JUDGMENT : V. Gopalaswamy, J. - The present Petitioner, as the landlord of the house in question, has filed the H. R. C. Case No. 18 of 1981 u/s 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act praying for eviction of the present opposite party No. 1 from his house and its premises on the ground of bona fide requirement of the house and further alleging that the opposite party" No. 1 is a wilful defaulter in the matter of payment of rent. The opposite party No. 1 had resisted the application for eviction on the ground that he was in occupation of the house in his own right after constructing it over the Government land and that, therefore, in respect of that house, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The House Rent Controller (opposite party No. 2) found that in respect of the house in question, the opposite party No. 1 was a tenant under the Petitioner and was a wilful defaulter in the matter of payment of rent and that the landlord required the house for his bona fide use and on the basis of such findings, passed the judgment dated 31-8-1982 in favour of the Petitioner directing the opposite party No. 1 to vacate the said house and the premises. Being aggrieved by that order, the opposite party No. 1 preferred the H. R. C. Appeal No. 12 of 1982 and the same was allowed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mayurbhanj (Opp. party No. 3) on the sole ground that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties in respect of the house in dispute. The appellate Court did not consider it necessary to give its findings on the other issues. Hence, the present writ application is filed for setting aside the order of the appellate authority (Opp. party No. 3) dismissing the H. R. C. Case filed by the Petitioner. 2. Admittedly, the land over which the house in dispute stands belongs to the Government and there is no written agreement between the parties in evidence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between them. The main issue which came up for decision before the House Rent Controller and the appellate authority is whether there was existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties in respect of the house in question. 3. The main issue which came up for decision before the House Rent Controller and the appellate authority is whether there was existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties in respect of the house in question. 3. The opposite party No. 1 lodged the F. I. R. Ext. 2 on 15-10-1980, alleging that the Petitioner has trespassed into the house in question and bas committed mischief and on the basis of that F. I. R., G. R. Case No. 868 of 1980 was initiated against the Petitioner. On a perusal of the judgment dated 31-8-1982 of the House Rent Controller, it is seen that the admissions made by opposite party No. 1 in the F. I. R., Ext. 2, admitting that he was a tenant in respect of the disputed house, very much weighed with the trial Court in passing the judgment ill favour of the Petitioner directing the eviction of opposite party No. 1 from that house, as can be seen from the following observations in paragraph 5 of the judgment: Ext. 2 is the F. I. R. which was lodged at Baripada Police Station by the O. P. himself on 15-10-1980 on the allegation that the Petitioner having trespassed into the disputed house committed mischief and created troubles in his possession. Said F.I.R. was reduced in to writing by p. w. 6 according to the direction of the then O.I.C./ Pratap Chandra Samal. P. w. 6 makes it clear in his evidence that he reduced the oral report of the O. P. into writing as per Ext. 2 and he read over and explained the contents thereof and the O. P. and after knowing the correctness of the contents signed the same. Not only from the evidence of p. w. 6 but also from the endorsement made by him in Ext. 2 it is abundantly clear that the copy of the said F.I. R. was delivered to the O. P. at that time P. w. 6 being a responsible Police Officer cannot be believed to have deposed lie particularly when he has taken oath to speak nothing but truth. It is also not conceivable that while Ext. 2 was reduced into writing at that time the Petitioner who was not present at the police station got anything inserted in that F. I. R. gaining over the concerned Police Sub-Inspector. The genuineness of Ext. It is also not conceivable that while Ext. 2 was reduced into writing at that time the Petitioner who was not present at the police station got anything inserted in that F. I. R. gaining over the concerned Police Sub-Inspector. The genuineness of Ext. 2 which speaks a volume on the subject is undoubtedly unquestionable. In Ext. 2 the O. P. has clearly admitted that he has been residing in the disputed house belonging to the Petitioner on payment of a monthly rent of about Rs 40/- for about last five years. This unambiguous admission of the O. P. appearing in Ext. 2 clinches the entire issue in as much as it is indicated therefrom that the house in question belongs to the Petitioner and the O. P. as a monthly tenant has been residing in two rooms thereof since the year 1975. 