JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was delivered by V. P. TIPNIS, J. - These four writ petitions raise common questions of fact and law and were, therefore, heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. In these petitions, the constitutional validity of the Bombay Sales Tax (Amendment and Validating Provisions) Act, 1987, is challenged. 3. With a view to encouraging entrepreneurs to establish industrial units in undeveloped or under-developed ares of the State of Maharashtra outside Bombay - Thane and Pune-Pimpri - Chinchwad regions, the Government of Maharashtra announced a package scheme of incentives in the year 1964. Certain incentives during the initial stages of production and a cash refund of sales tax were offered under the said incentive scheme. Thereafter, by further resolution dated October 23, 1973, the Government divided various undeveloped areas of the State into four groups and modified the package scheme with effect from August 15, 1973. Under the said scheme, eligible units were entitled every year to the sales tax incentive at 4 per cent of the cost of the fixed assets plus employment incentive based on the average employment worked out at Rs. 12,000 per job per year, limited to 4 per cent of the cost of fixed assets, provided the total amount so calculated was limited to the total sales tax liability during the year or 8 per cent of the gross value of the fixed assets whichever is lower. Further, special capital incentive scheme with effect from August 1, 1977, was also introduced. By Government resolution dated October 18, 1979, the special capital incentive scheme was extended for a further period of one year, i.e., up to July 31, 1980. 4. Thereafter, by Government resolution dated January 5, 1980, the Government introduced modified package scheme of incentives. It was to remain in force from August 1, 1979 to March 31, 1983, with liberty to Government to amend the scheme at any time after giving six month's notice. Under the scheme, the unit in production prior to August 1, 1979, was considered as an existing unit, while an industrial unit, for setting up of which at least one of final effective steps was required to be completed after August 1, 1979, was considered a new unit. The period of eligibility was varying between 3 to 13 years depending on the nature and location of the eligible unit. The period of eligibility was varying between 3 to 13 years depending on the nature and location of the eligible unit. The areas were classified into four groups, viz., "A", "B", "C" and "D" for the purpose of the said scheme. An eligible unit in the small-scale industries sector was given exemption from the purchase tax on the raw materials purchased by it as also from the sales tax on the sales effected by it during the period of eligibility without any limit. Thus, under the 1979 scheme, there was total exemption from payment of purchase tax and sales tax without any limit. These incentive schemes were introduced with a view to secure planned and co-ordinated development of various regions of the State. The 1979 scheme was in two parts giving option to the entrepreneurs to opt for the benefit under one or the other part. As far as sales tax incentives are concerned, the option was given to the entrepreneurs to choose between the incentives in the form of tax exemption or benefit in the form of deferral of payment of tax. 5. To give effect to the scheme the Government of Maharashtra amended its earlier notification issued under section 41 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, by adding entry 136 to the Schedule providing for a statutory exemption from the sales tax, purchase tax and Central sales tax in favour of an industrial unit set up in the developing region of the State. The eligible unit had to obtain the eligibility certificate and also a certificate of entitlement from the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax. It is an admitted position that all the petitioners in the four petitions before us have obtained such eligibility certificates as also the entitlement certificates. 6. It appears that though several units came to be entitled to such certificates, the same were denied to them. But, ultimately the Full Bench of this Court in Tapti Oil Industries v. State of Maharashtra [1984] 56 STC 193; AIR 1984 Bom 161 held that on the principle of promissory estoppel, the State cannot deny such certificates to the units who have complied with all the requirements and ultimately such certificates were issued to such industrial units. 7. It is the case of the State Government that during the operation of the 1979 scheme, certain facts came to its knowledge. 7. It is the case of the State Government that during the operation of the 1979 scheme, certain facts came to its knowledge. Difficulties were faced by some industrial units and particularly by the edible oil units which had gone into production prior to 1979. These units faced severe competition from the eligible units under the 1979 scheme and consequently they made several representations to the State Government to discontinue the incentives given to the new units under the 1979 scheme. Other industrial units which did not get the advantage of incentives under the 1979 scheme also made representations that they were finding it difficult to compete with the new units who were getting unlimited sales tax exemptions under the 1979 scheme. The State Government, therefore, by resolution dated July 5, 1982, modified the 1979 package scheme of incentives, inter alia, by limiting the total cumulative sales tax incentives to 100 per cent of the fixed capital investment during the period of entitlement. The said resolution was made effective from January 10, 1983, as under the 1979 scheme the Government had agreed to give 6 months notice for any amendment of the 1979 scheme. During the period from July 5, 1982, to January 10, 1983, several new units were set up who got the advantage of the 1979 scheme. The number of edible oil units being largest, with a view to save the old units from fierce competition the Government tried to regulate the issue of eligibility certificate or entitlement certificate by administrative instructions, but in view of the judgment of the Full Bench in Tapti Oil Industries case [1984] 56 STC 193; AIR 1984 Bom 161 the Government had to issue such certificates to the eligible units. 8. It is the case of the State Government that in the light of the actual facts in the implementation of the 1979 scheme, the Government came to the conclusion that the 1979 scheme had caused enormous harm or injury to old units which were not entitled to the benefit of sales tax exemption and they found it very difficult, if not impossible to compete with the new units having unlimited sales tax exemption. The State Government also felt that it is losing huge revenue on account of the exemption. The State Government also felt that it is losing huge revenue on account of the exemption. The State Government formed an opinion that the edible oil units formed a class by themselves and the competition faced by the old oil units in the edible oil industry was very fierce and unhealthy. The State Government further formed an opinion that the edible oil units did not suffer from the disabilities suffered by other units, particularly because the edible oil industry is agro-based, it was mainly concentrated in rule areas and was able to secure raw materials in or near about the site of its factory. It was also found that an edible oil unit could recover its entire capital invested in fixed assets within about an year's time. The State Government therefore decided not to give any incentive to units in edible oil industry going into production after April 1, 1983, either by exemption of sales tax or otherwise. 8A. Even after the deletion of the edible oil industry from the new package scheme of incentives, the Government received representations from old units, including the units in edible oil industry which were not getting the benefit of 1979 scheme, to the effect that unlimited incentives granted under the 1979 scheme continued to cause fierce competition to those units. However, in view of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Tapti Oil Industries case [1984] 56 STC 193; AIR 1984 Bom 161 it was not possible for the State Government to reduce the incentives already available to the units covered by the 1979 scheme, either by executive or administrative orders. 9. Thus, after realising that the enjoyment of unlimited exemption from payment of sales tax by the units under the 1979 scheme had not only resulted in huge draw on the public exchequer which was never intended, but it also created unhealthy trade practices and competition, the Government issued an Ordinance No. 5 of 1985 on May 24, 1985, inter alia, to limit the benefit derived on account of exemption from payment of sales tax under 1979 scheme to the extent of 100 per cent of gross fixed capital investment by the eligible units at the time of grant of eligibility certificates or such other lower percentage, if any, as may be provided under the eligibility certificate issued in accordance with the provisions of any package scheme of incentives. Petitions were filed by eligible oil units under the 1979 scheme challenging the said Ordinance. During the pendency of the said petitions, the Ordinance was replaced by the Act. During this intervening period, the Government received a number of representations from the small-scale industries. The Government also received representations from the units in edible oil industry which had started production either before August 1, 1979, or after April 1, 1983, to the effect that they were being subjected to hostile discrimination and they were not in a position to compete with those units in edible oil industry which were getting the benefit of exemption of sales tax without any limit under the 1979 scheme. On consideration of all these representations, the Government came to the conclusion that except the units in edible oil industry, which formed a separate class, all other units which were eligible for exemption from purchase tax and sales tax without any limit under the 1979 scheme during the period of eligibility should continue to get those incentives under the 1979 scheme. So far as the units in edible oil industry are concerned, the Government realised that there was discrimination between pre-1979 and post-April 1, 1983, units on the one hand the eligible units under the 1979 scheme on the other, which required to be removed. The Government also felt that it was not in public interest to continue the said exemption to the units in edible oil industry, because it was unnecessarily depriving the public exchequer of legitimate revenue, apart from causing loss and harm to units not covered by the 1979 scheme. Thereafter the Ordinance was replaced by the Maharashtra Act No. 15 of 1985, which was brought into force from May 24, 1985. By the said amending Act, a new section 41A was inserted in the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. The said section provided as under : "41A. Thereafter the Ordinance was replaced by the Maharashtra Act No. 15 of 1985, which was brought into force from May 24, 1985. By the said amending Act, a new section 41A was inserted in the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. The said section provided as under : "41A. