Judgment Prabha Shanker Mishra, J. 1. Trial of a civil suit started without the plaintiff examined as the first witness on behalf of the plaintiff. After examination of quite a few witnesses the plaintiff offered himself as a witness. He was examined in chief and the defendant-petitioners were called upon to cross examine him. They raised objections alleging that under Rule 3-A of Order XVIII of the Code of Civil Procedure the plaintiff was required to appear as a witness before any other witness on his behalf had been examined. Unless the court for reasons to be recorded permitted him to appear as his own witness at a later stage. Plaintiff never applied for permission to appear as his own witness at a later stage. Thus without any reason what-so-ever and without any application on his behalf the trial court permitted him to be examined as a witness at a later stage. Rule 3-A of Order XVIII of the Code of Civil Procedure has, according to the petitioners, been violated. 2. Order XVIII of the Code of Civil Procedure contains rules about the hearing of the suit and examination of witness. Rule 1 states:- The plaintiff has the right to begin unless the defendant admits the facts alleged by the plaintiff and contends that either in point of law or on some additional facts alleged by the defendant the plaintiff is not entitled to any part of the relief which he seeks, in which case the defendant has the right to begin. In the instant case the plaintiff began, Rule 2 states:- (1) On the day fixed for the hearing of the suit or on any other day to which the hearing is adjourned, the party having the right to begin shall state his case and produce his evidence in support of the issues which he is bound to prove. (2) The other party shall then state his case and produce his evidence (if any) and may then address the Court generally on the whole case. (3) The party beginning may then reply generally on the whole case. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, the court may, for reasons to be recorded, direct or permit any party to examine any witness at any stage. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 2 has been introduced by Sec. 69 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 104 of 1976. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, the court may, for reasons to be recorded, direct or permit any party to examine any witness at any stage. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 2 has been introduced by Sec. 69 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 104 of 1976. Along with the said amendment Rule 3-A has also been introduced which runs:- Where a party himself wishes to appear, as a witness, he shall so appear before any other witness on his behalf has been examined, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, permits him to appear as his own witness at a later stage. 3. In Shri Ram Maharaj V/s. Raj Kishore Bhagat (1978) BLJR 600 Satyeshwar Roy, J. sitting at Ranchi Bench of this Court read Rule 3-A to mean, in his words:- The word used in this provision is "shall" which ordinarily is mandatory. That it is mandatory will also appear from the Fifty-Fourth Report of the Law Commission which was accepted by the Legislature. The rule enables the court to permit a party to examine himself at a later stage and such permission may be granted by the court for the reasons to be recorded by it. On the plain reading of the rule it provides that such permission must be obtained from the court before any witness on behalf of a party is examined as a witness. If any other meaning is put to the interpretation of this rule it will be inconsistent with the legislative intent stated above. The plain meaning of rule, therefore, is that at the commencement of hearing of the suit, a party must examine himself as witness, if he intends to examine himself in that case or he must file an application for permission to examine himself as a witness at a later stage and if the court so permits the party to examine himself at a later stage, it shall record reasons for the same. It is true that it is a procedural law, but the object of insertion of a procedural law being to suppress a mischief must also be strictly construed. Correctness of the said view, however, was examined by a Division Bench of this Court in Rameshwar Sharma V/s. Surju Prasad (1979) BBCJ 637. It is true that it is a procedural law, but the object of insertion of a procedural law being to suppress a mischief must also be strictly construed. Correctness of the said view, however, was examined by a Division Bench of this Court in Rameshwar Sharma V/s. Surju Prasad (1979) BBCJ 637. The Division Bench has said:- It was pointed out in Shri Ram Mah rajas case that by the use of the word shall in the Rule, the provisions have been made mandatory. It is true that so far party is concerned he has been peremptorily enjoined, where he desires to appear as a witness, to examine himself as the first witness at the trial and we agree that if he omits to do so he cannot as a matter of right come subsequently to the witness box. The question, however, which remains to be decided is as to whether the court can entertain at a later stage, an application for permission for his examination. So for the courts powers are concerned, there are no words to indicate that an application for such permission has to be filed before the party examines his first witness. In absence of any restriction in this regard it should be held that ordinarily an application for such permission can be made either at the initial stage or when its occasion arises. In a case where the party has already decided to examine himself as a witness but for adequate reasons he is not a position to examine himself at the initial stage, it is desirable that he files such application in the very beginning, There may be, however, cases where necessity for examination