JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, J.—The landlord, who claims himself "specified landlord" preferred eviction petition under section 15 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereafter for short "the Act") relating to Set No. 3, on the first floor of Ashiana building Tuti Kandi, Shimla. His claim is that he has been in service of Government of India Press at Tuti Kandi since 13-7-1951 and going to retire-from the post of a Reader in the Press at Shimla, on attaining the age of superannuation from 31-10-1990. In support of this fact, he has also filed a certificate duly signed by the competent authority. According to him, the respondent is the only tenant in the premises which are needed by him for his residence after his retirement. He has also stated that neither he nor his spouse own or possess any other suitable accommodation in their own right as owner or tenant in the urban area of Shimla and presently he, his wife and son are residing in one of the rooms of Dev Cottage No. 274 which is, in fact, held and possessed by his step-mother as a tenant in her own rights alongwith her son, sons wife, sons son and daughters. Quarrels between the family members are quite frequent and step-motherly treatment is being meted out to him and his family members. In addition to this problem, he also says that his wife has some mental problem, therefore, calm and co-ordial atmosphere for her living is necessary. His son is of marriageable age and has got to be married soon. 2. The tenant was issued summons through registered A. D as well as by ordinary process in accordance with Schedule-II of the Act. He received summons through Registered A. D on January 10, 1990, while those sent by ordinary process, were received on January 24, 1990 He filed an application and affidavit under section 16 (4) of the Act on March 8, 1990 seeking permission to contest the petition on the ground that the landlord is not the sole owner of the premises, in question According to the tenant, the landlord was one of the co-owners thereof. It is also his case that the landlord owns another building in the urban area of Shimla known as Zamindara House’ and as such co-owners had been letting out the sets in this building to different tenants during the past five years. It is also his case that the landlord owns another building in the urban area of Shimla known as Zamindara House’ and as such co-owners had been letting out the sets in this building to different tenants during the past five years. Landlords status as "specified landlord" has also been challenged. The tenant has also claimed that the reason for late filing of the application for leave to contest, has been because of the winter vacations in the Court from January 21, 1990 and since the period of 15 days intruded into the Court vacations, it could not have been filed earlier. The landlord has reiterated his stand again in the reply to the tenants application, as taken in the eviction petition. He has also added that he is the absolute owner of the premises, in question, on account of family partition and the Zamindara House is exclusively owned by his step-mother and he has no share in this building. 3. The Rent Controller examined the question whether the landlord is a "specified landlord". It also examined the question of landlords relation with the property, in question, while examining the fact of late filing of the application and the affidavit for leave to contest by the tenant. After going into the matter quite seriously and exhaustively, the Rent Controller held that the landlord is a "Specified Landlord" and that the property > in question, is exclusively owned by him. He also concluded that even if the landlord is taken to be the co-owner thereof, he is entitled to maintain the petition. 4. On the question of late filing of the application and affidavit, it was held that the application and the affidavit were filed beyond the period of 15 days, therefore, the same could not be looked into by the Court. Taking this view of the matter, the eviction petition has been allowed and the tenant has been directed to deliver the vacant possession of the premises to the landlord in three months time. Through this petition, the tenant has challenged this decision against him. 5. During the course of arguments, the learned Counsel for the parties confined their claim to the question whether decision of the Rent Controller rejecting the application and the affidavit of the tenant as barred by time is illegal and inequitable, more particularly, in the facts and circumstances of this case. 6. 5. During the course of arguments, the learned Counsel for the parties confined their claim to the question whether decision of the Rent Controller rejecting the application and the affidavit of the tenant as barred by time is illegal and inequitable, more particularly, in the facts and circumstances of this case. 6. As noticed earlier, the tenant received registered notice dated 9-1-1990 personally on 10-1-1990 The other summons, sought to be served in the ordinary way, was received by his wife on 24-1-1990 and the contention of the learned Counsel for the tenant is that this is not a legal service since it was also to be served personally and not in accordance with Order 5 Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was also submitted that according to the directions on the left side of the summons, the case had been fixed for 27-2-1990 which was declared a holiday on account of the elections in the State, therefore, the period of 15 days should be counted from February 28, 1990. In case, it is so counted, the application and the affidavit moved on March 8, 1990 are within 15 days. There is no substance in any of these submissions Perusal of statutory provisions on this aspect disclose that the Controller has to serve the tenant as early possible since the nature