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any judgment, decree or order of any Court or Tribunal to the contrary, on and after the date of commencement of the Bombay Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1985 (hereinafter in this section referred to as 'the commencement date'), the eligibility certificate granted to any registered dealer of an edible oil unit in accordance with the provisions of any package scheme of incentives shall cease to have any effect in relation to the exemption from payment of tax under this Act or under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and the certificate of entitlement issued in favour of such registered dealer by the Commissioner under entry 136 of the Schedule to the notification issued under section 41 shall stand automatically cancelled on the commencement date and such registered dealer shall not be entitled to claim any further benefit of exemption from payment of such tax under the eligibility certificate or the certificate of entitlement on and after the commencement date, and he shall surrender the certificate of entitlement together with all the unused forms BC which have been attested by the sales tax authorities to the Commissioner forthwith and in any case on or before the 31st day of August, 1985, unless he has already surrendered the same earlier." 10. Several edible oil units eligible under the scheme of 1979 challenged the validity of the said section. One such unit was Olympic Oil Industries Limited. The said petition was heard by the Division Bench of this Court along with several other petitions challenging the said section. 11. The main challenge to the constitutional validity of the said section 41A, as amended, was on the basis of it being violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India. Section 41A was also attacked as wholly arbitrary being unreasonable and also not in public interest. Doctrine of promissory estoppel was also pressed into service. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the State that the Bombay Sales Tax Act is a fiscal statute. It was always competent for the Legislature to enact this law. Section 41A was also attacked as wholly arbitrary being unreasonable and also not in public interest. Doctrine of promissory estoppel was also pressed into service. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the State that the Bombay Sales Tax Act is a fiscal statute. It was always competent for the Legislature to enact this law. That the matter of exemption is outside the province of the court and unless it is demonstrated that the withdrawal of the exemption is wholly arbitrary, the court cannot interfere with the wisdom of the Legislature. It was contended that the edible oil units formed a distinct class by themselves. 12. On consideration of the several decisions cited before it and on consideration of various rival submissions and the material on record, the Division Bench of this Court upheld the validity of the said section 41A, though the retroactive operation of the same was held to be violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India. Ultimately, the petitions were partly allowed by striking down the retrospective operation of the said Maharashtra Act No. 15 of 1985 in respect of edible oil units who validly enjoyed the benefit under the Ordinance. It was held that the Act shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from August 1, 1985, qua these edible oil units who were petitioners before the court. All other challenges were negatived and rejected. The said decision in Olympic Oil Industries Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra is reported in [1987] 65 STC 191 (Bom). 13. It is to be noticed that by the same amending Act, the "edible oil unit" was defined as under : "2. (12A) 'Edible oil unit' means an eligible unit engaged in - (i) delinting, decorticating or processing of groundnuts or other oilseeds; (ii) crushing of groundnuts or other oilseeds and manufacture of edible oil; (iii) refining of edible oil; or (iv) hydrogenation of edible oil." 14. It is to be noticed at this stage that the petitioners undertook the activity of crushing of oilseeds, extracting oil and refining oil. They crushed the oilseeds and manufactured non-edible oil and they also refined non-edible oil to make it edible. The cotton seeds are crushed resulting in manufacture of washed cotton seed oil which is a non-edible oil. Thereafter, the said washed cotton seed oil is refined which makes it edible. 15. They crushed the oilseeds and manufactured non-edible oil and they also refined non-edible oil to make it edible. The cotton seeds are crushed resulting in manufacture of washed cotton seed oil which is a non-edible oil. Thereafter, the said washed cotton seed oil is refined which makes it edible. 15. The petitioners in Writ Petition No. 2101 of 1987, M/s. Narendra Oil Refineries contended that inasmuch as their activity so far as it pertains to refining washed cotton seed oil is concerned, it falls outside the purview of the definition of "edible oil unit" under the amended provisions. It appears that the said contention did not find favour with the sales tax authorities who insisted that the petitioners did fall under the category of edible oil units even in respect of such a process of refining washed cotton seed oil. The matter was taken up under the provisions of section 52 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act before the Commissioner of Sales Tax. However, the Commissioner of Sales Tax rejected the contention and held that even the said activity of refining washed cotton seed oil and to make it edible makes the unit an edible oil unit. 16. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 2101 of 1987, viz., M/s. Narendra Oil Refineries filed Writ Petition No. 1280 of 1986 before this Court challenging the said interpretation made by the Commissioner of Sales Tax. The Division Bench of this Court, by its judgment dated December 11, 1986 [Reported as Narendra Oil Refineries v. State of Maharashtra [1988] 68 STC 208 (Bom).], upheld the contention of the petitioner therein. It held that so far as the activity of the petitioner therein of refining washed cotton seed oil into refined cotton seed oil is concerned, the same is not covered by the definition of "edible oil unit" and a relief limited to that extent was granted to the petitioners, viz., M/s. Narendra Oil Refineries. 17. It is thereafter that the Governor of Maharashtra issued Maharashtra Ordinance No. 5 of 1987 entitled the Bombay Sales Tax (Amendment and Validating Provisions) Ordinance, 1987. 17. It is thereafter that the Governor of Maharashtra issued Maharashtra Ordinance No. 5 of 1987 entitled the Bombay Sales Tax (Amendment and Validating Provisions) Ordinance, 1987. By section 2, it was provided that : "In section 2 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, for clause (12A), the following clause shall be substituted, and shall be deemed to have been substituted with effect from the 1st day of August 1985, namely :- "(12A) 'Edible oil unit' means an eligible unit engaged in - (i) delinting, decorticating or processing of groundnuts or other oilseeds, or (ii) crushing of groundnuts or other oilseeds and manufacture of edible oil, or (iii) refining of oil and manufacture of edible oil, or (iv) manufacture of edible oil by any process in any manner, or (v) hydrogenation of edible oil." Clause 3 of the said Ordinance made validating provisions and saving which provided that : "Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court or Tribunal to the contrary, any assessment, reassessment, levy or collection of tax in respect of sales or purchases effected by any edible oil unit made or purporting to have been made, or any action taken or thing done in relation to such assessment, reassessment, levy or collection, under the provisions of the principal Act during the period commencing on the 1st day of August, 1985 and ending on and including the day immediately preceding the date of commencement of this Ordinance, shall be deemed to be as valid and effective as if such assessment, reassessment, levy or collection or action or thing had been duly made, taken or done under the principal Act, as amended by this Ordinance." 18. Initially, the said Ordinance was challenged in Writ Petition No. 2101 of 1987. Thereafter the said Ordinance was replaced by Maharashtra Act No. 39 of 1987 called the Bombay Sales Tax (Amendment and Validating Provisions) Act, 1987. Identical provisions are were in the Ordinance were made in the said Act. By amendment, the petitioners have challenged the validity of the said Amendment and Validating Provisions Act. 19. Thereafter the said Ordinance was replaced by Maharashtra Act No. 39 of 1987 called the Bombay Sales Tax (Amendment and Validating Provisions) Act, 1987. Identical provisions are were in the Ordinance were made in the said Act. By amendment, the petitioners have challenged the validity of the said Amendment and Validating Provisions Act. 19. It must be made clear at this stage that Shri Manohar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in two writ petitions, and Shri Deshpande, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in other two writ petitions, have clearly stated that in these petitions, they are limiting their challenge to the retroactive operation of the Act. In other words, they are challenging the operation of the definition of "edible oil unit" made effective from the 1st day of August, 1985. They have clearly submitted that they cannot and do not challenge the validity of the said Act in so far as its prospective operation from September 23, 1987, is concerned. 