Judgment : 1. The petitioner is accused in P.R.C.No.2 of 1987 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Salem. 2. He was the Additional Superintendent of Police, Prohibition and Enforcement Wing, Salem at the relevant time. The respondent herein was in charge of an arrack shop belonging to his uncle, at Sivathapuram, who was the highest bidder in the auction held by the Government of Tamil Nadu. The sales in the licensed arrack shop of his uncle got dwindled by the illicit distillers of arrack. Consequently, he sent petitions to the higher authorities to quell the activities of the illicit distillers of arrack. Notwithstanding all these, the illicit distillery was on the increase and it was found out that such illicit distillery was done because of the helping hand stated to have been given by the petitioner on receipt of mamool from such illicit distillers. The respondent, consequently, sent petitions to the higher authorities regarding the corrupt activities of the petitioner in encouraging the illicit distillation. The petitioner therefore bore a grudge against the respondent. 3. Consequently, the respondent was summoned to his office on 20.3.1985 at about 8.30 P.M. Accordingly, he went there. On his reaching there, he was beaten black and blue by the petitioner. After some time, the respondent was stated to have been taken in a jeep to the Prohibition and Excise Wingsituate near Five Roads Junction and there also, he was belaboured by the petitioner. The torture went to such an extent that the petitioner even tried his level best to procure a gun or revolver to shoot and kill him. It was by sheer accident that he could not procure such weapons and therefore he got escaped from the perilous consequence in which he was placed at the hands of the petitioner. 4. Regarding the torture meted out at the hands of the petitioner, he sent petitions to the authorities in vain. He knocked at the doors of this court by filing Crl.M.P. for an action to be taken against the petitioner also in vain. He further agitated the matter by filing S.L.P. before the Supreme Court, which was also dismissed by giving a direction to resort to initiation of proceedings before the competent forum. Consequently, he laid the complaint on 29.1.1987, which is now pending in the aforesaid P.R. case for alleged offences under Secs. He further agitated the matter by filing S.L.P. before the Supreme Court, which was also dismissed by giving a direction to resort to initiation of proceedings before the competent forum. Consequently, he laid the complaint on 29.1.1987, which is now pending in the aforesaid P.R. case for alleged offences under Secs. 341, 342, 323, 363, 364, 506 (Part II) and 307, I.P.C. against the petitioner. 5. On receipt of process, the petitioner has come forward with the present action invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this court to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against him. 6. Learned senior counsel Mr.N. Natarajan would urge the following points for consideration: (1) There is an inordinate delay of nearly about two years in launching the prosecution, which is fatal to the case of the prosecution; (2) The prosecution is bad for want of sanction under Sec. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and (3) The prosecution, as instituted, is barred by limitation by the special provisions as adumbrated under Sec.53 of the Tamil Nadu District Police Act, 1859 (Central Act XXIV of 1859 -for short ‘the Act’). 7. Mr.N.T. Vanamamalai, learned senior counsel for appearing for the respondent would, however, repel such submissions. 8. No doubt true it is that the prosecution has been launched by the respondent after a delay of nearly two years. The delay in a petition like the present one is immaterial unless the delay is to stand in the way of the prosecution, in the sense of the same being a bar as barred by limitation. The delay, as otherwise, is a factor to be taken into consideration for the purpose of evaluating or assessing the credit-worthiness of the evidence and materials available on record during such a trial. It is equally permissible and plausible for the delay to be explained by adduction of evidence during trial. It is for the trial court to consider such question on the materials available on record and record a finding thereon. In this view of the matter, the delay, even if construed to be an inordinate one, if not falling within the purview of limitation, is of no consequence at this stage. [Para.9 omitted -Ed.] 9. The benevolence of the aforesaid provision is not at all available to a public servant falling within the definition of Sec.21 of the Indian Indian Indian Penal Code. [Para.9 omitted -Ed.] 9. The benevolence of the aforesaid provision is not at all available to a public servant falling within the definition of Sec.21 of the Indian Indian Indian Penal Code. Only such of those public servants, who are not removable from their office, save by or with the sanction of the Government alone are entitled to claim the right inhered in their favour in the section. The further thing that is necessary is that the act done by the Public servant should have been done or committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. If these two things are satisfied, then sanction for prosecution is a must ‘before any public servant is prosecuted for any offence whatever’. 10. So far as the case on hand is concerned, admittedly the petitioner serving at the relevant point of time as Additional Superintendent of Police, Prohibition and Excise Wing, is a public servant falling within Sec.21 of the Indian Indian Indian Penal Code and that apart, he is not removable from the office save by or with the sanction for the Government. [Para 12 omitted - Ed.] 11. At the relevant time, the petitioner, as stated earlier, had been serving as the Additional Superintendent of Police, Prohibition and Excise Wing, in charge of Salem District. On the face of Sec.21 of Tamil Nadu District Police Act, it goes without saying that the petitioner shall for all practical purposes be considered to be always on duty and shall have the powers of a police officer in every part of the General Police District, namely, Salem District, who was then in charge of Prohibition and Excise Wing. He was therefore entitled to summon any person to his office for purposes enumerated in the aforesaid section. 12. The respondent was stated to have been taken to the office of the petitioner on the relevant day, pursuant to the exercise of power inhering in him; but that does not mean, under the colour of exercise of such power, he is entitled to torture him by his being kicked and beaten black and blue and such alleged acts, can, by no stretch of imagination, be stated to have been done in the discharge of his official duties. The benevolent provisions of Sec. 197, Cr.P.C. can come to his rescue only for such acts done in discharge of his official duties. In such state of affairs, to say that sanction is required for his being prosecuted for such alleged acts is not tenable. 