4. For getting over the effect of the admissions made by the opposite party in Ext. 2, he relied on the certified copy of his own deposition as p. w. 2 in G. R. Case No. 868 of 1980, which was received as additional evidence on his side and marked as Ext. G in the appellate Court. From paragraph 9 of the judgment in H. R. C. Appeal it is seen that the statements made by opposite party No. 1 while deposing in the G. R. Case weighed very much with the appellate Court while allowing the appeal as can be seen from the following observations made by the appellate Court in paragraph 9 of its judgment: Moreover, the certified copy of the deposition is a public document and it is necessary for the ends of justice to admit the same as additional evidence at this stage for a just decision. Therefore, the certified copy of the deposition of the O. P. as p. w. 2 in G. R. Case No. 868/80 is admitted as additional evidence and the prayer of the O. P. to admit the same is thus allowed. The said certified copy of the deposition of the O. P. as p. w. 2 is therefore, marked as Ext. G. Ext. G clearly shows that the O. P. has denied the tenancy under the Petitioner in respect of the suit premises. Further the O.P. has categorically stated in Ext. The said certified copy of the deposition of the O. P. as p. w. 2 is therefore, marked as Ext. G. Ext. G clearly shows that the O. P. has denied the tenancy under the Petitioner in respect of the suit premises. Further the O.P. has categorically stated in Ext. G that he has not made any statement that he is occupying two rooms on rental basis in the house belonging to the Petitioner. He has also denied categorically before the police that the house is constructed by Akhaya Kumar Behera and that two rooms are let out to him on a monthly rent of Rs. 40/-. 5. In this writ petition the main contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that Ext. G. is inadmissible and that the appellate authority acted illegally in placing reliance on the self-serving statements made by opposite party No. 1 while deposing in the G. R. Case, as the same are not admissible in evidence and that the judgment of the appellate Court is vitiated on that score alone. 6. Ext. G is the certified copy of the deposition of the opposite party No. 1 in the criminal proceeding, wherein the opposite party No. 1 is the informant and the present Petitioner figured as an accused. The general rule is that all evidence must be direct, that is, the witness must himself appear in Court to give viva voce evidence of the facts which he claims to have perceived. Section 33 of the Evidence Act is an exception to this general rule. Under this section, a deposition given by a witness in a former judicial proceeding is admissible to prove the truth of the facts stated therein, provided the unavailability of the witness is satisfactorily proved and the conditions enumerated in that section are fulfilled. Proof of unavailability of the witness is a necessary pre-requisite for the admission of former deposition. So in the present case the deposition, Ext. G, is not admissible u/s 33 of the Evidence Act. However, as a previous deposition is a previous statement it may, therefore, be legitimately used for purposes for which previous statements are generally used. Proof of unavailability of the witness is a necessary pre-requisite for the admission of former deposition. So in the present case the deposition, Ext. G, is not admissible u/s 33 of the Evidence Act. However, as a previous deposition is a previous statement it may, therefore, be legitimately used for purposes for which previous statements are generally used. On a consideration of the classification of the relevant facts under Chapter II of the Evidence Act, it is seen that the relevancy of the statements about the facts to be proved is covered by Sections 17 to 39 of the Evidence Act. So it remains to be considered whether at all the statements contained in the deposition Ext. G can be received as an admission. 7. u/s 17 an admission is a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, provided it is made by any of the persons and under the circumstances enumerated in Sections 18 to 20. Sections 17 to 20 of the Evidence Act define admissions and Section 21 makes admissions relevant and provable. An admission as defined u/s 17 includes both self-serving statements as well as self-harming statements. The admissions are substantive evidence and if a party is permitted to prove the statements made by himself and in favour of his own case, it would encourage him to fabricate evidence in his own favour. It would be extremely unsafe to allow the parties to support their claims by their own self-serving testimony. It is precisdly for this reason Section 21 provides that admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the person, who makes them or his representative in interest but they cannot be proved by or on behalf of the person who makes them or by his representative in interest, except in the three cases mentioned in the section. 