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Gujarat High Court · body

1990 DIGILAW 157 (GUJ)

YUSUFBHAI NOORMOHMED NANDOLIYA v. STATE

1990-11-05

R.K.ABICHANDANI, S.B.MAJMUDAR

body1990
MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who is occupant of two survey numbers 864 and 687 of village Samalpati in Patan Taluka of Mehsana District has brought in challenge the orders passed by respondents refusing to hold that land acquisition proceedings qua these lands have lapsed as award under Sec. 12 of the Land Acquisition Act has not been passed qua these lands within two years from the date of declaration of Sec. 6 notification. A few dates relevant for this challenge may be noted at the outset. The petitioners aforesaid two lands alongwith lards of other occupants were put in acquisition by the state of Gujarat - respondent No. 1 for the purpose of North Gujarat University which was to be established at Patan. Section 6 notification was issued on 12-5-1988. We may take it that it was also published in the locality round about that time. The learned Advocate for the petitioner stated that such publication took place somewhere in June 1988. The petitioner challenged this Sec. 6 notification by filing Special Civil Application No. 4342 of 1988 in this Court. That petition is still at admission stage. Notice has been issued to the other side. So far as interim relief was concerned, as per prayer (E), the petitioner prayed for stay of operation and implementation of the (1) Spl. C. A. No. 4314 of 1990 decided on 14-6-1990 by G. H C. (2) notification under Sec. 6 of the Act issued with reference to the petitioners lands. However, this Court granted only limited ad interim relief regarding possession only. Ad interim relief injunction which was issued to the respondents read as under : It is hereby accordingly ordered that you, your servants and the agents be and are hereby restrained from taking possession of the land in dispute of the petitioner, pending admission of the aforesaid Special Civil Application by this Court. " this ad interim relief was granted on 9-8-1988 and it is still current. In the meantime, it appears that the second respondent found that proceedings regarding passing of award pursuant to notification under Sec. 6 were not stayed by this Court. He, therefore, issued notice under Sec. 9 (1) and proceeded to determine the compensation after hearing the objections. " this ad interim relief was granted on 9-8-1988 and it is still current. In the meantime, it appears that the second respondent found that proceedings regarding passing of award pursuant to notification under Sec. 6 were not stayed by this Court. He, therefore, issued notice under Sec. 9 (1) and proceeded to determine the compensation after hearing the objections. When this inquiry was initiated by respondent No. 2, the petitioner and other occupants whose lands ware also under acquisition raised objections before respondent No. 2 that as two years have passed after the declaration of notification under Sec. 6, all these proceedings have lapsed. For this purpose, reliance is placed on sec. 11 A of the Act which reads as under :"11a. Period within which an award shall be made :- The Collector shall make an award under Sec. 11 within a period of two years from the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse : provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1894, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation :- In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. "respondent No. 1 rejected the said contention of the petitioner placing reliance on a decision rendered by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 4314 of 1990 decided by the Division Bench consisting of R C. Mankad and r. J. Vaidya, JJ on 14-6-1990. The aforesaid Division Bench speaking through r. C. Mdnkad, J. negatived an identical contention canvassed by another occupant of the land whose land also was sought to be acquired by the very same notification and who had obtained ad interim relief re-possession from this Court. ( 2 ) MR. Vakharia appearing for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1 was in error in placing reliance on the decision of the Division Bench in special Civil Application No. 4314 of 1990 (supra) as the said decision does not lay down correct law and is required to be reconsidered by a larger bench. ( 2 ) MR. Vakharia appearing for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1 was in error in placing reliance on the decision of the Division Bench in special Civil Application No. 4314 of 1990 (supra) as the said decision does not lay down correct law and is required to be reconsidered by a larger bench. Before examining this aspect, we may point out that the main contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner in connection with alleged lapsing of land acquisition proceedings centred round Sec. 11a which is reproduced earlier. It is true that it per requirement of Sec. 11a, the Collector has to make award under Sec. 11 within a period of two years from fhe publication of the declaration and if no such award is made within the period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of land shall be treated to have lapsed. The period of two years is to be counted from the date of declaration of notification under Sec. 6. There cannot be any dispute on this aspect. But