JUDGMENT V. P. Bhatnagar, J —One Swam Singh sold land measuring 23 bighas and 2 biswas alongwith abadi site and rights in the Shamlat Deh to Onkar Singh and others (in brief, the vendees) through registered deed Ex. P-A dated April 19, 1974, for a sum of Rs. 70,000. Appellant Lakha Singh instituted a suit on May 7, 1975 for pre-emption of the aforesaid sale on the ground that he was vendors brother. According to him, the actual sale consideration was Rs 32,000 only and it had been fictitiously shown to be Rs. 70,000. The suit was decreed on June 30, 1979 by the learned trial Court who permitted him to pre-empt the sale on payment of Rs. 32,000 in addition to the expenses incurred in the execution and registration of the sale deed amounting to Rs 4,915. In first appeal decided on December 31,1980, the learned District Judge upheld the right of the appellant to pre-empt the same but directed that Rs 70,000 be paid by him to the vendees instead of Rs. 32,000 allowed by the Court below. The balance amount was duly deposited within the time granted by the District Judge. The vendees thereafter withdrew the amount. In execution proceedings, Lakha Singh was delivered the possession of land in question on June 23, 1981. Simultaneously, Lakha Singh had filed a Regular Second Appeal on March 2, 198! praying that the impugned order to the extent it related to increase in the sale consideration be set aside. 2. During the pendency of the present appeal, the Supreme Court held in Atam Prakash v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1986 SC 859 the right of pre-emption granted to kinsfolk on the basis of consanguinity illegal. Thus, clauses First, Secondly’ and Thirdly of section 15 (!) (a) and (b) and (c) and the whole of section 15(2) were declared ultra-vires the Constitution. Thus, clauses First, Secondly’ and Thirdly of section 15 (!) (a) and (b) and (c) and the whole of section 15(2) were declared ultra-vires the Constitution. In Jagdish and others v. Nathi Mal Kejriwal and others, AIR J987 SC 68 the expression "other co-sharers" in clause Fourthly of section 15 (i) (b) fell for interpretation and the Supreme Court held that it referred only to those co sharers who do not fail under clause First or Secondly or Thirdly of section 15 (i) (b) It was observed in Partap Singh and others v. Vidya Devi, ILR 1987 HP 281 that the rationale behind excluding co-sharers who fall under clauses First’ or secondly or Thirdly of section 15 (i) (b) is that they are also related to the Vendor in a manner so as to be entitled to claim pre-emption On the ground of consanguinity. 3. Appellant Lakha Singh, as stated above, had prayed for a decree of possession through pre-emption on the basis that he was vendors brother. Manifestly, therefore, his right to pre-empt no longer existed after the aforesaid pronouncements made by the Supreme Court. 4. It was during the pendency of the present Rugular Second Appeal that the respondents moved C. M. P. No. 52 of 1987 praying that the said appeal be disposed of in accordance with the judgments of the Supreme Court mentioned above. On the other hand, the appellant moved C. M P. No. 62 of 1987 praying that his appeal be dismissed as withdrawn since the only point involved pertains to additional pre-emption amount which stands deposited and the money withdrawn. Before arguments could be heard on the aforesaid applications and appeal decided one way or the other, the Punjab Pre-emption (Himachal Pradesh Repealing) Act, 1987 was promulgated with effect from May 8, 1987. It repealed the provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 in the territories comprised in the State of Himachal Pradesh and stipulated that on and from the date of its commencement, no Court shall pass a decree in any suit for pre-emption However, the same was not to affect any decree which has been passed under the Act so repealed and had become final. 5. The law laid down in Atam Parkash was to have no applicability to the decrees which had become final and against which no appeals had been preferred. 5. The law laid down in Atam Parkash was to have no applicability to the decrees which had become final and against which no appeals had been preferred. To the same effect are the provisions of the Punjab Preemption (Himachal Pradesh Repealing) Act, 1987. The underlying idea of making this provision by Court as also the Legislature manifestly was not to disturb or unsettle the dispute which stood settled under the law of pre-emption prevalent for many decades. 