgencyprovisions in Ss. 24-A. 24-B and 24-C of the Act. In our opinion to be the dwelling or residentialaccommodation it must be capable of being separately enjoyed and whether or not the premises inquestion can be so enjoyed does not depend merely because that a portion cannot be locked upindependently or separately. 24-A. 24-B and 24-C of the Act. In our opinion to be the dwelling or residentialaccommodation it must be capable of being separately enjoyed and whether or not the premises inquestion can be so enjoyed does not depend merely because that a portion cannot be locked upindependently or separately. " FROM tlie aforesaid passage it appears that the extraordinaryprovision contained in Sections. 25-A, 25-B and 25-C providedfor summary trial in certain cases. The normal procedureunder the other provisions of the Rent Act for getting evictionof the tenant was different. In the present case however, theprocedure for both Section 14 (1) (e) as well as Sections 14-A,14-B, 14-C and 14-D is the same namely the summary procedure provided by Section 25-8. The aforesaid principle waslaid down by the Supreme Court because the two procedureswere different. In the present case the procedure for Section14 (l) (e) and Section 14-D being the same the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court would not he applicable to thepresent case, ( 22 ) ONE of the contentions raised before us was also thatthe words for her own residence in Section 14-D meant thatthe premises must be required by the landlady herself and noone else. In other words, the requirement or need of othermembers of the family was not to be taken into considerationunder Section 14-D. It was contended that whereas in Section 14 (l) (e) it is specifically provided that the premises maybe required for occupation of the landlord or for any member ofhis- family dependent upon him, in Section 14-D the requirementof the members of the family are missing. It is no doubt truethat in section 14-D there is no specific mention of membersof the family. In our opinion however, the use of the expression own residence must mean residence of the landlady withsuch person without whom she cannot be expected. . in normalcircumstances, to live. For example, the landlady may beresiding with her aged parents or parents-in-law or with herinfant children when her husband expired. In such circumstances because of emotional ties and social and other responsibilities the widow cannot be expected to discard other members of the family and live alone. She can reside only whereher aged parents or parents-in-law can also be accommodated. A widow, young or old, may require a companion, who maynot even be a member of the family, who must reside with her. She can reside only whereher aged parents or parents-in-law can also be accommodated. A widow, young or old, may require a companion, who maynot even be a member of the family, who must reside with her. In a sense, therefore, Section 14-D is wider than Section14 (1) (e ). Whereas under Section 15 (l) (e) it is only the requirement of the members of the family, other than the landlord,which are to be taken into consideration, but for the purposeof Section 14-D what is to be seen is the requirement of thewidow who may need a companion, who may be an old friend,relative or a trusted servant, without whom it is not possiblefor her to reside alone. A widow may be able to set up residence only if she has other person[s to live with her. A widow,in this country, needs social as well as emotional security plusshe may have obligations towards her near and distant relations,without whom she cannot live. It will depend on the facts andcircumstances of each case as to who are the other persons whoseresidence in the premises is to be regarded as the need or requirement of the landlady herself, while applying the provisionsof Section 14-D. ( 23 ) REFERRING to Gopal Dass and others Vs. S. C. D. Guptaand another; 1988 (2) RCJ 351 (10), Kartar Sin^h V. Chamanlal: (1969 DLT 344) (II ). It was sought to be contendedthat Section 14-D can apply to only such a case where the pre-mises have been let for residence and will not apply to a casewhere the premises have been let out for residence-cum-commercial purposes. Except for the ca. se of Gopal Dass (supra) none of the other cases were concerned with the provisions analogous to the provisions of Section 14-D. The othercases were concerned with Section 14 (l) (e) where it is specifically provided that premises have to be let for residential purposes. Section 14-L as we have already observed, does notprovide that the premises should have been let for residentialpurpose. In Gopal Dass s case (supda) this court was concerned with Section l4 (l) (h) and one of the contentions raisedwas that the premises had not been let for residential purposes. On evidence the learned Judges came to the conclusion that ithad not been proved that the premises had been let