20. Shri Manohar contended that he is also not challenging the legislative competence of enacting the said provision. However, he is seriously challenging the retroactive or retrospective implementation of the same from 1st of August, 1985, as being violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India being arbitrary, unreasonable and almost unconscionable. Shri Manohar in that behalf submitted that though the petitioners who started enjoying exemption from payment of sales tax from 1981-82 to the extent of 4 per cent of sales tax on the purchase of their raw material and also 4 per cent of sales tax on the sale of their finished product, the petitioners themselves are not able to retain the benefit and the benefit in fact has passed on either to oilseed producers or the consumers of the finished product. Shri Manohar contended that the sales tax saved by the petitioners is not converted by them into profit. He therefore contended that the petitioners had to incur heavy investment for establishment and commissioning of their industrial unit in backward area which they undertook only on the basis of promise in the form of incentive schemes. Taking away these exemptions by amendment of the definitions is unconscionable. He therefore contended that the petitioners had to incur heavy investment for establishment and commissioning of their industrial unit in backward area which they undertook only on the basis of promise in the form of incentive schemes. Taking away these exemptions by amendment of the definitions is unconscionable. Shri Manohar contended that though the promissory estoppel against the Government may not be available to challenge the validity of the legislation or legislative Act, for the purposes of judging the reasonableness and fairness of the provisions, the said facts are relevant. 21. In paragraph 23 of the Writ Petition No. 2101 of 1987, the petitioner has given the amount of sales during the different periods between August 1, 1985 to September 22, 1987, the amount of notional tax and the amount of profit as per income-tax returns and on that basis it is submitted that the sales tax works out to approximately 3.21 crores. As against that, the total investment towards plant and machinery is Rs. 4.70 lacs. The partners' capital in the unit is 6.41 lacs and it has an outstanding loan of approximately Rs. 4.70 lacs from the Development Corporation of Vidarbha Limited and Rs. 2.10 lacs from the Maharashtra State Finance Corporation. It is submitted that if the alleged liability of sales tax is raised against the first petitioner the entire unit stands eroded. In paragraph 24, similar figures in respect of petitioner No. 2 therein are given and it is contended that even in his case, the imposition of the tax liability would result into shutting down of the said unit. In paragraph 25, in case of first petitioner in the said Writ Petition No. 2101 of 1987, it is further contended that the first petitioner also produced washed cotton seed oil and for a particular period, instead of using the same for refining, he sold the same in open market for a profitable price. If he had not sold the same to outsider, but used it for refining in his own factory, he would have been required to pay only a single point tax, namely, sales tax at 4 per cent on the sale of refined cotton seed oil, whereas in respect of the same quantity purchased by it, he is now required to pay a double point tax in respect of the quantity, namely, the purchase tax as well as the sales tax. It is contended on these facts that the retroactive operation is unconscionable, arbitrary and most unreasonable and deserves to be struck down on that ground. It is further stated in paragraph 27 of the petition that during the relevant period, viz., August 1, 1985 to September 22, 1987, the petitioners have not realised the amounts or charged the amounts either of the purchase tax or the sales tax to their consumers and the benefit has been passed to the consumers only. The tax liability now attempted to be raised retroactively would cast the entire burden on the shoulders of the petitioner and they will have to pay it from their own pocket. It is submitted that the petitioners established their units under the 1979 scheme, relying on the promises contained in the same scheme. The petitioners to their detriment established their industry in the backward region. They were assured of the sales tax exemption for a period of 7 years. In the implemention of the schemes, various agreements were entered into between the petitioners and the State. For example, under the agreement entered into by the eligible units with the implementing agency, the eligible unit is under an obligation to continue working for a period of 15 years and also to maintain normal average production every year. If the eligible unit does not abide by these two terms or the eligibility certificate or the entitlement certificate is cancelled or revoked for whatever reason, the eligible unit is under an obligation to reimburse the Government of the entire benefit of tax concession obtained by the eligible unit along with interest at 15 per cent and costs, etc. Shri Manohar submitted that under these circumstances, the retroactive withdrawal of the tax benefit is totally arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. He submitted that the petitioners on the basis of the law as it stood, had tailored their business and did not derive any benefit and under the circumstances, the imposition of the tax liability is obviously unreasonable and arbitrary. 22. Shri Deshpande appearing for the petitioners in other two petitions adopted the arguments and submissions made by Shri Manohar. He submitted that the petitioners on the basis of the law as it stood, had tailored their business and did not derive any benefit and under the circumstances, the imposition of the tax liability is obviously unreasonable and arbitrary. 22. Shri Deshpande appearing for the petitioners in other two petitions adopted the arguments and submissions made by Shri Manohar. In addition, he contended that as is evidenced from the stand taken by the State of Maharashtra reflected in the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in [1989] 72 STC 354; (1989) Supp 1 SCC 153 (Bharat General and Textile Industries Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra), the intention of the Legislature when it defined "edible oil unit" in the year 1985 was clearly to exclude the units refining washed cotton seed oil and making it edible from the definition of edible oil unit. Shri Deshpande therefore contended that the stand taken by the State that it was always intended to cover such units in the definition of "edible oil unit" is factually incorrect and if that is so, the State cannot pass an Act completely inserting a new item and tax it retrospectively. Shri Deshpande further contended that inasmuch as the petitioners have passed on the entire benefit either to the oilseed manufacturers or to the consumers who have purchased refined washed cotton seed oil from them, now, the liability will have to be borne by the eligible oil units themselves. This, in effect, would be taxing the income of the petitioners and would cease to be a sales tax. In the circumstances, he submitted that the retroactive operation of the definition must be struck down as amounting to a legislation which is not only arbitrary but is almost confiscatory. Shri Manohar in support of his various submissions, cited following cases : [1961] 12 STC 429 (SC); AIR 1961 SC 1534 (J.K. Jute Mills Co. In the circumstances, he submitted that the retroactive operation of the definition must be struck down as amounting to a legislation which is not only arbitrary but is almost confiscatory. Shri Manohar in support of his various submissions, cited following cases : [1961] 12 STC 429 (SC); AIR 1961 SC 1534 (J.K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh), [1985] 58 STC 12 (SC); AIR 1985 SC 12 (K.M. Mohamed Abdul Khader Firm v. State of Tamil Nadu), [1987] 65 STC 191 (Bom) (Olympic Oil Industries Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra), [1988] 70 STC 59 (SC); AIR 1988 SC 1247 [Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Asst.), Dharwar v. Dharmendra Trading Company], AIR 1985 SC 746 (Collector of Customs & Central Excise v. Oriental Timber Industries), [1988] 71 STC 298 (SC); AIR 1988 SC 1814 (West Bengal Hosiery Association v. State of Bihar), [1990] 76 STC 67 (SC) (Shri Krishna Enterprises v. State of Andhra Pradesh), AIR 1990 SC 1020 ; 1990 (1) SVLR (T) 122 (Rathi Alloys & Steel Ltd., Alwar v. Collector, Central Excise, Jaipur) and other cases. Shri Deshpande on his part, cited [1989] 72 STC 354 (SC); (1989) Supp 1 SCC 153 (Bharat General and Textile Industries Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra), AIR 1963 SC 1667 ; [1963] 50 ITR 171 (SC) (Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar), [1989] 75 STC 105 (SC); AIR 1989 SC 644 [Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-I v. Parle Exports (P) Ltd.], [1985] 58 STC 1 (SC); AIR 1984 SC 1780 (D. Caswasji & Co., Mysore v. State of Mysore) and [1988] 68 STC 421 (SC); (1987) Supp 1 SCC 350 (J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Union of India). 23. Shri Karekar, the learned counsel appearing in all these petitions on behalf of the respondent-State, Commissioner of Sales Tax, as also on behalf of Advocate-General (to whom notice had been issued by this Court), submitted that by Ordinance of 1985, section 41A was added to the Bombay Sales Tax Act by which the benefit of exemption granted to industrial units was restricted to 100 per cent of the fixed capital assets. By Act No. 15 of 1985, the exemption granted to the edible oil units was completely taken away and "edible oil unit" was defined by adding section 2(12A). By Act No. 15 of 1985, the exemption granted to the edible oil units was completely taken away and "edible oil unit" was defined by adding section 2(12A). Thereafter, the sales tax authorities considered the units like those of the petitioners who refined washed cotton seed oil also within the purview of the edible oil unit. However, in view of the judgment [See [1988] 68 STC 208 (Bom).] of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1280 of 1986, the said intention of the Legislature was defeated. As such, it became necessary to amend the definition with a view to clearly bringing out the true intention of the Legislature. Shri Karekar submitted that by 1985 Ordinance and the subsequent Act, the State intended to take away exemptions from edible oil units and while defining such unit, it was found out, in view of the judgment [See [1988] 68 STC 208 (Bom).] of this Court in W.P. No. 1280 of 1986, that the activity of refining washed cotton seed oil was inadvertently or by mistake, omitted. The judgment of the High Court with reference to the definition given in the amending Act of 1985 declared that it covered refining edible oil or it covered crushing of groundnuts and other oilseeds and manufacture of edible oil, but it did not cover refining of washed cotton seed oil (which is a non-edible oil) and manufacturing edible oil. Shri Karekar submitted that by the Act of 1985, the intention was to exclude edible oil units outright and