JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J. - This application is directed against an order dated 6.4.1990 passed by Shri Bishambhar Upadhaya, Sub-ordinate Judge, Ranchi in Misc. Case No. 33/87 whereby and whereunder the said learned court rejected the application filed by the plaintiffs Opp-parties in terms whether it was declared that the consent decree dated 24.6.1987 was an unlawful and illegal one. 2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. 3. The Opp-party No. 1 filed a partition suit being Partition Suit No. 327 in the Sub-ordinate 1st Court Ranchi. The Opp-party No.1 being the mother of the plaintiffs-Opp-parties No.2 to 6 acted as their next friend and guardian. 4. The defendants No. 1 to 3 petitioners in the aforementioned suit filed their written statement denying and disputing the claim of the plaintiff. Allegedly the parties entered into a compromise and adjusted all their disputes on 24.6.1987. The said compromise was allegedly signed by all the defendants as also by the plaintiff No. 1 on behalf of the minor plaintiff purported to be upon obtaining necessary permission of the Court. By an order dated 1.7.1987 the said petition of compromise filed by the parties was accepted and a final decree was prepared on the basis thereof. The said final decree was signed on 13.7.1987. 5. On 10.7.1987 an application was filed under Section 151 of the C.P.C. in the aforementioned suit praying therein that the order accepting the said compromise dated 24.6.1987 be set aside. 6. The said application dated 10.7.1987 which is contained in Annexure-3 to the civil revision application was inter alia based on two grounds viz : (i) A fraud was practised upon plaintiff No.1 to sign the said compromise petition dated 24.6.1987 and her signature was• obtained on a false representation. (ii) Plaintiff No.1 being the mother of the other minor plaintiff had no authority under the law to compromise the suit on their behalf. 7. A rejoinder to the said application was filed by the petitioners wherein the assertions made by the plaintiffs Opp-parties were denied and disputed. The said petition is contained in Annexure-4 to the civil revision application. 8. The plaintiffs-Opp-parties filed a rejoinder to the said application which is contained in Annexure-5 to the civil revision application. 9. 7. A rejoinder to the said application was filed by the petitioners wherein the assertions made by the plaintiffs Opp-parties were denied and disputed. The said petition is contained in Annexure-4 to the civil revision application. 8. The plaintiffs-Opp-parties filed a rejoinder to the said application which is contained in Annexure-5 to the civil revision application. 9. By reason of the impugned order, the learned court below held that he had jurisdiction to make an enquiry with regard to the allegations made in the application filed by the plaintiffs-opp. parties under Section 151 of the CPC. 10. The learned court below in support of his aforementioned findings relied upon a decision of this court in Maimun Nisa vs. -Mohammad Khodabin reported in AIR 1985 Patna 55. 11. Upon consideration of the evidences, on record the learned court below further held that as fraud was practised upon the plaintiff No. 1 in obtaining her signature on the compromise petition and further in view of the fact that no leave of the court was obtained by the next friend or guardian of the minor for the purpose of entering into the aforementioned compromise as is required under Order 32 Rule 7 (1) (A) of the CPC, the said compromise being not lawful, a suit is barred in terms of Order 23 Rule 3A of the CPC and in that view of the matter the application under Section 151 was maintainable. 12. It was further held that in view of Article 360 of the Mulla's Mohammedan Law, the mother being not a guardian, she was not entitled to enter into a compromise on behalf of her children. Reliance in this connection has been placed in Md. Zaffar vs. Amiruddin reported in 1963 Patna 108. 13. Mr. Prasad the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised several contentions in support of the application. The learned counsel firstly submitted that in view of sub-section 3 of section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure as also Order 43 Rule 1 (A) (2) thereof it must be held that an appeal was maintainable, and thus an application under Section 151 of the - CPC was not maintainable. 14. The learned counsel further submitted that in relation to the question as to whether the plaintiff no. 14. The learned counsel further submitted that in relation to the question as to whether the plaintiff no. 1 had authority to sign the compromise petition or not could only - be determined by filing a suit as in relation thereto the provisions of Order 23 Rules 3A of the CPC would have no. application. The learned counsel in this connection has relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Lagandeo Singh vs. Satyadeo Singh reported in 1992 (1) PLJR 184; Gosto Behari Pramanik vs. Matti Sen reported in AIR 1985 Calcutta 379 and S.G. Thimnappa vs. T. Anantha and others reported in AIR 1986 Karnataka 1. 15. The learned counsel further submitted that a fraud practised upon a party cannot be equated with fraud practised upon the court and in that view of the matter too, an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not maintainable. 16 The learned counsel in this connection has relied upon a decision of this Court in Sheodhar Prasad Singh vs. Ramdeo Pmsad Singh and ors. reported in AIR 1934, Patna, 229. 17. Learned counsel further submitted that from the records it would appear that an application was filed by plaintiff no. 1 for obtaining leave to enter into a compromise on behalf of the minors although no order was passed thereupon. According to the learned counsel, therefore, plaintiff no. 1 took all steps which were necessary to be taken for entering into a lawful compromise. Learned counsel further submitted that in any event, the order dated 1.7.1987 could not have been set aside by the court below inasmuch the said order has been passed by his predecessor in office having satisfied himself that the compromise petition was lawful. 