6. While striking down clauses First, Secondly’ and Thirdly’ of section 15 (1) (a) and (b) and (c) and whole of section 15 (2) as ultra-vires on the ground that right of pre-emption granted to kinsfolk on the basis of consanguinity was illegal, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Atam Prakash considered as to from which date the law laid down therein would become applicable to the cases pending in various courts. In para 14 of that case, they observed as under:— "We are told that in some cases suits are pending in various courts and where decrees have been passed, appeals are pending in appellate Courts. Such suits and appeals will now be disposed of in accordance with the declaration granted by us. We are told that there are a few cases where suits have been decreed and the decrees have become final, no appeals having been filed against those decrees. The decrees will be binding inter-parties and the declaration granted by us will be of no avail to the parties thereto. 7. As far as the present case is concerned, it is not denied that the parties from the very beginning have been litigating mainly with respect to the quantum of the sale consideration. The learned trial Court decreed the suit for pre-emption on payment of Rs. 32,000 as the amount actually paid in addition to the expenses incurred. In the first appeal preferred against the aforesaid judgment and decree, the sale consideration was enhanced to Rs 70,000. This judgment was delivered as back as on December 31, 1980, Lakha Singh deposited the enhanced amount within time and got the possession of the suit land on June 23, 1981 in execution proceedings. The pre-emption amount was duly withdrawn by the vendees. The law is clear that the title in the suit land would pass to the pre-emptor from the date of deposit of the pre-emption amount. The pre-emption amount was duly withdrawn by the vendees. The law is clear that the title in the suit land would pass to the pre-emptor from the date of deposit of the pre-emption amount. Reference in this connection may be had to Bhoop v. Matadin Bhardwaj, JT 1990 (4) SC 594. 8. Had the matter rested there, the controversy would have come to an end. Lakha Singh, however, instituted the present Rugular Second Appeal on March 2, 1981 throwing a challenge to the enhancement of the pre-emption amount from Rs, 32,000 to Rs. 70,000 Thus the main question which falls for determination is whether the pre-emption decree can be deemed to have become final inter-se the parties, notwithstanding the pendency of this appeal. 9. As stated above, the present appeal is only confined to the point of enhancement of pre-emption amount. The controversy with respect to Lakha Singh having superior right to pre-empt has neither been agitated nor cross-objections filed. Taking a strict technical view of the matter, it could be said that no final decree exists as of today because of the pendency of this appeal but it has to be borne in mind that the parties have not been at issue for a period of as long as almost ten years as far as the right to pre-empt is concerned. Not only that, Lakha Singh even got the possession of the suit land in the year 1981 and the vendees withdrew the pre-emption amount. In the totality of the above circumstances, the position thus obtained need not be altered at this point of time I am of the firm view that adoption of such a course would only meet the broad intention of their Lordships of the Supreme Court expressed in para 14 of Atam Prakash. 10. Furthermore, appellant Lakha Singh has moved an application for dismissal of his appeal as withdrawn and there is no legal bar in allowing it. Once this application is accepted, this appeal otherwise would come to an end. 1.1. As regards the Punjab Pre-emption (Himachal Pradesh Repealing) Act, 1987, it has been stated at the bar that its vires stand challenged in another appeal which stands admitted. Once this application is accepted, this appeal otherwise would come to an end. 1.1. As regards the Punjab Pre-emption (Himachal Pradesh Repealing) Act, 1987, it has been stated at the bar that its vires stand challenged in another appeal which stands admitted. This need not told me from giving the final decision of this case since I am basing my decision mainly on the law laid down in Atam Prakash and also because adjudication of the point with respect to vires of aforesaid Act will not have any bearing on this case either way. 12. As a consequence of above discussion, I accept C. M. P. No. 62 of 1987 and allow the appellant to withdraw his appeal which is accordingly dismissed. CMP. No. 52 of 1987 would automatically stand disposed of. Parties are left to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.