Having lost in both the two Courts below, the defendant has filed the present second appeal. 2. Briefly stated, according to the plaintiff, the suit land was inherited by him and got his share of possession as a result of an amicable family partition, and on 20. 11. 71 the defendant denied his title and made an attempt to construct a house on the suit land. There was also a criminal proceeding regarding possession. Hence the suit. According to the defendant, about 2^/22 years before the suit was filed, he purchased the suit land from the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 90/- with delivery of possession. Though the plaintiff agreed to execute the sale deed, subsequently he refused to do so. The defendant alleged that he was in possession of the suit land from the date of his alleged purchase with the knowledge of the plaintiff, and has thus acquired title by adverse possession. 3. The learned trial Court framed as many as four issues and inter alia held that the defendant failed to prove his purchase, as alleged, ,and also the plea of adverse possession. The finding was affirmed by the learned lower appellate Court. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the judgments of the learned Courts below. 5. The first contention of Mr. Chakravorty, learned counsel for the appellant, is that the suit must fail inasmuch as the plaintiff has failed to prove his title over the suit land. According to Mr. Chakravorty, as the plaintiff claimed the suit land by inheritance and amicable petition, the plaintiff ought to have proved the said partition and that in any event in this suit, a decree cannot be passed for eviction but at best a preliminary decree for partition. In this connection, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 , wherein their Lordships held that in ejectment suit, the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own title and this can be done by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus that is en him irrespective of whether the defendant has proved his case or not. There cannot be any dispute on the above proposition of law. 6. There cannot be any dispute on the above proposition of law. 6. Coming to the case in hand, I find the whole case of the defendant is that he acquired title by right of purchase from the plaintiff and also by adverse possession The defendant has neither denied title nor possession before the alleged purchase. As the defendant admitted the title and possession of the plaintiff, I do not find any force in the contention of Mr. Chakravorty. Accordingly, I hold that there is no question of any preliminary decree, proof of title or partition, etc. as urged. 7. The area of the disputed land is about 4 Katha. Ext. 1 and Ext. A, namely, Jamabandi and Patta of the suit land are the revenue records. In both these documents, the names of the plaintiff as well as the defendant appear and as such they are co-pattadars. Mr. Sarma, learned counsel for the defendant, has urged that there cannot be any question of adverse possession against co-pattadars i.e. co-owners. In this connection, the learned counsel has placed reliance in Syed Shah Ghulam Ghousel Mohiuddin vs. Syed Shah Ahmed Mohiuddin Kamisul, 1977 (1) SCC 597, wherein the ratio laid down was that possession of co owner is not by itself adverse to other co-owners and that on the contrary possession of one co-owner is supposed to be on behalf of other co-owner unless it is established that the possession of the cd-owner is in denial of title of co-owners and the possession is in hostility to co-owners by exclusion of them. I may add that when a co-owner claims adverse possession, his assertion of hostile title must be to the knowledge of the other co-owners. Keeping in view the above ratio, I am of the opinion that in the case in hand, as the defendant as co-owner has claimed adverse possession against another co-owner, namely, the plaintiff, he cannot succeed unless it is shown that he asserted his hostile right to the knowledge, of the plaintiff There is no such evidence regarding this aspect of the matter. I, therefore, find considerable force in the contention of Mr. Sarma. 8. According to Mr. I, therefore, find considerable force in the contention of Mr. Sarma. 8. According to Mr. Chakravorty, learned counsel for the appellant, the present suit is covered by Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and not by Article 65 of the said Act, and the corresponding Articles in old Limitation Act were Articles 142 and 14 respectively. Relying on the decision of this Court as well as other Courts, Mr. Chakravorty has urged that as this suit is governed by Article 64, i.e Article 142 of the old Act, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove possession within twelve years from filing the suit. In reply, Mr Sarma has placed reliance on a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Sabdar Ali Mean vs. Jadu Goala, (1987) 2 GHC 15 and in para 12 of the said report, the Division Bench held as follows: "On the basis of the above analysis, it can be answered that old Article 144 did not precisely operate on the same field as that of new Article 65. The new Article 65 does not at all deal with suits for possession of immovable property on the basis of previous^ possession, while the old Article 144 dealt with suits for possession of immovable property or any interest thereon not otherwise specially provided in the old Act. It did not mention the basis of the right to possession." 9. Be that as it may. the contention of Mr. Chakravorty needs no consideration as, in my opinion, that stage is over as the parties have adduced evidence and the case in hand has to be decided on the preponderance of evidence on record. 