for residential-cum-commercial purpose. In Gopal Dass s case (supda) this court was concerned with Section l4 (l) (h) and one of the contentions raisedwas that the premises had not been let for residential purposes. On evidence the learned Judges came to the conclusion that ithad not been proved that the premises had been let for residential-cum-commercial purpose. There was no discussion on thequestion whether Section 14 (l) (h) would be applicable to acase where premises were let for composite purpose or not. Thatcase is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. In B. M. Chanana scase (supra) we have already held that Section 14-C is applicable even where premises had been let for a composite purpose of repidential-cum-commercial. In this behalf we haveobserved as follows :- "it war also contended that Section 14 (l) (e) appliesto a case where the premises were let out for residential purpose and it had no application wherethe premises were let out either for commercialpurpose or were let out for a compisite purpose ofresidential-cum-commercial. The submission wasthat the same restriction or ingredients have to beread into Section 14-C. We are unable to agreewith this submission. Section 14 (l) (e) no doubtapplies to a case where the premises have been letfor residential purposes. Section 14-C on the otherhand uses expression premises and further statesthat the same are required by the landlord forhis residence . As we read Se:tion 14-C it appearsthat the premises to which the said provision willapply must be those which are residential in nature. A landlord cannot invoke the provisions of Section14-C in respect of premises which are commercialin nature. For example if a landlord who is a government employee, let out office premises or shopthen he cannot invoke Section 11-C and contendthat he is entitled to the possession thereof as herequires those premises for his residence. This willbe contrary to the very spirit of the said provision. Special provision, contained in section 14-C hasbeen enacted in order to provide residential accommodation to the landlord and is not to be usedmerely as a modus operandi for getting rid of an inconvenient tenant. At the same time. Section 14-Ccannot made inapplicable if residential premiseshave been let out by the landlord for commercialor rradential-cum-commercial purpose, as long asthe landlord^ requires those premises for his ownresidence. It will be for the Controller to judgewhether the premises are required by the landlordfor his residence or not. At the same time. Section 14-Ccannot made inapplicable if residential premiseshave been let out by the landlord for commercialor rradential-cum-commercial purpose, as long asthe landlord^ requires those premises for his ownresidence. It will be for the Controller to judgewhether the premises are required by the landlordfor his residence or not. If the premises are suchwhich are residential in nature and the Controllercomes to the conclusion that they are required bythe landlord for his residence then, on the otheringredients of Section 14-C being satisfied, the landlord would be entitled to retain the possession ofthe said premises even if they had been let out fora composite or a commercial purpose. To anexample if a house in a residential colony is givento a business organisation for residental-cum-commercial purpose or for running an office thenthe nature of the premises will always remain residentialand on the ingredients of Section14-C being satisfied the landlord should be able torecover the possession thereof if the premises areneeded by him for his own residence " ( 24 ) THE provisions of Section 14-D are similar to Section14-C and therefore, for the same reasons we must come to theconclusion that Section 14-D would also apply to cases wherethe premises which are let out were residential in nature eventhough the premises may have been let out for residential-cum-commercial purpose. It was contended by Sh. Chandiok thatit is possible, and it happens quite frequently that the premisesmay be residential in nature when they are let out and subsequently they are converted into commercial premises. Someadditions and alterations are made and the premises are then used for commercial purposes. Can it be said in such a casethat the purpose for which the premises had been let is to beignored. As held by us in Chanana s case (supra) what hasto be seen is not the letting purpose but the nature of the pre-mise themselves. If the premises are residential in nature evenif they are let out for commercial purpose the provisions of Section 14-D would apply. As held by us in Chanana s case (supra) what hasto be seen is not the letting purpose but the nature of the pre-mise themselves. If the premises are residential in nature evenif they are let out for commercial purpose the provisions of Section 14-D would apply. If, on the other hand, the nature ofthe premises themselves