M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is a society registered under the Karnataka societies Registration Act and runs a school at 11th cross, west park road, malleswaram, Bangalore city, for the last over 20 years. It is claimed that as many as 1,500 children prosecute their studies in the said school. It consists of nursery, primary, middle and high school sections. Adjacent to the school run by the petitioner-society is a vacant plot of land belonging to the corporation of the city of Bangalore which has been granted under circumstances hereinafter stated to the 3rd respondent-malleswaram sangeetha sabha, Sri Rama Mandiram, east park road, malleswaram, Bangalore. Aggrieved by that fact the petitioner has challenged the numerous orders in question culminating in the proceedings before the government under Section 102 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act') resulting in the order dated 11-9-1984 as at Annexure-G to the petition (a true copy ). ( 2 ) THE facts leading to this petition may be stated briefly and they are as follows. Such a vacant plot of land belonging to the corporation of the city of Bangalore-lst respondent exists is not in dispute. As far back as in the year 1976, the secretary of the petitioner-society wrote a letter to the administrator of the 1st respondent-corporation stating that there were some vacant sites in the vicinity of the school which come under the jurisdiction of the corporation and that the site adjoining the malleswaram vegetable market towards the south and the site adjoining the one being used by the chamundi scouts were vacant and that the school which was developing fast could not accommodate all the children. Therefore, it needed more space in order to house the classes and also provide the children with suitable playground facilities. An appeal was made to the administrator to allot to the school any vacant corporation site that may be available in the vicinity. Therefore, it needed more space in order to house the classes and also provide the children with suitable playground facilities. An appeal was made to the administrator to allot to the school any vacant corporation site that may be available in the vicinity. However, in proceedings of the administrator dated 13th august, 1976, the administrator who was then in charge of the affairs of the corporation of the city of Bangalore in the absence of an elected municipal council, exercising his powers as the standing committee (town planning and improvements), (taxation and finance) and the corporation, in subject No. 122 regard being had to the commissioner's note granted the site measuring 100' x 75' on lease to the 3rd respondent in place of the land granted earlier situate in vyalikaval site measuring 60' x 58' on an annual rent of Rs. 600/- for a period of 30 years. In the course of the decision arrived at it has been observed by the administrator that the site granted in favour of the 3rd respondent on lease was being used for committing nuisance by the public and therefore the site measuring 100' x 75' at west park road, malleswaram market, in the accompanying sketch by the letters 'abcd' may be granted on lease fora period of 30 years. Soon thereafter the petitioner made a representation to the commissioner of the corporation of the city of Bangalore reiterating its needs and specifically pointing out the site adjoining to the school which to the surprise of the society had been granted to the sangeetha sabha, the 3rd respondent, and that it had commenced constructions thereon. A fresh plea was made to reconsider the whole issue and cancel the grant made in favour of the 3rd respondcnt-sangeetha sabha. Thereafter, on 15th june, 1982, the deputy commissioner (revenue), corporation of the city of Bangalore addressed a letter calling upon the head mistress of the vidya mandir education society to appear before it at 4 p. m. to discuss the lease of the corporation land at west park road, malleswaram, Bangalore. Similarly, about the same time a representation appears to have been made to the chief minister of Karnataka at that point of time, who in turn addressed the secretary to the government of karnataka, housing and urban development department with a copy to the commissioner of the corporation of the city of Bangalore. Similarly, about the same time a representation appears to have been made to the chief minister of Karnataka at that point of time, who in turn addressed the secretary to the government of karnataka, housing and urban development department with a copy to the commissioner of the corporation of the city of Bangalore. Somebody on behalf of the chief minister addressed a letter calling for the records in connection with the construction undertaken by sangcctha sabha at the site in question as the chief minister wanted to look into the same. Accordingly, the sequence of events led to the impugned order of the government purporting to be one passed under Section 102 of the act. ( 3 ) MR. B. p. holla, learned senior counsel, appearing for the petitioner's societyhas questioned the legality and correctness of the impugned order of the government as at Annexure-G inter alia on the ground that it is in violation of the mandatory functions assigned to the 1st respondent-corporation in terms of item 25 of Section 58 of the. act as constrastcd with the discretionary functions of the corporation enumerated at itcm-8 of Section 59 of the act and that the impugned order being bereft of reasoning, but bald and summary, is arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as the powers exercised by the 2nd respondent-state of Karnataka was quasi-judicial in character having been exercised under the revisional jurisdiction of the government under Section 102 of the act. ( 4 ) IT will be useful at this stage to refer to the statement of objections filed by the 3rd respondent. It is rather a lengthy statement of objections filed. It is contended that the petition is liable to be dismissed in 1 inline as not maintainable. It is asserted by the 3rd respondent that it is also a society registered under the Karnataka societies Registration Act with such laudable objects as: (A) to