18. Learned counsel further drew my attention to the fact that the final decree was prepared and signed on 13.7.1987. The said final decree is Annexure-2 to the Civil Revision application. On a perusal of the said final decree it would appear that Schedule B lands were allotted to the plaintiff opposite party no. 1, Mary Khan widow of late Mohit Khan and daughter-in-law of late Fazlu Karim Khan. The said allotment is at page 16 of the final decree whereunder a total area of 4.88 acres of lands were all oiled to her. 1, Mary Khan widow of late Mohit Khan and daughter-in-law of late Fazlu Karim Khan. The said allotment is at page 16 of the final decree whereunder a total area of 4.88 acres of lands were all oiled to her. Likewise under Schedule Dl at pages 1719 of the Final decree the minor plaintiffs opposite party nos. 4 & 5 namely Fazal Khan and Mustafa Khan have been jointly allotted lands in different villages to the extent of 19.52 acres. In like manner under Schedule DII at pages 19-20 of the final decree lands in different villages to the extent 14-67 acres have been allotted to the shares of minor plaintiff/opposite party nos. 2, 3 and 6 namely Fatima, Firoza and Farida. It has been submitted under paragraph 3 of the said compromise petition forming part of the final decree the interest of the minor plaintiff/opposite parties have been fully safeguarded as till the age of attaining majority by the said minor children their mother shall not sell or dispose of any property belonging to the, said minors except by the written permission of the District Judge I, competent judicial authority as per law. From the signature appended at its foot at page 21 of the final decree, it appears the plaintiff-opposite party no. 1 has signed the same in her individual capacity and also as natural guardian and next friend of minor plaintiff/opposite parties 2 to 6. The said compromise petition has also been duly signed by the Advocates concerned including the Advocate for the plaintiff/opposite parties. 19. It was further contended that 'as opposite party no. 1 alone filed the purported application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not on behalf of the minors, even the plea of non-grant of leave of the court in terms of Order 32 Rule 7 (1) (A) of the Code of Civil Procedure could not have been agitated therein nor can it be contended by plaintiff no. 1 that she was not the guardian of her minor children under the Mohammedan Law. Learned counsel submitted that in view of the provisions contained in Order 32 Rules 1 and 5, any next friend is entitled to file a suit on behalf of the minors subject to the condition that he or she docs not have any interest adverse to that of the minor. 20. Mr. Learned counsel submitted that in view of the provisions contained in Order 32 Rules 1 and 5, any next friend is entitled to file a suit on behalf of the minors subject to the condition that he or she docs not have any interest adverse to that of the minor. 20. Mr. M.Y. Eqbal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party on the other hand strongly relied upon the decision of this Court in AIR 1985 Patna 55 and submitted that this is clearly a case where the provisions of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be attracted. 21. Learned counsel further submitted that from a comparison of shares of the respective parties under the Mohammedan Law and the portions allotted to them in the final decree which is based upon the compromise petition, it would appear that the plaintiffs have been allotted only 46.45 acres of land out of their share of 60.32 acres and further the defendant–petitioner has not only been allotted the most valuable lands but also has been allotted a factory with all fixtures and machines, guns, motor cycles valued at Rs. 6 lakhs although in law he was entitled only to 55.97 acres of land. 22. Learned counsel further submitted that in terms of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was incumbent upon the court to satisfy itself as to whether the compromise entered into by and between the parties was a lawful one or not and the court is required to apply its mind with more care and - circumspection in a case where one of the parties is a lady and her minor children. According to the learned counsel, the order dated 1.7.87 does not ex facie show that the court had applied its mind before holding that the compromise is a lawful one. According to the learned counsel, the observations made by the court is casual in nature. Learned counsel in this connection has relied upon M/s. Damodar Ropeways & Construction Co. (P) Ltd. vs. Christopher Martin Dasgranges Martin & others reported in 1990 - (1) Unreported Judgments SC 251; in Gurprect Singh Versus Chatur Bhuj God reported in 1988 (1) SCC 270 ; in Sanyasi Jena and others vs. Mina Jena and others reported in AIR 1984 Orissa 213; and in Bindeshwari Pd. Chaudhary vs. Debendra Pd. (P) Ltd. vs. Christopher Martin Dasgranges Martin & others reported in 1990 - (1) Unreported Judgments SC 251; in Gurprect Singh Versus Chatur Bhuj God reported in 1988 (1) SCC 270 ; in Sanyasi Jena and others vs. Mina Jena and others reported in AIR 1984 Orissa 213; and in Bindeshwari Pd. Chaudhary vs. Debendra Pd. Singh and others reported in AIR 1958 Patna 618. 23. It was further submitted by Mr. Eqbal that the court did not at all take into consideration the fact as to whether the compromise was being entered into by plaintiff no. I as being the guardian recognised in the eye of law or not. Learned counsel in support of his contention has relied upon Mathura Singh and others vs Deodhari Singh and others reported in AIR 1972 Patna 17 and Smt. Usha Rani Banerjee and others vs Premier Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in AIR 1983 Allahabad 27. 