JUDGMENT : D.P. Mohapatra, J. - The short question that arises for determination in this case is wether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Sessions Judge, Puri was justified in dismissing the revision petition filed by the Petitioners (Criminal Revision No. 239 of 1989) in limine on the ground of limitation. 2. This application u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure has been filed by the members of the second party in the proceeding initiated u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure at the instance of the opposite party, the first party therein. The proceeding was disposed of by the order passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Bhubaneswar on 25-4-1989 declaring that the first party was in possession of the case and on the date of the preliminary order. Against the said order the Petitioners filed Criminal Revision No. 239 of 1989 on 28-9-1989. The revision petition was accompanied by an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing the case. The explanation offered for the delay was that the Petitioner No. 3 Upendra Mishra, who was looking after the case was ill with hypertension associated with vertigo and was bed-ridden from 10-12-1988 to 7-9-1989. After he recovered the Petitioners took information about the proceeding, applied for a certified copy of the impugned order, obtained the same on 28-9-1989 and filed the revision petition on 28-9-1989. The application for condonation of delay was rejected by the learned Sessions Judge by the impugned order. 3. On perusal of the impugned order it appears that the learned Sessions Judge considered the question of condonation of delay on the principle that the Petitioners were required to explain each day of delay and considered on that basis they failed to explain the delay of the entire period. The Petitioners had also not furnished the details about the person from whom information about the case was sought for and when it was received. As such their prayer to condone the delay could not be granted. 4. Sri Deepak Mishra appearing for the Petitioners contends that the approach of the learned Sessions Judge in the matter is palpably erroneous inasmuch as the position is now well settled that Courts are to take a lenient view in the matter of condoning delay in filling appeal/revision. The erroneous approach has vitiated the impugned order passed. 4. Sri Deepak Mishra appearing for the Petitioners contends that the approach of the learned Sessions Judge in the matter is palpably erroneous inasmuch as the position is now well settled that Courts are to take a lenient view in the matter of condoning delay in filling appeal/revision. The erroneous approach has vitiated the impugned order passed. Sri Ganeswar Rath appearing for the opposite party, on the other hand, contends that since the condonation of delay is at the discretion of the Court and the learned Sessions Judge in exercise of the discretion vested in him rejected the prayer of the Petitioners the order is not available to be interfered with in exercise of the inherent power of the Court u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. At the outset it is necessary to clarify certain factual positions which emerge from the impugned order. The learned Sessions Judge has not disbelieved the case of the Petitioners that the Petitioner No. 3 was looking after the case; that he was ill with hypertension and vertigo till 7-9-1989 and the Petitioners 1 and 2 who are the sons of Petitioner No. 3 were busy with the treatment of their father during his illness. The learned Sessions Judge has not recorded any finding that the Petitioners were guilty of deliberate negligence or laches or that the delay in filing the revision was actuated by malafide on their part. As noticed earlier, he examined the matter on the principle that it was mandatory on the part of the Petitioners to explain each day of delay. This question came to be considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others wherein the Court made the following observations: The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature inadequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature inadequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained", does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common Sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay 'in the institution of the appeal. A similar view was reiterated by the Court in the case reported in G. Ramegowda, Major and Ors Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore wherein the Court observed: There is, it is true no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel... A similar view was reiterated by the Court in the case reported in G. Ramegowda, Major and Ors Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore wherein the Court observed: There is, it is true no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel... If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate in action or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay. The principle was followed by a Division Bench of this Court to which I was a party in the case of Bennet Coleman and Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. Janaki Ballav and Ors. reported in 1989 (I) O.L.R. 197 . 6. From the ratio of the decided cases referred to above the position is manifest that the approach of the learned Sessions judge was erroneous. Tested on the touch-stone of the rule laid down by the Supreme Court the delay ought to have been condoned and the revision petition ought to have been considered on its merit. 7. The application is therefore allowed, the delay in filing the revision petition is condoned and the learned Sessions Judge is directed to dispose of the revision petition on merit. To cut but delay, as agreed by the learned Counsel for the parties, the case will be taken up by the learned. Sessions Judge on 7th May. 1990 without any further notice to the parties. The learned Sessions Judge will take up the case on that day or, if that is not possible will fix a suitable date on which the case will he heard without further adjournment and shall dispose of the case expeditiously not later than 30th' of June,1990. The records received from the Court of the Sessions Judge be returned forthwith. Application allowed. Final Result : Allowed