encourage and improve the science and art of music, dance, drama, harikatha and other fine arts; (b) arranging entertainment programme; (c) encouraging their study by awarding scholarships; (d) establishing and maintaining a library and reading room, etc. it has admitted that earlier a site measuring 60' x 58' was granted to it at vyalikaval, another extension close to the malleswaram extension of Bangalore city. it has admitted that earlier a site measuring 60' x 58' was granted to it at vyalikaval, another extension close to the malleswaram extension of Bangalore city. It has ad- mitted that it surrendered the said lease of site granted in its favour as the site granted on lease was inadequate for the purpose of constructing a music hall in order to promote its laudable objects and made a request for the grant of a site resulting in the decision of the administrator to which reference has been made while narrating the facts of the case. It is further submitted by the 3rd respondent that it has executed the lease pursuant to the order of the administrator agreeing to the terms and conditions set out in the deed of lease. Thereafter, it took possession of the land on 22-8-1977 and obtained licence for construction of a concert hall. On 8-12-1981 the foundation stone was laid and on 16-2-1981 the construction work commenced. On representation of some, the commissioner of the 1st respondent-corporation issued instructions to the 3rd respondent to slop further construction though the corporation continued to collect the rent even for the subsequent years. The 3rd respondent approached for vacating of the stay which resulted in the impugned order. In the meanwhile, plan sanctioned earlier had expired and on approaching the corporation for fresh sanction, the same was granted on 12-10-1984 and the petitioner resumed the construction as per sanctioned plan collecting donations from the members of the public. However, on 12-11-1984 the 3rd respondent was again served with an order of slay issued by the state government. That order of stay came to be vacated by the government on 1-6-1988 by another order passed by the government of karnataka. In support of those assertions, the necessary documents like the plan, the receipt for payment of rent, the order of 1st june, 1988 and the order of 1-12-1989 issued by the commissioner are produced along with the statement of objections. ( 5 ) HOWEVER, in the meanwhile, the writ petition was presented in this court by the petitioner and Rule was issued on 28-12-1989. An interim order was also granted directing the 3rd respondent not to proceed with the construction work. Than the matter has come up for hearing in view of the urgency pointed out by both the parties. The matter was heard in part on 28-2-1990. An interim order was also granted directing the 3rd respondent not to proceed with the construction work. Than the matter has come up for hearing in view of the urgency pointed out by both the parties. The matter was heard in part on 28-2-1990. Certain records of the corporation were called for with reference to the government order of 1977 referred to at item 1 in the preamble to the impugned order as at Annexure-G. ( 6 ) DESPITE the understanding on the earlier date of hearing, that this matter would be taken up for further hearing, today, the court finds the counsel for the 3rd respondent is not present and therefore this order has been passed ex parte the 3rd respondent and without the advantage of having heard the counsel for 3rd respondent. ( 7 ) I have noticed in summary the averments in the statement of objections, but those relate to facts which are not in dispute and which are not disputable. Therefore, the only question which falls for consideration is whether the contentions advanced for the petitioner should be upheld and the order impugned set aside? ( 8 ) ITEM 25 of Section 58 of the act reads as follows:"58. Obligatory functions of the corporations. It shall be incumbent on the corporation to make reasonable and adequate provision by any means or measures which it is lawfully competent to use or to take, for each of the following matters, namely,xx xx xx xx. " (25) the provision of public parks, gardens, playgrounds and recreation grounds;" Mr. B. p. holla, argued that it is an obligatory duty and function of the corporation to provide playgrounds and the school having applied for sanction of a vacant land in its favour for developing its school as well as for utilisation of vacant space for playgrounds for the children of the school, the corporation was under an obligation on account of the mandatory nature of the function assigned to it under Section 58 of the act and sanction the use of the land in question to the petitioner and not give it away to the 3rd respondent without even hearing the petitioner. Therefore, the attack is directed against the decision of the administrator taken in 1977 as at Annexure-B by which the 3rd respondent was favoured with the sanction of the lease of an area measuring 100' x 75' in lieu of the vacant site earlier leased but surrendered by the 3rd respondent. ( 9 ) ATTRACTIVE as it may appear it is difficult to accept the contention as reflecting the correct legal position. The corporation is under no obligation to provide for playground facility to any school which is not run by the corporation. The language employed in item 25 of the Section 58 of the act clearly refers to providing public parks, gardens, playgrounds and recreation grounds and the like. The enumeration in item 25 of Section 58 of the act is illustrative and cannot be said to be exhaustive. In fact, the corporation has provided playgrounds, swimming pools, parks and public gardens in discharge of its obligatory functions under the act. But that cannot be equated with the grant of request made by a private body for grant of land to provide buildings and playgrounds facility for its students. If such a grant in favour of private body like the petitioner-society is equated with playgrounds mentioned in item 25 of Section 58, then access to such playgrounds must be available to all members of the public and not only to the students of the school. If the access is confined