Judgment :- Padmanabhan, J. Conviction for murder and the imprisonment for life awarded as sentence for having murdered his father Krishnan Nair are challenged by the sole accused in this criminal appeal. 2. Murderwas inside the residential house at 10.30 p.m. on 15-4-1986. As usual Krishnan Nair came drunkard picked up quarrels with his wife PW2. She was threatened with assault and scared away from the house. In that process, Krishnan Nair hit against a door and fell flat on the floor. Appellant picked up MO 1 wooden pestle and beat the deceased on his head and body. He died there itself as a result of the injuries. PW 1, an independent neighbour, gave Ext.P1 first information statement the next morning. 3. Defence of the appellant is total denial of his involvement in the crime. 4. Prosecution examined 16 witnesses. Exts.P1 to P11 are the documents proved. Five material objects were identified. No defence evidence was adduced. 5. There is no direct evidence regarding the commission of the offence. Main item of evidence is the extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the appellant to PW 1 and his wife PW 8 immediately after the incident when he went to their house. They are next door neighbours, whose impartiality and independence is not under challenge. He told them that he is worried because he is coming after beating his father. After drinking water asked for and obtained from PW 8, he went away. This is the version in Ext.P1 and the same version was given by both these witnesses in the box also. That version is probabilise by the medical evidence and the other evidence and circumstances also. 6. Extra judicial confession is said to be a weak form of evidence. But we do not feel that any type of evidence could be said to be weak by categorisation alone. It is the worth of the evidence that counts. When extra judicial confession spoken to by impartial and trustworthy witnesses is found unblemished and acceptable, nothing prevents its acceptance as the basis for conviction. Only thing is that the court must be cautious in assessing and accepting the evidence because of possibilities of wrong statements being put in. Evidence regarding extra judicial confession is just like any other item of evidence. When such evidence gets corroboration and support from other acceptable sources, the position is still better. Only thing is that the court must be cautious in assessing and accepting the evidence because of possibilities of wrong statements being put in. Evidence regarding extra judicial confession is just like any other item of evidence. When such evidence gets corroboration and support from other acceptable sources, the position is still better. Such support is there in this case. 7. It was PW 10 who conducted autopsy on the dead body. Ext.P7 is the postmortem certificate. There was fracture of skull and many ribs. Medical evidence is that the injuries are sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death and they could be caused by beating with MO 1 in the lying position. Death is homicidal. Thus the medical evidence sufficiently corroborates the extra judicial confession. Coupled with that, there is the conspicuous absence of the son and his absconding when the father, with whom he was living, died. 8. Father, mother and all the children, including PWs 3 to 6, the appellant and another brother were residing together. PW 2 is the mother, who is the widow of the deceased. She is a hostile witness. Her evidence shows that her husband sustained the homicidal injuries when all the other inmates of the house were scared away and the appellant and the deceased alone were in the house. That part of her evidence is acceptable also. Therefore, the appellant is the only person who could have explained how the father sustained the injuries if he is not the person responsible. He has no explanation at all and his plea is one of denial, which is evidently false. That false plea is also one of the links in the chain of circumstantial evidence available to the prosecution. The fact that there was nobody else in the house other than the deceased and the appellant is clear from the evidence of PW 6, who is also a hostile witness. 9. The other persons who could have given evidence in this case are PWs. 3 to 5. They are the younger brothers of the appellant. They were also cited and put into the box as occurrence witnesses. PW3 was aged 16 and was studying in the 9th standard. The other two were aged 11 and 9. 9. The other persons who could have given evidence in this case are PWs. 3 to 5. They are the younger brothers of the appellant. They were also cited and put into the box as occurrence witnesses. PW3 was aged 16 and was studying in the 9th standard. The other two were aged 11 and 9. After putting one or two questions to them and getting the answers that they do not know where they are or the purpose of their presence and the necessity of speaking truth, the Sessions Judge refused to examine them on the ground that they are incapable of understanding questions and giving rational answers. Valuable evidence was thus shut out. We do not in any way appreciate the action of the Sessions Judge. We would have remanded the case to enable the examination of these witnesses. But we do not think that it will serve any purpose other than delaying the decision. In all probability, these witnesses are likely to turn hostile just like PWs.2 and 6. Further the materials on record will be sufficient for a proper decision. Nothing more than what PWs 2 and 6 said is likely to come out from them. Therefore, we are not inclined for a remand for which no request also came from any source. 10. at the same time, we wish to impress upon the Sessions Judge that what he did is wrong and practically amounts to illegal shutting out of evidence. Under S.118 of the Evidence Act, all persons shall be competent to testify unless the court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from giving rational answers to those questions. The inability could be due to tender age, extreme old age or other reasons. Though there is no provision of law to ask preliminary questions to test the capacity of the child witnesses to testify, it has always been taken as a wholesome course to be adopted, But the best test of the capacity of the child witness to testify is the evidence itself and the manner in which it is given. In testing the capacity of a witness to testify if questions are put they must be proper questions. In testing the capacity of a witness to testify if questions are put they must be proper questions. The questions must to ascertain in the best way whether from the extent of his intellectual capacity and understanding he is able to give rational account of what he has seen or heard on a particular occasion. If a person of tender age can satisfy these requirements, his competency as a witness is established. 11. it is true that one of the considerations in ascertaining the capacity to swear whether the child has a sufficient appreciation of the solemnity of the occasion and the adieu; possibility to tell the truth. But if the child is otherwise competent the solemnity of the occasion and the responsibility to speak the truth are matters which could be made knot in to the child. The Sessions Judge only asked about the solemnity of the occasion, the purpose of giving evidence and the responsibility to speak the truth. Answers were in the negative. Nothing more was done to ascertain whether these answers themselves were correct. Probably negative answers were given to avoid the box. Capacity has not been ascertained. PW 3 was aged 16 and studying in Standard IX. We are of opinion that the Sessions Judge has not acted properly and correctly and the evidence of these witnesses was improperly shut out. Anyhow, we do not prepare to deal with the matter further even though we are satisfied that the capacity and competence of these witnesses were not properly tested. 12. MO1 was recovered from the house. Medical evidence is that beating with it could cause the injuries. The circumstances are clear and complete. The only conclusion possible is that appellant beat the deceased with MO 1. 13. The prosecution evidence shows that the de picked up quarrels with his wife PW 2. That may be the reason why the appellant thought of doing away with him because he was a regular nuisance in the house. As earlier stated, his plea is one of total denial. He is not claiming the benefit of any of the exceptions to S.300. There is no circumstance justifying the availability of any exception also. It appears that the fatal injuries were inflicted on the deceased at a time when he was in a lying position. Intentional infliction of the injuries in such a position is clear from the evidence. He is not claiming the benefit of any of the exceptions to S.300. There is no circumstance justifying the availability of any exception also. It appears that the fatal injuries were inflicted on the deceased at a time when he was in a lying position. Intentional infliction of the injuries in such a position is clear from the evidence. The injuries are found sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death also. The appellant was, therefore, rightly convicted for murder. Since he was awarded only the lesser punishment, it is not necessary for us to interfere with the sentencing discretion also. Confirming the conviction and sentence, we dismiss the criminal appeal.