Judgment :- VENKATASWAMI, J. These two tax cases are preferred against a common order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal in T.A. Nos. 761 and 764 of 1978, in respect of assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75 respectively. 2. The common question that arises for consideration in both these tax cases is, whether the crude oil sold by the assessee is liable to tax at 7 per cent or 8 per cent falling under item 47-A of the First Schedule to Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, for different periods. The assessing officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and also the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal have all held that the crude oil will fall under item 47-A and, therefore, exigible to tax at the point of first sale in the State at the rate prevailing during the relevant period. Aggrieved by the abovesaid view of the authorities below including the Tribunal, these tax revision cases are filed. 3. Mr. K. J. Chandran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, submitted that the words referring to any commodity and occurring in a taxing statue must be understood in the manner in which such commodity is known in common parlance and commercial community. On the contrary, by wrongly applying the technical meaning supported by a technical opinion to the word "crude oil", the Tribunal has concluded that the same is a kind of mineral oil, and as such, will fall under item 47-A of the First Schedule. This approach vitiates the conclusion of the Tribunal, is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In support of this, he cited the decision in Madras Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 1982 (49) STC 259 (Mad.). In addition to this, he also placed reliance on the affidavits obtained from business people and filed before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. 4. Learned counsel also attacked the order of the Tribunal by contending that the Tribunal ought not to have relied on a subsequent amendment to item 47-A to understand the meaning to be attributed to the word "crude oil". In support of this, he relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Collector of Central Excise, Kanpur v. Krishna Carbon Paper Co. In support of this, he relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Collector of Central Excise, Kanpur v. Krishna Carbon Paper Co. reported in 1988 AIR(SC) 2223, 1988 (S3) SCR 12, 1989 (1) SCC 150 , 1988 (4) JT 762 , 1988 (2) SCALE 880 , 1989 (20) ECR 273, 1989 (72) STC 280, 1988 (2) Scale 880 , 1988 (37) ELT 480 , 1989 (19) ECC 32, 1989 UPTC 188, 1989 SCC(Tax) 42 ; 1988 AIR(SC) 2223, 1988 (S3) SCR 12, 1989 (1) SCC 150 , 1988 (4) JT 762 , 1988 (2) SCALE 880 , 1989 (20) ECR 273, 1989 (72) STC 280, 1988 (2) Scale 880 , 1988 (37) ELT 480 , 1989 (19) ECC 32, 1989 UPTC 188, 1989 SCC(Tax) 42. Alternatively, he submitted that the Tribunal ought to have given the plain and natural meaning to the word "crude oil" and by so doing, should have held that the same will not fall under item 47-A. 5. The learned Additional Government Pleader (Taxes), contending contra, submitted that it is an accepted canon of interpretation to construe the meaning of a word occurring in the taxing statute by placing reliance on a subsequent amendment. In support of this, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Manickam and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 1977 (39) STC 12, 1977 (6) CTR 87, 1977 AIR(SC) 518, 1977 (1) SCC 199 , 1977 (1) SCR 950 , 1976 UJ 943 , 1977 TaxLR 1621, According to the learned Additional Government Pleader, item 47-A begins by saying "all kinds of mineral oils" which enables the Revenue to bring into the ambit of that entry "crude oil" which belongs to the family of mineral oils. He submitted that item 47-A of the First Schedule was introduced after the judgment of Madras High Court in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited v. State of Madras reported in 1968 (21) STC 227 . According to the learned Additional Government Pleader, after the amendment of item 47 and introducing 47-a, any doubt that existed prior to the amendment was cleared and it is not now open to contend that "crude oil" will not fall within the ambit of "all kinds of mineral oils". 6. According to the learned Additional Government Pleader, after the amendment of item 47 and introducing 47-a, any doubt that existed prior to the amendment was cleared and it is not now open to contend that "crude oil" will not fall within the ambit of "all kinds of mineral oils". 6. To appreciate the rival submissions, it is necessary to set out item 47 item 47-A and also item 47-A as amended by Tamil Nadu Act 40 of 1976. "S. No. Description of the goods Point of levy Rate of tax (per cent) 47 Lubricating oils (not At the point of 8 otherwise provided first sale in for in this Act) the State quenching oils and greases. 47-A All kinds of mineral do. 8" * oils (other than those falling under item 47 and not otherwise provided for in this Act) including furnace oil. Item 47-A subsequent to the amendment and with effect from 7th September, 1976, reads thus : "All kinds of mineral oils (other than those falling under item 47 of this Schedule and under item 3-A of the Second Schedule and not otherwise provided for in this Act) including furnace oil :" * 7. It is true that in 1982 (49) STC 259 (Madras Aluminum Co. Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu), a Division Bench of this Court has held as follows : "In the commercial community, the expression 'bar' is more appropriately used to refer to long pieces of metal with sharply defined sides, which may yield a cross section of a square or a hexagon or other many sided shape. In contrast, a rod is always envisaged by people who buy or sell things in the shops as a long piece, which is round in cross section. As marketable commodities, therefor, there do exist two distinct descriptions : a 'bar' on the one hand, and a 'rod' on the other, even though they might be made of the same metal and might possibly be used in the manufacture of the same kind of articles." * 8. As marketable commodities, therefor, there do exist two distinct descriptions : a 'bar' on the one hand, and a 'rod' on the other, even though they might be made of the same metal and might possibly be used in the manufacture of the same kind of articles." * 8. It is also true that the Supreme Court in Polestar Electronic (pvt.) Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner, Sale Tax reported in 1978 AIR(SC) 897, 1978 (41) STC 409, 1978 (1) SCC 636 , 1978 (3) SCR 98 , 1978 TaxLR 1907, 1978 (2) SCJ 601, 1978 SCC(Tax) 68, has ruled as follows : "When the court is construing a statutory enactment, the intention of the legislature should be gathered from the language used by it and it is not permissible to the court to speculate about the legislative intent. If the language of a statue is clear and explicit, effect must be given to it, for in such a case the words best declare the intention of the law-giver. It would not be right to refuse to place on the language of the statute the plain and natural meaning which it must bear on the ground that it produces a consequence which could not have been intended by the legislature. It is only from the language of the statute that the intention of the legislature must be gathered, for the legislature means no more and no less than what it says. It is not permissible to the court to speculate as to what the legislature must have intended and then to twist or bend the language of the statute to make it accord with the presumed intention of the legislature." * Likewise, the Supreme Court, in Collector of Central Excise, Kanpur v. Krishna Carbon Paper Co. reported in 1988 AIR(SC) 2223, 1988 (S3) SCR 12, 1989 (1) SCC 150 , 1988 (4) JT 762 , 1988 (2) SCALE 880 , 1989 (20) ECR 273, 1989 (72) STC 280, 1988 (2) Scale 880 , 1988 (37) ELT 480 , 1989 (19) ECC 32, 1989 UPTC 188, 1989 SCC(Tax) 42, has undoubtedly held that in preference to strict or technical meaning, a word occurring in a taxing statute must be understood according to common parlance. The Supreme Court, in this context, has observed as follows : "It is a well-settled principle of construction, as mentioned before, that where the word has a scientific or technical meaning and also an ordinary meaning according to common parlance, it is in the latter sense that in a taxing statute the word must be held to have been used, unless contrary intention is clearly expressed by the legislature. This principle is well-settled by a long line of decisions of Canadian, American, Australian and Indian cases. Pollock, J., pointed out in Grenfell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1876) 1 Ex D 242 at 248, that if a statute contains language which is capable of being construed in a popular sense, such a statute is not to be construed according to the strict or technical meaning of the language contained in it, but is to be construed in its popular sense, meaning, of course, by the words 'popular sense' that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. The ordinary words in every day use are, therefore to be construed according to their popular sense. The same view was reiterated story, J., in Two hundred Chests of Tea (1984) 9 Wheaton (US) 430 at 438, where he observed that the legislature does not suppose our merchants to be naturalists, or geologists, or botanists. See the observations of Bhagwati, J., as the learned Chief Justice then was, in Porritts & Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana 1979 AIR(SC) 300, 1979 (1) SCR 545 , 1979 (1) SCC 82 , 1989 (25) ECR 443, 1983 (13) ELT 1607 , 1978 (42) STC 433, 1978 UJ 697 , 1979 TaxLR 1692, 1979 UPTC 866, 1979 SCC(Tax) 38, 1980 Supp(SCC) 174 (SC); 1979 AIR(SC) 300, 1979 (1) SCR 545 , 1979 (1) SCC 82 , 1989 (25) ECR 443, 1983 (13) ELT 1607 , 1978 (42) STC 433, 1978 UJ 697 , 1979 TaxLR 1692, 1979 UPTC 866, 1979 SCC(Tax) 38, 1980 Supp(SCC) 174 ; 1979 AIR(SC) 300, 1979 (1) SCR 545 , 1979 (1) SCC 82 , 1989 (25) ECR 443, 1983 (13) ELT 1607 , 1978 (42) STC 433, 1978 UJ 697 , 1979 TaxLR 1692, 1979 UPTC 866, 1979 SCC(Tax) 38, 1980 Supp(SCC) 174. But there is a word of caution that has to be borne in mind in this connection, the words must be understood in popular sense, that is to say, these must be confined to the words used in a particular statue and then if in respect of that particular items, an artificial definition is given in the sense that a special meaning is attached to particular words in the statute then the ordinary sense or dictionary meaning would not be applicable but the meaning of that type of goods dealt with by that type of goods in that type of market, should be