Judgment S.B.SINHA, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed on behalf of the petitioner for issuance of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to forbear from coerceing the petitioner to obtain licence in terms of the provisions of Bihar Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1970 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act for the sake of brevity), as also for issuance of appropriate writ for quashing the order dated 22-5-1987 as contained in Annexure-2 to the writ petition (wrongly mentioned as Annexure-1 in the writ petition) as also the order passed by the respondent No. 2 as incorporated in its letter dated 29-5-1988 written to the petitioner in Annexure-7 to the writ petition. 2. The petitioner is a Government Company within the meaning of sec. 617 of the Companies Act and carries on business in manufacture of iron and steel. The petitioner own various mines and steel plants. One of the steel plants of the petitioner-Company is situate at Bokaro Steel City, commonly known as Bokaro Steel Plant. 3. According to the petitioner it purchases wood which is used in the Plant for incidental purposes, i.e. for bracing or laying tracks etc. 4. For the purpose of purchase of wood, the petitioner floats tender by publishing the same in various newspapers or on limited tender enquiry basis. 5. According to the petitioner, in each purchase order a clause is contained that the market fee @ 1% shall be paid extra. The petitioner has asserted further that a consumer of wood for the aforementioned purpose does not come within the purview of the definition of trader and as such no licence for tendering in wood is required to be obtained by it, in terms of the provisions of the Act. 6. However, it received a notice dated 22-5-1987, as contained in Annexure-2 to the writ petition, issued by respondent No. 3, whereby and whereunder it was intimated that it had been carrying on business of purchase and sale of agricultural produce without a licence and as such by the said notice the petitioner was directed to obtain a licence in terms of the provisions of the Act, and Rules framed thereunder by depositing the requisite licence fee. 7. 7. The petitioner by its letter dated 1-6-1987 addressed to the respondent No. 3 denied and disputed its liability, to take out a licence in terms of the provisions of the said Act and the Rules framed thereunder. In reply to the aforesaid letter (Annexure-3) the respondent No. 3 again by his letter dated 8-7-1987, as contained in Annexure-4 to this writ petition, asked the petitioner to obtain a licence, as allegedly the petitioner had been carrying on business in purchasing agricultural produce. By a notice dated 9-11-1987 Sri Rajendra Prasad Shrivastava, Advocate, on behalf of the respondent No. 1, threatened the Managing Director, Bokaro Steel Plant, of the petitioner which is contained in Annexure-5 to the writ petition, that unless a necessary licence is obtained within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice, legal action would be taken against him. By a letter dated 16th November, 1987, as contained in Annexure-6 to the writ petition, the petitioner, in reply to the said notice of Sri Shrivastava, Advocate, reiterated that it was not liable to obtain a licence in terms of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The petitioner along with the said letter (Annexure-6) annexed a chart showing the supply position of the agricultural tax, (wrongly stated for market fees) for the years 1986-87. 8. By the impugned notice dated 29-3-1988 issued by respondent No. 1, which is contained in Annexure-7 to the writ petition, the petitioner was finally asked to take out a licence in terms of the said Act. 9. The petitioner has contended that as it is not a trader, nor does it carry on any business or trade in any agricultural produce, and merely purchases wood for incidental use thereof and not for manufacturing purpose, the purported notices issued to it by respondent No. 3 and respondent No. 1 as contained in Annexures-2 and 7 to the writ petition respectively are wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. 10. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 3 wherein it has not been denied or disputed that the petitioner purchases wood for its own consumption and it does not carry on any business of purchase and sale of wood, which is an agricultural produce. 10. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 3 wherein it has not been denied or disputed that the petitioner purchases wood for its own consumption and it does not carry on any business of purchase and sale of wood, which is an agricultural produce. It has, however, been asserted by the said respondent in the aforementioned counter-affidavit that the petitioner, however, being a regular purchaser of wood would be deemed to be carrying on business of buying wood, which is an agricultural produce and thus being a trader is required to obtain a licence under the Act. 11. The respondent in this connection, has relied upon a decision of this Court in Lucky Biscuit Company V/s. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1978 Patna 16. 12. Mr. M.M. Banerjee, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is not a trader within the meaning of the sec. 2(1)(w) of the said act, as it does not carry on any trade in wood It was further submitted that the petitioner pays to the various traders from whom it purchases wood either by floating open tender or on the basis of the limited tender enquiry, the requisite market fee @ 1 % of the value thereof and as such it is not liable to take out any licence whatsoever. 