D. M. DHARMADHIKARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a revision by the defendants arising out of the suit under S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short 'the Code'), in relation to the public trust known as Vaikunth Mandap Shri Venktesh Mandir Trust of Ayodhya (Faizabad) U. P. The defendants raised objection to the jurisdiction of the trial Court at Murwara (Katni) to entertain the present suit under S. 92 of the Code and the said objection has been overruled by the Court by order dated 21-1-1988 impugned in the present revision. ( 2 ) THE revision raises important and intricate question of interpretation of the provisions of S. 92 of the Code, in relation to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain suits in respect of management of public charities or trusts and for grant of reliefs specified in the said section. The counsel appearing for both the sides have cited a few rulings in support of their contentions which I shall refer to in my order in the following paragraphs, but the decisions contained therein do not appear to fully deal with the question arising for decision in this revision. ( 3 ) SECTION 92 (1) of the Code reads as under:-"92. (1) In the case of any alleged breach of public charities any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the (leave of the Court) may institute a suit, whether contentious or not, in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of trust is situate to obtain a decree - (a) removing any trustee; (b) appointing a new trustee; (c) vesting any property in a trustee; [ (cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property. ] (d) directing accounts and inquiries; (e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust; (f) authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged; (g) settling a scheme; or (h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the trust may require. "section 92 of the Code confers jurisdiction on a Civil Court to entertain suits based on alleged breaches of any express or constructive trust created for public charitable or religious purpose and to issue necessary direction for its administration. The territorial jurisdiction of the Civil Court for granting reliefs specified in S. 92 of the Code is carved out by the use of the expression "within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject matter of the trust is situate. " Before deciding the above legal question, it would be necessary to state relevant facts and the rival contentions of the parties. ( 4 ) THE facts not in dispute are that one Pandit Sitaramacharyaji of Ayodhya (U. P.) who was follower of Shri Ramanuj Sampraday, had built a temple with idol of Thakur Shri Venkatesh Maharaj, popularly known as "shri Vaikunth Mandap'. According to the plaint allegations, the founder of the trust, namely Pandit Sitaramacharyaji by a registered gift deed dated 1-7-1932 dedicated his house and the land having an area of about six bighas bearing No. 126 situate in Mohalla Ramkot Nzsarbag Ayodhya (U. P.) to the said temple for charitable and religious purposes. After the above dedication to the temple for charitable and religious purposes the above named founder described himself as Sarwarakar and executed a registered will creating a trust for management of the properties attached to the temple and constituted a trust committee for its management. The founder expired in 1952 and on his death, the defendants Smt. Hulsamani Devi with the help of Girdharinath Mishra started managing the property as Sarwarakar and president of the trust committee. The founder expired in 1952 and on his death, the defendants Smt. Hulsamani Devi with the help of Girdharinath Mishra started managing the property as Sarwarakar and president of the trust committee. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to the plaint allegations in paragraph 3, from the income derived from the trust property at Ayodhya, the founder of the trust purchased a house at Katni, which is situate within the jurisdiction of the trial Court at Murwara (Katni) in the State of M. P. The only allegations with regard to the trust property at Katni in the State of Madhya Pradesh are contained in paragraphs 3 and 20 of the plaint and the relevant parts read as under:-"3. That thereafter, from income of said Thakurji Sarvarakar Sitaramacharyaji purchased in name of Thakurji house at Katni and house and land in Hoshangabad district at Pipariya and Ayodhya. ""20. The huge amount of rent at Katni building of trust particularly to plaintiff's knowledge is in arrears and most is barred by limitation. One Shri Chhaganlal Palor of Katni had donated Rs. 1,000/- to defendant No. 1 for construction of a room, has been misappropriated by defendants Nos. 2, 6 and no room has been constructed. "it may be seen that all the other allegations in paragraph 20 of