only to the school then they will acquire the character of a private playground and therefore falls outside the scope of item 25 of Section 58 of the act. In that view of the matter, the interpretation sought to be put by Mr. Holla on the scope and meaning of the provision contained in item 25 of Section 58 of the Act, cannot be accepted by this court. ( 10 ) EVEN if one were to see it in contrast with entry 8 of Section 59 of the act which provides for the following:" (8) the provision of music for the people;" it does not take the case of the. Petitioner any nearer the goal which the counsel seeks to achieve by that contention. ( 10 ) EVEN if one were to see it in contrast with entry 8 of Section 59 of the act which provides for the following:" (8) the provision of music for the people;" it does not take the case of the. Petitioner any nearer the goal which the counsel seeks to achieve by that contention. Providing music as a directory or discretionary function is with reference to such amusement which the corporation may in its discretion provide to the general public living within its city limits for purpose of entertainment in a part or a music hall owned by it or any other convenient place where such music may be provided. Even if the widest meaning and scope is given to that entry it does not include the obligation to grant sites to any society which wants to promote the music as an Art. Therefore, the need to contrast the requirements of the petitioner's society to use it as a playground and the need of the 3rd respondent to provide for its members and the public a concert hall does not arise. At best both of them may be considered as persons seeking largess from the 1st respondent-corporation to promote the objects for which each of them have constituted themselves as a society and no more. On the basis of those entries in sections 58 and 59 of the act no right as such flows in favour of the petitioner or the 3rd respondent-society. If they want the land belonging to the corporation, they are in no better position than any other person who asks for grant of a piece of land, owned by the corporation, for any specific purpose. I therefore see no force in the first contention. ( 11 ) THE second contention that the order is not a speaking Order, is bald and bereft of reason must be examined carefully with reference to the citations relied upon by the learned counsel. Though the history of the case is set out in detail in the preamble to the order impugned, the operative portion of the order reads as follows:"g. O. No. Hud 27 mng 81, Bangalore, dated 11th september, 1984. 1. The representations of the young men's mandyam association and Sri Vidya Mandir Education Society are rejected, as they are devoid of merit. 2. 1. The representations of the young men's mandyam association and Sri Vidya Mandir Education Society are rejected, as they are devoid of merit. 2. Allotment of the said land on lease in favour of malleswaram sangectha sabha, subject to the terms and conditions of the lease, as approved in g. o. dated 5-7-1977 is upheld. 3. The stay granted against the construction of concert hall on the said bit of land by malleswaram sangeetha sabha is hereby vacated". it is evident that the parties were actually heard through their counsel and there were more than two claimants for the land and the third was yet another society of youth organisation which had obtained lease of the land in question for a period of 11 months which period had since expired and its claim for further lease was pending before the corporation when the grant was made in favour of the 3rd respondent by the then administrator of the corporation. As is seen, the claim of the youth organisation has been summarily rejected as not tenable. No reason whatsoever is assigned, despite the fact that it had the advantage of the use of the land in question for its purpose for a period of 11 months in accordance with the lease admittedly granted by the corporation. There is no mention whatsoever of the need and the prayer of the petitioner in terms of the representation made to the chief minister which was the cause for the exercise of the rcvisional j urisd iction as is evidenced by the narration of facts and the documents produced as at annexures-a, b, c and d to the petition. The only redeeming feature of the order is at paragraph 1 which refers to the earlier government order of 1977. The court wanted to look into that order and see if any reasons were assigned for the grant made in favour of the 3rd respondent and that there was sufficient application of mind by the government while according sanction for the grant of lease in favour of the 3rd respondent. Unfortunately, that government order is not forthcoming from the records of the corporation. Not has the contesting respondent, namely, the 3rd respondent produced the same. In fact, as earlier noticed, it has been placed ex pane today. Unfortunately, that government order is not forthcoming from the records of the corporation. Not has the contesting respondent, namely, the 3rd respondent produced the same. In fact, as earlier noticed, it has been placed ex pane today. ( 12 ) THAT the records were called for by the government is not left in doubt and therefore the only source of power under the act is Section 102 of the act and that is the rcvisional power of the state government to suo motu or on the application of any aggrieved person to call for records and examine any order passed by the corporation or the standing committees or any of its officers. Therefore, I am left in no doubt that the impugned order is an order passed under revision. The revision as understood in judicial or quasi-judicial functions of any authority is the exercise of a jurisdiction of a superior authority to rectify the errors if any of any inferior authority. In that view of the matter, the citations relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner, have come significance. ( 13 ) THE first of the citations is to the case of M/s. Travancore rayons ltd. V Union of India and others, AIR 1971 SC 862 . That case went to the Supreme Court against the order passed by the central government in revision under