13. Mr. Srideo Misra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand submitted that as the petitioner regularly purchases wood, it would be held that it is ordinarily engaged in business of buying of agricultural produce and as such it is liable to obtain a licence in terms of the provisions of the said Act and the Rules framed thereunder. 14. In view of the aforesaid rival contentions, the only question which arises for consideration is : whether the petitioner being a consumer of wood, which it uses for incidental purpose and not for manufacturing purposes, is a trader within the meaning of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and thus is liable to obtain a licence in terms thereof. 15. The Act was enacted in order to provide for better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce and establishment of markets for agricultural produce in the State of Bihar and for matters connected therewith. 15. The Act was enacted in order to provide for better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce and establishment of markets for agricultural produce in the State of Bihar and for matters connected therewith. It is now well known that object of the said Act is to establish markets and to regulate buying and selling of agricultural produce in those markets for the purpose of protecting the interests of agriculturists. The said Act has been enacted in terms of entry No. 28 of list II of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution of India. 16. Trade has been defined in sec. 2(1)(v) of the said Act which reads as follows:- "trade means any kind of transaction of sale and purchase or any kind of remuneration on sale and purchase of any agricultural produce". Trader has been defined in sec. 2(1)(w) of the said Act, which reads as follows: " trader means a person ordinarily engaged in the business of buying and selling agricultural produce as a principal or as a duly authorised agent of one or more principals and includes a commission agent or a person ordinarily engaged in the business of processing of agricultural produce". Buyer or purchaser has been defined in sec. 2(1)(y) of the said Act which is as follows : " buyer or purchaser means a person who buys or agrees to buy any agricultural produce and includes a person who buys or purchases on behalf of any other person as his agent or servant, or commissioned agent. A seller has been defined in sec. 2(1)(z) of the said Act to meant: " seller means a person who sells or agrees to sell any agricultural produce and includes a person who sells on behalf of any other person as his agent or servant or commission agent". Processor has been defined in sec. 2(1)(zz) of the said Act which reads as follows " processor means a person who processes any agricultural produce, either on his own account, or on paying of charges". Agricultural produce has been defined in sec. 2(1)(a) of the said Act which reads as follows: "Krishi Upaj Se Abhiprerit Hal Krishi Uddhankrishi (Bagwani), Bagano, Pashu Palan, Ban, Resham Uddhan, Matsya Palan Ki Sabhi Upaj, Chahe Wah Bidhait (Taiyar) To Ya Abidhait; Binimit Ho Ya Nahin, Our Iske Antargat Anushuchi Me Yathabinirdisth Pasudhan Ka Kukkut, Adi Bhi Hain." 17. sec. Agricultural produce has been defined in sec. 2(1)(a) of the said Act which reads as follows: "Krishi Upaj Se Abhiprerit Hal Krishi Uddhankrishi (Bagwani), Bagano, Pashu Palan, Ban, Resham Uddhan, Matsya Palan Ki Sabhi Upaj, Chahe Wah Bidhait (Taiyar) To Ya Abidhait; Binimit Ho Ya Nahin, Our Iske Antargat Anushuchi Me Yathabinirdisth Pasudhan Ka Kukkut, Adi Bhi Hain." 17. sec. 15 of the Act imposes an embargo upon a seller, except a retail seller and for personal consumption to carry on business at any other place except in the principal market year or sub-market yard or yards. 18. sec. 18 of the said Act provides for powers and duties for the market committee. In terms of clause (ii) of Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 18 of the Act, market committee is, inter alia, authorised to issue licence in accordance with the rules to traders, brokers, weighmen, measurers, surveyors, warehousemen and other persons including persons or firms engaged in the processing, storing or pressing of agricultural produce concerned operating in the market area; where market has been established. 19. sec. 52 of the said Act provides for rule making power upon the State Government. In exercise of its power conferred upon it u/s. 52 of the said Act, the State of Bihar has framed rules known as the Bihar Agricultural Produce Market Rules, 1975. 20. Rule 98, inter alia, restricts a person from carrying on business as trader in agricultural produce in the market except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence in form 23 issued by the Market Committee. 21. Rule 82(iii) provides that if a seller is a licencee and buyer is not a licencee, the seller shall realise the market fee from the buyer and shall within a week deposit the same with the Market Committee. Sub-rule (iii) of Rule 81 empowers the committee to direct the owner or manager of an industrial concern located within the market areas to furnish such information in respect of agricultural produce for which the market is established and which is handled or used by the industrial concern, as the Market Committee may think necessary for the purpose of the market. 