8. Statutory Illustration (2) u/s 21 explains as to what type of statement can be proved by a party as an admission and so the same is considered below. The question between A and B is, whether a certain deed is or is not forged. A affirms that it is genuine, B that it is forged. Under Section 17, an admission is a statement which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact. So the earlier statements made by. The question between A and B is, whether a certain deed is or is not forged. A affirms that it is genuine, B that it is forged. Under Section 17, an admission is a statement which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact. So the earlier statements made by. A that the deed is genuine or that the deed is forged are both admissions, though one is self-serving and the other is self-harming. Likewise, the earlier statements made by B that the deed is genuine or that the deed is forged are both admissions. But then, it is extremely unsafe to allow the parties to support their claims by their own self-serving testimony. Hence only, it is expressly provided under Illustration (a) that A may prove a statement by B that the deed is genuine and B may prove a statement by A that the deed is forged; but A cannot prove a statement by himself that the deed is genuine, nor can B prove a statement by himself that the deed is forged. 9. So the principle enunciated in Illustration (a) u/s 21 must be kept in mind while considering the admissibility of Ext. G in favour of the opposite party No. 1. In the present case, the question between the Petitioner and the opposite party No. 1 is whether the opposite party No. 1 is or is not a tenant in respect of the disputed house. The Petitioner affirms that the opposite party No. 1 is a tenant, whereas the opposite party No. 1 denies it. So the Petitioner may prove the statement made by the opposite party No. 1 that he is a tenant. Likewise the opposite party No. 1 may prove a statement made by the Petitioner admitting that he (opp. party No. 1) is not a tenant in respect of the disputed house, but the opposite party No. 1 will not be permitted to prove to a statement by himself that he is not a tenant. 10. Section 21 provides that admissions cannot be proved by or on behalf of the person, who makes them except in the three cases mentioned in Clauses (1), (2) and (3) of that section. 10. Section 21 provides that admissions cannot be proved by or on behalf of the person, who makes them except in the three cases mentioned in Clauses (1), (2) and (3) of that section. According to Section 21(1), the statement is admissible even in favour of its maker and during his life time if on the death of its maker, it would be admissible under anyone of the eight clauses of Section 32. Under Section 21(3), if an admission becomes admissible in favour of the person, who made it under some other section of the Act, it will not be rendered inadmissible by the rule indicated in Section 21. Thus the entries in books of account regularly kept are admissible u/s 34, even if they amount to admissions in one's own favour. 11. Coming to the facts of the present case the opposite party No. 1 while deposing in the G. R. Case as p. w. 2 on 15-10-1982 (that is subsequent to the date of the judgment of the House Rent Controller against him on 31-8-1982) stated that the recitals in Ext. 2 were not read over to him arid that he was not occupying the house as a tenant and that he did not make any statement earlier that he was occupying the house on rental basis and all the said statements are self-serving statements made by opposite party No. 1 himself and, therefore, u/s 21 of the Evidence Act he cannot be permitted to prove the same as evidence on his own behalf. The nature of the statements contained in the deposition, Ext. G, are such that they do not come within any of the three exceptions mentioned in Clauses (1), (2) and (3) of Section 21. So the appellate Court acted illegally in relying on the self-serving statements made by opposite party No. 1 while deposing in the criminal case as the same are inadmissible evidence for the reasons stated above. 12. The appellate Court has relied on for its decision upon the deposition Ext. G which is inadmissible in evidence. As the statements of opposite party No. 1 in Ext. G very much weighed with the appellate Court in allowing the appeal, it is impossible to state what the conclusion of the appellate Court would have been, had this Ext. G been excluded from consideration. G which is inadmissible in evidence. As the statements of opposite party No. 1 in Ext. G very much weighed with the appellate Court in allowing the appeal, it is impossible to state what the conclusion of the appellate Court would have been, had this Ext. G been excluded from consideration. So it is proper that the case should be remanded to the appellate Court for fresh disposal according to law. 13. As it is proposed to remand the case for re-hearing by the appellate Court, it is neither necessary nor proper to discuss the other points raised by the parties, as such a discussion by this Court is very likely to prejudice one or the other of the parties at the time of re-hearing of the appeal. 14. In the result, the judgment passed by the appellate Court in H. R. C. Appeal No. 12 of 1982 is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the appellate Court for fresh disposal according to law with the direction that Ext. G should be excluded from its consideration while considering the material on record. Accordingly, the writ application is allowed, but in the circumstances of the case, the parties to bear their own costs. G.B. Patnaik, J. I agree. Writ application allowed. Final Result : Allowed