( 1 ) THE following order of the Court was delivered by Y. B. Suryawanshi J. The petitioner Girdhar Nagar s/o Krishna Gopal has filed this petition under Arts. 226/227 of the Constitution of India for an appropriate writ, direction or order for quashing the orders passed by the District Magistrate, Indore, u/s. 3 (2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (for shorts, called the "the Act" ). The petitioner, for reasons whatever they may be, is not under detention and, therefore, the prayer is not for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, but mandamus, for quashing the alleged order, which are said to be illegal. Hence, the petition is against threatened detention under the Act. ( 2 ) THE petitioner has stated that he is a businessman belonging to a particular party; that on 14-10-89 there were communal disturbances in which certain persons lost their lives and other got injured; certain shops were looted; that curfew was clamped and remained in force for a long time; that Police, Malharganj, Indore registered 2 Criminal cases first crime No. 687/89 u/ss. 147,153-A, 224 and 353, IPC and secondly, Crime No. 670/89 u/s. 147, 307, 336, 435, 427 and 436/149, IPC; that similarly at Police Station, Chhatripura, Indore crime No. 852/89 under Ss. 295 and 427, IPC was registered. The petitioner further alleges that on 14-10-89, he was not present in Indore but was examined for medical treatment in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, New Delhi. Annexure D is the copy of the O. P. D. Ticket and Annexure E is the copy of the X-ray slip that Kailashchandra Singi, a complainant in aforesaid crime No. 670/89 of P S. Malharganj, Indore, has filed an affidavit (Annexure-F) stating, that the petitioner was not involved in the alleged offence throwing acid on his son; similarly, one Ther Ali has also sworn an affidavit (Annexure-G) that during the riots on 14-10-89 at Indore in a case involving damages to the Dargah, the petitioner was not involved. Taher Ali claims to be living at the same place and claims to be its patron. Taher Ali claims to be living at the same place and claims to be its patron. According to the petitioner, he has learnt the since he has been critical of the S. P. and the Collector's role during the riots, they have, in a revengeful attitude, passed the impugned order of detention under the provisions of the Act; that in various petitions, the orders passed by the detaining authority were found to be cryptic, brief, arbitrary, unconstitutional, mechanical and in a cyclostyled form and the petitioner apprehends that similar orders have also been passed against him, that the petitioner is not under detention, but he has prayed for examining the validity, propriety and correctness of the detention order and has prayed for quashing the same by issuance of a writ of mandamus or appropriate directions or orders. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the reply to the show cause notice filed on behalf of the respondents, supported by an affidavit sworn in by the District Magistrate, Indore the petitioner is absconding and, therefore, the impugned order of detention, together with the grounds of detention have not been served and, therefore, on this ground alone, the petition deserves to be dismissed. ( 4 ) IT is not disputed that the petitioner is involved in 3 crimes referred earlier but it is stated that the petitioner indulged in antisocial elements, provoked and incited people during sensitive and dangerous period of communal riots; that in fact, the petitioner resisted but was arrested on 18- 10-89 in crime No. 670/89 but he incited the crowds and obstructed the Police officers in the course of their duties and got himself freed from the custody (copy of FIR R-1 dated 18-10-1989 by Girish Kumar Patidar, S. O. Malharganj, Indore) that the O. P. D. ticket any X-ray slip appear to be manipulated and forged in view of report against the petitioner (R-2) that as regards the affidavit of Kailashchandra Singi, it is stated that this person has not registered any complaint at the Police Station, Malharganj, that there are various crimes registered against the petitioner as per list Annexure R-3 and the Court may peruse the record at the time of hearing that, since the petitioner is evading service of the impunged detention order, the petition be not entertained as it does not disclose grounds relevant for the issuance of the writ of Mandamus nor the petitioner has challenged any grounds of detention order and the merits of the grounds could be raised only after there is proper detention according to law claiming the writ of habeas corpus; that the detention order has been passed by the District Magistrate Indore, u/s. 3 (3) of the National Security Act and power has been duly delegated to him under the notification in the Gazette (Annexure R-4 ). ( 5 ) THE factual position is that the order of detention was passed on 28-10-89. The grounds of detention, which of course, could not have be served are dt. 3-11-89. There were also annexure, with the grounds of detention. The State Government approved the detention order on 8-11-89 on the other hand, the District Magistrate sent a memo to the Superintendent of Police for service of the said order on the petitioner. The memo dt. 3-11-89 from S. O. Malharganj, Indore, addressed to the Additional District Magistrate, Indore, stated that the petitioner is absconding. The Jail authorities informed that the petitioner is not detained in jail. The memo dt. 3-11-89 from S. O. Malharganj, Indore, addressed to the Additional District Magistrate, Indore, stated that the petitioner is absconding. The Jail authorities informed that the petitioner is not detained in jail. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri R. S. Garg and the learned Government Advocate, Shri D. D. Vyas for the State, heard. ( 7 ) THE first preliminary question is competency of this petition since the petitioner is not under detention. This need not detain us any longer. A similar question arose in Misc. Petition No. 1049/85 (Fazal Hussain v. State of Madhya Pradesh decided on 31-3-1986), in which the order of detention against the petitioner was passed under the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980. The contention was on the question of competency of the petition; placing reliance on Jayantilal Bhagwandas Shah v. State of Maharashtra (1981 Cri LJ 767), this Court held that the order of detention can be quashed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India even though the person sought to be detained has not been detained in pursuance of the order of detention. The M. P. decision (supra) is distinguishable on 2 points. Therein, the District Magistrate has not filed any affidavit about the subjective satisfaction reached on the basis of facts alleged against the petition (petitioner) secondly in that case, the State was unable to point out that the act which formed one of the grounds, namely