24. It was further submitted that in any event, this Court should not exercise its jurisdiction u/s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure inasmuch as a substantial justice has been done to the parties by reason of the impugned order. Learned counsel in this connection has relied upon Ramzan Ali vs Mt. Satul Bibi reported in AIR (35) 1948 Allahabad 244 and in Ramdeo Jim, and others vs Chander Thakur and others reported in AIR 1982 Patna 172. It was further submitted that if by setting aside an illegal order, another illegal order is restored, in that case also, this Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed upon Surajdeo vs. Board of Revenue reported in AIR 1982 Allahabad 23. 25. It has further been submitted that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court should be exercised in aid of justice. In support of this proposition, Mr. Eqbal has relied upon a decision of the Gujrat High Court reported in Shah Jagmohandas Purshottamdas and another vs. Jamnadas Vrajlal Gandhi and others reported in AIR 1965 Gujrat 181. 26. Order 23 Rule 3 and Order 23 Rule 3A read thus : “Rule 3 - compromise of suit. In support of this proposition, Mr. Eqbal has relied upon a decision of the Gujrat High Court reported in Shah Jagmohandas Purshottamdas and another vs. Jamnadas Vrajlal Gandhi and others reported in AIR 1965 Gujrat 181. 26. Order 23 Rule 3 and Order 23 Rule 3A read thus : “Rule 3 - compromise of suit. Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that agreement or compromise (in writing and signed by the parties), or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith (so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject matter of the suit): Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other than an adjournment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment". Rule 3 (A) - Bar to suit: No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful". 27. The provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC had been amended by Amendment Act of 1976 inter alia by adding an explanation. Before a compromise petition is recorded the court has to satisfy itself with regard to genuineness thereof as also the fact as to whether the same is lawful or not. In terms of Section 96 of the Code of Civil procedure an appeal would not lie from a consent decree. However an appeal lies from an order recording the compromise petition in terms of Rule 1A (2) of Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 28. Before a compromise petition is recorded in terms of the proviso appended to Order Rule 3A of the CPC the court has the power to make an enquiry if an allegation is made that a compromise has not been entered into by a party to the suit. 29. 28. Before a compromise petition is recorded in terms of the proviso appended to Order Rule 3A of the CPC the court has the power to make an enquiry if an allegation is made that a compromise has not been entered into by a party to the suit. 29. There appears to be a great deal of controversy as to whether a consent decree can be set aside by the court in exercise of its inherent power. In Sheodhar Prasad Singh vs. Ram Deo Prasad Singh and others reported in AIR 1934 Patna 229, this court held that a fraud practised upon a party to the suit cannot by itself be said to be a fraud practised upon a court. 30. In Chutur Prasad Sah vs. Mt. Bishuni Kuer and another reported in AIR (30) 1943 Patna 13, the Division Bench followed its earlier decision of this Court in Sheodhar Prasad Singh. vs. Ramdeo Prasad Singh reported in AIR 1934 Patna 229 where it has been held as follows : “A Court is not competent, either in view or under its inherent powers, to set aside a compromise decree on the ground that the consent of the parties to the compromise was obtained by fraud. The only remedy of the injured party is to institute a suit to set aside the decree on the ground of fraud. But where it is found that the aggrieved party had not in fact consented to the compromise the Court has inherent power to set aside a decree based on the compromise." The decision in 1943 Patna, therefore, is contrary to the submission of Mr. N. K. Prasad. 31. In Gosto Bihari Parmanik vs. Malati Sen reported in AIR 1985 Calcutta 379, learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court held as follows : “It is well known that the consent or compromise decree can only be set aside in separate suit or proceedings on the ground that the consent was obtained by fraud or coercion and such consent or compromise decree resulted in serious and substantial injustice". 32. However, in support of the said finding, neither any precedent was cited nor the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 and Order 23 Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure were interpreted. 32. However, in support of the said finding, neither any precedent was cited nor the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 and Order 23 Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure were interpreted. Further, in that case, the court was concerned with the question of maintainability of a revision application against an order passed by an appellate court which had no jurisdiction in the matter. 33. In S.G. Thimmappa vs. T. Anantha and other reported in AIR 1986 Karnataka 1, a learned Single Judge has held as follows: “A contract or agreement may be lawful but can still be challenged on the ground that it was entered into or achieved by exercising fraud, undue influence or coercion and can be avoided. This aspect of the matter is not covered by the words 'not lawful' occurring in Rule 3A of O.23 CPC. There fore, to hold that the compromise decree cannot be challenged on the ground of fraud, undue influence or coercion under R. 3 A would not be correct. In my opinion, the court below has erred in holding to the contrary". This case, therefore, is not an authority for the proposition as to whether an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be maintainable or not. 34. In Maimum Nisa vs. Mohammed Khadopin reported in AIR 1985 Patna 55, a learned Single Judge of this Court however has dissented from the ratio in Shiv Dhar Prasad Singh vs. Ramdeo Prased Singh reported in AIR 1934 Patna 229 holding that the court may exercise its power to investigate into the allegations as to whether the signature of the party has been obtained by fraud or not and in the event if it is found that any fraud has been committed upon the party and as a result of that, the court has passed an order accepting the compromise petition then it must be held that fraud has been practised upon the court itself. 