22. Mr. 22. Mr. Banerjee, as noticed hereinbefore, submitted that the petitioner is not a trader within the meaning of the said Act, inasmuch as it neither carries on any business in any agricultural produce nor does it process the same. According to Mr. Banerjee, the end product so far as the plant of the petitioner is concerned being iron and steel, the agricultural produce purchased by it is neither used as a raw material nor is used for the purpose of manufacturing its end product, nor the same is processed by the petitioner, nor is it transformed to any other agricultural produce or any other commodity. 23. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the impugned notices issued by respondents Nos. 1 and 3 and as contained in Annexures-2 and 7 to the writ petition, whereby and whereunder the petitioner has been directed to obtain a licence in terms of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, must be held to be wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. 24. Mr. Mishra, on the other hand has placed strong reliance upon the decision of this Court in the Belsand Sugar Co. Ltd. V/s. State of Bihar, 1976 BBCJ 453 : (AIR 1977 Patna 136) and Lucky Biscuit Co. V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 1978 Patna 16 for the proposition that if a person buys agricultural produce regularly, it is a trader within the meaning of the provision of the Act and is thus liable to obtain a licence. Learned counsel in this connection has also relied upon the Supreme Court decisions reported in State of Andhra Pradesh V/s. M/s. H. Abdul Bakhi and Bros., AIR 1965 SC 531 and in Sri Krishna Coconut Co. V/s. East Godavari Coconut and Tobacco Market Committee, AIR 1967 SC 973 . These aforesaid Supreme Court decisions appear to have been relied on and followed by this Court in Belsand Sugar Companys case, (AIR 1977 Patna 136) as also in Lucky Biscuit Companys case, (AIR 1978 Patna 16). 25. It is not disputed before us that wood purchased by the petitioner is not used for manufacturing of iron and steel in any manner whatsoever. It is admitted that wood is used only for incidental purpose and has got nothing to do with the manufacturing process. From the definition of sec. 25. It is not disputed before us that wood purchased by the petitioner is not used for manufacturing of iron and steel in any manner whatsoever. It is admitted that wood is used only for incidental purpose and has got nothing to do with the manufacturing process. From the definition of sec. 2(i)(v) of the said Act it would appear that the trader has been defined to mean transaction of sale and purchase or any kind of remuneration on sale and purchase of any agricultural produce. 26. The definition of trader is in two parts. The first part deals with those who are ordinarily engaged in business of buying and selling of agricultural produce, whether as principal or as a duly authorised commission agent of one or more principals. Second part of the said section provides for an extended meaning and embraces within its fold commission agent or a person ordinarily engaged in the business of processing of agricultural produce." 27. Both the words trade and trader having been defined, in my opinion, the definition of trade has also to be borne in mind, while interpreting the word trader. 28. As noticed hereinbefore, Mr. Mishra could not and did not dispute that the petitioner is not ordinarily engaged in business of processing agricultural produce. Thus evidently the petitioner does not come within the purview of the second part of the definition of trader. 29. However, according to him, the petitioner comes within the purview of the first part of the definition, inasmuch as it is ordinarily engaged in the business of buying agricultural produce. 30. Mr. Mishra with reference to the decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh, ( AIR 1965 SC 531 ) and in Sri Krishna Coconut Co., ( AIR 1967 SC 973 ), contended that a person who regularly buys agricultural produce, is also a trader. 31. Learned counsel has also drawn our attention to paragraphs 17 and 21 of the Belsand Sugar Companys case, (AIR 1977 Patna 136 and paragraph 14 of the Lucky Biscuits case, (AIR 1978 Patna 16). 32. 31. Learned counsel has also drawn our attention to paragraphs 17 and 21 of the Belsand Sugar Companys case, (AIR 1977 Patna 136 and paragraph 14 of the Lucky Biscuits case, (AIR 1978 Patna 16). 32. In Belsand Sugar Companys case (supra) the petitioner thereof used to manufacture sugar and for the said purpose used to purchase sugar cane which was regulated by an ordinance known as Bihar Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Ordinance by reason whereof it was bound to purchase sugar cane from a particular market area at a fixed price as may be directed by the concerned authorities from time to time. 33. So far sale of sugar was concerned, levy sugar was controlled by an order made by the Central Government known as Levy Sugar Supply (Control) Order 1972, and so far free sale sugar was concerned, according to the petitioner of the said case, no sale thereof used to take place within the concerned market area. In that case, therefore, it was contended that as purchase of sugar cane was regulated by the Ordinance, the same cannot be said to be voluntary purchase and similarly the sale of levy sugar being controlled by the Order of the Central Government, also does not come within the purview of the voluntary sale. 34. It was, thus, contended in that case that there being no voluntary purchase or voluntary sale within the market area, the petitioner of that case were not liable to pay any market fee. 35. In paragraph 17 of the said decision, N.P. Singh, J., however speaking for the Division Bench held as follows:- (AIR 