M.A. (F) No. 6 of 1980, S.A, No. 36 of 1980 and Civil Revision No. 32 of 1980 can be disposed of by a common judgment as they are from a common judgment of the District Judge at Gauhati passed in Title Appeal Nos. 8 and 9 of 1976. 2. Facts, — One Senehiram died in the year 1949 leaving his widow Krishni and three sons, namely Mannalal, Sawarmal and Sitaram and his four daughters, namely Patia, Rampiyari, Radha and Durga. Mannalal died in the year 1954 leaving his widow Panna aod three sons, namely Radheshyam, Ramgopal and Motilal, and four daughters, namely Geeta, Ridhia, Chanda and Puspa. Senehiram's widow Krishni died in 1962. Naurangrai is the husband of Durga. Parties are governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu law. Panna and Radheshyam instituted Title Suit No. 21 of 69/35 of 1972 in the Court of the Assistant District Judge, Gauhati against Naurangrai, husband of Durga, and others for eviction of Naurangrai from the suit premises under Holding No. 20 of Ward No. 6 of Gauhati Municipal Corporation and arrears of rent, etc. Their case is as follows. The suit premises were coparcenary properties of the Hindu joint family firm, M/s Jainarain Senehiram. Naurangrai has been a tenant under the firm at a monthly rent of Rs.300/- with effect from July 1950. By a registered deed of partition dated 13.2.67 between the coparceners, the suit premises were allotted to them as their share and, therefore, they are the full owners of the suit premises. After the partition, Naurangrai, was allowed to remain as tenant of Panna and Radheshyam under an agreement that he would remain as such upto March 1967 till a new agreement was made. But Naurangrai has defaulted to pay the rent since December 1967 and he has also made unauthorised construction and alteration. That apart, the suit premises are bona-fide requirei for their own use. Durga and her husband Naurangrai filed counter suit being Title Suit No. 92 of 60/40 of 1972 against Panna, Radheshyam and others in the Court of the Assistant District Judge (II) Gauhati for declaration of her right and titles to the suit premises and for confirmation of possession, etc. Their case is that in the year 1948 they came from Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to Gaubati as was desired by Senehiram. Their case is that in the year 1948 they came from Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to Gaubati as was desired by Senehiram. Senehiram, who died in the year 1949, was the owner of the suit premises. On their arrival at Gauhati, during his life time, Senehiram made an oral gift of the suit premises to his daughter Durga in the year 1948 with delivery of possession out of love and affection. Since then Durga and her husband have been in possession of the suit premises as their own perfecting thereby their right by adverse possession. Naurangrai has never been a tenant of anybody in respect of the suit premises. (It may be noted here that Durga died during the pendency of the Suit and her legal representatives have been made parties to the Suit). 3. The suits were jointly tried by the Assistant District Judge (II) Gauhati, The trial Court by a common judgment dismissed the Title Suit No 21 of 69/35 of 1972 instituted by Panna and Radheshyam and decreed Title Suit No. 92 of 69/40 of 1972 filed by Durga and her husband Naurangrai in their favour. Being aggrieved by the decrees of the trial Court, Panna and Radheshyam filed two separate appeals, namely Title Appeal Nos. 8 and 9 of 1976, in the Court of the District Judg3, Gauhati. The lower appellate Court allowed the appeals and dismissed the suit filed by Durga and her husband and made an order of remand in respect of the suit filed by Panna and Radheshyam to the trial Court for determination on the question formulated in its judgment. Hence these appeals and revision. 4. The revision petition (Civil Revision No. 32 of 1980) has been filed doubting whether an appeal shall lie or not from such an order of remand. The question which therefore arises for con­sideration is whether an order of remand is appealable. O 43, R 1 (u) provides that an appeal shall lie from "an order under Rule 23 A of Order XLI remanding a case, where an appeal would lie from the decree of the Appellate Court,'' Therefore, under O 43, R 1 (u), an appeal will lie from an order of remand only in those cases in which an appeal would lie against the decree if the appellate Court instead of making an order of remand passed a decree. In the present case, while allowing the appeals, the lower appellate Court has held that there was no gift; Durga's right has not been perfected by adverse possession; and Naurangrai is a tenant of Panna and Radheshyam. The findings of the lower appellate Court indicate that the lower appellate Court has substituted its own judgment for that of the trial Court and as such the order of remand was under O 41, R 23-A. CPC, and not under O 41, R 23, CPC. If a decree was passed in Title Appeal No. 8 of 1980 instead of making an order of remand, an appeal would He from the decree under section 100, CPC, as provided there under. Therefore, an appeal shall lie from the remand order passed in the present case, and not revision. 5. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the appeal from the order of remand will be heard under section ICO, CPC. In Abdul Gani vs. Devi Lal, AIR 1960 Rajasthan 77, the Rajasthan High Court has held that an appeal under O 43, R I (u) from an order of remand is to be beard as an appeal under section 100, CPC and, therefore, the appellant cannot agitate the questions of fact as in a first appeal. In Kaluvaroya vs. Ganesa, AIR 1969 Madras 248, it has been held by the Madras High Court that in an appeal under O 43, R 1 (u), the appellant can agitate not only illegality or propriety of the order of remand, but also findings of fact. However, the Madras High Court has further held that where the lower appellate Court substitutes its own judgment for that of the trial Court and remand the case, the remedy is to file a second appeal and not an appeal under O 43, R 1 (u). The decisions in the above cited cases are from the order of remand under O 41, R 23. But in the present case, the order of remand was made under O 41, R 23 A. 6. The procedure for dealing with a first appeal differs from that of a second appeal. In a second appeal, the High Court is to exercise its power under sections 100 and 101, CPC. But in the present case, the order of remand was made under O 41, R 23 A. 6. The procedure for dealing with a first appeal differs from that of a second appeal. In a second appeal, the High Court is to exercise its power under sections 100 and 101, CPC. It is settled that in a second appeal, the High Court in exercise of its power under section 100, CPC cannot make reappraisal of evidence and come to a different finding contrary to the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court except for special and exception of circumstance. In other words, in a second appeal, a finding of fact even if erroneous is generally not to be disturbed unless the finding is vitiated by application of wrong tests or on the basis of con­jectures and assumptions. If any authority is required, I may refer to the decisions in Dudh Nath vs. Suresh Chandra, AIR 1986 SC 1509 and Budhwanti vs, Gulab Chand, AIR 1987 SC 1484. In a first appeal the appellant can agitate the question of fact or has the right to ask for reappraisal of evidence. Section 2(14), CPC provides that: "order” means the formal expression of any decision of a civil Court which is not a decree". In view of section 2(14), CPC, an order of remand is not a decree. However, in any case appeal from an appellate order of remand is a second appeal, although it is not under section 100. In spite of the fact that an appeal from appellate order of remand is not a second appeal under section JOO on the ground that the order of remand is not a decree, but, from an order O 43, R 1 (u). I am of the view that the principle underlying section 100 will be applicable while hearing an appeal from an order of remand passed in an appeal. As already stated, the order of remand was made under O 41, R 23 A as the lower appellate Court has substituted its own judgment for that of the Court, and the appeals on hand are from a common judgment passed in two appeals (Title Appeal Nos. 8 and 9 of 1976) arising out of two suits. As already stated, the order of remand was made under O 41, R 23 A as the lower appellate Court has substituted its own judgment for that of the Court, and the appeals on hand are from a common judgment passed in two appeals (Title Appeal Nos. 8 and 9 of 1976) arising out of two suits. In the present case, in view of contentions made by the counsel for the parties and in order to render justice to the parties affected, I shall consider the evidence whenever it is necessary or I shall peruse the evidence for my own satisfaction whenever I think it fit. 7. Both the Courts below have held that oral gift cannot be accepted in view of section 123, T.P. Act. I am of the view that the findings of the Court below are well founded. However, I am of the opinion that it would be required to determine whether there was factum of oral gift as it may be required for consideration whether oral gift, if any, can be used for collateral purpose. The evidence of Naurangrai is that the suit premises were give to his wife Durga by her father Senehiram. The evidence of Ramgopal Bajoria, son of Durga, is that Senehiram made an oral gift of the suit premises to his daughter Durga. Section 122, T.P. Act defines "Gift" to mean the transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. 8. Keeping the meaning of gift in view, the word 'gift' is a legal expression to be inferred from the reproduction of the exact words made by the donor. Therefore, in my judgment, reproduction of exact words made by the donor is required for the reason that the statement is to be examined whether it amounts to gift or not, and to afford a piece of reliable evidence, it must pass the test of reproduction of exact words. That apart, Durga's name also does not appear in the Mutation Register, and she did not pay taxes and land revenues in respect of the suit premises. Therefore, a mere statement that the suit premises were given or gifted to Durga cannot be accepted. For these reasons, the plaintiffs have failed to prove the fact of oral gift. 9. That apart, Durga's name also does not appear