35. In Lagandeo Singh vs. Satyadeo Singh reported in 1992 (2) PLJR 184 a Division Bench of this Court has held that the question where the compromise is recorded or not due to undue influence, fraud, coercion, misrepresentation etc. is required to be decided in the very same suit if it is so alleged. 36. 35. In Lagandeo Singh vs. Satyadeo Singh reported in 1992 (2) PLJR 184 a Division Bench of this Court has held that the question where the compromise is recorded or not due to undue influence, fraud, coercion, misrepresentation etc. is required to be decided in the very same suit if it is so alleged. 36. However, it was held that the passing of a decree in terms of the compromise where factum of compromise has been disputed and/or legality has been doubted, the bar of Section 96 (3) of CPC shall not operate. 37. The learned court below while passing the impugned order has held as follows: (i) The plaintiffs-opp. parties had been able to prove that the plaintiff no. 1 was made to understand that the suit would be withdrawn and on 'that misrepresentation for compromise; (ii) That as a fraud had been practised upon the court the application under Section 151 is maintainable; (iii) That no leave of the court as required under Order 32 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure having been obtained, the compromise was not lawful; (iv) The compromise petition having been filed by the plaintiff no. 1 as mother and natural guardian of plaintiff nos. 2 to 6, the same is illegel as under the Mohammedan Law, the mother is not a natural guardian of her children. 38. So far as the finding of fact arrived at by the learned court below is concerned, namely, that the signature of plaintiff no. 1 was obtained on the compromise petition by the defendants by making misrepresentation to her is a question of fact and thus binding upon this court in the civil revision application. Mr. N.K. Prasad also did not question the said finding of fact. 39. It is not disputed that if a fraud is practised upon this court recording a compromise, an application under section 151 CPC would be maintainable. Reference in this connection may be made to Attarbai vs. Mishrilalsa reported in AIR 1966 MP 318 and in Sheodhar Prasad Singh vs. Ramdeo Prasad and others reported in AIR 1934 Patna 229. 40. The court in terms of Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC can accept a compromise only when the same is lawful within the meaning of the explanation appended thereto. 40. The court in terms of Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC can accept a compromise only when the same is lawful within the meaning of the explanation appended thereto. It is admitted that prior to recording of the compromise only an application was filed on 26.6.1987 whereby a Simple prayer was made to enter into a compromise by the plaintiff no. 1. 41. From the order sheet dated 3.7.1987 it does not appear that even filing of such application had been taken note of therein far less passing an order granting leave of the court. 42. Order 32 rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads thus : ''Agreement or compromise by next friend or guardian for the suit : 7 (1) : No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leavel of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into any agreement or compromised on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian. 1A: An application for leave under sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by an affidavit to the next friend or the guardian for the suit, as the case may be, and also, if the minor is represented by a pleader, by the certificate of the pleader, to the effect that the agreement or compromise proposed is, in his opinion, for the benefit of the minor; provided that the opinion so expressed, whether in the affidavit or in the certificate shall not preclude the Court from examining whether the agreement or compromise proposed is for the benefit of the minor. (2) Any such agreement or compromise entered into without the leave of the Court so recorded shall be voidable against all parties other than the minor". From a bare perusal of Order 32 Rule 7(1A) of the CPC it is evident that not only an application for leave has to be filed but an affidavit is required to be filed by the guardian stating that the compromise entered into is in the interest of minor. Not only that, even the opinion of the advocate appearing for the minors is necessary to be submitted. Even then the court is not precluded from considering the fact as to whether the compromise would be in the interest of the minors or not. Not only that, even the opinion of the advocate appearing for the minors is necessary to be submitted. Even then the court is not precluded from considering the fact as to whether the compromise would be in the interest of the minors or not. It is thus, clear that the .Parliament intended to safegurad the interest of the minor while a compromise petition is filed and is to be recorded. 43. If a compromise is recorded without compliance of Order 32 Rule 7 of the CPC, the same is not voidable at the instance of the parties except the minor. 