of the case is such that no unnecessary delay is caused in the disposal of the same With this end in view and in order to serve the tenant and to bring him before the Court, three modes, namely, one by issue of summons and the other by registered post and the third by publication of summons in the newspaper, if the circumstances of the case so permit. In case the tenant has been served through one of the earlier two modes, requirement stands satisfied. In the present case, the tenant has admitted that he received registered A. D. notice on 10-1-1990, therefore, no grievance of the other summons received through his wife can be taken to have any substance. In case the tenant has been served through one of the earlier two modes, requirement stands satisfied. In the present case, the tenant has admitted that he received registered A. D. notice on 10-1-1990, therefore, no grievance of the other summons received through his wife can be taken to have any substance. The requirement is essentially of notice to the tenant of the petition and to appear before the Controller within 15 days of the service thereof and to obtain the leave of the Controller to contest the application for eviction and in default thereof the applicant becomes entitled, as any time after the expiry of the said period of 15 days, to obtain an order for his eviction from the said premises. Perusal of the summons, issued in accordance with the Schedule-II discloses no infirmity in the issuance thereof and there could be no reason for the tenant to be under any mistaken belief simply because the case had been fixed on 27-2-1990. Same view was taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in (1988) 1 RCR 168, Krishan Lal alias Kalla v. Des Raj Sethi and 1986 (2) RCJ 52, Food Corporation of India v. Smt. Usha Bhardvaj Therefore, he could put his appearance in the Court, since in the body of the summons there is clear direction to appear before the Controller within 15 days of the service and to obtain the leave of the Controller to contest the application. Although the Court closed for winter vacation from 22-1-1990 to 20-2-1990, the limitation had started running and the tenant could appear on the opening of the Court His case that he was out of the town and was also not aware of the nature of the proceedings, has no basis in view of the documents on record which point out quite clearly that he was very well in Simla and was also in touch with his Lawyer. 7. Then the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that Schedule-II is not part of section 16 nor it can be said to be mandatory in application. It was also submitted that the Controller did not pass the order of eviction on completion of period of 15 days and the application of the tenant could be entertained at any time before the impugned order was passed, I see no substance in any of these submissions also. It was also submitted that the Controller did not pass the order of eviction on completion of period of 15 days and the application of the tenant could be entertained at any time before the impugned order was passed, I see no substance in any of these submissions also. There is no doubt that Schedule-II is part of section 16 of the Act. This is so not only by statutory construction but also for the reason that section 16 of the Act makes clear references to this Schedule ; prescribing of 15 days time by the legislature is mandatory since these proceedings are intended to be completed quickly, that is why special procedure for the disposal of such like cases has been specifically and particularly provided for in the Act. When once the limit of 15 days is allowed to be violated, there would be no bar to extend these proceedings to any length of time. This was not the intention of the legislature while enacting these provisions ; wherever it wanted time to be allowed or extended, it has expressly provided it, as, for example, sections 24, 31 etc. The Court, cannot, therefore, extend this period. Same view has been taken in 19£0 (1) RCJ 500, Shri Gurditta Mai v. Shri Bal Sarup. And even if the case is postponed to some other date, that does not entitle the tenant to file and press his application within that period or till the matter is decided. As a matter of fact, as soon as the tenant makes default in appearing before the Court within 15 days of the service of the summons on him and to obtain leave of the Controller to contest the application for eviction, the landlord becomes entitled to obtain an order for the eviction of the tenant from the premises at any time after the expiry of the said period of 13 days. Learned Counsel for the tenant then rested his argument on the inherent powers of the Court to allow the tenant further time to contest the case of the landlord. However, Shri B. R. Verroa, Counsel for the landlord, assailed this submission and submitted that the Court has no such jurisdiction. 8. Learned Counsel for the tenant then rested his argument on the inherent powers of the Court to allow the tenant further time to contest the case of the landlord. However, Shri B. R. Verroa, Counsel for the landlord, assailed this submission and submitted that the Court has no such jurisdiction. 8. In view of the statutory provisions, it is difficult to accept that Court can, in exercise of inherent powers, cross the statutory fence and extend the time to permit the tenant to appear and oppose the landlords application. Statute has clearly laid down period of 15 days, for this purpose. The Court should not, in my opinion, exercise inherent powers, even if it has any, against the express statutory provisions. 9. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that there is no substance in this revision petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs. The tenant will put the land lord in possession of the premises on or before January, 31, 1991. Revision dismissed. -