1977 Patna 136). "In view of the fact that I have already held that whenever there is supply of cane by the cane growers to the petitioner-Company, there is a sale the petitioner will be deemed to be a trader inasmuch as the petitioner is ordinarily engaged in the business of buying agricultural produce from the cane-growers. In the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in Salar Jung Sugar Mills Ltd. while considering as to whether such sugar-cane factories shall be deemed to be dealer within the meaning of the Mysore Sales Tax Act when they purchase sugar-cane from the cane-growers, it was held that they will be deemed to be dealers within the meaning of that Act. In that Act dealer had been defined to mean a person who carries on the business of buying, selling, supplying or distributing goods for cash or for deferred payment. The definition of dealer is more or less similar to the definition of trader in the present Act and, as such, there should not be any difficulty in holding that the petitioner will be deemed to be a dealer and as such it has to take a licence in accordance with the provisions of the Act." 36. The Division Bench in that case further considered the import of rule 82 and held: (AIR 1977 Patna 136). "The rule making authority has simply carried out the purposes of the Act by making the rule in question for the purpose of restricting the evasion of market fee by such buyers who are not licensees. It is well known that where a charging section is to be interpreted it should be interpreted strictly in favour of the subject. But the same principle does not apply by construing a section which only provides the machinery for collection." 37. In Lucky Biscuit Companys case, (AIR 1978 Patna 16) the Division Bench held that : "Learned Solicitor General further contended that if the interpretation as contended by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner was accepted, then the validity of the definition of trader as given in sec. 2(1)(w) of the Act may be challenged on the ground that it makes a discrimination between different persons doing business of buying agricultural produce for one who buys and sells the agricultural produce will be liable to obtain a licence but another who buys the agricultural produce but sells it after transforming it into another goods which is not agricultural produce will not be liable to obtain a licence even though the business of his buying the agricultural produce may be much more than that of one who buys agricultural produce and sells it in the same form. According to learned Solicitor General, the definition of sec. 2(1)(w), therefore, has to be given an interpretation as contended by him to make it intra vires. There also appears substance in this contention of learned Solicitor General. I would accordingly hold that the petitioner which is ordinarily engaged in the business of buying agricultural produce is a trader within the meaning of the terms as defined in sec. 2(1)(w), therefore, has to be given an interpretation as contended by him to make it intra vires. There also appears substance in this contention of learned Solicitor General. I would accordingly hold that the petitioner which is ordinarily engaged in the business of buying agricultural produce is a trader within the meaning of the terms as defined in sec. 2(1)(w) of the Act." 38. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the word and can be read as or in certain circumstances depending upon the context in which it is used. The word and however ordinarily is conjunctive and should be read as such. 39. It is now well settled by various decisions of the Supreme Court that literal meaning has to be given to a statute and recourse to various rules of interpretation can only be taken where literal meaning, if given, would render the Act invalid or which would run contrary to the manifest intention of the Legislature enacting the statute. Reference in this connection may be made to the Commr. of Wealth-tax V/s. Smt. Hashmatunnisa Begum, AIR 1989 SC 1024 , Ajay Pradhan V/s. State of M.P., AIR 1988 SC 1875 , Mithilesh Kumari V/s. Prem Behari, 1989 BBCJ 54 : ( AIR 1989 SC 1247 ) and State of U. P. V/s. Malik Zarid Khalid reported in (1988) 1 SCC 145 : ( AIR 1988 SC 132 ). 40. In Abdul Bakhis case ( AIR 1965 SC 531 ) definition of dealer as contained in sec. 2(e) of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act was as follows:- "dealer means any person, local authority, company, firm Hindu undivided family or any association or associations of persons engaged in the business of buying, selling or supplying goods in the Hyderabad State whether for a commission, remuneration or otherwise, and includes a State Government which carries on such business and any society, club or association which buys or sells or supplies goods to its members." In view of the definition of dealer aforesaid, the Supreme Court in that case held as follows :- "We are unable to agree with this view of the High Court. A person to be a dealer must be engaged in the business of buying or selling or supplying goods. A person to be a dealer must be engaged in the business of buying or selling or supplying goods. The expression businesss though extensively used is a word of indefinite import; in taxing statutes it is used in the sense of an occupation, or profession which occupies the time, attention and labour of a person, normally with the object of making profit. To regard an activity as business there must be a course of dealings, either actually continued or contemplated to be continued with profit