44. The court below has found that a separate lawyer was engaged who was also related to the Advocate for the defendant for the purpose of recording the compromise. Admittedly, the original lawyer who appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs was not consulted in the matter. The said compromise petition was filed on 24.6.1987 and a report was called for from the sheristeder and the records were directed to be put up on 26.6.1987. 45. On 26.6.1987 the Sheristedar reported that the compromise is lawful. 46. By an order dated 1.7.1987 the Court accepted the said compromise evidently on the basis of the Sheristedar's report. It may also be noticed that on 7.7.1987 the non-judicial stamps were filed and on 13.7.1987 i.e. even before the expiry of the stipulated period, the final decree was sealed and signed. 47. Neither the Court considerd the implication of Order 32 Rule 7 of the CPC nor it took into consideration the fact that the plaintiff no. I under Mohammedan Law could not act as guardian of the plaintiff nos. 2 to 6. A decree passed on compromise with a minor who is not represented by any guardian' is a nullity (See AIR 1927 Patna 271 and AIR 1973 Madras 24). 48. In M/s Damodar Ropeways & Construction Co. (P) Ltd. vs. Christopher Martin Dasgranges Martin & Ors. reported in 1990 (1) Unreported Judgment S.C. 251, the Supreme Court held that for finding out as to whether a compromise petition is lawful and would be beneficial to the trust, the court must satisfy himself in relation thereto. 49. 48. In M/s Damodar Ropeways & Construction Co. (P) Ltd. vs. Christopher Martin Dasgranges Martin & Ors. reported in 1990 (1) Unreported Judgment S.C. 251, the Supreme Court held that for finding out as to whether a compromise petition is lawful and would be beneficial to the trust, the court must satisfy himself in relation thereto. 49. In Sanyasi Jena and others vs. Mina Jena and others reported in AIR 1984 Orissa 213, it has been held as follows : “it is indisputable that without defendants 4 to 8 and 11, there cannot be legal and valid compromise of the suit for partition. It is unthinkable how without their consent or agreement the rest of the parties could determine their shares or make allotment of property. The learned Subordinate Judge, however, could not see through the game. He accepted the compromise as having been lawfully entered into and valid and recorded the same. He directed as under : “Hence the compromise being lawful, it is recorded. The suit is decreed finally on the terms of compromise. The compromise petition, allotment sheet and sketch map are made part of Decree". The clear non-application of judicial mind is discernible from the aforesaid order. Whenever a petition of compromise is filed, the court should be very cautious, circumspect and scrutinising. Verious aspects are to be considered which I need not enumerate, the most important being if the interest of any minor is involved. A mechanical approach might lead to consequences which have resulted in this case. In Nityamani Dasi V. Gokul Chandra Sen (1911) 9 Ind. Cas 210, the Calcutta High Court observed: “The Decree of the Subordinate Judge must be set aside and the whole case retried, because, as this is a suit for partition of joint property, a Decree by consent amongst some only of the parties possibly be maintained". In that case, the partition suit was disposed of in terms of the compromise as between those who were parties to the compromise and ex parte against the non-consenting parties. In Vir Singh v. Kharak Singh AIR 1925 Lah 280, all the proprietors had not assented to the compromise, Moti Sagar, J. observed : ".... the alleged compromise not having been assented to by all the proprietors was clearly contrary to law and the court was, therefore, fully justified in refusing to enforce it....". In Vir Singh v. Kharak Singh AIR 1925 Lah 280, all the proprietors had not assented to the compromise, Moti Sagar, J. observed : ".... the alleged compromise not having been assented to by all the proprietors was clearly contrary to law and the court was, therefore, fully justified in refusing to enforce it....". In Taraprasanna Sarkar V. Kalika Mohan Sarkar AIR 1924 Cal 80 Mookerjee and Rankim, JJ. held: "..... there can be no compromise binding upon all the parties to a partition suit until and unless all the parties have joined in the compromise. In fact there connot be a different view." 50. Similarly in Bindeshwari Pd. Chaudhari vs Debendra Pd. Singh and others reported in AIR 1958 Patna 618, the court pointed out as to how the satisfaction of the court should be interpreted. From a perusal of the aforementioned decisions there cannot be any doubt that satisfaction on the part of the court that a compromise is a lawful one, can be arrived at only upon application of the mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. Such application of mind however, must appear from the orders accepting the compromise itself or from the materials on records. In this case, as indicated hereinbefore, the Court did not apply its mind to the fact as to whether the compromise was lawful or not. Even the application purported to have been filed by plaintiff no. 1 (which in her deposition before the court below she had denied) did not receive the attention of the court insofar as neither the same has been mentioned in the order dated 26.6.1987 nor any order was passed thereon. Even the court did not consider the fact as to whether the compromise entered into by plaintiff no. 1 satisfies the requirement of law or not. In Banwari Lal vs. Smt. Chando Devi reported in 1993 (1) PLJR 21 (S.C.), the Supreme Court held: “The present ease depicts as to how on 27.2.1991 the Court recorded the alleged agreement and compromise in a casual manner. It need not be impressed that Rule 3 of Order 23 does not require just a seal of approval from the Court to an alleged agreement or compromise said to have been entered into between the parties. It need not be impressed that Rule 3 of Order 23 does not require just a seal of approval from the Court to an alleged agreement or compromise said to have been entered into between the parties. The statute requires the court to be first satisfied that the agreement or compromise which has he en entered into between the parties is lawful, before accepting the same. Court if expected to apply its judicial mind while examining the terms of the settlement before the suit is disposed of in terms of the agreement arrived at between the parties. It need not be pointed out that once such a petition of compromise is accepted, it becomes the order of I he Court and acquires the sanctity of a judicial order”. 