the plaint- and in other paragraphs are concerning mismanagement of the trust property by the members of the trust committee, which is outside the local jurisdiction of the Court at Murwara (Katni) and concerning the acts of the trustees or properties of the trust situate in the State of U. P. The plaint contains the following relief, which are referable to S. 92 of the Code :- (1) Removing the defendant No. 2 Smt. Hulsamani Devi and her brother defendant Camodarcharya from office of trustees. (2) Appointing new trustees and vesting the trust property in the trustees of defendant No. 1. (3) Directing account to be taken and inquiries to be made from defendant No. 2 Smt. Hulsamani Devi of trust property am payment of balance to new trustees. (4) Settling schemes for better administration and management of the trust. (5) Costs of suit be awarded to the plaintiffs. (3) Directing account to be taken and inquiries to be made from defendant No. 2 Smt. Hulsamani Devi of trust property am payment of balance to new trustees. (4) Settling schemes for better administration and management of the trust. (5) Costs of suit be awarded to the plaintiffs. ( 6 ) IT may be seen that the plaint read as a whole contains allegations about the mismanagement of trust property by the trustee and contains reliefs of removal of the trustees, appointment of new trustees, taking of accounts and settling of a scheme for better management of the trust. No separate relief has been claimed in respect of the property of the trust, particularly the house at Katni. The only allegation in the plaint as quoted above in paragraph 20, is non-recovery of arrears of rent of the house at Katni. The defendants raised two preliminary objections before the trial Court regarding the maintainability of the suit under S. 92 of the Code. The first objection was that it is not a case of a public trust, but is a case of private trust and suit under S. 92 of the Code was incompetent. The second objection was that the Court at Murwara (Katni) in M. P. has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the trial Court was in error in granting leave to file suit at Murwara. ( 7 ) IN the present revision the contention is not pressed before me that the trust is a private trust and rightly so because for maintainability of a suit under S. 92 of the Code, the plaint allegations are required to be prima facie seen to determine the maintainability of the suit and the question of grant of leave. The trial Court rightly placed reliance on the decisions in Swami Parmatmanand v. Ramji Tripathi AIR 1974 SC 2141 , and Asson. of R. D. B. Bagga Singh v. Gurunam Singh AIR 1972 Raj 263 . The fact whether the trust is a private or public trust is a matter to be decided on merits in the suit and is not a relevant question for deciding the very maintainability of the suit. of R. D. B. Bagga Singh v. Gurunam Singh AIR 1972 Raj 263 . The fact whether the trust is a private or public trust is a matter to be decided on merits in the suit and is not a relevant question for deciding the very maintainability of the suit. The first submission in this revision, made before me by the learned counsel appearing for the defendants, is that in the situation obtaining at the time of institution of the suit, the course open to the trial Court, was to stay the proceedings and direct the plaintiff to approach the Registrar of the Public Trusts for registration of the public trust under provisions of the M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951 so as to claim relief from the civil Court, under S. 26 of the said M. P. Act. The learned counsel referred to the following decision to support his contention that such a course was adopted to these cases : (1) Shri Deo Hanumanji Swami v. Ram Julam 1962 0 MPLJ 799. (2) Swami Indradevanand Guru Swami Shri Parmanandji v. The State of M. P. AIR 1977 Madh Pra 102. (3) Ramkrishna v. Smt. Sarjubai 1983 M. P. W. N. Note 455 C. R. No. 890 of 82 (1) D/28-6-83. (4) Rambhaai v. Registrar of Public Trusts M. P. No. 48 of 1980 (1) decided on 13-12-1985 (1986) 2 MPWN Note 197. ( 8 ) THE above first submission of the learned counsel for the applicants need not detain me for any considered decision because of the fact that admittedly the trust in the present case is situate in State of Uttar Pradesh which is not liable to be registered in the State of Madhya Pradesh under the provisions of M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951. The counsel for the non-applicants/plaintiffs is right in relying on the decision in Anant Prasad Lakshminiwas Ganeriwal v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1963 SC 853 , in support of his submission that the provision of M. P. Public Trusts Act can have no extra territorial operation in respect of public trusts situate outside the state of M. P. He is also supported by the other following