motive, and not for sport or pleasure. But to be a dealer a person need not follow the activity of buying, selling and supplying the same commodity. Mere buying for personal consumption, i.e. without a profit motive will not make a person dealer within the meaning of the Act, but a person who consumes a commodity bought by him in the course of his trade or use in manufacturing another commodity for sale, would be regarded as a dealer. The Legislature has not made sale of the very article bought by a person a condition for treating him as a dealer: the definition merely requires that the buying of the commodity mentioned in Rule 5(2) must be for sale or use with a view to make profit out of the integrated activity of buying and disposal. The commodity may itself be converted into another saleable commodity, or it may be used as an ingredient or in aid of a manufacturing process leading to the production of such saleable commodity." (Underlining is mine for emphasis) 41 Plainly enough such is not the position here. 42. In Sri Krishna Coconuts case, ( AIR 1967 SC 973 ) the Supreme Court was considering interpretation of sec. 11(1) of Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act. The relevant provisions of the said Act and the rules which fell for consideration by the Supreme Court would be evident from paragraph 5 of the reported case which is in the following terms :- "Sec. 11(1) with which we are concerned in these appeals reads: The Market committee shall, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf, levy fees on the notified commercial crop or crops bought and sold in the notified area at such rates as it may detertnine. The Explanation to sub-s. (1) provides that all notified commercial crops leaving a notified area shall, unless the contrary is proved, presumed to be bought and sold within such area. Sub-sec. (2) provides that the fee chargeable under sub-s. (1) shall be paid by the purchaser of the commercial crop concerned provided that where such a purchaser cannot be identified the fee shall be paid by the seller. sec. 12 provides that all monies received by a Market Committee shall be paid into a fund and all expenditure incurred by the Market Committee shall be defrayed out of the said fund. The expenditure which the committee can incur is for purposes set out in S.13 which incidentally reflect the object and purpose of the Act. sec. 18 empowers the State Government to make rules including rules for licence fee under S.5, the registration fee and the prohibition of buying and selling of commercial crops in the notified area by persons not so registered and the fee to be levied on commercial crops bought and sold in the notified area. Rule 28 lays down the maximum fee leviable on commercial crops under S.11(1) as also the maximum fee payable for licences and registration. Rule 28-A provides that the fees referred to in sub-r. (1), that is, fees under S.11(1), shall not be levied more than once on a commercial crop in a notified area. 43. In that case it was held by the Supreme Court that the provisions clearly show the policy of safeguarding the interests of the producers and of guaranteeing to them reasonable return for the crops they would bring to sell without being exploited. In that case the argument advanced was that in order to be subjected to levy of fee, the notified commercial crop or crops must both be bought and sold within the notified area itself. This argument was advanced on the basis that the notified crop or crops are bought within the notified area but are sold outside thereof and, therefore, no fee could be levied by the Committee. 44. Repelling this argument, the Supreme Court held : ( AIR 1967 SC 973 , ) "If the construction commended to us for acceptance by Mr. Agarwala were to be correct viz. that the appellants transactions stopped at the stage of goods bought they would not be transactions in respect of goods bought and sold. 44. Repelling this argument, the Supreme Court held : ( AIR 1967 SC 973 , ) "If the construction commended to us for acceptance by Mr. Agarwala were to be correct viz. that the appellants transactions stopped at the stage of goods bought they would not be transactions in respect of goods bought and sold. If the fee was levied on sales effected by the appellant with their customers its levy would not be valid under S.11(1) and would also be repugnant to Art.286 where goods were delivered outside the State. But it is a well settled rule of construction that the Court should endeavour as far as possible to construe a statute in such a manner that the construction results in validity rather than its invalidity and gives effect to the manifest intention of the legislature enacting that statute. The object in passing the Act was to prevent the mischief of exploitation of producers of commercial crops such as coconuts and copra and to see that such producers dot a fair price for their goods. The mischief to prevent which the Act was enacted was the exploitation of these producers by middlemen and those buying goods from them and therefore, the Act provided facilities such as a market place, place for storage, correct weighment etc. so that the producers and his purchasers come face to face in a regulated and controlled market and a fair price was obtained by them. If the construction suggested by Mr. Agarwalla were to be accepted and the section were to be construed as being applicable to those transactions only which have a dual aspect, that is, buying by a dealer from a producer and the dealer selling those identical goods within the notified area, the object