51. The Court, therefore, accepted the compromise petition without application of mind. Such mindless orders are nullities besides being not ‘lawful’ within the meaning of explanation appended to Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 52. It is true that the application for setting aside the compromise was filed only by plaintiff no. 1. However, the question which arises for consideration is as to whether plaintiff no. 1 in law could enter into a compromise on behalf of her children. 53. Sections 359 and 360 of Mullah's Mohammedan Law read thus : "359. Legal guardians of property: The following persons are entitled in the order mentioned below to be guardians of the property of a minor : 1. the father; 2. the executor appointed by the father's will. 3. the father's father. 4. the executor appointed by the will of the father's father. 360. Guardian of properly appointed by Court : In default of the legal guardians mentioned in Sec. 359 the duty of appointing a guardian for the protection and preservation of the minor's property falls on the judge as representing the State". 54. In SK. M. Zalir Vs. SK. Amiruddi and others reported in AIR 1963 Patna 108, it has been held as follows : “The lands coming from the mother's side (Nanihali) were roughly about 13 bighas and they were given to defendant 1 exclusively. Mr. Ghose for the appellant contended that Abdul Gaffar and Md. Ismail (father and uncle. 54. In SK. M. Zalir Vs. SK. Amiruddi and others reported in AIR 1963 Patna 108, it has been held as follows : “The lands coming from the mother's side (Nanihali) were roughly about 13 bighas and they were given to defendant 1 exclusively. Mr. Ghose for the appellant contended that Abdul Gaffar and Md. Ismail (father and uncle. respectively of the plaintiff) were minors in 1917 and Bibi Sabudan, their mother, being only the de facto guardian, was wholly incompetent to act for the minors and divide the properties. He pointed out that mother could not be the legal guardian of the minor's properties. There can be no doubt about this proposition. According to Mahommedan Law, the persons, who are entitled to be guardians of the property of a minor, are in this order: (1) the father; (2) the executor appointed by the father's will; (3) the father's father; (4) the executor appointed by the will of the father's father. In default of these guardians, the Court has to appoint a guardian for the protection and preservation of the minor's property". The position of Bibi Sabudan, the mother of the two minors in 1917 was that she was neither a legal guardian nor a guardian appointed by the Court, but she had voluntarily placed herself in charge of the person and property of the two minors. She was thus only a de facto guardian being in custody of the person and property of those two minors. A legal guardian only of the property of a minor is competent to deal with immovable properties of that minor in certain circumstances, but that power does not vest in a de facto guardian. A de facto guardian has no power to transfer any right or interest in the immovable property of the minor and such a transfer is not merely voidable but void. A de facto guardian has no power to transfer any right or interest in the immovable property of the minor and such a transfer is not merely voidable but void. The leading case on the point is Imambandi V. Mutsaddi 45 Ind App 73: (AIR 1918 PC 11) where their Lordships observed that: “Under the Mohammedan Law a person who has charge of the person or property of a minor without being his legal guardian, and who may therefore, be conveniently called a 'de facto guardian has no power to convey to another any right or interest in immovable property which the transferee can enforce against the infant; nor can such transferee, if let into possession of the property under such unauthorised transfer, resist an action in ejectment on behalf of the infant as a trespasser". In Pratap Singh v. Sant Kaur, AIR 1938 PC 181, it was held that where there was no person who had authority either under the law of contract or under the personal law applicable to the minors to make a compromise on their behalf, a compromise entered into by minors settling dispute as regards inheritance between themselves and their father's collaterals was not binding on them, and a transaction of that kind could not be upheld even on the ground of family settlement. In Mohd Amin v. Vakil Ahmad, AIR 1952 SC 358 a question arose, as to whether a deed of family settlement to which a Mohammadan minor was a party represented by his mother the de facto guardian was void and not binding on the minor, it was held that under the Mohammadan Law a person who had charge of the person or property of a minor without being his legal guardian, and who might, therefore, be conveniently called a 'de facto guardian' had no power to convey to another any right or interest in immovable property. The deed of settlement, in that case, was thus held to be void and, that being so, it was further held that the deed was void altogether qua all the parties including those who were sui juris. I may refer to one decision of this court as well, in the case of Kharag Narain v. Mt. The deed of settlement, in that case, was thus held to be void and, that being so, it was further held that the deed was void altogether qua all the parties including those who were sui juris. I may refer to one decision of this court as well, in the case of Kharag Narain v. Mt. Bibi Hamida Khatoon 1955 BLJR 512: AIR 1955 Patna 475) where it was held that a transfer made by a de facto guardian was not merely voidable but void ab initio under the Mohammadan Law. As a 'de facto' guardian mother is not competent to enter on behalf of her minor children into an agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration, if the agreement involves dealings with immovable property (vide Abdul Karim Vs. Most. Maniram, AIR 1954 Pat 6 .)” 