is changed by the landlord from residentialto commercial and then those premises are let for commercial purpose the position would be quite different, in thatcase the Rent Controller may well come to the conclusion thatthe nature of the premises are not residential and therefore thequestion of Section 14-D applying may not arise because thepremises cannot be used for residential purpose after they havebeen recovered by the landlord. The nature of the premiseswould change if the premises themselves are modified by thelandlord and from residential they are converted into commercialpurpose and then they are let out for commercial purpose. Itmay, however, happen that even after the changes and alterations have been made the premises may still retain the characterof residential purpose, therefore, it will always be a questingof fact for the Rent Controller to determine whether premisesare residential in character or not. If the conclusion is Thatthe premises in question are residential and are capable of beingused as such by the landlord after he recovers possession thereofthen the provisions of Section 14-B, 14-C and 14-D will applyeven if those premises had been let out for a composite purpose or even a commercial purpose. It is, however, to be seenthat if originally the premies are residential in nature and itis the case of the tenant that the nature of the premises hadbeen altered to commercial then a mere allegation in this behalfwould not be sufficient in order to persuade the Rent Controllerto come to the conclusion that Section 14-B, 14-C and 14-Ddo not apply. Even at the stage of application for grant ofleave to contest where the landlord shows that the premisesin question are residential and there is some proof in supportthereof then on behalf of the tenant, if he wants to plead thatthe nature of the premises had been altered by making structural changes from residential premises to commercial premises,some prima facie facts will have to be disclosed by him to thateffect. Unless such facts are disclosed, which would disentitlethe landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possessionof premises, the Controller under sub-section (5) of Section25-B would not grant leave to contest. ( 25 ) IT was vehemently urged that in order to apply Section14-D the landlady must show that either she is the owner ofthe premises or she has substantial or some interest therein. In other words the learned counsel sought to contend that unlessand until the landlady had an interest in the property, whichmay even be a life estate, an application under Section 14-Dwas not maintainable. ( 26 ) WE do not see in Section 14-D the requirement for thelandlady to be an owner of the premises in question for the saidprovisions to apply. It is true that in Section 14 (1 ) (e) thequestion of ownership would be relevant, but then Section 14-Dis a clear departure from the provisions of Section 14 (1 ) (e ). If the contention of the petitioner is correct then the Legislature would have provided for the landlady to be an ownerin order to attract the provisions of Section 14-D. The Legislature did not do so. This departure from Section 14-D mustbe regarded as a deliberate and conscious act while enactingthe said provision. It would be inappropriate to set the intention of the Legislature at nought by interpreting Section 14-Din such a way, as is being suggested by the petitioner, to readinto the said provision the requirement for the landlady to bean owner of the premises in question or to have any beneficialrights therein. We may, however, note that even though Section 14-D does not require the landlady to be the owner ofthe premises or to have any beneficial interest therein never. theless where an application under Section 14-D is filed therent Controller will have to satisfy himself that the premiseswill be used by her for her own residence. It was submittedby Shri Chandiok that, prior to the amendment of Section 19. just as the said provision had to be read into Section 14-Asimilarly the word landlord in Section 14-D has to be theowner of the premises. It was submittedby Shri Chandiok that, prior to the amendment of Section 19. just as the said provision had to be read into Section 14-Asimilarly the word landlord in Section 14-D has to be theowner of the premises. Section 19 had to be read into Section14-A because Section 19 contained a restriction relating to theuse of the premises after the recovery thereof on the groundof Section 14 (l) (e) or Section 14-A. Section 19 provided thatonce the premises are required for the Landlord s own use theywere not to be let out within a period of 3 years from the dateof obtaining such possession. It was considered necessary toread this provision into Section 14-A so that the provisions ofsection 14-A were not abused. We see no analogy betweenthat situation with the present one. Whereas reading Section19 into the provisions of Section 14-A