so far as Sec. 6 is concerned, sub-sec. (2) thereof lays down that every declaration shall be published in the official gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situated of which at least one shall be in the regional language and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the declaration.) For the present purpose, we may proceed on the basis that the last of the dates of publication indicated by Sec. 6 (2) occurred somewhere in June 1988 and, therefore, by June 1990, two years as contemplated by sec. 11a would be over for passing the award. However, explanation to Sec. 11a is pressed in service by the respondents. The Explanation in terms provides that in computing the period of two years, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. However, explanation to Sec. 11a is pressed in service by the respondents. The Explanation in terms provides that in computing the period of two years, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. The moot question is, whether on the facts of the present case, it can be said that by the order of this Court, any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration was stayed. If the answer is in affirmative, then the period of stay would get excluded; if it is in the negative, then the benefit of exclusion contemplated by the said explanation would not be available to the respondents. ( 3 ) MR. Vakharia for the petitioner veheroently contended that what this court has done in the petitioners petition challenging the land acquisition proceedings being Spl. C. A. 4342 of 1988 is that taking of possession is stayed, and no other action of the respondents is stayed by this Court. It was vehemently contended by Mr. Vakharia that the words any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration as employed by the Explanation would contemplate actions as per Sees. 7 and 8 of the Act. Under Sec. 7, the appropriate Government can direct the Collector to take order for acquisition of the land. That will be the action of the appropriate Government while the Collectors action would be under sec. 8 which lays down that the Collector shall thereupon cause the land, (unless it has been already marked out under Sec. 4) to be marked out. He shall also cause it to be measured and if no plan has been made thereof, a plan to be made of the same. These are the two actions contemplated by the appropriate Government and the Collector under Sees. 7 and 8. That would be pursuant to declaration under Sec. 6. But there, in the submission of Mr. Vakharia, the contemplated actions by Explanation to Sec. 11a would end and there would remain only the proceedings to be taken pursuant to the declaration. These proceedings are contemplated by Sees. 9, 10 and 11. 7 and 8. That would be pursuant to declaration under Sec. 6. But there, in the submission of Mr. Vakharia, the contemplated actions by Explanation to Sec. 11a would end and there would remain only the proceedings to be taken pursuant to the declaration. These proceedings are contemplated by Sees. 9, 10 and 11. Section 9 deals with notice to be issued to persons interested and lays down that the Collector shall cause 4 public notice to be given at convenient places on or near the land to be taken stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land, and that claims to compensation for all interests in such land may be made to him. Sub-sec. (2) thereof deals with particulars of the notice to be stated in such notice. Section 10 deals with power to require and enforce the making of statements as to names and interests, in the proceedings. Then follows sec. 11 which deals with inquiry to be made by the Collector pursuant to notice and the award to be passed under Sec. 11. The award which is to be passed by the Collector after inquiry, is to comprise of three aspects, viz. (i) the true area of the land; (ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land, and (iii) apportionment of the compensation among all persons known or believed to be interested in the land. It was submitted by the learned Advocate of the petitioner that these proceedings under Sees. 9, 10 and 11 are the only proceedings which are within the scope of Explanation to Sec. 11a. That question of taking possession is totally foreign to the scope of Explanation to Sec. 11a, save and except when urgency clause is invoked. But even there, Mr. Vakharia had reservation to the effect that perhaps even that would not be covered. But we are not concerned with urgency clause and hence, we do not dilate on this aspect. Our attention was invited to Sec. 12 of the Act which lays down that such award shall be filed in the Collectors Office and shall be final and conclusive evidence as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the land, and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. The next relevant section to which our attention was invited was sec. 16 which says that when the Collector has made an award under Sec. 