55. The contention of Mr. Prasad to the effect that in view of Order 32 Rule 1 and Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Personal Law of parties relating to the guardianship of a minor becomes irrelevant, is devoid of any merit. Order provides for procedure to file a suit by or against minor and persons of unsound mind. Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, do not and cannot override the rights and obligations of the parties under the Personal Law. Further, under Mohammedan Law so far as protection and preservation of Minor's property is concerned, if there is no legal guardian, the duty to appoint one falls on the Judge as representing the interest of he Minor. No person other than those who have been mentioned in Article 359 of the Mulla's Principles of Mohammedan Law are entitled to the guardianship of the property of Minor in law. The plaintiff no. 1, therefore, could have acted as guardian of minor so far as their properties are concerned only if she had been appointed as such by the Court. 56. In terms of Section 361 of the Mulla's Principles of Mohammedan Law, a de facto guardian of a minor is merely a custodian of a person and property of minor but such a de facto guardian has no power to transfer any right or interest in the immovable property of the minor and such transfer would be void. 57. 56. In terms of Section 361 of the Mulla's Principles of Mohammedan Law, a de facto guardian of a minor is merely a custodian of a person and property of minor but such a de facto guardian has no power to transfer any right or interest in the immovable property of the minor and such transfer would be void. 57. Order 32 Rule 7 provides for obtaining leave of the court by a next friend or a guardian which, in the facts and circumstance of the case has no application. In this view of •the matter, it must be held that the compromise decree' is void so far as the minors are concerned. Consequently the entire compromise decree was liable to be set aside. 58. The compromise was also voidable at the instance of the minor and in such an event, the court could set aside the same. Thus, an application for setting aside the compromise decree would be maintainable at any stage of the proceedings at the instance of the minors. In this situation it has been held in Mahabir Mahto and others vs. Chandeshwar Mahto reported in AIR 1985 Patna 251 that either a regular suit or an application for review of a compromise decree is maintainable. It is also not in dispute that under the Mohammedan Law mother is not the guardian who can enter into a compromise. The court therefore could not have even granted leave to the mother before the compromise could have been recorded and it was bound to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor. 59. In this situation even assuming that technically a petition under Section 151 of the CPC would not have been maintainable at the instance of the plaintiff no. 1 a suit was maintainable and a review application was also maintainable on behalf of the minors. Judging the case from this angle, in my opinion, the court cannot be said to have committed an illegality in entertaining the application and setting aside the said compromise decree. 60. The question as to whether an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be maintainable for purpose of setting aside an ex-parte decree is no longer res-integra. 60. The question as to whether an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be maintainable for purpose of setting aside an ex-parte decree is no longer res-integra. In a recent decision in Banwari Lal vs. Smt. Chando Devi reported in 1993 (1) PLJR 21 (S.C.) it has been held as follows: “The application for exercise of power under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 can be labeled under Section 151 of the Code but when by the amending Act specifically such power has been vested in the Court before which the petition of compromise had been filed, the power in appropriate cases has to be exercised under the said proviso to Rule 3. It has been held by different High Courts that even after a compromise has been recorded, the Court concerned can entertain an application under Section 151 of the Code, questioning the legality or validity of the compromise. Reference in this case may be made to the cases Smt. Tara Bai Vs. V.S. Krishnaswamy Rao, AIR 1985 Karnataka 270; S.G. Thimmapa V.T. Ananths, AIR 1986 Karnataka 1; Bindeshwari Pd. Chaudhary Vs. Devendra Pd. Sinha, AIR 1958 Patna 618: Mangal Mahton Vs. Behari Mahton AIR 1964 Patna 432 and Sri Iswar Gopal Jew Vs. Bhagwandas Shaw, AIR 1932 Cal. 12, where it has been held that application under Section 151 of the Code is maintainable. The Court before which it is alleged by one of the parties to the alleged compromise that no such compromise had been entered between the parties that Court has to decide whether the agreement or compromise in question was lawful and not void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. If the agreement or the compromise itself is fraudulent then it shall be deemed to be void within the meaning of the explanation to the proviso to Rule 3 and as such not lawful. The learned Subordinate Judge was perfectly justified in entertaining the application filed on behalf of the appellant and considering the question as to whether there had been a lawful agreement or compromise on the basis of which the court could have recorded such agreement or compromise on 27.2.91. Having come to the conclusion on the material produced that the compromise was not lawful within the meaning of Rule 3, there was no option left except to recall that order”. 