searched. In the instant case, we have 'all kinds of papers including papers subjected to coating, impregnating, etc.' If there is a market meaning or trade meaning of that kind of a paper that should be adhered to." * But the common question that we have to consider in these cases is, the meaning to be given to the words "all kinds of mineral oils" occurring in item 47-A of the First Schedule. While construing the meaning to be given to the abovesaid words, we cannot ignore the words preceding the words "mineral oils", namely, "all kinds" which, in our opinion, include within its sweep "crude oil" though crude oil is understood in the commercial community as a distinct and different commodity. That does not mean, the legislature cannot include that distinct and different commodity into the fold of mineral oils by so wording the item as to include crude oil. In this context, we cannot also ignore the circumstances under which item 47-a was introduced. Originally the Revenue was under which impression that item 47 will take within its fold furnace oil, and levied tax as such. Item 47 before amendment read as follows : "Lubricating oils, all kinds of mineral oils (not otherwise provided for in this Act) quenching oils and greases." * One of the assessees, namely, Burmah Shell challenged the view of the Revenue that furnace oil will come under item 47. When the matter came up before this Court in 1968 (21) STC 227 (Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited v. State of Madras), accepting the contention of the assessee, this Court observed as follows : "........ When the matter came up before this Court in 1968 (21) STC 227 (Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited v. State of Madras), accepting the contention of the assessee, this Court observed as follows : "........ that having regard to the objects and reasons appended to Madras Act VII of 1964, and the association of words preceding and following the words 'all kinds of mineral oils' in the entry, the words 'all kinds of mineral oils' had only a limited meaning, namely, mineral oils which were lubricants. Therefore entry 47, as amended in 1964, did not include furnace oil.The words '(not otherwise provided for in this Act)' in entry 47 can only refer, in the context, to mineral oils which are lubricants and which are provided for elsewhere in the Schedule than in entry 47." * Because of the above view of this Court, item 47 was amended and item 47-A was introduced. This Court in the same judgment, at another place, observed as follows : "....... We agree with the Tribunal that dissociated from the associated words, from the context and de hors the statement of objects and reasons, the words 'all kinds of mineral oils' are capable of a wide meaning and would well include oils which are not lubricants. But, since these words appear in the context and association of words and the amending Act was intended merely to clear the doubt, it appears clear that the words 'all kinds of mineral oils' in the entry bear only a limited meaning, namely, mineral oils which are lubricants." * 9. For completion of the narration, it may also be pointed out that certain assessees challenged the amendment giving retrospective effect. That was negatived by this Court in Krishnamurthi and Company v. State of Madras reported in 1969 (23) STC 1 . It was in Krishnamurthi and Co. For completion of the narration, it may also be pointed out that certain assessees challenged the amendment giving retrospective effect. That was negatived by this Court in Krishnamurthi and Company v. State of Madras reported in 1969 (23) STC 1 . It was in Krishnamurthi and Co. v. State of Madras reported in 1972 AIR(SC) 2455, 1973 (31) STC 190, 1973 (1) SCC 75 , 1973 (2) SCR 54 , 1972 (1) CTR 361, 1973 TaxLR 1601, 1973 SCC(Tax) 114, the Supreme Court, while confirming the judgment of this Court in 1969 (23) STC 1 (Krishnamurthi and Company v. State of Madras) observed as follows : "It would thus appear that the amending Act was intended to cure an infirmity as revealed by the judgment of the High Court and to validate the past levy and collection of tax in respect of all kinds of nonlubricating mineral oils, including furnace oil, with effect from April 1, 1964. The legislature for this purpose split the original entry 47 into two entries, 47 and 47-A. The new entry 47 related to lubricating oils (not otherwise provided for in the Act), quenching oils and greases, while entry 47-A covered all kinds of mineral oils (other than those falling under item 47 and not otherwise provided for in the Act) including furnace oil. The tax levied by entry 47-A, in our opinion, was not a fresh tax." * In the light of the above, we are of the view that the principle relating to common parlance meaning or meaning as understood among the commercial community to be given to a word occurring in a taxing statute cannot be pressed into service in construing "all kinds of mineral oils" occurring in item 47-A of the First Schedule. Therefore, we hold that the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners are of no avail. On the other hand, we find that there is force in the argument of the learned Additional Government Pleader that a subsequent amendment to item 47-A gives the clue in understanding the mind of the legislature while introducing item 47-A in the First Schedule. It is necessary