10. This Court in Budhina Hazarika and others vs. Hira Payeng and another, (1989) 2 GLR 430, [1989 (1) GLJ 288] held that it is settled law that mere possession, without a claim of right, for however long a time, is not sufficient to create adverse possession as possession and adverse possession do not mean the same thing; for example a squatter upon a land, though holding possession even for the statutory period, cannot acquire title by adverse possession, unless his possession is (1) under claim of title, (2) hostile to the true owner, and (3) actual, open, uninterrupted, notorious, exclusive and continuous. That was a second appeal, and this Court held that the finding of facts of the learned Courts below cannot be assailed in second appeal. 11. In the present case, Mr. Chakravorty has urged that the plaintiff in his evidence did not give the actual date of dispossession and as such his case is not believable. Though it is second appeal, I have gone through the evidence, and I find that PW-1 stated on oath that he was dispossessed in 1971, but he was not cross-examined on this point. Mr. Chakravorty has urged that the evidence of PW-2 would show that the defendant was all along in possession but this aspect was duly considered by the lower Court and it was held that the entire statements of the PWs. if considered as a whole, do not give any convenient handle to the defendant. In other words the Court was of opinion that from the evidence, it cannot be held that the defendant was in possession. This finding of fact is binding on this Court in the second appeal. Accordingly, I do not find any scope for taking a contrary view. 12. Mr. Chakravorty has drawn my attention to a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Official Receiver vs. Chara Govindaraju, AIR 1940 Madras 798, where it was held that under Article 142 suit for ejectment by person out of possession cannot succeed unless he, in addition to title, proves that he has been in possession within twelve years of suit. Mr. Cbakravorty has also drawn my attention to a decision of this Court in Kanak Lal Nath vs. Jogendra Chandra Nath, ILR 1963 Assam 250, wherein it was held that where a person enters into possession without any title to the property, the presumption will be that he continued in possession as hostile to the rightful owner in these cases tried to assert that the party entered into possession under some permission or as a tenant it is for him to prove it. 13. In the instant case, it is not the allegation of the plaintiff that the defendant entered into the land with permission or as a tenant and as such the ratio laid down in Kanak Lal Nath (supra) is not applicable to this case. 13. In the instant case, it is not the allegation of the plaintiff that the defendant entered into the land with permission or as a tenant and as such the ratio laid down in Kanak Lal Nath (supra) is not applicable to this case. Regarding the decision of the Madras High Court in Official Receiver (supra), I have already stated that the contention of the learned counsel that the plaintiff did not state regar­ding dispossession, is not wholly correct. Of course, it is true that he did not give the particular date in his evidence though it was stated in the pleading, but this by itself is of no help for the defendant as no cross-examination was there on this point. That apart, both the Courts below rejected the claim of possession of the defendant. 14. Regarding Article 142 of the Limitation Act, Mr. Chakravorty has also drawn my attention to Prameswar Das vs. Madhab Chandra Das, AIR 1950 Assam 55, wherein it was held that the plaintiff should prove title and possession within twelve years. This point has already been dealt with earlier. 15. Mr. Chakravorty has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Kshitish Chandra Bose vs. Commissioner of Ranch!, AIR 1981 SC 707 in support of his contention that the fact of adverse possession need not be proved to the true knowledge of the plaintiff. In para 8 of the said report, it was laid down that all that the law requires is that the possession must be open and without any attempt at concealment and it is not necessary that the possession must be so effective so as to bring it to the specific knowledge of the owner. Their Lordships further held that such requirement may be insisted on, where an ouster of title is pleaded but that was not so in that case. In the present case, the dispute is between two co-owners and on facts both pleas of the defend­ant regarding purchase and possession have been rejected. So, in my opinion, the above ratio is not applicable. 16. Another decision of the Apex Court on which Mr. Chakr­avorty has placed before this Court is Jugal Kishore Mandal vs. Fani Bhushan Kundu, AIR 1973 SC 2341 . Relying on the decision, Mr. So, in my opinion, the above ratio is not applicable. 16. Another decision of the Apex Court on which Mr. Chakr­avorty has placed before this Court is Jugal Kishore Mandal vs. Fani Bhushan Kundu, AIR 1973 SC 2341 . Relying on the decision, Mr. Chakravorty has urged that there is nothing to show that after the alleged amicable partition, the plaintiff was ever in poss­ession of the land and the plaintiff has also failed to prove that after the alleged oral sale to the defendant the plaintiff ever possessed the land. It is again a finding of fact and the learned Courts below considering the evidence on record clearly held that the defendant was not in possession. I, therefore, do not find any force in the contention of the learned counsel, I may add here that adverse possession being a question of fact, the finding of the learned Courts below that the defendant did not acquire title by right of adverse possession is binding and as such it cannot be disturbed. 17. According to Mr. Chakravorty, as the plaintiff is a co-pattadar and according to him he got the land by amicable family partition, the plaintiff cannot get a decree for delivery of khas possession unless partition is' proved. This point is not relevant here inasmuch as this plea was never taken in the written statement. That apart, the specific case of the defendant is that he purchased the suit l*nd by an oral sale and he was in possession of the suit land all along. In view of these facts, the contention of Mr. Chakravorty has no force. 18. For what has been stated above, I do not find any merit in the present appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.