in the Mutation Register, and she did not pay taxes and land revenues in respect of the suit premises. Therefore, a mere statement that the suit premises were given or gifted to Durga cannot be accepted. For these reasons, the plaintiffs have failed to prove the fact of oral gift. 9. Mr. J.N. Sarma, the learned counsel for the appellants, Naurangrai and others, has contended that, even if the gift fails, Durga was entitled to l/7th share of the properties left by her father Senehiram on the ground that under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, on the death of her father, her mother Krishni would be entitled to her father's separate property as a son, or her mother Krishni would take the place of her father Senehiram on the death of Senehirara in the coparcenary property, and after coming the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 into operation her mother Krishni became full owner of property and, therefore, on the death of her mother, Durga together with other heirs would be entitled to interest of her mother Krishni irrespective of whether the property was held by Senehiram in absolute severally or not. 10. No issue has been framed by the trial Court on this point. However, the trial Court has held that Jainarain is father of Senehiram and Govardhan. Senehiram separated from his brother Govardhan after the death of their father Jainarain. Therefore, Senehiram became sole owner of the suit premises after the separation from Govar­dhan. Thereafter, the trial Court observed that Durga could claim a share of the Hindu joint family property as one of the heirs of her deceased parents. The lower appellate Court has held that Senehiram acquired the land on partition of his ancestral properties and, there­fore, the suit premises are coparcenary properties and not separate properties of Senehiram, I have perused the evidence on record for my satisfaction. Evidence of PW 2 Hari Chandra, who is an em­ployee of Gauhati Municipal Corporation, is that Holding No. 20 of Ward No. 6 (suit premises) was in the name of M/s Jainarain Sene­hiram in the jamabandi. The evidence of PW 3 Rajeswor Chakra-borty, who was serving in the firm M/s Jainarain Senehiram till I960, is that after the partition the suit premises were allotted to Senehiram. The partition took place about 4/5 years before the death of Senehiram. The evidence of PW 3 Rajeswor Chakra-borty, who was serving in the firm M/s Jainarain Senehiram till I960, is that after the partition the suit premises were allotted to Senehiram. The partition took place about 4/5 years before the death of Senehiram. The evidence of the two witnesses support the conclusion arrived at by the lower appellate Court that the suit premises were coparcenary properties. Therefore, the findings of the lower appellate Court are based on the evidence and materials on record. 11. The next question is whether Durga would succeed to her mother's interest. The Mitakshara Law recognises two methods of devolution of properties, namely survivorship and succession. Survivorship applies to the Hindu joint family property or coparce­nary property, and the rule of succession applies to the property held in absolute severally. 12. Under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 in the case of a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law when the Hindu dies intestate leaving separate property, widow, or if there is more than/one widow, all his widows together, shall be entitled to the same share as a son. But with regard to the Hindu joint family property, the widow shall have in the property the same interest as her husband himself had, that is, the widow takes the place of the husband. However, the interest devolving on a Hindu widow shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu Women's estate having the right to claim partition. But if the widow does not seek partition ob termination of her limited estate, her interest will be merged into coparcenary property. If the claims partition, she is severed from other members and her interest becomes a defined interest in the coparcenary property. Therefore, if she dies after partition, her interest will devolve upon the heirs of her husband. But, after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force, changes have been made. Under proviso to section 6, if ' deceased coparcener had left him a female relative specified therein, the interest of the deceased in the coparcenary property shall devolve by succession not by introducing a concept of a notional partition immediately before his death. 13. But, after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force, changes have been made. Under proviso to section 6, if ' deceased coparcener had left him a female relative specified therein, the interest of the deceased in the coparcenary property shall devolve by succession not by introducing a concept of a notional partition immediately before his death. 13. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 runs : "Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property,- (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation,..................... (2) Nothing...................... (emphasis added) 14. In Kutturswami vs. Beeravva, AIR 1959 SC 577 , the Supreme Court has held that the word "possessed" is used in section 14 in a broad sense and in the context possession means the state of owning or having in one's hands or power. It includes possession by receipt of rents and profits. The possession might have been either actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law. but unless the female, whose limited estate in disputed property is claimed to have transferred into absolute estate under section was at least in such possession, taking the word 'possession' in the widest connotation when the Hindu Succession Act came into force, section 14 would not apply. 15. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, in order to claim the limited ownership of a Hindu female has been transferred to full ownership the Hindu female must be in the possession of the property taking the word 'possession' in the widest connotation when the Hindu Succession Act came into force. But, the 'possession' must be proved or the circumstances and materials suggesting the in­ference of possession must exist. The receipt of rents or profits is known to law as one as the forms of possession. 16. Turning to the case on hand, there is no averment in the plaint nor is in the evidence to indicate or suggest that Krishni sought partition of the properties or that she was in possession of the suit premises or any portion of any of the properties left by her husband. According to, Durga and her husband have been in actual possession of the suit premises from before the death of Senehiram or his widow Krishni. According to, Durga and her husband have been in actual possession of the suit premises from before the death of Senehiram or his widow Krishni. Therefore, the question of Krishni's possession of the suit premises after the death of her husband does not arise. Since Krishni had never been in possession of -her limited estate during her life time, the limited ownership has never been transformed into full ownership. For these reasons, the submission of Mr. Sarma cannot be entertained. 17. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the right of Durga has been perfected by adverse possession or Naurangrai is a tenant in respect of the suit premises. 18. The lower appellate Court has held thus. The disputed holding was in the name of M/s Jainarain Senehiram in the records of right ( Jamabandi) aad after partition in the year 1967 it has been recorded in the names of Panna aad Radheshyam. The name of Durga never appeared in the records of right. 'Ram Gopal Bhagwati Prasad' the name of the business of Naurangrai, was shown as the tenant in the records of right. On 9.11.49, a sum of Rs. 25/-was paid in the name of Naurangrai as security for electric! y meter, as stated by DW-1 Upen but he does not know for which tuuse it was paid. PW 3 Rajeswar, while he was in service of the firm M/s Jainarain Senehiram, he collected rent on behalf of the firm Naurangrai and deposited with the firm. The evidence of PW 7 Ram Gopal, the power of attorney holder of Panna, that he collected rent from Naurangrai. To support the evidence of payment of rent books of account have been, produced. Both the Courts below have held that Naurangrai was once carrying on business in the name and style of 'Ram Gopal Bhagwati Prasad'. However, during the argument much discussion was made relating to the difference of amount of rent of Rs. 100/-P.M. recorded in the records of holdings and the amount of rent of Rs. 300/- PM stated by Panna and another. This matter has been discussed by the lower appellate Court in details and t agree with the finding of the lower appellate Court in this regards. As regards the entries in the books of account, the learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the entries have not been proved. 300/- PM stated by Panna and another. This matter has been discussed by the lower appellate Court in details and t agree with the finding of the lower appellate Court in this regards. As regards the entries in the books of account, the learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the entries have not been proved. A perusal of the evidence of PW 7 Ram Gopal reveals that writings have been proved. However, there is no direct evidence that the book of account were regularly kept in the course of business. But, on the perusal of the evidence, I find that there are circumstances showing that the books of account were regularly kept in the course of business. However, the entries should be subject to close scrutiny. This matter shall be considered further later in this judgment. As regards other findings, on perusal of evidence, I find they are based on evidence and materials on records and there is nothing to interfere with the findings. 19. From she above evidence and materials, it is to be decided whether the suit premises were tenanted by Naurangrai, or whether the right of Durga has been perfected by adverse possession. 20. As regards the adverse possession, there must be some overt act on the part of the person claiming adverse possession indicating assertion of hostile title, and the indication must be to the knowledge of the owner. Mere continuance of unauthorised possession even for a period of more than 12 years is not enough as unlawful possession does not mean adverse possession. 