therefore when the lacuna in the definition was revealed, as per the judgment [See [1988] 68 STC 208 (Bom).] of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1280 of 1986, the State amended the Act by amending the definition of "edible oil unit" to bring out the intention of the Legislature clearly. Shri Karekar submitted that no new entry is inserted, but the definition of "edible oil unit" is made absolutely clear. Shri Karekar submitted that when the original definition was found to be ambiguous in the light of the judgment [See [1988] 68 STC 208 (Bom).] of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1280 of 1986, it was always competent to the Legislature to make the same explicitly clear by amending the law and making it operative retroactively. Shri Karekar submitted that the action of making it retroactive cannot be called arbitrary at all. Shri Karekar submitted that the action of making it retroactive cannot be called arbitrary at all. The object was to withdraw the exemption totally from all edible oil units and when it was found that edible oil unit like the petitioners, in so far as they are undertaking the activity of manufacturing edible oil, by refining non-edible, viz., washed cotton seed oil, were inadvertently omitted from the earlier definition, the said lacuna is attempted to be cured. Shri Karekar further submitted that section 41A is held to be valid by the decision of this Court in Olympic Oil Industries Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [1987] 65 STC 191. He referred to the various passages from the said judgment and pointed out that almost identical challenges were repelled by this Court with reference to the constitutional validity of section 41A of the Bombay Sales Tax Act. Shri Karekar submitted that admittedly all the petitioners are the edible oil units. The mistake was committed by the expert while drafting, when edible oil unit was defined by the 1985 Act. Shri Karekar submitted that unless the legislative act is palpably arbitrary, unreasonable or mala fide, the court should not interfere with the legislative wisdom. Regarding the alleged financial hardship that may be caused to the petitioner, Shri Karekar submitted that the same is not at all relevant. Assuming that it results into some harshness or injustice, it is for the Legislature to consider the balancing of individual hardship or injustice and the public good, viz., avoiding loss to the public revenue. Shri Karekar submitted that in the case of Bharat General and Textile Industries Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra reported in [1989] 72 STC 354 (SC); (1989) Supp 1 SCC 153, the non-edible oil units used to produce only washed cotton seed oil and the units producing washed cotton seed oil were treated as non-edible oil units. The justification was only in respect of such units producing merely washed cotton seed oil, whereas in case of the petitioners, we are dealing with altogether different category, viz., the units manufacturing edible oil after refining non-edible oil, viz., washed cotton seed oil. The justification was only in respect of such units producing merely washed cotton seed oil, whereas in case of the petitioners, we are dealing with altogether different category, viz., the units manufacturing edible oil after refining non-edible oil, viz., washed cotton seed oil. Shri Karekar cited following authorities : AIR 1987 SC 2310 [Utkal Contractors & Joinery (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa], AIR 1985 SC 1683 (Hindustan Gum & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana), [ 1973 31 STC 178 (SC); AIR 1973 SC 1034 (Hira Lal Rattan lal v. Sales Tax Officer, Section III, Kanpur), AIR 1987 SC 251 (State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal), [1973] 31 STC 190 (SC); AIR 1972 SC 2455 (Krishnamurthi and Co. v. State of Madras). Before considering the rival submissions, it may be useful to refer to the various authorities cited as the Bar. 24. Shri Manohar referred to paragraph 13 of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in [1961] 12 STC 429; AIR 1961 SC 1534 (J.K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh). He specifically referred to the following sentence in the said paragraph 13 (page 438 of STC) : "It is no doubt true that a sales tax is, according to accepted notions, intended to be passed on to the buyer, and provisions authorising and regulating the collection of sales tax by the seller from the purchaser are a usual feature of sales tax legislation." We are afraid, the sentence cannot be appreciated without the context Paragraph 13 of the said judgment (page 437 of STC) reads as under : "And then it is argued that a sales tax being an indirect tax, the seller who pays that tax has the right to pass it on to the consumer, that a law which imposes a sales tax long after the sales had taken place deprives him of that right, that retrospetive operation is, in consequence, an incident inconsistent with the true character of a sales tax law, and that the Validation Act is therefore not a law in respect of tax on the sale of goods, as recognised, and it is ultra vires entry 54. We see no force in this contention. We see no force in this contention. It is no doubt true that a sales tax is, according to accepted notions, intended to be passed on to the buyer, and provisions authorising and regulating the collection of sales tax by the seller from the purchaser are a usual feature of sales tax legislation. But it is not an essential characteristic of a sales tax that the seller must have the right to pass it on to the consumer, not is the power of the Legislature to impose a tax on sales conditional on its making a provision for sellers to collect the tax from the purchasers. Whether a law should be enacted, imposing a sales tax, or validating the imposition of sales tax, when the seller is not in a position to pass it on to the consumer, is a matter of policy and does not affect the competence of the Legislature. This question is concluded by the decision of this Court in Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar [1958] 9 STC 267; [1958] SCR 1355; AIR 1958 SC 452 . The following observations of Das, C.J., bearing on this question might be quoted : 'Under the 1947 Act the primary liability to pay the sales tax, so far as the State is concerned, is on the seller. Indeed before the amendment of the 1947 Act by the amending Act the sellers had no authority to collect the sales tax as such from the purchaser. The seller could undoubtedly have put up the price so as to include the sales tax, which he could have to pay but he could not realise any sales tax as such from the purchaser. That circumstance could not prevent the sales tax imposed on the seller to be any the less sales tax on the sale of goods. The circumstance that the 1947 Act, after the amendment, permitted the seller who was a registered dealer to collect the sales tax as a tax from the purchaser does not do away with the primary liability of the seller to pay the sales tax. The circumstance that the 1947 Act, after the amendment, permitted the seller who was a registered dealer to collect the sales tax as a tax from the purchaser does not do away with the primary liability of the seller to pay the sales tax. This is further made clear by the fact that the registered dealer need not, if he so pleases or chooses, collect the tax from the purchaser and sometimes by reason of competition with other registered dealers he may find it profitable to sell his goods and to retain his old customers even at the sacrifice of the sales tax. This also makes it clear that the sales tax need not be passes on to the purchasers and this fact does not alter the real nature of the tax which, by the express provisions of the law, is case upon the seller. The buyer is under no liability to pay sales tax in addition to the agreed sale price unless the contract specifically provides otherwise. See Love v. Norman Wright (Builders) Ltd. [1944] 1 KB 484. If that be the true view of sales tax then the Bihar Legislature acting within its own legislative field had the powers of a sovereign Legislature and could make its law prospectively as well as retrospectively. (Pages 284-285 of STC); (pages 1378-1379 of SCR); (page 463 of AIR)." The said paragraph makes it cleat that it is not an essential characteristic of a sales tax that the seller must have the right to pass it on to the consumer, nor is the power of the Legislature to impose a tax on sales conditional on its making a provision for sellers to collect tax from the purchasers. The Supreme Court has further observed that whether a law should be enacted, imposing a sales tax, or validating the imposition of sales tax, when the seller is not in a position to pass it on to the consumer, is a matter of policy and does not affect the competence of the Legislature. In paragraph 15 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has observed that the power of the Legislature to enact with reference to a topic entrusted to it is unqualified, subject only to any limitation imposed by the Constitution. In paragraph 15 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has observed that the power of the Legislature to enact with reference to a topic entrusted to it is unqualified, subject only to any limitation imposed by the Constitution. In the exercise of such a power, it will be competent for the Legislature to enact a law, which is either prospective or retrospective. 25. In [1985] 58 STC 12; AIR 1985 SC 12 (K.M. Mohamed Abdul Khader Firm v. State of Tamil Nadu), in paragraph 11 (page 17 of STC), the Supreme Court has referred to the earlier decision in [1974] 34 STC 73; AIR 1974 SC 2272 (Kodar v. State of Kerala) wherein the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "As regards the second contention that the provisions of the Act are violative of the fundamental rights of the appellants under article 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g), as the tax is upon the sale of goods and is not shown to be confiscatory, it cannot be said that the provisions of the Act impose any unreasonable restrictions upon the appellants' right to carry on trade. It is, no doubt, true that every tax imposes some restriction upon the right to carry on a business; but it would not follow that the imposition of the tax in question is an unreasonable restriction upon the appellants' fundamental right to carry on trade. Generally speaking, the amount of rate of tax is a matter exclusively within the legislative judgment and as long as a tax retains its avowed character and does not confiscate property to the State under the guise of a tax, its reasonableness is outside the judicial ken. But it was contended that as the dealer is prohibited from passing on the incidence of tax to the purchaser, the additional tax, unlike sales tax, is a tax on income of the dealer which he must pay whether the makes any profit or not and is, therefore, an unreasonable restriction on his fundamental rights under article 19(1)(g). The legal incidence of a tax on sale of goods under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, falls squarely on the dealer. It may be that he can add the tax to the price of the goods sold and thus pass it on to the purchaser. The legal incidence of a tax on sale of goods under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, falls squarely on the dealer. It may be that he can add the tax to the price of the goods sold and thus pass it on to the purchaser. But it is not necessary that the dealer should be enabled to pass on the incidence of the tax on sale to the purchaser in order that it might be a tax on sales of goods." The Supreme Court also referred to its decision reported in [1958] 9 STC 397; AIR 1958 SC 756 (Konduri Buchirajalingam v. State of Hyderabad) wherein it was held that in law a sales tax need not be an indirect tax and that a tax can be a sales tax though the primary liability for it is put upon a person without giving him any power to recoup the amount of the tax payable, from any other party. 