Research › Browse › Judgment

Supreme Court of India · body

1990 DIGILAW 147 (SC)

Rameshwar Dass v. Chief Settlement Commissioner

1990-03-02

K.JAGANNATHA SHETTY, R.M.SAHAI

body1990
( 1 ) CERTAIN land was given to Labh Singh firstly by lease and later by Sanad with proprietary rights under Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1955. The lease was given in 1956 and sanad was granted in 1958. During the period 1960-64 Lab Singh divided that land and alienated in favour of the appellants under different sale-deeds in their favour. They were also put into possession of the different parcels of land purchased. ( 2 ) IN 1966, Ranbir Singh and others claiming that the said land ought to have been granted to them filed an appeal under Section 22 of the said Act before the Settlement Commissioner who by order dated 17/01/1966 rejected their claim. They, then appealed to the Chief settlement Commissioner under Section 24 who however, allowed their appeal setting aside the Sanad of Labh Singh. ( 3 ) BEFORE the Chief Settlement Commissioner, it was urged on behalf of the purchasers that they were entitled to the benefit of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act being bona-fide purchasers for consideration. That contention was not accepted by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. He held that there was no proper enquiry made by the purchasers regarding the title to the property. Thepurchasers then moved the High court by way of Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Learned Single Judge before whom the writ petition came for hearing was of the opinion that the purchasers should be regarded as bona-fide purchasers and entitled to get the benefit of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. So stating, he accepted the writ petition and set aside the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Thereupon, there was an appeal before the division bench by Ranbir Singh and others. Learned Judges of the division bench did not examine the validity of the finding on the merits. They however, observed that the applicability of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act depends upon the investigation of disputed get the benefit of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. So slating, he accepted the writ petition and set aside the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Thereupon, there was an appeal before the division bench by Ranbir Singh and Others. Learned Judges of the division bench did not examine the validity of the finding on the merits. So slating, he accepted the writ petition and set aside the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Thereupon, there was an appeal before the division bench by Ranbir Singh and Others. Learned Judges of the division bench did not examine the validity of the finding on the merits. They however, observed that the applicability of Section 41 of the Transfer of property Act depends upon the investigation of disputed questions of fact which cannot be determined in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. They allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of learned Single Judge. ( 4 ) THE present appeal has been preferred by obtaining leave against the order of the High court. ( 5 ) WE have carefully perused the judgment impugned in this appeal in the light of submissions of counsel on both sides. We have also perused the other material on record. ( 6 ) IT seems to us that the division bench of the High court was in error in staling that the case involves a lot of disputed questions of fact. It is not as of the High court was called upon for the first time to determine the question relating to the plea put forward by the appellants under Section 41 of T. P. Act. That question was considered by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in his appellate jurisdiction and thereafter by the learned Single Judge of the High court. In the circumstances, it would not be proper to drive the parties to another litigation. If the material on record are not sufficient to come to a proper conclusion on the plea raised by the appellants, it would be open for the High court to direct the statutory authority to deal with such question with opportunity to the parties to lead evidence. We do not think in the circumstances of the case, the division bench of the High court was justified in simply setting aside the learned Single Judge order without going into the merits of the case. ( 7 ) WE therefore, allow the appeal in setting aside the order of the division bench with a request to restore the appeal and dispose of the same in accordance with law. All the contentions of both the parties are left open. ( 8 ) IN the circumstances of the case, we however, make no order as to costs.