of a party may itself arise at a belated stage and he may be advised by the counsel to do so. In such a case he could not have filed an application in the beginning. Does it mean that in these cases the court is left helpless in not coming to the aid of the party although convinced that he had a good case for not examining himself as his first witness. There may be other situation in which a party may be justified in asking for necessary permission later on. Does it mean that in these cases the court is left helpless in not coming to the aid of the party although convinced that he had a good case for not examining himself as his first witness. There may be other situation in which a party may be justified in asking for necessary permission later on. The rules of procedure are intended to aid the administration of justice and not to hamper it and all rules of court are nothing but provisions intended to secure proper administration of justice. The object of the rules of procedure is to subserve and facilities the cause of justice and not to govern or obstruct it as has been observed by the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat V/s. Ram Prakash P. Puri -- . The rules of procedure must be construed so as to promote the cause, the main cause being, to arrive at the truth on a consideration of the evidence made by the parties. We, therefore, hold that Rule 3-A must be so interpretated as to clothe the court with the authority to permit a party to examine as a witness later on in a proceeding if he makes out sufficient cause for it on an application which may be filed in appropriate case even later. We accordingly hold that the decision given in Shri Ram Maharajas case was not given correctly. Thus this Court has taken the view that Rule 3-A should not be made rigid and inflexiable. Circumstances may warrant examination of a party at later stage. The court in its discretion may decide to permit the party to examine itself even at a later stage. 4. In Marappa Goundea and Ors. V/s. Sellappa Gounder and Ors. -- , however a single Judge of the Madras High Court has taken the view that a duty is a cast ou the court by Rule 3-A to record reasons, which means the valid and compulsive graunds must be made out, for postponing the examination of parties to the suit. If a party to the suit desires to be examined later on, he should seek prior permission before the other witnesses are examined. In its absence it can be sought later on at the time when the party is put in the witness box, if by mischance any of his witnesses have been already examined, without securing earlier permission. If a party to the suit desires to be examined later on, he should seek prior permission before the other witnesses are examined. In its absence it can be sought later on at the time when the party is put in the witness box, if by mischance any of his witnesses have been already examined, without securing earlier permission. Whenever permission is sought for, it is obligatory on the part of the Court to record reasons, by passing a written order, either granting or refusing it. If permission is sought in the initial stage before any witness is examined; then reasons to be given should relate to the justifiable inability on the part of the party to first examine himself. Before granting permission it should hear the objections, if any, of the other side and them alone permit any witness of the party to be examined. The Madras Court also adverted to cases wherein without prior permission witnesses of the party has been examined, and later on the party wished to appear as a witness himself. The court has said:- The Court is duty bound to find out, whether on the party being examined at that stage, it would result in filling up any blanks or lacunae left out in the evidence already given, and whether want only he avoided the witness-box with ulterior motives, and whether he was placed in such a situation or circumstances which had disabled him from being examined earlier etc. According to the Madras judgment unless compelling strong circumstances which are relevant and germane had existed, permission to a party to a proceeding to examine himself after his witnesses had been examined, ought not to be granted. It thus ruled out as undesirable grant of oral permission saying:- If oral permission is granted, the reasons which prevailed upon the trial court would be unknown and in turn parties would suffer. When the rule itself imposes a duty to record reasons, no other method is permissible. With respect, I record that the Madras view is in no way in conflict with the Patna view in a Division Bench. Unless there is a good reason the ordinary rule of procedure is that the party must examine himself as the first witness. When the rule itself imposes a duty to record reasons, no other method is permissible. With respect, I record that the Madras view is in no way in conflict with the Patna view in a Division Bench. Unless there is a good reason the ordinary rule of procedure is that the party must examine himself as the first witness. The Court, therefore, must know the reason before it allows examination of the party as a witness at a later stage of the evidence of its witnesses. The rule says: ...Unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, permits him to appear as his own witness at a later stage. Thus the court is required to record reasons for granting such permission. In Bhola Nath V/s. Kalipada -- a similar view has been expressed. Thus the law is no longer in doubt. Rule 3-A is a rule of caution. It is a rule which should be followed in its spirit and not letter. Substance of the rule is that a party should not be allowed to be examined at a later stage unless there is a good reason for doing so. That reason must appear in the order of the court and permission granted should be expressed clearly and specifically saying why the permission