decisions cited by him:- (i) Hariram v. Mahant Raghunathdas 1960 M. P. LJ (Note) 5 CR No. 433/58 D/-24-9-59. (ii) Rameshwar Prasad v. Pandit Krishna Mohanath Raina 1968 0 MPLJ 545 . (ii) Rameshwar Prasad v. Pandit Krishna Mohanath Raina 1968 0 MPLJ 545 . The first submission of the learned counsel for the applicant has, therefore, no force. ( 9 ) IT is then urged by the learned counsel for the applicants that looking to the plaint allegations and the reliefs claimed therein, the Court at Murwara (Katni) in the State of Madhya Pradesh had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The counsel for the defendants argued that merely because a part of the trust property, particularly a house is situate in Katni within the local limits of the Court at Murwara (Katni), that Court could not claim territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit under S. 92 of the Code. The learned counsel for the applicants took me through the relevant allegations in the plaint to point out that the allegations are concerning mismanagement management of all the trust properties by the members of the trust committee in general. Admittedly, the trust is situate in Ayodhya in State of Uttar Pradesh. The trustees also reside outside the local jurisdiction of the Court at Murvara (Katni) and the alleged acts of mismanagement are also committed outside the local limits of the lower Court. No part of the subject matter of the suit is situate within the local limits of the Court at Murwara (Katni) and, therefore, according to the counsel for the applicants, the trial Court could neither grant leave nor entertain the suit. The reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the applicants on a decision in Bilasrai Jaharmal v. Shivnarayan Sarupchand AIR 1944 PC 39. ( 10 ) REPLYING to the above contentions urged by the learned counsel for the applicants, the counsel for the N. As. laid stress on the expression used in S. 92 of the Code conferring territorial jurisdiction "within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject matter of the trust is situate". Placing emphasis on the above expression, the counsel for the N. As. argued that "subject matter of trust" is not to be confused with the "subject matter of the suit. Placing emphasis on the above expression, the counsel for the N. As. argued that "subject matter of trust" is not to be confused with the "subject matter of the suit. " It is urged that the part of the subject matter of the trust which is the house property at Katni is situate within the local limits of the trial Court and that Court, therefore, undoubtedly had jurisdiction to entertain the suit in accordance with the express terms of S. 92 of the Code. The counsel for the N. As. made an attempt to distinguish the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Bilasrai Jaharmal (AIR 1944 PC 39) (supra), cited by the applicants and stated that the case before the Privy Council was concerning a public trust in a foreign State, not within British India and it is in that context, it was held by the Privy Council that such reliefs, which will have extra territorial operation, could not be granted by the Court in India under S. 92 of the Code. The counsel laid particular emphasis on the allegations contained in paragraph 20 of the plaint to point that certain acts of mismanagement have been pleaded also in respect of the house property at Katni and that was sufficient to clothe the civil Court at Murwara (Katni) with jurisdiction to entertain the suit. According to the learned counsel for the plaintiffs since undoubtedly a part of the subject matter of the trust is situate at Katni within the local limits of the trial Court at Murwara, the trial Court committed no error in holding that it had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The counsel for the non-applicants/plaintiffs placed reliance on two decisions of Bombay High Court in Himatlal Jamnadas Dani v. Birbhanjgiriji Bisheshargirji AIR 1949 Bom 350, which has considered the case of the Privy Council in Bilasraj Jaharmal's case (AIR 1944 PC 39) (supra) and in Fazlehussein Haiderbhey Buxamusa v. Yusufally Adamji AIR 1955 Bom 55. The counsel for the non-applicants/plaintiffs placed reliance on two decisions of Bombay High Court in Himatlal Jamnadas Dani v. Birbhanjgiriji Bisheshargirji AIR 1949 Bom 350, which has considered the case of the Privy Council in Bilasraj Jaharmal's case (AIR 1944 PC 39) (supra) and in Fazlehussein Haiderbhey Buxamusa v. Yusufally Adamji AIR 1955 Bom 55. ( 11 ) HAVING carefully considered the contentions of the rival parties and having perused the judgments cited by the parties at the bar, I am of the view that merely because one of the items of the trust properties is situate at Katni, the trial Court could not derive jurisdiction to entertain the suit because neither the whole nor part of 