21. The case of Durga and her husband is that they have been in possession of the suit premises as were gifted to Durga by her father, and her husband has never been a tenant of any person, Assuming that Naurangrai has not been a tenant, as there was no factum of gift, Durga and her husband have been in unauthorised possession for more than 12 years. The question is whether there was/is any overt act on the part of Durga and/or her husband indicating assertion of hostile title, From the findings of the lower appellate Court discussed above and on examination of evidence, it appears that there is no evidence on record indicating any overt ,act on the part of Durga and or her husband indicating assertion of hostile title. As regards the paymant of Rs. As regards the paymant of Rs. 25/as security for electricity meter, Naurangrai in his evidence, did not state that he paid it. The adverse possession is claimed by Durga. There is no evidence that it was paid on behalf of Durga. Therefore, the payment of Rs. 2S/-, ever assuming that it was paid in respect of the suit pre­mises, cannot be said to be an overt act indicating assertion of hostile title. Over and above, there is no evidence to show that the deposit of the sum of Rs 25/-was to the knowledge of the owner of the premises. For these reasons, Durga and her husband have failed to prove adverse possession. 22. As regards the question whether the suit premises were tenanted by Naurangrai. Failure of Durga Devi and her husband to prove the fact urn of the alleged gift and adverse possession, the non-payment of taxes and land revenues, recording of the name of the business of Naurangrai "Ram Gopal Bhagwati Prasad' as a tenant, and recording of the name of the firm M/s Jaiharain Senehiram and thereafter in the names of Panna and Radheshyam in the Jamabandi as owners, are tie circumstances to prove tenancy. The evidence of PWs 3 and 7 is that they collected rent from Naurangrai. As regards the entries in the books of account, the entries are corroborative evidence and even in the absence of entries, the tenancy cannot be disproved on the facts and circumstances of the case. For these reasons, there is no material to interfere with the findings of the lower appellate Court that Naurangrai has been a tenant of M/s Jainirain Senehiram and, thereafter, of Panna and Radheshyam. 23. The question then is, - Whether Naurangrai defaulted the payment of rent ? As already stited, the case of Naurangrai is that he has never been a tenant of any person and he never paid any rent. This clearly indicates that he did not pay the rent as is required and he is a defaulter. I agree with the finding of the lower appellate Court that Naurangrai is a defaulter. 24. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the direction in the order of remind shall be set aside exercising the power under O41,R33, CPC. 25. Mr. I agree with the finding of the lower appellate Court that Naurangrai is a defaulter. 24. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the direction in the order of remind shall be set aside exercising the power under O41,R33, CPC. 25. Mr. J. N. Sarma, the learned counsel for the appellants, has submitted that the power under O 41 R 33, CPC can only be exercised if the Court finds that the appeal on its merits must succeed. He has referred me to the decision of this Court in Kalicharan vs. Rameswari Priya, AIR 1979 Gau 7 . 26. In Choudhary Sahu vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1982 SC 98 , the Supreme Court reiterated the observation made in Nimala ts. Balai Chand, AIR 1965 SC 1874 and observed; ''Ordinarily, the power conferred by this rule will be confined to those cases where as a result of interference in favour of the appellant further interference with the decree of the lower Court is rendered necessary In order to adjust the rights of the parties according to justice, equity and good conscience." (emphasis added) Considering the above decision of the Supreme Court, the word "ordinarily" in particular, I have, in Second Appeal No. 199 of 1986 (Gopal Chand vs. Madanlal), observed that rule 33 is general in its terms, which are wide, but the rule contains no words to suggest that the rule is applicable only to those cases where the appellate Court interferes in appellant's favour. However, as it may cause injustice to the parties appealing if the respondent has not appealed or filed cross-objection, ordinarily the jurisdiction under rule 33 will be confined to those cases, where as a result of interference in favour of the appellant farther interference with the decree of the lower Court is rendered necessary in order to adjust the rights of the parties according to justice, equity and good conscience. Therefore, I have held that the appellate Court has jurisdiction, while dismissing an appeal, to rectify an error in the judgment and decree of the lower Court, if the lower Court has not passed any decree or made any order which ought in law to have been passed or made although the respondent has not appealed or filed cross-objection. My attention has also been drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in