to set out here the circumstances which necessitated the amendment of item 47-A in the year 1976. The Parliament, by Act 103 of 1976, amended section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act. It is necessary to set out here the circumstances which necessitated the amendment of item 47-A in the year 1976. The Parliament, by Act 103 of 1976, amended section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act. The relevant portion of the amendment reads as follows : "...... Crude oil, that is to say, crude petroleum oils and crude oils obtained from bituminous minerals (such as shale, calcareous rock, sand) whatever their composition, whether obtained from normal or condensation oil-deposits or by the destructive distillation of bituminous minerals and whether or not subjected to all or any of the following processes :- 1. decantation; 2. de-salting; 3. dehydration; 4. stabilisation in order to normalise the vapour pressure; 5. elimination of very light fractions with a view to returning them to the oil-deposits in order to improve the drainage and maintain the pressure; 6. the addition of only those hydrocarbons previously recovered by physical methods during the course of the above-mentioned processes; 7. any other minor process (including addition of pour point depressants or flow improvers) which does not change the essential character of the substance." * To fall in line with the above amendment, the Tamil Nadu Legislature amended item 47-A by Tamil Nadu Act 40 of 1976. The amendment as introduced, reads as follows : ".... In the First Schedule to the principal Act, - (1) in item 47-A, for the words and figures 'other than those falling under item 47' the words, figures and letter 'other than those falling under item 47 of this Schedule and under item 3-A of the Second Schedule' shall be substituted; Amendment of Second Schedule. - In the Second Schedule to the principal Act, - (1) ......................... (2) after item 3 and the entries relating thereto, the following item and entries shall be inserted, namely :- (1) (2) (3) (4) '3-A. Crude oil, that is to say, At the point 4.' crude petroleum oils and of first sale crude oils obtained from in the State. - In the Second Schedule to the principal Act, - (1) ......................... (2) after item 3 and the entries relating thereto, the following item and entries shall be inserted, namely :- (1) (2) (3) (4) '3-A. Crude oil, that is to say, At the point 4.' crude petroleum oils and of first sale crude oils obtained from in the State. bituminous minerals (such as shale, calcareous rock, sand), whatever their composition, whether obtained from normal or condensation oil-deposits or by the destructive distillation of bituminous minerals and whether or not subjected to all or any of the following processes : From the above amendment introduced to item 47-A, as rightly pointed out by the Tribunal, the intention of the legislature is quite clear that the original entry in item 47-A, namely, "all kinds of mineral oils" will include crude oil. If that was not the intention, there would be no necessity to amend item 47-A to exclude from that item, item 3-A of the Second Schedule. In this connection, the observations of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax Gujarat v. Distributors (Baroda) P. Ltd. reported in 1972 AIR(SC) 288, 1972 (83) ITR 377, 1972 (4) SCC 353 , 1972 SCR 726 , 1972 (1) CTR 274, 1972 CTR(SC) 275, are apposite. They read as follows :" * ... We cannot say that the legislature did not know its own mind when it used that expression in section 23A. We must give some reasonable meaning to that expression. No part of a provision of a statute can be just ignored by saying that the legislature enacted the same not knowing what it was saying. We must assume that the legislature deliberately used that expression and it intended to convey some meaning thereby ........... ".The observations of the Supreme Court in Manickam and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 1977 (39) STC 12, 1977 (6) CTR 87, 1977 AIR(SC) 518, 1977 (1) SCC 199 , 1977 (1) SCR 950 , 1976 UJ 943 , 1977 TaxLR 1621, relied upon by the learned Additional Government Pleader are also relevant. They read as follows :" * ....... In Cape Brandy Syndicate v. I.R.C. 1987 (29) ELT 620, 1921 (2) KB 403 Lord Sterndale, M.R., said : 'I think it is clearly established in Att-Gen. They read as follows :" * ....... In Cape Brandy Syndicate v. I.R.C. 1987 (29) ELT 620, 1921 (2) KB 403 Lord Sterndale, M.R., said : 'I think it is clearly established in Att-Gen. v. Clarkson [1900] 1 QB 156, that subsequent legislation may be looked at in order to see the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous. I quite agree that subsequent legislation if it proceeded on an erroneous construction of previous legislation cannot alter that previous legislation; but if there be any ambiguity in the earlier legislation, then the subsequent legislation may fix the proper, interpretation which is to be put upon the earlier'......" In the light of the above discussion, we find that the order of the Tribunal holding that item 47-A as it stood at the relevant period includes "crude oil" is correct, and the contention to the contrary cannot be accepted. 10. In the result, the tax cases fail and accordingly they are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.