'the subject matter of the trust' is situate within the local limits of the trial Court at Murwara (Katni ). I shall now state the reasons in support of my above conclusion. ( 12 ) THE question of jurisdiction under S. 92 of the Act depends upon the correct interpretation of the expression "within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject matter of the trust is situate". The question that requires decision is what is the meaning to be assigned to the words 'subject matter of the trust'. Whether the subject matter of the trust will constitute that trust property on which the trust is founded or will it include all its properties or income. To answer this, it is necessary to understand legal meaning of 'trust'. The expression 'trust' has been defined in the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. The Act may not be applicable to religious public trusts and is applicable only to private trusts, yet the meaning of the word 'trust" is the same in legal parlance to all kinds of trusts, public or private. Section 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 defines the word 'trust' as under:- "trust" "3. The Act may not be applicable to religious public trusts and is applicable only to private trusts, yet the meaning of the word 'trust" is the same in legal parlance to all kinds of trusts, public or private. Section 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 defines the word 'trust' as under:- "trust" "3. Interpretation-clause.- A trust is obligation annexed to the ownership of property and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner : "author of the trust" "trustee"; "beneficiary" "trust-property" "beneficial interest" "instrument of trust" the person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the "author of the trust" : the person who accepts the confidence is called the 'trustee' : the person for whose benefit the confidence is accepted is called the "beneficiary"; the subject-matter of the trust is called "trust-property" or "trust money"; the "beneficial interest" or "interest" of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property, and the instrument, if any, by which the trust is declared is called the "instrument of trust". " in Halsbury's Laws of England (Halsbury 2nd Edn. Vol. 33 page 87), the trust has been defined as "a confidence reposed in a person with respect to property of which he has possession or over which he can exercise a power, to the intent that he may hold the property or exercise the power for the benefit of some other person or object. " Under Art. 31 Hindu Law 3rd Edition, Vol. 1 by S. V. Gupte, it stated that an endowment, the subject or the object of which is not certain, is invalid. The learned author has quoted Lord Eldon in Morico v: Bishop of Durham (1810) 10 Ves 522, See Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. " Under Art. 31 Hindu Law 3rd Edition, Vol. 1 by S. V. Gupte, it stated that an endowment, the subject or the object of which is not certain, is invalid. The learned author has quoted Lord Eldon in Morico v: Bishop of Durham (1810) 10 Ves 522, See Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. IV p. 167 as under:-"as it is a maxim that the execution of a trust shall be under the control of law, it must be of such a nature that it can be under that control so that the administration of it can be reviewed by the Court, or if the trustee dies, the Court itself can execute the trust - a trust which in case of maladministration could be reformed and a due administration directed and this, unless the subject and object can be ascertained upon principles familiar in other cases, it must be decided that the Court can neither reform maladministration nor direct a due administration. "the learned author in his commentaries further stated as under:-"it will be recalled that in order to constitute a valid endowment all that is necessary is to set apart specific property for a specific purpose or purposes which are religious or charitable. Where the subject, that is, the property or the subject matter of the endowment is not specified, that is, where it is not set apart, there can be no dedication at all. " ( 13 ) ACCORDING to the above definitions, the subject matter of the trust would be the property which has to be held in confidence and managed for the benefit of other persons or object of the trust. To me, meaning of 'subject matter of the trust' is that matter thing or person which is foundation of the trust and was the object of creating trust, dedication or endowment. 'subject matter of the trust' may be a property or a legal person, but property of the trust as such is not necessarily the subject matter of the trust unless such property was the foundation of the trust itself and this would be determined with reference to the intention of the author of the trust. 