of the Act would be defeated for in a large number of cases the transactions halt at the stage of buying and the committee in those cases would have no power to levy the fee on them. Why is a buyer or a seller or a buyer and seller required to be registered and why does the Act prevent those who have not registered themselves from effecting transactions in commercial crops unless the object was to regulate and control transactions in those commodities at all stages and in a manner preventing the exploitation of the producer. Why is a buyer or a seller or a buyer and seller required to be registered and why does the Act prevent those who have not registered themselves from effecting transactions in commercial crops unless the object was to regulate and control transactions in those commodities at all stages and in a manner preventing the exploitation of the producer. The legislature had thus principally the producer in mind who should have a proper market where he can bring his goods for sale and where he can secure a fair deal and a fair price. The Act thus aims at transactions which such a producer would enter into with those who buy from him. The words bought and sold used in S.11(1) aim at those transactions whereunder a dealer buys from a producer who brings to the market his goods for sale. The transactions aimed at must be viewed in the sense in which the legislature intended it to he viewed that is one transaction resulting in buying on the one hand and selling on the other. Such a construction is commendable because it is not only in consonance with the words used in S.11(1) but is consistent with the object of the Act as expressed through its various provisions. The construction on the other hand canvassed by the appellants is defective of the purpose of the Act and should, unless we are compelled to accept it, be avoided. The construction which we are inclined to accept acquires some support from the East that S.11(1) makes the purchaser and not the seller primarily responsible for payment of the fee and it is only when the purchaser cannot be identified that the seller is made liable." 45. It has been held in that case by the Supreme Court that the word and should be read as or only with a view to give effect to the provisions of the said Act. 46. Such is not the case here. So far as the trader of an agricultural produce is concerned, the same is an exhaustive definition. 47. In the definition of trader the word and in my opinion, has to be read as conjunctive and not as disjunctive. A trader is a person who may buy agricultural produce from the agriculturist and sale the same either in the same form or after processing the same to a customer or to another dealer. 47. In the definition of trader the word and in my opinion, has to be read as conjunctive and not as disjunctive. A trader is a person who may buy agricultural produce from the agriculturist and sale the same either in the same form or after processing the same to a customer or to another dealer. The definition of trader in my opinion, is required to be read in the context of Rule 98, inasmuch as the petitioner has been directed by the respondents to obtain licence in terms of the provisions of the said Act and the rules framed thereunder only because, according to it, the petitioner is engaged in the business of buying. 48. The dictionary meaning of the word business although is wide, in my opinion. for the purpose of construing the said word in the context of regulating and penal statute, like the Act, must be read as carrying on a commercial venture. 49. Admittedly, the word which is an agricultural produce and which is purchased by the petitioner is not bought by it either for selling it in the same form or in a transformed form. 50. The intention of the legislature in directing the trader to obtain licence is absolutely clear and unambiguous in so far as it seeks to regulate the trade for purchase and sale. Thus a person who is not buying an agricultural produce for the purpose of selling it whether in the same form or in the transformed form, is merely a consumer, inasmuch as it is not using such agricultural produce directly for manufacturing purpose. In order to manufacture iron and steel in its steel plant, the petitioner is required to make purchase of various articles which may include such articles in respect whereof regulatory legislations may exist. 51. The petitioner is called upon to obtain licences in respect of each and every commodity which may be the subject-matter of one or the other regulatory legislation, the same, in my opinion, would lead to an absurd result. 51. The petitioner is called upon to obtain licences in respect of each and every commodity which may be the subject-matter of one or the other regulatory legislation, the same, in my opinion, would lead to an absurd result. As for example it may be mentioned that the petitioner may be purchasing cement for construction of its building which has got no direct nexus with the production of iron and steel, but if the petitioner is asked to take out a licence for the same on the ground that it is a controlled commodity, in our opinion, it would lead to an absurdity. 52. Further, it is well known that construction of statute will depend upon the purport and object of the Act, as has been held in Sri Krishna Coconuts case ( AIR 1967 SC 973 ) (supra) itself. Therefore, different provisions of the statute which had the object of enforcing the provisions thereof, namely, levy of market fee, which was to be collected for the benefit of the producers, in our opinion is to be interpreted differently from a provision where it requires a person to obtain a licence so as to regulate a trade. 