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. On a conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, it was submitted that taking of possession is not pursuant to the declaration under Sec. 6 but it is pursuant to the award under Sec. 11 and, therefore, even though this Court has granted ad interim injunction against possession in Special Civil Application No. 4342 of 1988 moved by the petitioner challenging Sec. 6 notification, the said ad interim relief will not extend the period for passing the award on the facts of the present case and, therefore, as two years have expired by the end of June 1990, all these proceedings qua the petitioners lands must be treated to have lapsed. ( 4 ) IT is not possible to agree with, the contention of Mr. Vakharia for obvious reasons. Firstly, Explanation to Sec. 11a enjoins exclusion of the entire period during which any action or proceeding to be taken pursuant to declaration under Sec. 6 is stayed by an order of a competent Court. It is pertinent to note that the Explanation is not confined to only staying of passing of award pursuant to Sec. 6 notification but it is widely worded and covers in its sweep the entire period during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of declaration under sec. 6 is stayed by the competent Court. any action is wide phrase and includes all actions which are taken in the light of Sec. 6 notification in the process of resorting to all consequential steps flowing from Sec. 6 notification till taking the ultimate step of obtaining possession of the acquired land which would put Sec. 6 notification to its logical end. If any of these actions is stayed by the competent Court in connection with the impugned land acquisition proceedings, benefit of the Explanation will start flowing for the respondents. It is also not possible to agree with the contention that under Sec. 16, possession is to be taken pursuant to the award. So far as award is concerned, Sec. 11 requires the Collector to pass award in connection with only three aspects as mentioned earlier. It is also not possible to agree with the contention that under Sec. 16, possession is to be taken pursuant to the award. So far as award is concerned, Sec. 11 requires the Collector to pass award in connection with only three aspects as mentioned earlier. Section 11 has nothing to do with possession. Though award as per Sec. 11 may form an inter-mediate step before possession can be taken under Sec. 16 in cases not covered by Sec. 17, even then, right to take possession accrues to the acquiring authority pursuant to declaration under Sec. 6. It is obvious that under Sec. 6, once the declaration is made, it become conclusive between the acquiring authority on the one hand and the holder of the land on the other. It is after Sec. 6 declaration that the acquiring authority would proceed to take possession after following the due procedure. But his right to take possession is directly linked up with Sec. 6. That right may be exercised earlier under Sec. 17 or later after Sec. 11 award if there is no urgency clause. All the same, right to take possession accrues to the acquiring authority on the basis of legal notification under Sec. 6 and not de hors it. It is obvious that only a valid Sec. 6 notification entitles the authorities to award compensation and get the vesting of the acquired land as contemplated by Sec. 16 of the Act. Thus, the ultimate step of taking possession and as a consequence vesting of acquired land free from all encumbrances in the Govt. as per Sec. 16 are in pursuance of the Sec. 6 notification and cannot be de hors it. Therefore, right to take possession and to get the land vested in Govt. directly and logically flows from Sec. 6 notification and not from the award. Award is not the least concerned with crystalising of right to take possession. Award may be a condition precedent to taking possession as per Sec. 16 in cases contemplated by it but it would not mean that right to take possession flows from the award and not from the notification under Sec. 6. Award is not the least concerned with crystalising of right to take possession. Award may be a condition precedent to taking possession as per Sec. 16 in cases contemplated by it but it would not mean that right to take possession flows from the award and not from the notification under Sec. 6. Consequently, if the respondents right to take possession under land acquisition notification is stayed by the Court, the period during which such stay operates has to be treated as period during which action or proceeding pursuant to declaration under Sec. 6 remains stayed. As the said injunction is still operative, it cannot be said that two years period as contemplated by Sec. 11 A has come to end and that acquisition proceedings have lapsed. This view of ours finds support from the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in spl. C. A. No. 4314 of 1990 (supra ). We entirely agree with the reasoning of the Division Bench taking the very same view. The division Bench of this Court while taking this view has also followed an earlier decision of another Division Bench which bad also interpreted explanation to Sec. 11a on the same lines. We respectfully concur with the ratio of the decision of these cases. It may be noted that the Kerala high Court has taken a contrary view on the language of Explanation to sec. 11a, in its decision reported in AIR 1988 Ker 280 (S. Bavajan Sahib v. State of Kerala ). But that view is rightly dissented from in the aforesaid decision in Spl. C. A. No. 4314 of 1990 and we concur with the said dissent. Consequently, no case is made out for our interference with the view taken by the respondents that the land acqusition proceedings have not lapsed. This petition is, therefore, summarily rejected. .