26. In [1988] 70 STC 59 (SC); AIR 1988 SC 1247 [Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Asst.), Dharwar v. Dharmendra Trading Company], the contention on behalf of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to the effect that doctrine of promissory estoppel was not applicable in the said case because it was found by the Government of Karnataka that the concessions granted under the said order dated June 30, 1969, were being misused and undue advantage was being taken of the same, was considered by the Supreme Court. The said contention was not accepted. It was observed that no counter-affidavit was filed by the appellant before the trial court in the writ petition. Beyond the statement of counsel, there is nothing to show that any misuse was made of these concessions or undue advantage taken of the same. It was observed that it is true that the preamble to the order dated January 12, 1977, does recite that the concessions given by the earlier order had given room for many types of misuse but such a recital by itself cannot establish that the concessions were, in fact, misused. If that were so, it was the duty of the Government and the concerned authorities to file a counter-affidavit and place the relevant facts establishing the misuse before the court. This they have totally failed to do. If that were so, it was the duty of the Government and the concerned authorities to file a counter-affidavit and place the relevant facts establishing the misuse before the court. This they have totally failed to do. It was further observed that it is well-settled that if the Government wants to resile from a promise or an assurance given by it on the ground that undue advantage was being taken or misuse was being made of the concessions granted, the court may permit the Government to do so but before allowing the Government to resile from the promise or go back on the assurance the court would have to be satisfied that allegations by the Government about misuse being made or undue advantage being taken of the concessions given by it were reasonably well-established. In the case before it, the Supreme Court found that there is nothing on record to show that any such misuse was being made or undue advantage taken of the said concessions by the newly established industries. The Supreme Court held that the Government had, therefore, failed to establish the requisite ground on the basis of which it might be allowed to go back on its promise. We are afraid, this case may not be of much assistance to the petitioner. Firstly, in the said case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the issue of promissory estoppel as against the executive action of the Government which in turn was on consideration of executive orders. In these petitions, we are concerned with the legislative acts of the competent Legislature. Secondly, in Olympic Oil Industries case [1987] 65 STC 191, the Division Bench of this Court referred to the statement of objects and reasons of the impugned legislation and in paragraph 26 of the said judgment, it is observed that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience, and that discriminations are based on adequate grounds. That the Legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. It is the function of the State, in order to raise revenue for State purposes to determine what kind of taxes shall be levied and in what manner. That the Legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. It is the function of the State, in order to raise revenue for State purposes to determine what kind of taxes shall be levied and in what manner. In substance, its function is to raise revenue for public purposes. Even if the exemption was given in public interest, and if after experience the public interest demand otherwise then the Legislature can withdraw the exemption. Unless it is demonstrated that the discretion exercised is palpably discriminatory or arbitrary the court cannot go into the propriety of the legislative wisdom. The court further observed that having regard to the facts and circumstances disclosed in the affidavit and the statement of objects and reasons it could safely be held that the classification made by the Legislature in withdrawing the exemption qua edible oil units only is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. Thus, this Court had already found enough justification for withdrawal of the tax exemptions qua the edible oil units. 27. Shri Manohar also relied upon [1988] 71 STC 298 (SC); AIR 1988 SC 1814 (West Bengal Hosiery Association v. State of Bihar). He relied upon paragraph 9 of the judgment (page 303 of STC) where the Supreme Court held that the notification dated August 1, 1984 is void and quashed the same. The Supreme Court observed in paragraph 9 of the said judgment (page 303 of STC) as follows : "............................. He relied upon paragraph 9 of the judgment (page 303 of STC) where the Supreme Court held that the notification dated August 1, 1984 is void and quashed the same. The Supreme Court observed in paragraph 9 of the said judgment (page 303 of STC) as follows : "............................. We realise that quashing of this notification on the ground that it was void ab initio might lead to undue hardship for the dealers in the State of Bihar who might have sold locally manufactured hosiery goods without taking into consideration any amount on account of the liability to sales tax in view of the exemption granted by the said notification dated August 1, 1984, In order to obviate this hardship, we direct that the arrears of sales tax which would become payable by the dealers in the State of Bihar in respect of sales of local hosiery goods made during the period when the said notification was in operation should not be collected." It was a case where hosiery goods manufactured outside the State of Bihar but sold in the State of Bihar were subjected to the levy of sales tax at the rate of 5 per cent whereas the sales of similar goods manufactured by hosiery industries in the State of Bihar were exempted from sales tax. It was held that from a commercial or normal point of view, such a discriminatory levy of sales tax is bound to affect the free-flow of hosiery goods from outside States into the State of Bihar and would, therefore, amount to hampering the free-flow of trade and commerce. It was held that the discrimination made must be regarded as violating the provisions of article 304(b) of the Constitution. Shri Manohar pressed this case in support of his contention that even if the amending Act in its retroactive operation is held to be valid, even then, taking into consideration the financial hardship to which the petitioners may be exposed, we should in exercise of our jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India, restrain the State from collecting the tax to which the petitioners would be liable. We are afraid, it is not possible to accept this submission. We are afraid, it is not possible to accept this submission. Either the Act is valid or invalid, but once it is held to be valid, it is difficult to entertain such prayer and to restrain the Government from collecting the tax under a valid enactment, in a writ petition, in exercise of jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India. Shri Manohar, in support of the same submission, also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in [1990] 76 STC 67 (Shri Krishna Enterprises v. State of Andhra Pradesh) wherein, in the order on a review petition, the Supreme Court observed that they have looked into the various aspects involved in the matter and are of the view that the review petition should be dismissed. The Supreme Court further observed that this is on account of the fact that after the Forty-sixth Amendment of the Constitution, State legislation was necessary to give effect to liability of sales tax and the Andhra Pradesh Act was a prospective legislation. The Supreme Court further observed that the incidence of sales tax is ordinarily passed on to the customer and in the event of accepting the retrospective amendment a liability would be created without affording any opportunity to the hoteliers to pass on the incidence of the tax. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court did not think that there was any justification for review. In our opinion, these observations of the Supreme Court must be read in the context and especially in the context that they were made while rejecting the review petition on consideration of various aspects involved in the matter before the Supreme Court. Shri Manohar also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1990 SC 1020 ; 1990 (1) SVLR (T) 122 (Rathi Alloys & Steel Ltd., Alwar v. Collector, Central Excise, Jaipur) wherein the Supreme Court observed as under : "What is apparent is that leviability of duty on runners and risers as covered by tariff item No. 26 was not free from difficulty. The Board, the Government and even the department by and large was clearing these items as scrap entitled to benefit of notifications exempting or levying duty on concessional rate on item covered by tariff item No. 26. Even in the State of Punjab it was cleared for some time till dispute arose. The Board, the Government and even the department by and large was clearing these items as scrap entitled to benefit of notifications exempting or levying duty on concessional rate on item covered by tariff item No. 26. Even in the State of Punjab it was cleared for some time till dispute arose. Although it would not operate as estoppel but rule of fairness is yet another principle which is well-settled and precludes public bodies, specially the Government department from reopening such matters which were taken to be settled due to its actions." We are afraid that these observations also will have to be read in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case and do not help the petitioners in support of their submission that under our jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India, even if the Act is held to be valid, we should restrain the Government from collecting the sales tax from the petitioners from August 1, 1985 to September 22, 1987. 