53. If a person is not a trader in a particular commodity, in our opinion, he cannot be held bound to obtain a licence which would go beyond the intention of the legislature so as to include a person, within its purview, who has not been intended to be included under the provisions of the statute by the legislature. 54. From perusal of the said rules, it would appear that various statutory obligations have been imposed upon a licensed trader. It would also be evident from Rule 98(xii) that a trader who carries on business without a valid licence may be liable, in addition to any action taken u/s. 48 of the Act, to pay a sum of rupees five as surcharge for each day of his default for not obtaining licence as required under sub-rule (i) in addition to the licence fee and market fees payable by him. 55. sec. 48 of the said Act provides for penalty. Thus any person carrying on business without any valid licence may be prosecuted and upon proof of the allegation against him may be sentenced to imprisonment of one year or fine to the extent of Rs. 100.00 or both. 56. 55. sec. 48 of the said Act provides for penalty. Thus any person carrying on business without any valid licence may be prosecuted and upon proof of the allegation against him may be sentenced to imprisonment of one year or fine to the extent of Rs. 100.00 or both. 56. It is now well knwon that in a case of doubt in construction of a penal statute, the same should be construed in favour of the subject and against the State. 57. In the case of London and North Eastern Railway Company V/s. Berriman, 1946 AC 278 Lord Simonds quoted with approval the following observations of Lord Esher N. K. In the case of Truck and Sons V/s. Priester, (1887) 19 QBD 629, 638. "We must be very careful in construing that section, because it imposes a penalty. If there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular case, we must adopt that construction. If there are two reasonable constructions we must give the more lenient one. That is the settled Rule for the construction of penal sections." 58. The above authority was also followed by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Tolaram Relumal V/s. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 496 . 59. In M/s. Jamuna Flour and Oil Mills V/s. Bihar State Pollution Control Board, Patna (1989) 2 BLJ 340 , a Division Bench of this Court upon taking into consideration various decisions, including Member Secry., Andhra Pradesh State Board for Prevention and Control of Water Pollution V/s. Andhra Pradesh Rayons Ltd. (1989) 1 SCC 44 : ( AIR 1989 SC 611 ) and Collector, Central Excise V/s. Krishna Carbon Paper Company; (1989) 1 SCC 150 : ( AIR 1988 SC 2223 ) held that fiscal statute must not only be construed literally, but also strictly. It is further well known that if in terms of the provisions of a penal statute a person became liable to follow the provisions thereof, it should be clear and unambiguous so as to let him know his obligations and liabilities thereunder. 60. Further, as indicated hereinbefore, ordinarily a literal meaning should be given to a statute. 61. Taking thus all aspects of the matter into consideration, it must be held that the word and used in sec. 2(i)(w) of the said Act must be read conjunctively and not disjunctively. 60. Further, as indicated hereinbefore, ordinarily a literal meaning should be given to a statute. 61. Taking thus all aspects of the matter into consideration, it must be held that the word and used in sec. 2(i)(w) of the said Act must be read conjunctively and not disjunctively. By reading the word buying and selling conjunctively, neither violation of the phreaseology used by the Legislature shall take place, nor the object of the Act shall be defeated. 62. Thus the statute being a penal one, the provision thereof must be strictly construed. In this view of the matter also, a person who is not otherwise required to obtain a licence under the provisions of the said Act and the rules framed thereunder cannot be held to come within the purview of the said Act, only for the alleged reason that if they are not so brought within the purview of the said Act itself may be held ultra vires as has been held by this Court in Lucky Biscuit Companys case (AIR 1978 Patna 16) (supra). Further, in my opinion, the said Act will not be rendered unconstitutional, if the buyers are not brought within the purview of the definition, of trader. As noticed above, in Lucky Biscuit Companys case (supra), this Court has held that the Act makes discrimination between different persons doing business of buying agricultural produce for one who buys and sells the agricultural produce will be liable to obtain a licence but another who buys the agricultural produce but sells it after transforming it into another goods which is not an agricultural produce will not be liable to obtain a licence. 63. The persons who buy an agricultural produce for transforming the same into another goods, which is not agricultural produce form a class by themselves. Such classification would be a valid classification and provisions of the statute cannot be interpreted on the basis of supposed violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India, although on that ground it may not be declared as ultra vires. 64. From a plain reading of the provisions of the said Act, it would be evident that only traders are required to obtain a licence. 