'subject matter of the trust' may be a property or a legal person, but property of the trust as such is not necessarily the subject matter of the trust unless such property was the foundation of the trust itself and this would be determined with reference to the intention of the author of the trust. In order to decide its competence to entertain the suit under S. 92 of the Code, what the Court should first determine is what was the foundation of the trust or its principal aim or object and to which thing or person it relates and whether they fall within its local limits. The situation or situs of properties or the trust are relevant for the purpose of determining jurisdiction of the Court under S. 92 of the Code only, if such property or properties constitute foundation of the trust; but mere properties of the trust are not necessarily its subject matter. ( 14 ) SOME assistance in understanding the meaning of the expression 'subject matter of the trust' can be had from 'the Dictionary of Modern Legal Usages by Bryan A. Garner'. In the above dictionary explaining legal meaning of the word 'corpus' it is explained thus :-"corpus is the Latin word meaning 'body'. It usually denotes an abstract collection or body (a substantial corpus of legal commentary in this field ). In the following sentences, corpus is used in its most usual legal context, involving trusts : "the corpus of the trust was composed of securities"/ "the trustee was authorized to distribute trust income or corpus to the beneficiaries. " The power to pay out trust corpus necessarily involves a power to terminate the trust in whole or in part". The plural form is corpora. "the abovenamed dictionary shows that the following words are synonymous to the word 'subject matter of the trust'. They are 'corpus', 'principal' and 'res'. Corpus is the latin word meaning 'body'. The body of the trust is, therefore, that property on which the trust is founded. The same dictionary also explains the meaning of the word 'res' which is synonym with the word 're' or 'rem' and means a 'thing'. 'res' is most often used as a synonym of 'principal' or 'corpus'. The dictionary explains that it is even used in its literal sense to mean a 'thing'. The same dictionary also explains the meaning of the word 'res' which is synonym with the word 're' or 'rem' and means a 'thing'. 'res' is most often used as a synonym of 'principal' or 'corpus'. The dictionary explains that it is even used in its literal sense to mean a 'thing'. Understanding the said word from the above dictionary of Modern Legal Usages, the 'subject matter of the trust' should mean 'corpus of the trust or the 'principal' or 'thing' or 'body' for which the trust was created or founded. Some assistance can also be had from the 'words and Phrases' (Volume 42-A), where one of the definitions of trust is given as under :"a "trust" involves a specific subject matter of res. Hackner v. Morgan C. C. A. N. Y. , 130 F. 2nd 300, 302 a trust res or subject matter is an indispensable condition to the creation 'of a "trust" Ballian v. Ballian's Market 119 p. 2nd 426, 429, 48 Cal. App. 2nd 150". This meaning also gives an indication that it is only the 'corpus' of the trust constituting the foundation of the trust, which may be called 'subject matter of the trust'. An income of the trust or accretion to its property cannot be the subject matter of the trust. ( 15 ) APPLYING the above test, 'the subject matter of the trust in the present case' is the temple of Thakur Shri Venkatesh Bhagwan known as 'vaikunth Mandap', which is situate in Ayodhya (U. P. ). No part of the subject matter of the trust is situate in Katni within the local limits of Court at Murwara (Katni ). The expression 'subject matter' of the trust is not synonymous with the 'subject matter of the suit or 'an item of trust property'. The subject matter of the trust is that matter or material or subject for which the trust is created. From the plaint allegations in paragraph 3 it is clear that the house at Katni was an accretion of the trust property from the income of the trust, the object of which was proper management and upkeep of temple Shri Venkatesh Bhagwan in Ayodhya in the State of Uttar Pradesh. From the plaint allegations in paragraph 3 it is clear that the house at Katni was an accretion of the trust property from the income of the trust, the object of which was proper management and upkeep of temple Shri Venkatesh Bhagwan in Ayodhya in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The counsel for the non-applicants is, therefore, not right in contending that existence of an item of' the trust property, subsequently acquired from the trust income, should be deemed to be the subject matter of the trust to confer jurisdiction on the Court at Murwara (Katni ). ( 16 ) AS I have stated above, there are no cited cases directly covering the point and I could