28. Shri Deshpande referred to the case reported in [1989] 72 STC 354 (SC); (1989) Supp 1 SCC 153 (Bharat General and Textile Industries Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra). In the said case, section 41 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act was challenged as constitutionally invalid being violative of articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court negatived the challenge and held that section 41 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act is valid. The Supreme Court observed that while the constitutionality of section 41 has been challenged, the validity of section 41-A which disentitles only the units producing edible oil from having the continued benefit to tax exemption, has not been impugned. The Supreme Court further observed that this factor by itself weakens the attack of the petitioner on the constitutional validity of section 41. The Supreme Court observed in the said judgment that the washed cotton seed oil has to be processed still further for being made fit for human consumption. Therefore, as long as it is produced and sold without further processing it will not constitute edible oil. The Supreme Court observed in the said judgment that the washed cotton seed oil has to be processed still further for being made fit for human consumption. Therefore, as long as it is produced and sold without further processing it will not constitute edible oil. The Government, therefore, are well within their powers in refusing to accept the claim that washed cotton seed oil is also edible oil and, therefore, all the new units which are engaged in the manufacture of washed cotton seed oil should also be rendered ineligible from enjoying the benefit of tax exemption as has been done in the case of units producing edible oil. The Supreme Court has further observed that even though edible and non-edible oils may fall under the general heading of "oils" they undoubtedly constitute two separate groups which are capable of distinct classification on intelligible basis. The Supreme Court further observed that when the Government made full assessment and found that the new units engaged in the production of edible oil alone have derived undue advantage by reason of the tax exemption, and that the other eligible units engaged in the manufacture of other products including non-edible oils have not derived benefit to such an extent as to justify revocation of the tax exemption benefit, this assessment exercise falls purely within the domain of the executive and it is not for the court to see whether other edible oil units also derive huge benefits and as such Government ought to have revoked the tax exemption benefit in their cases as well. The classification between units engaged in producing edible oils and non-edible oils is on an intelligible and sustainable basis and as such the court cannot hold that the Government should treat both kinds of units alike and direct the withdrawal of the tax exemption benefit in the case of non-edible oil producing units also. It is clear that the question before the Supreme Court was whether units manufacturing washed cotton seed oil are to be treated as units manufacturing edible oil. The State Government has taken a stand that units manufacturing washed cotton seed oil cannot be treated as units which are manufacturing edible oil, whereas in the facts before us, it is an admitted position that the petitioners' units manufacture edible oil after refining washed cotton seed oil. The State Government has taken a stand that units manufacturing washed cotton seed oil cannot be treated as units which are manufacturing edible oil, whereas in the facts before us, it is an admitted position that the petitioners' units manufacture edible oil after refining washed cotton seed oil. We therefore do not find any force in the submission of Shri Deshpande that the intention of the Legislature in 1985 was to exclude the refining manufactures of edible oil by refining washed cotton seed oil or that any such intention was pleaded and supported by the State Government before the Supreme Court in the case of Bharat General and Textile Industries Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [1989] 72 STC 354 (SC); (1989) Supp 1 SCC 153. 29. In [1963] 50 ITR 171 (SC); AIR 1963 SC 1667 (Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar), in paragraph 11 (page 179 of ITR), the Supreme Court has observed : "It is also true that though the Legislature can pass a law and make its provisions retrospective, it would be relevant to consider the effect of the said retroactive operation of the law both in respect of the legislative competence of the Legislature and the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by it...." In paragraph 12 (page 179 of ITR), it is observed as follows : "............ It is, of course, true that the power of taxing the people and their property is an essential attribute of the Government and Government may legitimately exercise the said power by reference to the objects to which it is applicable to the utmost extent to which Government thinks it expedient to do so. The objects to be taxed so long as they happen to be within the legislative competence of the Legislature can be taxed by he Legislature according to the exigencies of its needs, because there can be no doubt that the State is entitled to raise revenue by taxation. The quantum of tax levied by the taxing statute, the conditions subject to which it is levied, the manner in which it is sought to be recovered, are all matters within the competence of the Legislature, and in dealing with the contention raised by a citizen that the taxing statute contravenes article 19, courts would naturally be circumspect and cautious. The quantum of tax levied by the taxing statute, the conditions subject to which it is levied, the manner in which it is sought to be recovered, are all matters within the competence of the Legislature, and in dealing with the contention raised by a citizen that the taxing statute contravenes article 19, courts would naturally be circumspect and cautious. Where for instance it appears that the taxing statute is plainly discriminatory, or provides no procedural machinery for assessment and levy of the tax, or that it is confiscatory, courts, would be justified in striking down the impugned statute as unconstitutional. In such cases, the character of the material provisions of the impugned statute is such that the court would feel justified in taking the view that, in substance, the taxing statute is a cloak adopted by the Legislature for achieving its confiscatory purposes........." But, the Supreme Court, in paragraph 13, while considering the validity of the retrospective operation of the Act in the said case, considered the argument of the counsel that, in respect of passengers carried by the owner between April 1, 1950 and the date of the Act, how can be owner recover the tax he is now bound to pay to the State. The Supreme Court observed that prima facie, the argument appears to be attractive, but a closer examination would show that the difficulty which the owner may experience in recovering the tax from the passengers will not necessarily alter the character of the tax. The Supreme Court found that the nature of the tax in the case before it is the same both in regard to prospective and retrospective operations. In paragraph 17, the Supreme Court observed that it is conceivable that cases may arise in which the restrospective operation of a taxing or other statute may introduce such an element of unreasonableness that the restrictions imposed by it may be open to serious challenge as unconstitutional; but the test of the length of time covered by the restrospective operation cannot, by itself, necessarily be a decisive test. The Supreme Court further observed that we may have a statute whose retrospective operation covers a comparatively short period and yet it is possible that the nature of the restriction imposed by it may be of such a character as to introduce a serious infirmity in the retrospective operation. The Supreme Court further observed that we may have a statute whose retrospective operation covers a comparatively short period and yet it is possible that the nature of the restriction imposed by it may be of such a character as to introduce a serious infirmity in the retrospective operation. On the other hand, we may get cases where the period covered by the retrospective operation of the statute, though long, will not introduce any such infirmity. The Supreme Court further observed as follows : "Take the case of a Validating Act. If a statute passed by the Legislature is challenged in proceedings before a court and the challenge is ultimately sustained and the statute is struck down, it is not unlikely that the judicial proceedings may occupy a fairly long period and the Legislature may well decide to await the final decision in the said proceedings before it uses its legislative power to cure the alleged infirmity in the earlier Act. In such a case, if after the final judicial verdict is pronounced in the matter the Legislature passes a Validating Act, it may well cover a long period taken by the judicial proceedings in court and yet it would be inappropriate to hold that because the retrospective operation covers a long period, therefore, the restriction imposed by it is unreasonable..........." 30. In [1989] 75 STC 105 (SC); AIR 1989 SC 644 [Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-I v. Parle Exports (P) Ltd.], it is observed that : "It is well-settled that when two views of a notification are possible, it should be construed in favour of the subject as notification is part of the fiscal enactment. However, that is so in the event of there being a real difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of a particular enactment that the question of strictness or of liberality of construction arises. While interpreting an exemption clause, liberal interpretation should be imparted to the language thereof, provided no violence is done to the language employed. It must, however, be borne in mind that absurd results of construction should be avoided." 