V. D. GYANI, J. ( 1 ) BY this petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. , the petitioner prays for quashing of an order dated 17-7-1987, passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mhow, in Criminal Case No. 87 of 1975, proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. ( 2 ) AS the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. have been pending since 1975, it would not be out of place to give a brief re'sume' of facts leading to the presentation of this petition: It is not in dispute that agricultural land bearing Survey Nos. 71, 72, 73, 74 and 75, situated in village Gavalu, tehsil Mhow, District Indore, were by order dated 13-5-1975, passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate under Sec. 146, Cr. P. C. , were attached and handed over to the Tahsildar, Mhow, who was appointed Receiver and ever since this order the agricultural income from these lands is being deposited. These lands were auctioned for cultivation and the income so derived is being deposited in the Govt. Treasury. After this attachment, respondents 1 and 2 filed a suit for specific performance of contract, wherein they also prayed for an ad interim injunction, claiming to be in possession of the lands in question. ( 3 ) THIS relief was not only refused by the trial Court, but even on a Misc. Criminal Appeal No. 87 of 1975, (decided on 26-7-1978), being preferred by the respondents, the same was also dismissed. Certified copy of the order is available on record. Plaintiff-respondents case, as noted by the learned Judge, was a follows :'the plaintiff 's case, as it appears from the plaintiffs' application, is that the suit lands which stand recorded in the name of defendant No. 1, Keshavrao, as a Bhumiswami, were taken on lease by the plaintiffs from defendants Nos. 1 to 4 for the period 1971-72 to 1975-76, for which the plaintiffs paid in advance a cash consideration of Rs. 5100/- and accordingly executed a written document, incorporating terms and conditions of the lease, in favour of the plaintiffs and thereafter on two occasions obtained further cash amounts of Rs. 1100/- and 3300/- from the plaintiffs and extended the lease period up to 79-80, for which also they executed documents in favour of the plaintiff. 5100/- and accordingly executed a written document, incorporating terms and conditions of the lease, in favour of the plaintiffs and thereafter on two occasions obtained further cash amounts of Rs. 1100/- and 3300/- from the plaintiffs and extended the lease period up to 79-80, for which also they executed documents in favour of the plaintiff. On account of this transaction, according to the plaintiffs they have acquired the rights of an occupancy tenant as the defendants have violated the provision of Section 168 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code. Further, when defendant No. 1 by notice dated 23-1-75, threatened to dispossess the plaintiffs from the suit lands, on which their crops were standing, the plaintiffs were compelled to file the present suit for declaration and injunction as also for return of the cash consideration paid to them. On these allegations, the plaintiffs sought the relief of temporary injunction by stating these facts in an application under 284 Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, supported by affidavits of persons to show prima facie, the actual possession of the plaintiffs over the suit lands. (Emphasis supplied by me ). ( 4 ) SHRI K. C. Maheshwari learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that an application was moved by the petitioner on 18-6-1986 to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, specifically and pointedly inviting attention of the Court to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mathuralal v. Bhanwarlal. AIR 1980 SC 242 : (1980 Cri LJ 1) and Ram Sumer Puri v. State of U. P. ( AIR 1985 SC 472 ): (1985 Cri LJ 752), praying for restoration of possession to the petitioner of the lands in question and staying operation of the order dated 21-7-1979. This order dated 21,7-1979, passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is also available on record of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's file (it may be noted at this stage that complete record of the S. D. M. Court is not available and a report dated 9-3-90 received from him states that the record would be placed as soon as it was traced. A further reminder sent by this Court has not been replied to by the S. D. M. ). A further reminder sent by this Court has not been replied to by the S. D. M. ). This order dated 21-7-1979 was passed by the S. D. M. on an earlier application dated 22-1-1979, moved by the petitioner, thereby rejecting petitioner's prayer for restoration of possession of the lands in question and dismissing the application. The Receiver, as appointed, was directed to continue till final disposal of the case, which has now been pending since 1975. ( 5 ) THE impugned order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is more or less on similar lines. The judgments of the Supreme Court, referred to above, which were specifically mentioned in the application itself have not at all been adverted to, much less considered by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. ( 6 ) SHRI R. C. Maheshwari, learned counsel appearing for the respondents on the other hand submitted that the petitioner had not preferred any revision against the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and in absence of such a revision, the present petition under Sec. 482, Cr. P. C. was not maintainable. In this connection reliance was placed by him on decisions in Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Admn.) AIR 1980 SC 258 : (1980 Cri LJ 202), Shashidhar Naik v. Gadadhar Patel, 1978 Crilj 1316 (Ori) and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Krishan Lal Pardhan (1987 Cri LJ 