not also find any. The cases cited at the bar merely touch the question inyolved in this case but need to be considered as relevant. In the decision of the Privy Council in Bilasraj Jaharmal's case (AIR 1944 PC 39) (supra) the charitable hospital was in a foreign country and the action was brought in the Bombay High Court on its original side. It is in that context that the observations were made by the Privy Council quoted hereunder :-"the learned Chief Justice has pointed out that no evidence was given upon the question whether the law of the Jaipur State permitted trustees to alter the name of a charity such as this without the order of a Court; and that if any Court can sanction such a change or condone the action of the trustees in making it, the proper Court for the purpose must be that of the Jaipur State. The case is not one of founding a charity abroad, or settling a scheme for a charity to be conducted abroad, nor of assisting a foreign charity or a foreign Court to collect or administer funds within the jurisdiction. Their Lordships cannot doubt that upon settled principles it was a correct exercise of discretion by the High Court of Bombay that it should leave the plaintiffs to their remedy from courts of country in which this hospital is carried on and whose poor are beneficiaries of the charity. Their Lordships cannot doubt that upon settled principles it was a correct exercise of discretion by the High Court of Bombay that it should leave the plaintiffs to their remedy from courts of country in which this hospital is carried on and whose poor are beneficiaries of the charity. It would be plainly inconvenient if not intolerable that the Courts of a foreign country should interpose their authority upon particular questions arising in the course of administering such a trust-acting intermittently according as they may be invoked by particular complainants in preference to the Courts of the country in which the charity was meant to operate, and enforcing their orders by removing the trustees and entrusting to others the management of all the charity and its affairs. " ( 17 ) THE aforesaid case of the Privy Council arose from the decision of the Bombay High Court in Shivnarayan Sarupchand v. Bilasrai Jaharmal AIR 1942 Bom 208 and was considered by the Bombay High Court in its subsequent decisions, the first being in the case of Bhagwandas Ranchhoddas Modi v. Natwarlal Maganlal Mehta AIR 1949 Bom 351. The aforesaid case was also a case of a foreign trust and the reliefs claimed were in relation to the defalcation by the trustees is respect of its properties in Indian Union. The question of jurisdiction of the Court at Bombay was raised. It is in that context that the Bombay Court held as under:-"in my opinion this court in the exercise of its jurisdiction will compel a trustee who had made defalcation to restore the original trust property as also property which is not the original trust property but is the result of its sale proceeds. 1 hold that this Court has jurisdiction to order accounts to be taken and to order payment of moneys due at the foot of that account, so that the moneys belonging to the trusts are recovered and preserved, the Court making out the slightest attempt to determine how that property is to be administered. The administration of that property must on well established principles of law be left to the foreign Court in whose jurisdiction that property is situate. Mr. K. K. Desai argued that the case is covered by S. 92 Civil P. C. and not by Cl. 12 Letters Patent. The administration of that property must on well established principles of law be left to the foreign Court in whose jurisdiction that property is situate. Mr. K. K. Desai argued that the case is covered by S. 92 Civil P. C. and not by Cl. 12 Letters Patent. He cited Mulla's Civil Procedure Code p. 327 where it is stated that S. 92 overrides cl. 12. Letters Patent (Padampat Singhanya v. Narayandas Jhunjhunwalla, 59 Cal 357: AIR 1932 Cal 444. Mr. K. K. Desai argued that S. 92 contains the words "the subject matter of the trust is situate". He argued that if the trust property was lost or misappropriated the Court had no jurisdiction. I do not agree with that proposition. " ( 18 ) THE above observations of learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court have to be understood in the context of the above case where the trust was situate in a foreign country, but the relief as sought in relation to its mismanagement and misdeeds of the trustees in India and, therefore, the subject matter of the trust was taken to be in India. The above quoted Privy Council decision and the decision of the learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court were reconsidered by the subsequent decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Fazlehussein Haiderbhoy Buxamusa v. Yusufally Adamji AIR 1955 Bom. 