31. While interpreting an exemption clause, liberal interpretation should be imparted to the language thereof, provided no violence is done to the language employed. It must, however, be borne in mind that absurd results of construction should be avoided." 31. In [1985] 58 STC 1 (SC); AIR 1984 SC 1780 (D. Cawasji & Co., Mysore v. State of Mysore), the Supreme Court observed that in the case before it, the State instead of remedying the defect or removing the lacuna has by the impugned amendment sought to raise the rate of tax from 6 1/2 per cent to 45 per cent with restrospective effect from April 1, 1966 to avoid the liability of refunding the excess amount of sales tax collected and has further purported to nullify the judgment and order passed by the High Court directing the refund of the excess amount illegally collected by providing that the levy at the higher rate of 45 per cent will have retrospective effect from April 1, 1966. The Supreme Court observed that the judgment of the High Court declaring the levy of sales tax on excise duty, education cess and health cess to be bad become conclusive and is binding on the parties. It may or may not have been competent for the State Legislature to validly remove the lacuna and remedy the defect in the earlier levy by seeking to impose sales tax through any amendment on excise duty, education cess and health cess; but, in any event, the State Government has not purported to do through the amending Act. As a result of the judgment of the High Court declaring such levy illegal, the State Government became obliged to refund the excess amount wrongfully and illegally collected by virtue of the specific direction to that effect in the earlier judgment. It appears that the only object of enacting the amended provision is to nullify the effect of the judgment which became conclusive and binding on the parties to enable the State Government to retain the amount wrongfully and illegally collected as sales tax and this object has been sought to be achieved by the impugned amendment which does not even purport or seek to remedy or remove the defect and lacuna but merely raises the rate of duty from 6 1/2 per cent to 45 per cent and further proceeds to nullify the judgment and order of the High Court. The Supreme Court observed that in its opinion, the enhancement of the rate of duty from 6 1/2 per cent to 45 per cent with retrospective effect is in the facts and circumstances of the case clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. The Supreme Court further observed that the defect or lacuna is not even sought to be remedied and the only justification for the steep rise in the rate of duty by the amended provision is to nullify the effect of the binding judgment. The vice of illegal collection in the absence of the removal of the illegality which led to the invalidation of the earlier assessments on the basis of illegal levy, continues to taint the earlier levy. In our opinion, the ratio of this case may not be attracted inasmuch as the Legislature in the facts of the case before us, clearly seeks to remove the defect and lacuna after the judgment [See [1988] 68 STC 208 (Bom).] of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 1280 of 1986. 32. In [1988] 68 STC 421; (1987) Supp 1 SCC 350 (J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Union of India), in paragraph 30 (page 434 of STC) the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "It is not disputed that the Legislature is competent to make laws both prospectively and retrospectively. But, as pointed out by this Court in Jawaharmal v. State of Rajasthan [1966] 1 SCR 890, the cases may conceivably occur where the court may have to consider the question as to whether excessive restrospective operation prescribed by a taxing statute amounts to the contravention of the citizens' fundamental rights; and in dealing with such a question the court may have to take into account all the relevant and surrounding facts and circumstances in relation to the taxation. Again in Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar [1964] 1 SCR 897, this Court has pointed out that if the restrospective feature of a law is arbitrary and burdensome, the statute will not be sustained and the reasonableness of each restrospective statute will depend on the circumstances of each case; and the test of the length of time covered by the restrospective operation cannot, by itself, necessarily be a decisive test." 33. In AIR 1987 SC 2310 [Utkal Contractors & Joinery (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa], in paragraph 14, Supreme Court has observed as follows : "The Legislature may, at any time, in exercise of the plenary power conferred on it by articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting a valid law. There is no prohibition against retrospective legislation. The power of the Legislature to pass a law postulates the power to pass it prospectively as well as retrospectively. That of course, is subject to the legislative competence ad subject to other constitutional limitation. The rendering ineffective of judgments or orders of competent courts by changing their basis by legislative enactment is a well-known pattern of all validating Acts. Such validating legislation which removes the causes of ineffectiveness or invalidity of action or proceedings cannot be considered as encroachment on judicial power. The Legislature, however, cannot by a bare declaration, without more, directly overrule, reverse or set aside any judicial decision." 34. In AIR 1985 SC 1683 (Hindustan Gum & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana), in paragraph 6, the Supreme Court has observed : ".......... It is now well-settled that it is permissible for a competent Legislature to overcome the effect of a decision of a court setting aside the imposition of a tax by passing a suitable legislation amending the relevant provisions of the statute concerned with retrospective effect, thus taking away the basis on which the decision of the court had been rendered and by enacting an appropriate provision validating the levy and collection of tax made before the decision in question was rendered." The Supreme Court referred to its decision in Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality [1970] 1 SCR 388; [1971] 79 ITR 136 wherein the Supreme Court had observed as under : "When a Legislature sets out to validate a tax declared by a court to be illegally collected under an ineffective or an invalid law, the cause for ineffectiveness or invalidity must be removed before validation can be said to take place effectively. The most important condition, of course, is that the Legislature must possess the power to impose the tax, for, if it does not, the action must ever remain ineffective and illegal. The most important condition, of course, is that the Legislature must possess the power to impose the tax, for, if it does not, the action must ever remain ineffective and illegal. Granted legislative competence, it is not sufficient to declare merely that the decision of the court shall not bind, for that is tantamount to reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power which the Legislature does not possess or exercise. A court's decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. Ordinarily, a court holds a tax to be invalidly imposed because the power to tax is wanting or the statute or the rules or both are invalid or do not sufficiently create the jurisdiction. Validation of a tax so declared illegal may be done only if the grounds of illegality or invalidity are capable of being removed and are in fact removed and the tax thus made legal. Sometimes this is done by providing for jurisdiction where jurisdiction had not been properly invested before. Sometimes this is done by re-enacting retrospectively a valid and legal taxing provision and then by fiction making the tax already collected to stand under the re-enacted law. Sometimes the Legislature gives its own meaning and interpretation of the law under which the tax was collected and by legislative fiat makes the new meaning binding upon courts. The Legislature may follow any one method or all of them and while it does so it may neutralise the effect of the earlier decision of the court which becomes ineffective after the change of the law. Whichever method is adopted it must be within the competence of the Legislature and legal and adequate to attain the object of validation. If the Legislature has the power over the subject-matter and competence to make a valid law, it can at any time make such a valid law and make it retrospectively so as to bind even past transactions. The validity of a validating law, therefore, depends upon whether the Legislature possesses the competence which it claims over the subject-matter and whether in making the validation it removes the defect which the courts had found in the existing law and makes adequate provisions in the validating law for a valid imposition of the tax." 35. The validity of a validating law, therefore, depends upon whether the Legislature possesses the competence which it claims over the subject-matter and whether in making the validation it removes the defect which the courts had found in the existing law and makes adequate provisions in the validating law for a valid imposition of the tax." 35. In [1973] 31 STC 178 (SC); AIR 1973 SC 1034 (Hira Lal Rattan Lal v. Sales Tax Officer, Section III, Kanpur), in paragraph 20 (page 186 of STC), the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "A feeble attempt was made to show that the retrospective levy made under the Act is violative of article 19(1)(f) and (g). But we see no substance in that contention. As seen earlier, the amendment of the Act was necessitated because of the Legislature's failure to bring out clearly in the principal Act its intention to separate the processed or split pulses from the unsplit or unprocessed pulses. Further the retrospective amendment became necessary as otherwise the State would have to refund large sums of money. The contention that the restrospective levy did not afford any opportunity to the dealers to pass on the tax payable to the consumers, has not much validity. The tax is levied on the dealer; the fact that he is allowed to pass on the tax to the consumers or he is generally in a position to pass on the same to the consumer has no relevance when we consider the legislative competence." 36. In AIR 1987 SC 251 (State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal), in paragraph 33, the Supreme Court has observed as under : "............ Moreover, the grant of licences for manufacture and sale of liquor would essentially be a matter of economic policy where the court would hesitate to intervene and strike down what the State Government had done, unless it appears to be plainly arbitrary, irrational or mala fide. We had occasion to consider the scope of interference by the court under article 14 while dealing with laws relating to economic activities in R. K. Garg v. Union of India [1982] 1 SCR 947; AIR 1981 SC 2138 . We pointed out in that case that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion, etc. We pointed out in that case that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion, etc. We observed that the Legislature should be allowed some play in the joints because it has to deal with complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or strait jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters, where, having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the Legislature." 37. In [1973] 31 STC 190; AIR 1972 SC 2455 (Krishnamurthi and Co. v. State of Madras), in paragraph 13 (page 200 of STC), the Supreme Court has observed as under : "Mr. Setalvad has referred to the fact that the appellants did not realise the sales tax on the sale of furnace oil at the rate of 6 per cent during at least some part of the period for which retrospective operation had been given to the amending Act. It is contended that this fact should weight with this Court in striking down the provisions of the amending Act. There is, in our opinion, no force in this contention. The fact that a dealer is not in a position to pass on the sales tax to others does not affect the competence of the Legislature to enact a law imposing sales tax retrospectively because that is a matter of legislative policy." The Supreme Court referred to the case of J.K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1961] 12 STC 429; AIR 1961 SC 1534 wherein the following observations were made : "And then it is argued that a sales tax being an indirect tax, the seller who pays that tax has the right to pass it on to the consumer, that a law which imposes a sales tax long after the sales had taken place deprives him of that right, that retrospective operation is, in consequence, an incident inconsistent with the true character of a sales tax law, and that the Validation Act is, therefore, not a law in respect of tax on the sale of goods, as recognised, and it is ultra vires entry 54. We see no force in this contention. We see no force in this contention. It is no doubt true that a sales tax is, according to accepted notions, intended to be passed on to the buyer, and provisions authorising and regulating the collection of sales tax by the seller from the purchaser are a usual feature of sales tax legislation. But it is not and essential characteristic of a sales tax that the seller must have the right to pass it on to the consumer, nor is the power of the Legislature to impose a tax on sales conditional on its making a provision for sellers to collect the tax from the purchasers. Whether a law should be enacted, imposing a sales tax, or validating the imposition of sales tax, when the seller is not in a position to pass it on to the consumer, is a matter of policy and does not affect the competence of the Legislature. This question is concluded by the decision of this Court in The Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar [1958] 9 STC 267; [1958] SCR 1355; AIR 1958 SC 452 ." In this case, as a result of the amendment made by Madras Act 7 of 1964 in entry 47 of the First Schedule to the principal Act sales tax was intended to be levied on all kinds of mineral oils, including non-lubricants, at the rate mentioned in that entry. Entry 47, however, was held not to include furnace oil which was a non-lubricant mineral oil by the Madras High Court in [1968] 21 STC 227 (Burmah shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited v. State of Madras) as the language used by the Legislature in that entry was found by the High Court to be not appropriate for levying tax on sale of non-lubricant mineral oils. The amending Act (19 of 1967) was passed by the Legislature to rectify and remove the defect in the language found by the High Court and to validate the past levy and collection of tax in respect of all kinds of non-lubricating mineral oils, including furnace oil, at the rate specified in entry 47 from April 1, 1964 when Act 7 of 1964 came into force. Such an amending and validating Act to make "small repairs" is a permissible mode of legislation. Such an amending and validating Act to make "small repairs" is a permissible mode of legislation. The Supreme Court held that such an amending and validating Act to make "small repairs" is a permissible mode of legislation and is frequently resorted to in fiscal enactments. 38. In the light of the aforesaid decisions, we find that the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners have no force. 39. At the outset, it must be appreciated that both the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners have not challenged the legislative competence of the Legislature to enact the amending law. It is accepted that it is a valid law so far as it operates prospectively. The only challenge is to the retrospective operation on the ground of it being unreasonable, arbitrary and almost unconscionable. 40. Shri Manohar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 2101 of 1987 and W.P. No. 2195 of 1987, emphasised the aspects that the petitioners have neither collected the tax nor made any profit out of it and the benefit has passed on either to the seed dealers or to the consumers who have purchased the final refined washed cotton seed oil. It is submitted that in case of the first petitioner in Writ Petition No. 2101 of 1987, he has sold the washed cotton seed oil in market as it was profitable for him to do so and in fact purchased washed cotton seed oil from outside for the purposes of refining it and making it edible. We are afraid the reasonableness or fairness of the provision in the Act cannot be judged with reference to individual transactions which inherently may differ from a person to person. Secondly, the mere assertions of the petitioners that they have not made any profit or that actual benefit has passed on to the consumers, may not be sufficient to hold the said fact proved. It is an issue which may require detailed investigation. That apart, even assuming that the petitioners are right in their submissions that they have passed on the benefit to the consumers, in the light of the principles enunciated by the various cases referred to above, we are of the opinion that that aspect is hardly relevant for the purposes of considering the validity of the statute. 41. That apart, even assuming that the petitioners are right in their submissions that they have passed on the benefit to the consumers, in the light of the principles enunciated by the various cases referred to above, we are of the opinion that that aspect is hardly relevant for the purposes of considering the validity of the statute. 41. On the other hand, we find that for valid and goods reasons, as found out by this Court and as reflected in the judgment of this Court in Olympic Oil Industries Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [1987] 65 STC 191, the State by amending Act of 1985 has decided to take away the entire exemption granted in favour of edible oil units. By the same Act, the "edible oil unit" was defined. The petitioners who were admittedly edible oil units are admittedly undertaking the activity of refining washed cotton seed oil (non-edible oil) and making it refined washed cotton seed oil (edible oil). Now, we see no logic or reason or any ground as to why units undertaking this particular activity should be excluded from the definition of "edible oil units" when the intention was clearly to take away exemption from all edible oil units. This Court on Writ Petition No. 1280 of 1986 [See [1988] 68 STC 208 (Bom).], on the interpretation of the definition of "edible oil unit" as given in 1985 Act came to the conclusion that under the definition, as it stood, so far as the petitioners' activity of refining washed cotton seed oil and making it an edible oil in concerned, the same does not fall within the definition of an "edible oil unit". 42. After this decision, the present impugned Amending and Validating Act is passed by which the intention is made clear by a detailed definition. This is, in our opinion, a case much similar to that of [1973] 31 STC 190 (SC); AIR 1972 SC 2455 (Krishnamurthi and Co. v. State of Madras) as we see no reason why such an activity should have been excluded. We find much force in the submission of Mr. Karekar on behalf of the State that this was just an inadvertent mistake on the part of the Legislature while defining and the Legislature has, by the Amending and Validating Act, made its intention clear which was always so. We find much force in the submission of Mr. Karekar on behalf of the State that this was just an inadvertent mistake on the part of the Legislature while defining and the Legislature has, by the Amending and Validating Act, made its intention clear which was always so. In the facts and the circumstances of the case, therefore,, we find that it was always competent for the State Legislature to enact the Amending and Validating Act and it cannot be stated that the same is unreasonable, arbitrary or unjust only because of the fact that it exposes the petitioners to the financial liability. We do not feel that the provision is arbitrary, as we find that without any basis, the petitioners' units so far as pertaining to their activity of refining washed cotton seed oil is concerned, were excluded under the definition, though all edible oil units were intended to be covered by the said definition and therefore, it was competent for the Legislature to make the definition clearer which it has done by the Amending and Validating Act. We find that there is enough basis and reason and on no count the said provision can be said to be either arbitrary or unreasonable. 43. After having held that the provision cannot be held to be invalid on the basis of the provisions of article 14 of the Constitutions of India, we do not think it to be permissible to still restrain the State Government from collecting the sales tax on the ground that it may result in financial hardship for the petitioners. Apart from the fact that we are not in a position to come to a positive finding on that aspect, we also find that that is a matter of legislative policy and it may not be proper for this Court to interfere in the same. 44. In the result, we do not find any merit in these petitions and the petitions are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the rule in all the petitions is discharged. The petitioners shall pay the costs of the petitions to the respondents. Writ petitions dismissed.