13. At this juncture, a useful reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in S.B. Saha and others v. M.S. Kochar S.B. Saha and others v. M.S. Kochar, 1979 Crl.L.J. 1367. The relevant portion of the judgment of their Lordships as given in Headnote (B) may be extracted and it is as follows: “The sine qua non for the applicability of Sec.197, Cr.P.C. is that the offence charged, be it one of commission or omission, must be one which has been committed by the public servant either in his official capacity or under colour of the office held by him. The words “any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” employed in Sec. 197(1) are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, “it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence and never can be”. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between these two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Sec.197(1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision. It is the quality of the act that is important, and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties, the protection contemplated by Sec.197 will be attracted. The question whether an offence was committed in the course of official duty or under colour of office depends on the facts of each case. It is the quality of the act that is important, and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties, the protection contemplated by Sec.197 will be attracted. The question whether an offence was committed in the course of official duty or under colour of office depends on the facts of each case. One broad test for this purpose is whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim, that what he does he does in virtue of his office. In a case under Sec.409, I.P.C. the official capacity is material only in connection with the entrustment’ and does not necessarily enter into the later act of misappropriation or conversion which is the act complained of. When the act complained of is dishonest misappropriation or conversion of the goods by the accused persons, which they had seized and, as such, were holding in trust to be dealt with in accordance with law, sanction of the appropriate Government was not necessary for the prosecution of the accused for an offence under Secs.499/120-B, I.P.C. because the alleged act of criminal misappropriation complained of was not committed by them while they were acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty, the commission of the offence having no direct connection or inseparable link with their duties as public servants. At the most, the official status of the accused furnished them with an opportunity or occasion to commit the alleged criminal act. There can be no dispute that the seizure of the goods by the accused and their being thus entrusted with the goods or dominion over them, was an act committed by them while acting in the discharge of their official duty. But the subsequent act of dishonest misappropriation or conversion complained of could not bear such an integral relation to the duty of the accused persons that they would genuinely claim that they committed it in the course of the performance of their official duty. There is nothing in the nature of quality of the act complained of which attaches to or partakes of the official character of the accused who allegedly did it. Nor could the alleged act of misappropriation of conversion, be reasonably said to be imbued with the colour of the office held by the accused persons.” 14. This decision is applicable on all fours to the facts of the case on hand. Nor could the alleged act of misappropriation of conversion, be reasonably said to be imbued with the colour of the office held by the accused persons.” 14. This decision is applicable on all fours to the facts of the case on hand. As such, the submission as respects procurement of sanction for prosecution of the petitioner bristles next to nothing. 15. On the question of limitation, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would draw my attention to the provisions adumbrated in Sec.53 of the Act and the first limb of the section, which is relevant for the purpose of this case may be extracted and it is as follows: “53. Limitation of action: All actions and prosecutions against any person which may be lawfully brought for any thing done or intended to be done, under the provisions of this Act, or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force conferring powers On the police shall be commenced within three months after the act complained of shall have been committed and not otherwise………” 16. According to this limb of the section, all actions and prosecutions for anything done or intended to be done by any person have to be launched within three months after the act complained of has been committed. Admittedly in the case on hand, initiation of launching of prosecution against the petitioner is after the lapse of nearly two years from the date of the act complained of. On the face of such provision, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner would say that the prosecution as launched is completely barred by limitation. He would also draw my attention to the provisions adumbrated under Sec.468, Cr.P.C. dealing with bar to taking cognizance after the lapse of the period of limitation. This section categorises the offences in respect of which cognizance cannot be taken after the expiry of the periods specified therein, irrespective of who has committed the offence. The benefit of this section is therefore available to every offender whether he is a private individual or a public servant, if his case falls within the purview of this section, whereas Sec.53 of the Act does not provide for limitation in relation to particular categories of offences unlike Sec.468 of the Cr.P.C, which provides for limitation in respect of prosecution, irrespective of their nature instituted against police officers. As such, Sec.468, Cr.P.C. and Sec.53 of the Act operate in different fields. Sec.53 of the Act is a special provision in regard to police officers while Sec.468 of the Cr.P.C. is a general provision in regard to offenders in general. Therefore, these two sections do not operate in the same field or area and do not overlap and that apart, the provision of Sec.53 of the Act, which is a special provision, must prevail over the general law enacted in Sec.468 of the Cr.P.C. To this effect is the decision reported in R.Meeriah and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh R.Meeriah and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1978 MLJ. (Crl.) 412 which was drawn to my attention by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. I respectfully agree with the said view taken by learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 17. In this view of the matter, the complaint in the case on hand having been filed long subsequent to the lapse of three months of the act complained of against the petitioner, it goes without saying that the prosecution so launched is clearly barred by Sec.53 of the Act. 18. In the view that I have taken on the question of limitation, the petition deserves to be allowed. 19. In the result, the petition is allowed and the proceedings initiated against the petitioner in P.R.C.No.2 of 1987 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Salem shall stand quashed.