Dnangir Madan Mohan, AIR 1988 SC 54 . My attention has also been drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in Dnangir Madan Mohan, AIR 1988 SC 54 . In- that case, the Supreme Court has held; "The appellate Court could exercise that, that power in favour of all or any of the respondents although such respondent may not have filed any appeal or objection. The sweep of the power under R. 33 is wide enough to determine any question not only between the appellant and respondent, but alto between respondent and co-respondents. The appellate Court could pass any decree or order which ought to have been passed in the circumstances of the case. The appellate Court could also pass such other decree or order as the case may require. The words "as the case may require” used in R. 33 of O 41 have been put in wide terms to enable the appellate Court to pass any order or decree to meet the ends of justice. What then should be the constraint ? We do not find many. We are not giving any liberal interpretation. The rule itself liberal enough. The only constraints that we could see may be these : That the parties before the lower Court should be there before the appellate Court. The question raised must properly arise out of judgment of the lower Court. If these two requirements are there, the appellate Court could consider any objection against any part of the judgment or decree of the lower Court. It may "be urged by any party to the appeal. It is true that the power of the appellate Court under R. 33 is discretionary. But it is a proper exercise of judicial discretion to determine all questions urged in order to render complete justice between the parties. The Court should not refuse to exercise that discretion on mere technicalities." The above observation made by the Supreme Court, in my view, has strengthened my view in Gopal Chand's case (supra). 27. Let me now deal with Kali Charao's case ( AIR 1979 Gau 7 ). In that case, the learned Single Judge has held that the power under O 41, R 33 can only be exercised if the Court finds that the appeal on merits must succeed. This decision was not brought to my notice while I was hearing Gopal's case (supra). In that case, the learned Single Judge has held that the power under O 41, R 33 can only be exercised if the Court finds that the appeal on merits must succeed. This decision was not brought to my notice while I was hearing Gopal's case (supra). Be that as it may, in Choudhury Safin's case (AIR 1982 SC 54), the word "ordinarily" has been used whereas in Kali Charan's case the word "only" has been employed. In Dbangri's case ( AIR 1988 SC 54 ), there is no indication that the power under O 41, R 33 cannot be exercised where the appeal on its merits must fail. Therefore, the above decisions of the Supreme Court have orverruled the decision of this Court in Kali Charan, For this reason, it is held that the power under O 41. R 33 can also be exercised even if appeal on its merits must fail. 28. The next question which arises for consideration is Whether the power under O 41 R 33 should be exercised in the present case. The lower appellate Court remanded the case for determination on the following questions :- 1. Whether in view of the present decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1979 page 1745 a notice of termination of tenancy as provided under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary in the instant case, and if so, whether such notice is there ? 2. Whether the house in suit is bona fide required by the present appellants as alleged in the case ? 29. In V. Dhanapal vs. Yesodai Amraal, AIR 1979 SC 1745 , the Supreme Court has held that notice under section 106, T.P. Act is not required for determination of lease by forfeiture for the eviction of tenant under any State Rent Control Act. As regards the bona fide requirement of the suit premises, no issue was framed in this regard, and there is also no evidence on record from which it can be inferred that the suit premises are bona fide required. The suits could have been decreed instead of sending back for determination of the questions formulated by the lower appellate Court on the ground that Naurangrai is a defaulter. Therefore, the lower appellate Court has not passed a decree which ought in law to have been passed. The suits could have been decreed instead of sending back for determination of the questions formulated by the lower appellate Court on the ground that Naurangrai is a defaulter. Therefore, the lower appellate Court has not passed a decree which ought in law to have been passed. The eviction suit was filed in the year 1969, that is, about 0 years ago. In my opinion the sending of the case back for determination of the questions formulated by the lower appe­llate Court is not required for the reasons stated and, if this part of the order is set aside, it would be just and fair and in accordance with equity. I do so accordingly. 30. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals and revision petition are dismissed. The suit filed by Panna and others is decreed and the suit filed by Naurangrai and his wife is dismissed. With the said observation and directions, the appeals and revision petition are disposed of. No costs.