JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - The judgment in a suit for partition, decreed preliminarily forms the subject matter of challenge in this appeal by the Defendant No. 1, substituted by his son, on the former's death during the pendency of this appeal. Plaintiffs Claiming half interest and praying for allotment of half share in the suit properties, filed the suit. In brief, their case was that they and Defendant No. 1 belong to the family of Raghunath Satpathy. Raghunath had originally married Chanda ' Sara, and Gadadhar (Defendant No. I) was their son. After death of Chanda, Raghunath married Plaintiff No. 1 ana Plaintiff No. 2 is their daughter. Raghunath died on 9-7-1938 leaving behind Plaintiffs and Defendant No. 1-as his only heirs. On account of death of various coparceners who bad one Maguni Satapathy as common ancestor-Raghunath had become the absolute owner in possession of the entire ancestral property. The suit properties appertaining to lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 8, 10, 12 to 15 stood recorded in the name of Raghunath and his cousin brother Kanhu in settlement records, while lot Nos. 4, 5, 9 and 11 stood recorded in the name of the family deities marfat Raghu, some of his cousin brothers and/or their widows. Lot Nos. 6 and 7 were recorded in the name of Raghu's cousin brother Kanhu. The items of properties standing in the name of deities were nominal or partial debottar in nature. After death of Raghunath shares of Plaintiff No. 1 and Defendant. No. 1 became half each, and they continued to remain jointly in mess and residence, and Defendant No. 1 was managing the entire family affairs including payment of rent, cess etc. in respect of the suit properties. On account of ill-feeling, Plaintiff No. 1 separated from Defendant No. 1 long back and was living separately from him. Defendant No. 1 was continuing to pay rent and cess as before and was obtaining receipts. After abolition of the estates, Defendant No. 1 got the rent fixed in respect of Bahal Land. Plaintiff No. 1 however, continue to be a co-sharer. Defendant No. 1 was continuing to pay rent and cess as before and was obtaining receipts. After abolition of the estates, Defendant No. 1 got the rent fixed in respect of Bahal Land. Plaintiff No. 1 however, continue to be a co-sharer. After separation, Defendant No: 1 sold some properties to Defendants 2, 3, 5, 6 and 8 and Plaintiff No. 1 also sold a part plot No. 2 property to Defendant No. 1, and gifted some properties by a deed of gift on 19-4-1967 to Plaintiff No. 2, who subsequently sold portions of the gifted land to Defendants 7 and 9 by registered sale-deeds. There being no earlier partition by metes and bounds, there was clash of interest though co-sharers, were in possession of the suit properties, more or less according to their shares. A demand for amicable partition having been turned down by Defendant No. 1, filing of the suit was necessitated. It was conceded that Plaintiff No. 1 had no right, title, interest or possession over the lands sold and gifted. 2. Defendant Nos. 1 to 5 and 9 filed their written statements separately, while Defendants 6 and 10 compromise the suit. Defendant No. 1 was for all practical purposes the sole contestant in the suit. According to him, the suit was not maintainable, and Plaintiff No. 1 had no cause of- action to file the suit which was bad on account of non-joinder of the family deities. A plea was also taken that Plaintiff No. 1 was not the wife of Raghunath and Plaintiff No. 2 was not the daughter of Plaintiff No. 1 and Raghunath. Regarding the registered documents executed, it was pleaded that they were manufactured for the purpose of creating evidence. Defendants 7 to 9 who are purchasers, supported the case of Plaintiffs for partition and prayed that separate allotments be made in respect of their purchased lands. Similar prayer was made by Defendant No. 5 who supported the case of Defendant No. 1 Defendants 2, 3 and 4 remained ex parte, 3. Seven issues were framed. Answering issue No. 2 relating to the question whether Plaintiffs were the widow and daughter of deceased Raghunath respectively, and about the correctness of the genealogy, it was held that Plaintiff No. 1 was the widow and Plaintiff No. 2 was the daughter of Late Raghunath. The genealogy was also held to be correct. Seven issues were framed. Answering issue No. 2 relating to the question whether Plaintiffs were the widow and daughter of deceased Raghunath respectively, and about the correctness of the genealogy, it was held that Plaintiff No. 1 was the widow and Plaintiff No. 2 was the daughter of Late Raghunath. The genealogy was also held to be correct. Answering issue Nos. 3 and 4 relating to the question whether the suit was bad for non-impletion of deities, and whether properties were the absolute or nominal/partial debottar in nature and available to be partitioned, it was held that the smt was not bad for non-joinder of parties; properties were nominal debottar properties and were partible. As regards entitlement of Plaintiffs, it was held, that Plaintiff No. 1 was entitled to half share in the suit property. The alienated properties were directed to be adjusted against the respective spares, of Plaintiffs and Defendant No. 1. It was directed that while effecting partition, the civil Court commissioner was to take notice of possession and convenience of parties as far as practicable. 4. In appeal, though various grounds of challenge were indicated in the memorandum of appeal, at the time of hearing of appeal, challenge was restricted to the correctness of the findings relating o properties recorded in the name of the deities. In other words, the scope of appeal was restricted to lot Nos. 4, 5, 9 and 11 of the suit properties. It was urged that plain tiff No. 1' s admission to the effect that A. 4.00 of land belong to the deities ancillary expenses were met from incomes of respective properties of the deities, amounted to acceptance of the position that debottar was absolute and therefore, the property in question was impartible. In view of the averments in the written statement that the properties were absolute debottar in nature and no evidence having been led to the contrary, the plea goes unrebutted and should have been so held by the learned trial Judge. It was further urged that whether property is nominal, partial or absolute debottar, it was not avail able to be partitioned. It was also urged that non-impletion' of deities rendered the suit non-maintainable. In essence, it was pleaded that findings of the learned trial Judge on the question relating to non-impletion of parties and nature of properties, are vulnerable. 