61. Having come to the conclusion on the material produced that the compromise was not lawful within the meaning of Rule 3, there was no option left except to recall that order”. 61. In any event, it is now well settled that exercise of power under Section 115 of the CPC is a discretionary one. It is also well known that the court is not bound to interfere with the impugned order only because it is lawful to do so (see AIR 1964 SC 497 ; AIR 1973 SC 1096 ). The aforementioned decisions were rendered prior to coming into force of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976. 62. In Ramzan Ali vs. Mt. Satul Bibi reported in AIR (35) 1948 Allahabad 244, a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is entirely discretionery and it is only in the interest of justice .that the High Court should interfere in revision. 63. By reason of the Amending Act of 1976 a proviso has been added to Section 115 CPC in terms whereof a court is precluded from reversing an order or setting aside any order except where inter alia the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion failure of justice, or cause an irreparable injuries to the party against whom it was made. 64. In Ramdeo Jha and others vs. Chandar Thakur reported in AIR 1982 Patna 172, it has been held as follows : “I shall now notice another hurdle in the way of the petitioners in attacking the impugned order. S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it now stands, not only requires the petitioners to show that the Subordinate court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested in it or has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, but further to satisfy the court that if the impugned order is allowed to stand, it would occasion a failure of justice or that an irreparable injury would be caused to the petitioners. In my view of the rider that if the order is allowed to stand, it would occasion a failure of justice or that an irreparable injury would be caused to the petitioners; is a big hurdle in the way of the petitioners to cross which they have miserably failed. In that view of the matter also in revision jurisdiction of this Court, no interference can be made in the present case". 65. The minors are entitled to raise the question of legality of the compromise petition even at the stage of execution as the compromise petition was voidable at the instance of minor. 66. In this view of the matter, even if the decree was• to be put in execution, the same could not have been executed. Thus, in my opinion, the impugned order may although be without jurisdiction, the same has not occasioned any failure of justice nor the same shall cause irreparable injury to the petitioner if the same is allowed so stand. 67. In National Thermal Power Corporation vs. Engineers Enterprises reported in 1992 BBCJ, 59, upon interpretation of proviso (b) to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has been held by me as follows: "In Chairman and another vs. Mahadeo Prasad and others reported in 1990 (1) PLJR, 92 it was held : “It is now well known that even if there be some jurisdictional error in an order passed by the inferior court, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may refuse to interfere with the same if substantial justice has been done between the parties to the suit”. In terms of proviso (b) appended to sub-section (1) of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court has been prohibited from exercising its discretion by varying or reversing any order made except where the order if allowed to stand would occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. In Mohammad Swalleh and others vs. Addl. District Judge, Meerut and another reported in (1988) 1 Supreme Court Cases 40 the Supreme Court held : “It is true that there has been some technical breach because if there is no appeal maintainable before the learned District Judge, in the appeal before the learned District Judge, the same could not be set aside. District Judge, Meerut and another reported in (1988) 1 Supreme Court Cases 40 the Supreme Court held : “It is true that there has been some technical breach because if there is no appeal maintainable before the learned District Judge, in the appeal before the learned District Judge, the same could not be set aside. But the High Court was exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court had come to the conclusion that the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and improper. The High Court itself could have set it aside. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case justice has been done though, as mentioned hereinbefore, technically the appellant had a point that the order of the District Judge was illegal and improper. If we reiterate the order of the High Court as it is setting aside the order of the Prescribed Authority in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 or the Constitution then no exception can be taken. As mentioned hereinbefore, justice has been done and as the improper order of the Prescribed Authority has been set aside, no objection can be taken." Apparently enough, the exercise of the discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary. Such is the position in law and with regard to the discretionery exercise of jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure". 68. So far as the submission made by Mr. N.K. Prasad to the effect that the decree passed on the, basis of the compromise petition was appealable in view of Order 43 Rule 1A of the CPC, it may be mentioned that the compromise petition was filed on the same day on which the decree was passed, at that time Order 43 Rule 1A of the CPC could not have been invoked. 69. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in the Civil revision application which is accordingly dismissed.