would have been necessary to prevent abuse of the process by the landlord, we failto appreciate how the use of the word landlord in Section14-D would necessarily imply the incorporation into that Section of the word owner as well. The further condition thatthe landlord should also be an owner is not called for for thepurpose of Section 14-D of the Act. ( 27 ) IT was then submitted by Shri Chandiok that Section14-A u;es the expression notwithstanding anything containedelsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being inforce or in any contract (whether express or implied), customor usage to the contrary whereas Section 25-A only uses theexpression notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the timebeing in force . The submission is that Section 25-A makesno reference to contract, custom or usage to the contrary. It is true that the latter words are not present in Section25-A but to our mind the same would make no difference. Asimilar contention was raised in Chanana s case and it was dealtwith by us as under :- "it was also contended that. the non-obstante wordsused in Section 14-A are not used in Section 14-B. 14-C and 14-D and therefore, the provisions ofsection 14-B, 14-C and 14-D can be invoked bythe landlord subject to the terms of the lease whichhe may have executed in favour of the tenant, orany other law for the time being in force. the non-obstante wordsused in Section 14-A are not used in Section 14-B. 14-C and 14-D and therefore, the provisions ofsection 14-B, 14-C and 14-D can be invoked bythe landlord subject to the terms of the lease whichhe may have executed in favour of the tenant, orany other law for the time being in force. In otherwords if a law prohibits the eviction of the tenantor if there is a lease, deed in his favour then thealleged right given under Sections 14-B, 14-C and14-D is ineffective. We are unable to agree withthis contention. Section 25-A provides that theprovisions of the Chapter are to apply notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith containedelsewhere in the Act or any other law for the timebeing in force, therefore once the provisions ofsection 25-B are made applicable to Sections 14-B. 14-C and 14-D then the Controller can pass anorder under Section 25-B notwithstanding containedin any law because of the provisions of Section25-A. In other words, even though the non-obstante words are not included in Sections 14-B. 14-C and 14-D but because of the- provisions ofsection 25-A the effect is as if the provisions arenon obstante. IT will be useful in this behalf to refer to the decisionof the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court inthe case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar Vs. Yesodaiammal; ( AIR 1979 SC 1745 (12 ). The questionwhich arose in that case was whether it. was neces-sary to terminate the tenancy of a tenant undersection 106 of the Transfer of Property Act beforean application for eviction could have been filedunder the tenancy Act. The Supreme Court cameto the conclusion that it was not necessary to terminate the tenancy by giving a notice under Section106 of the. Act. It was observed in this connectionas follows :-- "it will bear repetition to say that the Transfer ofproperty Act in order to entitle the landlord torecover possession determination of the lease isnecessary as during its continuance he could notrecover possession determination of the lease isrigour of law provided therein. Otherwise not. He cannot recover possession merely by determination of tenancy. Nor can he be stoppedfrom doing so on the ground that he has notterminated the contractual tenancy. Under thestate Rent Control Act the concept of the contractual tenancy has lost much of its significanceand force (emphasis added ). Otherwise not. He cannot recover possession merely by determination of tenancy. Nor can he be stoppedfrom doing so on the ground that he has notterminated the contractual tenancy. Under thestate Rent Control Act the concept of the contractual tenancy has lost much of its significanceand force (emphasis added ). IN our opinion, therefore, the right which is createdunder Section 14-C is an absolute and independent right with the landlord who is entitled torecover possession of the premises on his satisfying the ingredients of Section 14-C and nothingmore. The provisions of Transfer of Propertyact would not stand in his way. " PRESUMABLY because in Dhanapal Chettiar s case (supra)it was observed that under the State Rent Control Act theconcept of contractual tenancy had lost much of its significanceand force, that is why the legislature, possibly, did not thinkit necessary to add these words in the non obstante clause insection 25-A. ( 28 ) IT was lastly contended that the principles of resjudicatawould apply in cases like the present. It was argued that if apetition under Section 14 (l) (e) is dismissed inter alia on theground that the premises