was granted to do so. 5. In the instant case, however, no order was recorded and thus no reason stated in the order why the plaintiff was allowed to examine himself at a later stage. Yet he has been examined and his evidence in chief has been recorded. Objections have been raised only later on and a prayer has been made to expunge or ignore the examination in chief of the plaintiff. A Division Bench of this Court in Pravash Kumari V/s. Rishi Prasad 1986 PLJR (NOC) (B) Page 1, has considered a case in which the plaintiff examined himself as P.W. 13 after 12 witnesses on his behalf had already been examined. He did so without taking leave to appear as a witness at a later stage as provided in Order XVIII, Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court later expunged the evidence on the ground that he was examined in violation of the mandate of Order XVIII, Rule 3-A of the Code. He did so without taking leave to appear as a witness at a later stage as provided in Order XVIII, Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court later expunged the evidence on the ground that he was examined in violation of the mandate of Order XVIII, Rule 3-A of the Code. The Division Bench has said that the provision is directory and not mandatory, and therefore its non-observance in all cases should not lead to the extreme penaly of expunging evidence which has already been recorded. The trial court has declined to expunge the evidence of the plaintiff. It has, however, permitted the defendant-petitioners to cross-examine him. The trial court has, thus, acted in accordance with law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court and has rightly refrained from imposing the extreme penelty of expunging the evidence in view of the aforequoted rule. 6. Though it is not possible to say that an order passed on an application under Order XVIII Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure or on objection of a party to the grant of permission to examine a party as his own witness at a later stage is not revisable this Court shall be reluctant in exercising its revisional power under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in cases of infractions like one brought to this Court in the instant application. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure says:- (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears-- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or which material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit; Provided that the High Court shall not, under the section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where:- (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. (2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate there to. Explanation--In this section, the expression:- "any case which has been decided" includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other preceding. The law until Sec. 115, as quoted above, was amended by the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act 104 of 1976, was that the High Court refrained from interfering with an order which did not decide any case or part of the case. The law until Sec. 115, as quoted above, was amended by the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act 104 of 1976, was that the High Court refrained from interfering with an order which did not decide any case or part of the case. This, principle which was evolved by judicial pronouncements however has been retained in the language of Sec. 115 by the 1976 Amendment Act as it begins by saying that the High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit, but added a proviso;" the High Court shall not, under the section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deriding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. "A liberal view will take the court to a test whether the order would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding or not and then, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made or not. In sum the courts discretion is quite large. It may decline to interfere with an order which, if allowed to stand, not cause a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made or for the reason that in any case nothing is going to be finally disposed of by the impugned order. In other words a failure of justice and as a result of such failure irreparable injury to the party against whom it is made, is a sine qua non for exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 115, Code of Civil Procedure. In other words a failure of justice and as a result of such failure irreparable injury to the party against whom it is made, is a sine qua non for exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 115, Code of Civil Procedure. Maintainability of an application is one question. Exercise of discretion by the High Court to interfere with the impugned order is another question. The instant application may be maintainble but in, my view, the impugned order does not warrant exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with it. 7 The trial court, it appears, has granted a peremptory time to the defendant petitioners to prepare and cross-examine the plaintiff. Since the petitioner had filed the instant application, perhaps, he believed that he could wait until some order was passed by this Court. The trial court, I believe, shall not deny to the petitioners the right to cross-examine the plaintiffs witnesses whose cross examination it had postponed for a later date. The trial court shall proceed from the stage of the examination of the plaintiff as a witness afresh permit the defendant petitioners to cross-examine the plaintiff and any other witneess who has already been examined but not cross-examined by them. 8. For the reasons aforementioned I hold that there is no merit in this application. With the observations as above this application is dismissed.