64. From a plain reading of the provisions of the said Act, it would be evident that only traders are required to obtain a licence. Thus a person who is not a trader within the ambit of the said Act cannot be directed to Jake out a licence, only on the ground that they are carrying on business of buying. A person who buys agricultural produce for transforming it into another product, which is not an agricultural produce, cannot be said to be carrying on business in buying of agricultural produce within the meaning of sec. 2(i)(w) of the said Act. 65. A person is liable to pay fee when he buys an agricultural produce. The said Act and the rules fasten the liability upon the buyer to pay the market fee and if the buyer is not licencee, the seller has been authorised to realise market fee from him. 66. Thus even if a person buys agricultural produce for any purpose whatsoever, in our opinion, the object of the said Act is not defeated by reason of the fact that the buyer is not required to take out such licence, inasmuch as buyer has to pay the market fee and a licensed seller of the agricultural produce has been authorised to collect market fee from the buyer. 67. The purpose of the Act being to regulate market and to realise market fees, so as to render services to the agriculturist and other persons, in my opinion, the question as to whether a buyer should obtain a licence or not is wholly immaterial for the purpose of carrying out the object of the said Act. 68. The reasonings given by the learned Judges deciding the Lucky Biscuit Companys case (AIR 1978 Patna 16) (supra), to the effect that even if a person buys an agricultural produce occasionally, still he would be held to be carrying on business of buying of agricultural produce, does not appear to be sound. 69. Further, the definition of trader is exhaustive as therein both the words means and includes have been used. There is, therefore, no scope whatsoever for giving a further extended meaning to the said definition. In the premises aforesaid, I am of the opinion that Lucky Biscuit Company case ( AIR 1978 Pat 16 ) (supra) has not been correctly decided and must, therefore, be overruled. There is, therefore, no scope whatsoever for giving a further extended meaning to the said definition. In the premises aforesaid, I am of the opinion that Lucky Biscuit Company case ( AIR 1978 Pat 16 ) (supra) has not been correctly decided and must, therefore, be overruled. So far Belsand Sugar Companys case (AIR 1977 Patna 136) (supra) is concerned, as indicated hereinbefore, the facts of the case were absolutely different and have no bearing to the facts of this case. 70. Taking these all facts and circumstances into consideration, it must be held that the petitioner is not required to obtain any licence as it is not a trader within the meaning of sec. 2(i)(w) of the said Act. 71. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and it is declared that the petitioner being not a trader is not required to obtain any licence under the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Hence, the order dated 22-5-1987, passed by respondent No. 3, as contained in Annexure-2, and order dated 29-3-1988 passed by respondent No. 2, as contained in Annexure-7, being wholly illegal and without jurisdiction are hereby quashed. 72. However, in the circumstances of the case, parties shall pay and bear their own costs. 73. ROY, J.:- I have perused the judgment prepared by my learned Brother, Sinha, J. 74 It has been asserted by the petitioner that it purchases wood for use in its plant at Bokaro Steel City, namely, Bokaro Steel Plant, for incidental purposes, viz; laying of tracks etc. It neither trade in wood by entering into transaction of sale and purchase nor agricultural produces. Therefore, purchase of wood is not a trade within the meaning of the Act. It is also not a trader because it is not engaged in business of buying and selling of agricultural produces or is ordinarily engaged in business of processing agricultural produce. 75. According to the respondents, as the petitioner regularly purchases wood, it should be held that it is ordinarily engaged in business of buying agricultural produce, and, therefore, is liable to obtain licence. 76. In his judgment, learned Brother Sinha, J., has quoted the definitions of relevant words and has also quoted relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. From the definition of both trade and trader it would appear that it speaks about sale and purchase. 76. In his judgment, learned Brother Sinha, J., has quoted the definitions of relevant words and has also quoted relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. From the definition of both trade and trader it would appear that it speaks about sale and purchase. The word trader within its definition also means a person ordinarily engaged in business of processing of agricultural produce. According to the petitioner it does not process wood. In the counter-affidavit, the respondent has not denied this fact. Both the words trade and trader signify trading activity and this activity means buying and selling of agricultural produce or processing for sell of agricultural produce. Consumption of agricultural produces in this case is for incidental use in the plant and it can neither be trade or business, nor the petitioner can be said to be a trader. 77. I agree with the finding recorded by my learned Brother Sinha, J. that the petitioner is not required to obtain any licence as it is not a trader within the meaning of the Act and the orders as contained in Annexures-2 and 7 being wholly without jurisdiction are quashed. 78. B.P. SINGH, J.:- I agree. Petition allowed