are not required bonafide by thelandlord then another petition under Section 14-D would notbe maintainable and the same would be barred by the principlesof resjudicata. ( 29 ) IT is now well settled that if an earlier petition underseciton 14 (l) (e) has been dismissed then a fresh applicationunder Section 14 (l) (e) would be maintainable only onchanged circumstances, if the facts remain the same and thecircumstances have not changed then a fresh application undersection i4 (l) (e) will be barred on the principles of resjudicata. The question is whether this principle can also be extended toapply to an application under Section 14-D when an earlier application under Section 14 (l) (e) has been dismissed. ( 30 ) WE fined that Section 14 (l) (e) and Setcion 14-D are,to a limited extent, overlapping. For instance both Section14 (l) (e) as well as Section 14-D require the applicant to be alandlord. Moreover, while in Section 14 (1) (e) the premiseshave to be bonafide required by the landlord for his own useand use of his family members, Section 14-D postulates thepremise being required by the landlady by her for her ownresidence. In our opinion to the extent to which Section14 (l) (e) and Section 14-D are overlapping the aforesaid principle of resjudicata will apply. In our opinion to the extent to which Section14 (l) (e) and Section 14-D are overlapping the aforesaid principle of resjudicata will apply. To give an example, if in apetition filed under Section 14 (l) (e) the Rent Controller comesto the conclusion that the applicant is not a landlord then in asubsequent application under Section 14-D being filed unlesssome fresh fact or circumstances arise the tenant would bejustified in invoking the. principles of resjudicata. The Rentcontroller would ordinarily be bound by earlier decision on thesame point between the same parties namely-whether the applicant is a landlord or not Similarly if in an earlier petitionit is held that the landlord does, not need the premises forhimself for residence, then unless there are change of circumstances and facts, principle of resjudicata may apply. In eachcase it will have to be seen whether there is any merit with regard to the resjudicata, if it is raised. ( 31 ) BEFORE concluding we would like to make some observations on two important matters. ( 32 ) DURING the course of hearing our attention had beendrawn to the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Rent Control Actwhere an analogous provision exists giving relief not only towidows but also to divorcees. In the Delhi Act, however, thereis no separate provision which has been incorporated giving aright of immediate recovery of possession to a divorcee. Theposition of a divorcee may not be as pathetic or serious orurgent as that of a widow but nevertheless her needmerits more serious consideration. The provision in themadhya Pradesh Act providing for a summary procedure incase of premises being needed by a widow and divorcee, hasbeen upheld by the Courts. That provision could have servedas a guide in enacting Section 14-D of the Act. We find in thebill which was framed that Section 14-D was not there. Thisprovision was incorporated at the time when the Act was pausedand, possibly, the attention of the Legislature was not drawnto the need of the divorcees as being to that of a widow. Perhaps the Government may consider bringing about a furtheramendment to the Delhi Rent Control Act so as to providerelief to the divorcees. ( 33 ) SOME landladies addressed arguments before us on thequestion as to whether Section 14-D would be available to awidow who lets out the premises after her husband had died. Perhaps the Government may consider bringing about a furtheramendment to the Delhi Rent Control Act so as to providerelief to the divorcees. ( 33 ) SOME landladies addressed arguments before us on thequestion as to whether Section 14-D would be available to awidow who lets out the premises after her husband had died. We were informed that prior to the enactment of Section 14-Dpetitions under Section 14 (l) (e) had been filed but the samehave been languishing before the Rent Controller and the Additional Rent Controller for a number of years. The complaintbefore us was that though the applications under Section14 (l) (e) are required to be decided in a summary manner, inactual fact long drawn out legal battles occur spreading over anumber of years . That perhaps is the result due to superabundance of similar cases which are pending in the trial court. What is, however, of serious concern, and for which the litigantscannot be faulted, is the fact that the cases are adjourned. time and again, because of the non-availability of the counseldue to strike. We do not propose to go into the question asto whether strikes by lawyers are justified or not but we wouldlike to emphasis that it is the litigating public which suffers whenthe work in Courts cannot be transacted. ( 34 ) THE most important requirement of a human being,apart from food and clothing, is shelter. The litigation underthe Rent Control Act pertains to this. In any civilised societyit should be the endeavour of all that such litigation is not undulyprolonged. As already mentioned, strike by lawyers has. inrecent times, been one of the contributory factors in delayingthe disposal of the eviction petitions. Any delay would, naturally, benefit the defendant. ( 35 ) WHILE we cannot force or direct the lawyers to appearbefore the Rent Controllers and argue the cases, we think, looking at the realities of the situation, that lime has come thatsome directions should be issued to the Rent Controllers andthe Additional Rent Controllers to confront such a situation, andto discharge the duties in interest of justice and fair-play. Evenduring the strike period it should not be difficult, after theeviction petition i filed whether under Section 14 or Section14-A or 14-B, 14-C or 14-D, to direct the parties to be presentin person and complete the pleadings. Evenduring the strike period it should not be difficult, after theeviction petition i filed whether under Section 14 or Section14-A or 14-B, 14-C or 14-D, to direct the parties to be presentin person and complete the pleadings. Thereafter difficulty mayarise with regard to recording of evidence, If the parties agreethe Rent Controller may, in appropriate cases , direct evidenceto be taken on affidavits. Where necessary, and again with theagreement of the parlies, the parties may be at liberty to crossexamine any deponents or the court may even like to put questions to any deponents. In cases where the pleadings have beencompleted and evidence has been recorded and the case isripe for arguments then we see no justification as to why thecase should be adjourned time and again. Even if the counselare on strike and are not prepared to argue the cases in Court. the Rent Controllers can require the parties either to arguethe case themselves or to file written arguments. Filing ofwritten arguments can also be resorted to while deciding miscellaneous applications where arguments have to be put forth, forinstance when a question aries as to whether leave to defendshould be granted or not the Rent Controller can and ought toaccept written arguments. All over the world, especially inamerica and European Countries the written brief and arguments are more important and only limited time is given to thecounsel to argue the case. If the United States Supreme Courtcan decide the most complicated questions of law by hearingcounsel only for half an hour and by considering the writtenarguments in the case, we see no reason as to why the Rentcontrollers cannot decide miscellaneous applications and eviction petition", which are ripe for hearing, by considering writtenarguments. ( 36 ) WE, therefore, direct the Rent Controller and the Additional Rent Controller to follow the aforesaid procedure andwherever arguments are required to be heard, but counsel areunwilling to address, by reason of strike or otherwise, the Rentcontroller should issue directions, give reasonable time to theparties to file written arguments and should thereafter disposeof the miscellaneous applications and Eviction petition in accordance with law. We are constrained, and also unhappy, toissue these directions but we are compelled to do so in theinterest of general public because, unfortunately, going on strikehas become very frequent and they seem to prolong indefinitely. We are constrained, and also unhappy, toissue these directions but we are compelled to do so in theinterest of general public because, unfortunately, going on strikehas become very frequent and they seem to prolong indefinitely. The wheels of justice cannot be allowed to come to a grindinghalt and a solution has to be found to provide speedy relief andjustice to the needy. The litigants ought not to feel that theyare helpless and are being held to ransom. ( 37 ) REVERTING to the facts of this case we find it will be appropriate to set aside the impugned order of eviction passed bythe Rent Controller and direct, him to decide the application ofthe petitioner for leave to defend de novo. The reason for thisis that some contentions have been raised by the petitioner whichrequire serious consideration in the light of the observationswhich we have now made. in this judgment. We accordinglyi sue a writ of certioniri quashing the order dated 25-8-1989passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi and issue awrit of mandamus directing him to decide within a period ofsix months from today the application for leave to defend filedby the petitioner de novo in the light of the observations madein this judgment. There will be no order as to costs. ( 38 ) THE parties should appear before the Additional Rentcontroller for further directions on 3-7-1990. EVICTION Order set aside and case reverted to Rent Controller.