the Provisions of central excise and salt Act, 1944. The specific Section underwhich the revisional power was exercised did not provide for any particular procedure or opportunity for oral hearing. In that case a bald summary order was passed rejecting the revision petition without reference to any of the grounds urged by the petitioner before the Supreme Court under Article 226 of the constitution. The order impugned read as follows:"the government of India have carefully considered the points made by the applicant (s), but see no justification for interfering with the order in appeal. The revision application is accordingly rejected". The order impugned read as follows:"the government of India have carefully considered the points made by the applicant (s), but see no justification for interfering with the order in appeal. The revision application is accordingly rejected". analysing that order and the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 36 of the central excise and salt Act, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the central government was exercising judicial powers of the state while exercising the revisional jurisdiction and therefore such orders must be supported by cogent reasoning and in the absence of reasons to come to the conclusion to reject the claims of the petitioners before the central government, it had acted arbitrarily and such an order was liable to be set aside. ( 14 ) SIMILARLY, in the case of M/s. Hochtief gammon v State of Orissa and others, AIR 1975 SC 2226 the Supreme Court considered the scope of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 when an application for modification of the terms of reference of an industrial dispute was summarily rejected. In that behalf learned judges speaking through late a. Alagiriswami, j. , has said as follows: "the executive have to reach their decisions by taking into account relevant considerations. They should not refuse to consider relevant matter nor should they take into account wholly irrelevant or extraneous consideration. They should not misdirect themselves on a point of law. Only such a decision will be lawful. The courts have power to see that the executive acts lawfully. It is no answer to the exercise of that power to say that the executive acted bona fide nor that they have bestowed painstaking consideration. They cannot avoid scrutiny by courts by failing to give reasons. If they give reasons and they are not good reasons, the court can direct them to reconsider the matter in the light of relevant matters, though the propriety, adequacy or satisfactory character of these reasons may not be open to judicial scrutiny. Even if the executive considers it inexpedient to exercise their powers they should state their reasons and there must be material to show that they have considered all the relevant facts". Undoubtedly, the preamble to the impugned order sets out the material facts with which the government was seized. In fact, the preamble emphatically refers to the arguments advanced for the parties before it. Undoubtedly, the preamble to the impugned order sets out the material facts with which the government was seized. In fact, the preamble emphatically refers to the arguments advanced for the parties before it. There is no noticing of the arguments submitted by each counsel in support of the claim of the party whom he represented. It has earlier noticed the claim of youth organisation which was the earlier lease of the plot in question; but its claim has been summarily rejected. There is no reference to the claim of the petitioner who caused the rcvisional jurisdiction to be invoked. There is a mere reiteration that the order of the administrator is in conformity with the sanction accorded by the government in 1977. ( 15 ) IN this circumstance the cases as relied upon by the petitioner's counsel to which I have adverted to has great relevance. Even if purely an administrative convenience of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, is subjected to such rigour, there is no reason as to why this court should not to apply the same standards to judicial or quasi-judicial orders of state, as in the instant case, purporting to be one passed under Section 102 of the act. ( 16 ) IN that view of the matter, the order is liable to be set aside for being bald and bereft of reasons to sustain the order of the administrator making the grant in favour of the 3rd respondent. I may go a step further and point out on the basis of an analogy found in the land grant rules, which provide for consideration of the claims of all the applicants to the same bit of land, if they are made before the grant is actually made. There were three claimants. The government ought to have in the revisional jurisdiction examined the merit of the claim of each one of the claimants and then reach a conclusion as to whether the order made by the administrator should be sustained. There were three claimants. The government ought to have in the revisional jurisdiction examined the merit of the claim of each one of the claimants and then reach a conclusion as to whether the order made by the administrator should be sustained. Not having done that, but merely following the procedure or observing the rules of natural justice, but nevertheless rendering such procedure an empty formality, the impugned order in question is passed and therefore it has been quashed and the matter is relegated back to the government to dispose of the matter afresh in the light of the discussion made in the course of this order keeping in mind the merits of the claims of all the parties before it notwithstanding the fact that some construction was commenced by the 3rd respondent who bona fide began that construction considering that the land leased to him was in accordance with law. The 3rd respondent is not to be blamed for the events that subsequently occurred resulting in the temporary suspension of the rights, acquired by it. It can always be compensated in terms of money. ( 17 ) SUBJECT to the above observation, this writ petition is allowed and the matteris remitted back to the 1st respondent for disposal afresh. ( 18 ) ORDER accordingly. --- *** --- .