709 (SC) ). Referring to a decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Tarapore and Co. V/ S/ V/ O Tractors Export, AIR 1970 SC 1168 , Shri R. C. Maheshwari tried to explain as to what is meant by a final order. M/s. Tarapore's case (supra) was in the context of Article 133 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution of India and it was in that context that the Supreme Court explained the meaning of the expression 'final Order' as occurring in Article 133 (1) of the Constitution of India. No such interpretation is called for in the case at hand. It is a simple order of attachment and appointment of Receiver passed by the S. D. M. under Section 146, Cr. P. C. ( 7 ) RAJ Kapoor's case (supra), relied upon by the respondents itself holds that there is no total bar on the exercise of inherent power where abuse of the process of the Court of other extraordinary situation excites the Courts jurisdiction. P. C. ( 7 ) RAJ Kapoor's case (supra), relied upon by the respondents itself holds that there is no total bar on the exercise of inherent power where abuse of the process of the Court of other extraordinary situation excites the Courts jurisdiction. It further points out that the limitation is self-restraint. The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders are clearly capable of being considered in exercise of inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the Court in the face. In a later decision in Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan, AIR 1983 SC 67 : (l983 Cri LJ 159), it has been held by the Apex Court as follows:"after the coming into force of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 'present Code'), there was a serious divergence of judicial opinion on the question as to whether where a power is exercised under Section 397 of the present Code, the High Court could exercise those very powers under Section 482 of the present Code. It is true that Section 397 (2) clearly bars the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of interlocutory orders passed in appeal, enquiry or other proceedings. The matter is, however, no longer res intergra as the entire controversy has been set at rest by a decision of this Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1978) 1 SCR749: AIR 1978 SC 47 : (1978 Cri LJ 165), where this Court pointed out that Section 482 of the present Code had a different parameter and was a provision independent of Section 397 (2 ). This Court further held that while Section 397 (2) applied to the exercise of revisional powers of the High Court, Section 482 regulated the inherent powers of the Court to pass orders necessary in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. In this connection, Untwalia, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows: 'on a plaint reading of Section 482, however, it would follow that nothing in the Code, which would include sub-section (2) of Section 397 also, "shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court". In this connection, Untwalia, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows: 'on a plaint reading of Section 482, however, it would follow that nothing in the Code, which would include sub-section (2) of Section 397 also, "shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court". But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. . . . . But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397 (2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. "state of Himachal Pradesh v. Krishan Lal Pardhan (1987 Cri LJ 709 (SC) is a case where certain persons were not sent up for trial without any reason. The special Judge finding sufficient material on record to summon the accused, had issued process for consideration of charge against them, but his successor-in-Officer passed an elaborate order of acquittal under the garb of an order of discharge on the same material. At the stage of framing of charge all that was necessary to see, whether a prima facie case was made out against the accused, while in fact the Special Judge had decided the same on merits at that stage without affording opportunity to the prosecution to adduce evidence. It would thus be clear that the facts of the case were glaringly different. ( 8 ) GOING through the impugned order it is evident that the S. D. M. has refused to interfere with the order of attachment and appointment of Receiver on the ground that an order of attachment passed under Sec. 146 (1) Cr. P. C. operates until a competent Court has determined the rights of parties there to with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof. P. C. operates until a competent Court has determined the rights of parties there to with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof. ( 9 ) SHRI K. G. Maheshwari, learned counsel for the petitioner placing reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Mathuralal's case (1980 Cri LJ) (supra), submitted that the S. D. M. was labouring under a misconception of law. A similar argument was advanced before the Supreme Court in Mathuralal's case (supra) and this is what the Supreme Court has observed about it: "though at first blush there appeared to be force in the submissions of Shri Mukherji, a closer scrutiny of the provisions of Ss. 145 and 146 exposes their uncoundness. " explaining the position further the Apex Court observed :"quite obviously, Ss. 145 and 146 of the Cr. P. C. together constitute a scheme for the resolution of a situation where there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace because of a dispute concerning any land or water or their boundaries. If S. 146 is torn out of its setting and read independently of S. 245, it is capable of Bering construed to mean that once an attachment is effected in any of the three situation mentioned therein, the dispute can only be resolved by a competent Court and not by the Magistrate effecting the