5. It was further urged that whether property is nominal, partial or absolute debottar, it was not avail able to be partitioned. It was also urged that non-impletion' of deities rendered the suit non-maintainable. In essence, it was pleaded that findings of the learned trial Judge on the question relating to non-impletion of parties and nature of properties, are vulnerable. 5. In response, it has been urged by the learned Counsel for Respondents 1 and 2 that a reading of evidence of Plaintiff No. 1, examined as P.W. 2 never gives any indication of acceptance of the position as contended, that the properties were absolute debottar in nature. On the contrary, Defendant No. 1 in his evidence has not even whispered a single word about the nature of property. The stand that the properties were nominal debottar in nature goes unrebutted. It was further pleaded that irrespective of whether the properties are absolute or nominal they are partible. In view of the restricted nature of challenge, it is to be seen whether properties were partible and whether suit suffers on account of non-impletion of deities. At this juncture, it will be relevant to refer to a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Panchanan Dalai and Anr. v. Lakshamidhar Dalai and Ors. ILR 1957 Cutt 712. There the question as to the nature of property and the effect of non-impletion were also adjudicated. The adjudication of dispute relating to the nature and character of a debottar, was held-to be dependent on several factors. Where the dedication made by a settlor in favour of an idol covers the entire beneficiary interest which he had in the property, the debottar is an absolute or complete debottar. However, where some proprietary or pecuniary right or interest in the property remains undisposed of or is reserved for the settlor's family or relations, it becomes a partial dedication. In the latter case, the deity does not become the owner of the dedicated property, but is in the position of a charge-bolder in respect of the same. The charge is created on the property; and the holder has obligation to apply a portion of the income for the religious purposes indicated by the settlor. In that case, the property does not assume the character of extra commercium like a debottar property strictly speaking; but is alienable subject to the charge. The charge is created on the property; and the holder has obligation to apply a portion of the income for the religious purposes indicated by the settlor. In that case, the property does not assume the character of extra commercium like a debottar property strictly speaking; but is alienable subject to the charge. The ordinary rules of inheritance apply to the property. Whoever gets the property is burdened with the charity or religious trust. This view gains support from decision in Panchanan Dalai's case (supra). Dr. B.K. Mukherjee, a leading author on religious and charitable trusts, in his book. The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (Tagore Law Lectures, Fourth edition)" has made similar observation. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Dasarath Rami Redd v. Duddukuru Subba Rao and Ors. reported in AIR 1957 S.C. 797 , the question whether dedication was complete or partial was dependant on several factors. In my view, the conduct of the parties mode and quantum of utilisation of income or usufruct is also a relevant factor. As held in the case of AIR 1927 80 (Privy Council), the fact that the manager of Hindu joint family regularly paid the expenses from out of the profits of a property does not establish a dedication of the property completely. The privy Council emphasised the distinction between meeting 'the expenses out of a particular property and applying the entire receipts. The application of income was construed to be a charge and not a dedication. Coming to the partible nature or otherwise of the property, as held in Panchanan Dalai's case, marfatdari right is partible. Even if the properties are absolute debottar, the marfatdari right therein is open to be partitioned; but the marfatqars will take the properties with the obligation that they would spend the entire income there of for religious purposes in the interest of the deity. Partial debottars are also partible where by a grant, a mere charge or trust is created in favour of an idol, the dedication is partial or qualified. This view was expressed in the case of Jagadindra v. Hemanta Kumari Debi in (1904) 31 Ind App 203. Partial debottars are also partible where by a grant, a mere charge or trust is created in favour of an idol, the dedication is partial or qualified. This view was expressed in the case of Jagadindra v. Hemanta Kumari Debi in (1904) 31 Ind App 203. In the said case, Sir Arthur Wilson had observed that in case of a partial debottar, the property descends and is alienable and partible in the ordinary way but subject to the trust or charge in the idol's favour. Similar view was also expressed by Calcutta High Court in the case of Phani Bhusan Das Vs. Kenaram Bhuniya and Others. On analysis of the evidence, learned trial Judge has held that the properties are nominal debottar as claimed by the Plaintiffs. On evaluation of the evidence on record, I find that his conclusions are irreversible. The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that the properties are not absolute; but nominal or partial debottar and therefore, partible, but marfatdars will take the properties with the obligation that they would meet the expenses of the deity for religious purposes keeping in view the interest of deity, and respecting the intention of and purposes indicated by the settlor. The question of non-maintainability Of the suit on ground of non-impletion of deities loses significance in view of the finding that the properties were nominal or partial debottar. Similar challenge did not find favour with this Court in Panchanan Dalai's case (supra). 6. It was averred for the Appellants that observations should be given that the rooms where deities are installed are to be kept joint and excluded from partition. I find no such prayer in the plaint, and it is not indicated as to which specific property houses the deities. Needless to say, if any such specific property is there that is to remain joint. Since no particulars have been given, expression of any opinion is not called for. Subject to the above observations, decree as passed by the learned trial Judge stands confirmed and the appeal stands dismissed. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their respective costs. Ordered accordingly. Final Result : Dismissed