55. The said case of the Bombay High Court was also concerning a foreign charity. The question before the Bombay High Court was regarding its competence to entertain the suit under its original civil jurisdiction conferred by clause 12 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court. The principal question that fell for decision before the learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the aforesaid case was whether the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court, under clause 12 can extend to foreign charity which has certain properties in India within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay. The question before the Bombay High Court did not turn on the interpretation of the expression 'subject matter of the trust' used in S. 92 of the Code. The question before the Bombay High Court did not turn on the interpretation of the expression 'subject matter of the trust' used in S. 92 of the Code. The Bombay High Court in paragraph 5 of its order did come to the conclusion that the High Court on its original side derived jurisdiction from S. 92 of the Code which would override clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The Bombay High Court, however, assumed that if some of the properties of the trust are situate within the jurisdiction of Bombay High Court that Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. No discussion can, therefore, be found in the said judgment of the Bombay High Court to understand the meaning of the expression 'subject matter of the trust'. Paragraph 5 of the aforesaid judgment, in order to notice the distinguishing features of the case pointed by me above, may be seen, which reads as under:-" (5) the jurisdiction of this Court must be ascertained solely by reference to the existence or otherwise of property which is the subject-matter of the suit and not by reference to other considerations, such as the residence of the defendants or the cause of action or a part thereof arising within the jurisdiction of the Court. I am supported in that view of the case by adecision of the Calcutta High Court reported in 'padampat Singhanya v. Narayandas Jhunjhunwalla', AIR 1932 Cal 444 (A ). In that case Mr. Justice Buckland has observed (p. 445):. . . . . the words in the section (S. 92) referring to the subject matter of the trust are referable to both courts mentioned. If that view is correct, this section must be taken as overriding Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent, which permits a suit to be instituted in this Court if the defendants at the time of commencement of the suit shall dwell or carry on business or personally work for gain within the local limits of its ordinary original jurisdiction, for otherwise one would have to ignore the mandatory provisions of sub-sec. (2)". Admittedly three of the properties which are alleged to be subject matter of the trust are situate within the limits of this Court's jurisdiction, and prima facie this Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit and decide it. (2)". Admittedly three of the properties which are alleged to be subject matter of the trust are situate within the limits of this Court's jurisdiction, and prima facie this Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit and decide it. "the aforesaid decisions of the High Court of Bombay, therefore, do not decide directly the point arising before me in this case and in any case also do not bind this Court. ( 19 ) IN the present case, in my view, the whole of the subject matter of the trust, namely, the temple, and the dedication made by the founder were situate within the local limits of Uttar Pradesh Court. No part of the subject matter of that trust is within the local limits of the Court at Murwara (Katni ). To me, subsequently acquired property from the income of trust at Katni cannot be termed as 'the subject matter of the trust' to clothe the Court of Katni with jurisdiction to entertain suit under S. 92 of the Code. ( 20 ) IN view of my discussion on legal aspect of the case made above, I hold that the trial Court at Murwara (Katni) had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as no part of the subject matter of the trust is situate within its local limits. The preliminary objection regarding want of territorial jurisdiction raised by the defendants is, therefore, liable to be sustained. ( 21 ) CONSEQUENTLY, the revision succeeds and is allowed and the impugned order dated 21-1-1988 the trial Court is hereby set aside. The trial Court shall return the plaint to the non-applicant/plaintiffs under O. 7, Rr. 10 and 10a of the Code for presenting the same in the Court of competent jurisdiction in the State of Uttar Pradesh. In view of the intricacy of the legal question involved in the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs of this revision. Revision allowed. .