This appeal arises from the decree passed by the Assistant District Judge (1) Silchar in Money Suit No. 44. of 1978. 2. Facts,-The plaintiff, United Bank of India, instituted the suit against the defendants Jyotirmoy Bhattacharjee and Gopendra Kumar Bbaltacharjee for recovery of a sum of Rs. 23,078.56. The case of the plaintiff-bank is that, on 13.2.74, the defendant Jyotimoy Bhattacharjee took a loan of Rs. 16.500/- for carrying on his business with interest at 31/2% per annum above the Reserve Bank of India rate subject to minimum rate of interest at 101/2% per annum with monthly rests from the plaintiff's branch bank at Meherpur by executing a demand promissory note dated 13.2.74 and also by executing hypothecation agreement. The defendant Gopendra was the guarantor. The defendant Jyotirmoy also executed a letter of continuity in respect of demand promissory note. By a letter dated 29.7.74, the defendant Jyotirmoy admitted and acknowledged the debt on crediting sum of Rs. 15,800.22 as on 30.6.74. The defendant Jyotirmoy failed and neglected to repay the amount together with interest in spite of demands made to him and his guarantor. Rs. 23,078.56 now due to be paid to the plaintiff bank with the interest calculated upto 18.5.78. The plaintiff-bank for the realisation of the loan amount with interest thereon took recourse to Assam Recovery of Loans Act, 1976, and issued a certificate on 25.5.77 duly signed by the Agent of the branch bank at Mehorpur and forwarded the same to Bakijai Officer, Silchar. The Certificate Officer or Bakijai Officer registered a Case being No. BC No. 403 (UBI) 1976-77 against the defendants. Thereafter, on 3.5.78 the Certificate Officer made an order that the case was outside the scope of Assam Recovery of Loans Act and the Government Instruction dated 21.2.78, and he returned the case to the plaintiff-bank on 16.5.78. The plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence the recovery proceeding in good faith in the Court of the Certificate Officer and, therefore, in computing period of limitation for the suit the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act. The defendant Jyotirmoy contested the suit denying his liability to pay the amount. The defendant also took the plea that the suit was barred by limitation. In his written statement, the defendant claimed compensation. The defendant Jyotirmoy contested the suit denying his liability to pay the amount. The defendant also took the plea that the suit was barred by limitation. In his written statement, the defendant claimed compensation. His case is that in Bakijai Proceeding his Taxi No. ASC 4693 was attached on 3.11.77 by the Bakijai Officer, and the said vehicle had been lying with the Bakijai Officer though the proceeding itself was dropped. Therefore, he is entitled to Rs. 4,100/- as compensation at the rate of Rs. 50/- per day upto 3.2.80. 3. The lower Court has held that the plaintiff-bank is entitled to benefit under section 14 of the Limitation Act and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff bank. Although the defendant made a claim in the nature of counter-claim, no issue has been framed and no finding has been given. Hence this appeal. 4. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the first question which arises for consideration is whether the case of the plaintiff falls within section 14 of the Limitation Act. 5. Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act runs as follows : "In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it." A reading of section 14 indicates that in order to attract the applica­bility of section 14, the following conditions are to be satisfied- (a) the plaintiff was prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence ; (b) the earlier proceeding and latter proceeding relate to the same matter in issue ; (c) the former proceeding was being prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. 6. Before dealing with the requirements of section 14 a question arises for consideration is whether a proceeding before a Certificate Officer is a civil proceeding and/or the Certificate Officer is a Court. 6. Before dealing with the requirements of section 14 a question arises for consideration is whether a proceeding before a Certificate Officer is a civil proceeding and/or the Certificate Officer is a Court. Section 57 of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 provides that a Certificate Officer shall be deemed to b a Court, and any proceeding before him shall be deemed to be a civil proceeding within the meaning of section 14 of the Limitation Act. It seems that under section 3 of the Assam Recovery of Loans Act, 1976 a bank or a financial institution may take recourse to the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act for recovery of arrears of loan apart from any other mode of recovery. In that view of the matter, I approach the matter by considering a Certificate Officer to be a Court and any proceeding before him to be a civil proceeding for the purpose of section 14 of the Limitation Act. 7. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff-bank a as prosecuting any proceeding before the Certificate Officer, if so, with due diligence. A perusal of the records of the Bakijai Case No. 304 (UBI) 76-77 indicates that a "Demand Certificate", the certified copy of which is Ext. 1 was signed on 25. 6.77 by the Agent of the Meherpur Branch -of the plaintiff-bank and was sent to the Bakijai Officer, Silchar. On receipt of the certificate, the Bakijai Officer passed an order on 15, 6. 77 to enter in the Register of Bakijai Case and to issue distress warrant against the debtor. The next order which was passed on 28. 10. 77 runs : "The case is taken-up today. Neither DW has been returned by Nazir nor any amount realised Issue Notice against the defaulter." The third and last order was passed on 3.5.78. The order f the Certificate Officer dated 3.5.78, the certified copy of which is Ext. A, shows that the case before the Bakijai Officer was outside the scope of the Assam Recovery of Loans Act and Instruction of the Government dated 21.2.78 and the proceeding was dropped. 8. The scheme of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, "the Act" For short, is as follows. A, shows that the case before the Bakijai Officer was outside the scope of the Assam Recovery of Loans Act and Instruction of the Government dated 21.2.78 and the proceeding was dropped. 8. The scheme of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, "the Act" For short, is as follows. Section 4 provides that when the Certificate Officer is satisfied that any public demand payable to the Collector is due he may sign a certificate, in the prescribed form, stating that the demand is due and shall cause the certificate to be filed in his office. Section 3 (3) defines "Certificate Officer" to mean a Collector, a Sub-Divisional Officer, and any officer appointed by a Collector, with the sanction of the Commissioner, to perform the functions of a Certificate Officer under the Act. Section 5(1) of the Act further provides that when any public demand payable to any person other than Collector is due, such person may send to the Certificate Officer a written requisition in the prescribed form. Under section 6, on receipt of any such requisition, the Certificate Officer, if he is satisfied, that the demand is recoverable and that recovery by suit is not barred by law, may sign a certificate, in the prescribed form stating that the demand is due and shall cause the certificate to be filed in his office. Section 7 provides that when a certificate has been filed in the office of a Certificate Officer under section 4 or section 6 he shall cause to be served upon the certificate debtor, in the prescribed manner, a notice in the prescribed form and copy of the certificate. Under section 7, after the certificate is filed a notice is to be sent to the certificate debtor with a copy of the certificate in the prescribed form, that is, the Form II appended to the Act. The purpose of the notice is to enable the debtor to have his say about his liability. After the signing and filing of a certificate, and notice to the debtor the certificate is to be executed. The purpose of the notice is to enable the debtor to have his say about his liability. After the signing and filing of a certificate, and notice to the debtor the certificate is to be executed. A reading of section II together with section 12 shows that a certificate filed under section 4 or section 6 may be executed by the Certificate Officer in whose office the original certificate is filed, or by any other Certificate Officer in the same district or the Collector of any other district, to whom the certificate is sent for execution by the Certificate Officer in whose office the original certificate is filed. Section 13 relates to when a certificate may be executed and provides that no step in execution of a certificate shall be taken until the period of thirty days has elapsed since the date of the service of the notice required by section 7, or when a petition has been duly filed under section 9 until such petition has been heard and determined. 9. There two stages before a Certificate Officer, namely signing and filing of a certificate by the Certificate Officer and execution of the certificate filed. Therefore, the proceeding before the Certificate Officer, in the present case, should be a proceeding either under section 6 as it was arrears of loan payable to the bank and not to the Collector or for execution of a certificate. 