attachment. But S. 146 cannot be so separated from S. 145. It can only be read in the context of S. 145. Contextual construction must surely prevail over isolationist construction. Otherwise, it may mislead. That is one of the first principles of construction. Let us therefore look at S. 145 and consider S. 146 in that context. "having thus considered the matter at large, the Apex Court held :"in our view, it is wrong to hold that the Magistrate's jurisdiction ends as soon as an attachment is made on the ground of emergency. " shashidhar Naik's case (1978 Cri LJ1316) (Ori) (supra), relied upon by the respondents, relates to Section 146, Cr. P. C. and is of no avail and assistance in face of the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Mathuralal (supra ). ( 10 ) MATHURALAL's case (1980 Cri LJ l) (supra) was, as stated by the learned counsel, pointedly brought to the notice of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, who has simply omitted to consider the same. P. C. and is of no avail and assistance in face of the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Mathuralal (supra ). ( 10 ) MATHURALAL's case (1980 Cri LJ l) (supra) was, as stated by the learned counsel, pointedly brought to the notice of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, who has simply omitted to consider the same. It must, therefore, be held in the light of the case of Mathuralal (supra) that the view taken by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is wholly erroneous and cannot be subscribed to. ( 11 ) IT is an admitted position that a Civil Suit instituted by the respondents is still pending and they had in fact sought an ad interim injunction against the petitioner on the ground of being in possession, as has already been noted above and lost before the trial Court as also in Misc. Appeal No. 87 of 1975, preferred by them. ( 12 ) SHRI K. G. Maheshwari, urged, placing reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Ram Sumer Puri's case (1985 Cri LJ 752) (SC) (supra), that criminal proceedings under Sec. 145, Cr. P. C. , in face of civil litigation, should be dropped. The Supreme Court in Ram Sumer Puri's case (supra) observed :"when possession is being examined by the Civil Court and parties arc in a position to approach the civil Court for interim order, such as injunctions or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are, therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned Magistrate should be quashed. '' ( 13 ) IN the present case, in fact the question of possession was examined by the trial Court and injunction was refused to the respondents, who preferred an appeal to this Court, which was also dismissed. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, as already noted above, in spite of this decision in Mathuralal's case (1980 Cri LJ 1) (SC) (supra) having been specifically mentioned in the application itself, conveniently avoided to consider the same. This case squarely applies to the case at hand. ( 14 ) SHRI R. C. Maheshwari, learned counsel for the respondents urged that the petitioner is guilty of laches. This case squarely applies to the case at hand. ( 14 ) SHRI R. C. Maheshwari, learned counsel for the respondents urged that the petitioner is guilty of laches. He did not prefer any revision under Section 397, Cr. P. C. and has moved this Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. , although he had thrice applied to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for dropping of proceedings arid restoring possession of the lands in question to him. The submission is not wholly correct. The first application, as pointed out by Shri K. G. Maheshwari, was made when the Misc. Appeal No. 87 of 1975, preferred by the respondents was still pending before this Court and after the dismissal of the said appeal, he again approached the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. Thereafter when the Supreme Court clarified the position in Ram Sumer Puri's case (supra ). he again approached the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. It cannot, therefore, be said that the petitioner is guilty of laches and his petition under Sec. 482, Cr. P. C. can be thrown out on that count. ( 15 ) IN view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mathuralal's case (1980 Crilj1) (supra), there remains no doubt that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was labouring under a misconception of law in passing the impugned order, saying that his jurisdiction had ended with passing of the attachment order and until the competent Court had determined the rights of the parties, he could not interfere. ( 16 ) FOR the foregoing reasons this petition deserved to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is quashed, so also the proceedings. In view of long lapse of time since passing of the order under Section 146, Cr. P. C. and considering the fact that a Civil Suit instituted by the respondents is still pending, where the question of possession is being inquired into, it is directed that possession of the lands in question be restored back to the petitioner. As for mesne profits, Shri R. C. Maheshwari had urged that the amount lying with the State Government, fetching no interest. As for mesne profits, Shri R. C. Maheshwari had urged that the amount lying with the State Government, fetching no interest. In fact an application was made by the respondents in this behalf to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, as can be seen from the record, that this amount should be deposited in some Nationalised Bank so that it may fetch some interest, which may ultimately benefit the person, who is found to be entitled thereto. It is, therefore, directed that the amount so far collected be deposited in a Nationalised Bank for a fixed term of five years. Its disbursement is, however, left to the Civil Court. Petition allowed. .