JUDGMENT : S.C. Mohapatra, J. - Defendant is the petitioner in this Civil Revision, Claiming to be wife of the defendant, plaintiff filed a suit for maintenance. In the suit, plaintiff filed an application for interim maintenance. Trial Court having directed payment of Rs. 100/- per month as interim maintenance, this Civil Revision has been filed. 2. Undisputedly, plaintiff on an earlier occasion, filed an application for interim maintenance in the suit. Defendant who disputes the relationship with the plaintiff contested the said application. On the finding that plaintiff has not been able to prima facie prove that she is his legally married wife such application was rejected. Trial Court held that no material either documentary or which is acceptable was proved by the plaintiff. Thereafter, this application for interim maintenance was filed in which the impugned order has been passed. Besides assailing relationship, the defendant has challenged the maintainability of the second petition on the ground that the first application has already been rejected on the finding that relationship has not been proved prima facie in this Civil Revision. 3. Mr. B.L.N. Swamy, Advocate for the petitioner submitted that series of applications for interim reliefs ought not to be entertained by the Court so that the main proceeding can be disposed of early. He relied upon a decision reported in Arjun Singh Vs. Mohindra Kumar and Others, where it was observed. "............ the principle of res judicata does not apply to the findings on which these orders are based, though if applications were made for relief on the same basis after the same has once been disposed of the Court would be justified in rejecting the same as an abuse of the process of Court. There are other orders which are also inter locutory, but would fall into a different category. The difference from the ones just now referred to lies in the fact that they are not directed to maintaining the status quo, or to preserve the property pending the final adjudication, but are designed to ensure the just smooth, orderly and expeditious disposal of the suit. They are interlocutory in the sense that they do not decide any matter in issue arising in the suit, nor put an end to the litigation. The case of an application under Order 9, Rule 7 would be an illustration of this type. They are interlocutory in the sense that they do not decide any matter in issue arising in the suit, nor put an end to the litigation. The case of an application under Order 9, Rule 7 would be an illustration of this type. If an application made under the provisions of that rule is dismissed and an appeal were filed against the decree in the suit in which such application were made, there can be no doubt that the propriety of the order rejecting the reopening of the proceeding and the refusal to relegate the party to an earlier stage might be canvassed in the appeal and dealt with by the appellate Court. In that sense, the refusal of the Court to permit the defendant to "set the clock back" does not attain finality. But what we are concerned with is slightly different and that is whether the same Court is finally bound by that order at later stages, so as to preclude its being reconsidered. Even if the rule of res judicata does not apply, it would not follow that on every subsequent day on which the suit stands adjourned for further hearing, the petition could be repeated and fresh orders sought on the basis of identical facts. The principle that repeated applications based on the same facts and seeking the same reliefs might be disallowed by the Court does not however necessarily rest on the principle of resjudicata. Thus if an application for the adjournment of a suit is rejected, a subsequent application for the same purpose even if based on the same facts, is not barred on the application of any rule of resjudicata, but would be rejected for the same grounds on which the original application was refused. The principle underlying the distinction between the rule of res judicata and a rejection on the ground that no new facts have been adduced to justify a different order is vital. If the principle of resjudicata is applicable to the decision on a particular issue of fact, even if fresh facts were placed before the Court, the bar would continue to operate and preclude a fresh investigation of the issues, whereas in the other case, on proof of fresh facts, the Court would be competent, nay would be bound to take those into account and make an order comformably to the facts freshly brought before the Court." 4. Underline portions of the aforesaid decision make it clear that on proof of fresh facts a second application for the same purpose would be maintainable. Whether the second application for the same purpose would be maintainable would depend upon the nature of the application. This Court held in 53 (1982) C.L.T. 590 [Madhu Sethi (after him) Patle Sethi & Am. v. Bishnu Sethi (after him) Digdhan Sethi & Ors.} that an application for amendment of final decree when rejected a second application for the same purpose would not be entertained. However, question of interim maintenance stands on a different consideration. Maintenance is a continuous need and on each day the need becomes fresh. See (1962) 4 O.J.D. 27 (Simhadri Subudhi v. Gwubari Subudhiani). If in the first application, some basic preconditions could not be proved for want of facts, it would not bar another application by proving fresh materials on the self same materials which were not accepted by the trial Court once, no relief can be given in a second application. 5. This is an application for interim maintenance by a wife. As has been held by the Full Bench of this Court in the decision reported in 68(1989) C.L.T. 771 (F.B.) (Khadal Penthi v. Hulash Dei and Ors.), in a suit for maintenance, there is no scope for applying Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The application would, therefore, be one u/s 151, C.P.C. for grant of interim maintenance in exercise of inherent powers. While exercising inherent power, the Court is to see that justice is done to the parties. Technicalities for refusing to exercise inherent power should not stand on the way in Courts. Accordingly, for doing justice to the parties, a party ought not to be prevented to agitate for the same relief, if fresh materials are brought to the notice of the Court and in such cases the Court ought not to hesitate to grant the interim relief if it is satisfied that deficiency in the first application is not continuing. 6. In the present case, plaintiff has been able to bring the Advocate's Notice to record which was not filed in support of the previous application. The two witnesses who have been examined were not examined earlier. Non-supply of materials was the ground for rejecting the application in the earlier case. 6. In the present case, plaintiff has been able to bring the Advocate's Notice to record which was not filed in support of the previous application. The two witnesses who have been examined were not examined earlier. Non-supply of materials was the ground for rejecting the application in the earlier case. Accordingly, when fresh materials were brought to the record, and trial Court on assessment of the same is convinced that prima facie plaintiff has proved marital relationship with defendant, grant of interim maintenance cannot be said to be in excess of exercise of inherent power. Accordingly, 1 am not inclined to interfere with the order. 7. In the result, there is no merit in this applications which is accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. However, this being a suit for maintenance of a wife whose relationship is disputed, trial Court shall do well is disposing of the suit early. Final Result : Dismissed