10. The question which, therefore, arises for consideration is whether there was any proceeding before the Certificate Officer under section 6 for signing and filing of a certificate or for execution of a certificate. Under the Act, certificate is to be signed only by the Certificate .Officer, and not by any other. The case of the plaintiff-bank is that the certificate was signed by the Agent of branch bank. If the plaintiff-bank desired to have recourse to the Act, the plaintiff should have sent a requisition for signing a certificate by the Certificate Officer and causing the certificate to be filed in his office. That procedure has not been adopted. The Ext. 1, the "Demand Certificate", was signed by the Agent. The certificate is not signed in any of prescribed forms, viz, Form No. 1 or Form No. 2. That procedure has not been adopted. The Ext. 1, the "Demand Certificate", was signed by the Agent. The certificate is not signed in any of prescribed forms, viz, Form No. 1 or Form No. 2. As soon as the "Demand Certificate" was received, the Bakijai Officer started the execution of the certificate by issuing a distress warrant against the debtor, although there was no certificate signed by the Certificate Officer and filed in his office. There was no requisition sent by the bank. The Certificate Officer also did not sign and file any certificate under section 6 and the 'Demand Certificate' is neither in Form No. 2, as already stated. Therefore, there was 410 proceeding before the Certificate Officer for signing and filing of a certificate under section 6 or for the execution of a certificate signed and filed. As there was no proceeding before the Certificate Officer, the question of prosecuting a proceeding does not arise. 11. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff-bank was prosecuting recovery preceding with due diligence assuming that there was a civil proceeding before the Certificate Officer. Due diligence cannot be measured by any absolute standard. It depends on the relative facts of a particular crse. Due diligence, in my opinion is a measure of prudence or activity expected from, and ordinarily exercised by a reasonable and prudent person under the particular circumstances. The signing of the certificate by the Agent and sending it for execution in complete ignorance of the relevant law cannot be said that such an activity would be expected from a reasonable and prudent person under the particular circumstances. Therefore, the plaintiff bank was not prosecuting the recovery proceeding before the Bakijai Officer with due diligence. 11A. In view of my conclusions above, the question of consideration of other requirements of section 14 do not arise. For the reasons stated, the plaintiff has failed to prove the requirements of section 14 of the Limitation Act and therefore the suit is barred by limitation. 12. Mr. B.K. Goswami, the learned counsel for the respondent-bank, has contended that the suit is within time in view of payments shown in Ext. 9, copy of bank's books of account. The suit was instituted on 24.5.78. Considering the acknowledgement made on 29.7.74, if a fresh period of limitation is computed from 29.7.74, the suit is prima facie barred by limitation. B.K. Goswami, the learned counsel for the respondent-bank, has contended that the suit is within time in view of payments shown in Ext. 9, copy of bank's books of account. The suit was instituted on 24.5.78. Considering the acknowledgement made on 29.7.74, if a fresh period of limitation is computed from 29.7.74, the suit is prima facie barred by limitation. Under O 7, R 6, CPC. where the suit is instituted after the expiration of period prescribed by the law of limitation the plaint shall show the ground upon which exemption from such law is claimed. Therefore, where a suit is prima facie barred by limitation, the plaintiff has to state in his plaint the reason why the suit is within time. However, in O 7, R 6, CPC a proviso has been inserted by 1976 Amendment Act. Under the proviso, the Court may permit the plaintiff to claim exemption from the law of limitation on any ground not set out in the plaint, if such ground is not inconsistent with the grounds set out in the plaint. For the complete adjudication of the matter, I am dealing with the contention of Mr. Goswami. Althongh there is no statement in the plaint. In the certified copy of the bank's books of account (Ext. 9), there are entries showing payments made by debtor. They are Rs.400/- on 31.3.1976; Rs.500/- on 14.5.1976; Rs.200/- on 7.9.1976; and Rs. 275/- on 20. 12.1976. In Chandradhar vs. Gauhati Bank, AIR 1967 SC 1058 , the Supreme Court has held that mere entries from the bank's books of account or mere copies thereof are not sufficient to charge a person with liability. There has to be further evidence to prove payment of money. The Supreme Court has further held that the entry of a payment in the accounts does not help the bank for exemption of limitation, and that the entry is of no value under section 20(old) 19(new) of the Limitation Act. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, the plaintiff has to further prove the payment. But there is no such evidence in that behalf. For these reasons, the contention of Mr. Goswami cannot be accepted, and the suit is beyond time. 13. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. Accordingly, the judgment and the decree of the trial Court are set aside and the suit is dismissed. But there is no such evidence in that behalf. For these reasons, the contention of Mr. Goswami cannot be accepted, and the suit is beyond time. 13. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. Accordingly, the judgment and the decree of the trial Court are set aside and the suit is dismissed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are to bear their own costs throughout.