the order of detention for purchasing spurious lubricating oil and selling it in containers of reputed companies, was not shown to be falling within the purview of clause (a) or (b) of the explanation to S. 3 (1) of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 and it was further held, that if one of the grounds of detention is irrelevant and is not of consequential nature, the order of detention cannot be upheld. In the case before us, the District Magistrate has filed an affidavit. Moreover, S. 5 (a) of the National Security Act specifically provided, that the grounds of detention are separable. In the case before us, the District Magistrate has filed an affidavit. Moreover, S. 5 (a) of the National Security Act specifically provided, that the grounds of detention are separable. Thus, where the order is based on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall deemed to have been made separately on each such grounds and it cannot be deemed to be invalid merely because one or some of the grounds are or were vague non-relevant, not connected, etc. ( 8 ) ABOUT the competency of this petition, so far as Mandamus is concerned, the Bombay decision (Supra) was relied upon by this Court and a Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in Vedprakash Nevkinandan Chiripal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 Gujarat 253 was also considered. All those and other decisions have been recently considered by the Supreme Court in S. M. D. Kiran Pasha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (Judgment Today 1989 (4) SC 366) wherein, the aspects of post-violation resort to Art. 226 of the Constitution for remedy against violation and restoration of the right vis-a-vis pre-violation protection for compelling observance of the obligation or compulsion under the law have been considered. Suffice to state, that in view of the case law cited above and the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in Kiran Pasha's case (supra), we are of the view that this petition cannot be dismissed on the short ground of being premature and, therefore cannot be (said) as not maintainable. ( 9 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, on the dates of riots, he was at Delhi. The affidavits have also been sworn to that effect. It is interesting to note that in Monilal Roy Choudhury v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 2056 : (1975 Cri LJ 1776) a similar question about the plea of alibi arose though the order of detention was passed in compliance with the statutory requirements and communicated to the petitioner, who was a Government servant and the plea put forward was that the Government servant was attending office on the alleged dates. In a counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State, it was explained, that notwithstanding the entry of attendance in the office register, the detenu was involved in criminal incidents and eye-witnesses evidence was available for the detaining authority in this behalf. In a counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State, it was explained, that notwithstanding the entry of attendance in the office register, the detenu was involved in criminal incidents and eye-witnesses evidence was available for the detaining authority in this behalf. Krishna Iyer, J. observed : where the incidents alleged were such that, if true, they would have been sufficient for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that it was necessary to detain the person concerned for preventing him from acting in a 'prejudicial manner' but a plea of alibi was setup on his behalf. . . . . . . Ordinarily in cases of preventive detention, such questions are out side the purview of the Supreme Court in writ proceedings against the order of detention. In Masood Alam v. Union of India AIR 1973 SC 897 : 1973 Cri LJ 627. (Judgment by 3 Judges), it was observed (at page 629; 1973 Cri LJ) : ' The jurisdiction of preventive detention sometimes described as jurisdiction of suspicion depends on subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. It is designed to prevent the mischief from being committed by depriving its suspected author of the necessary facility for carrying out his nefarious purpose. This jurisdiction is thus essentially different from that of judicial trials for the commission of offences and also from preventive security proceedings in criminal Courts, both of which proceed on objective consideration of the necessary facts for judicial determination by Courts of law and justice functioning according to the prescribed procedure. ' it has further been observed on page 904 a under (at page 634; 1973 Cri LJ) : the facts stated in the grounds have to be accepted as correct and it is not open to this Court to enquire into their truth, like a Court of appeal. Writ proceedings cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise. ' ' It is not open to this Court to review and override the subjective opinion of the District Magistrate by going into the truth or otherwise of the facts accepted by him. The facts contained in the grounds reproduced earlier seem to us to be clearly relevant for the purpose of forming an opinion that they endanger both maintenance of public order and security of the State. The facts contained in the grounds reproduced earlier seem to us to be clearly relevant for the purpose of forming an opinion that they endanger both maintenance of public order and security of the State. ' ( 10 ) MOREOVER, the O. P. D. ticket does not even mention the parentage and residential address except the name on the other hand, the FIR names the petitioner and that too is by a Police Officer himself, for the purpose of bail application, it seems that the learned S. D. M. had passed order on 24-1-90, which is a different matter altogether. Therefore, we do not accept the contention that the O. P. D. ticket (Annexure-D) and the X-ray slip (Annexure E) would show that the ground for his detention is irrelevant. ( 11 ) WE agree with the learned Government Advocate that each case has to be considered in its own peculiar circumstances and facts. In the instant case, however, we find the same lacuna, which had been found in some other cases decided earlier, namely, there is a report by the Superintendent of Police addressed to the District Magistrate, which is in 6 pages, followed by the statement of Shri Nirbhaysing Jodon. S. O. , which formed part of the order of detention and on the basis of the above, the learned District Magistrate came to the conclusion that the acts of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. As we have seen in a catena of decisions in State of U. P. v. Kamal Kishore Saini, AIR 1988 SC 208 : 1988 Cri LJ 405 Dharamdas v. Police Commissioner ( AIR 1989 SC 1282 ) : (1989 Cri LJ 1130) Deben Das v. State of West Bengal AIR 1974 SC 1149 : (1974 Cri LJ 805) and Golam alias Golan Mallick v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1975 SC 754) : (1976 Cri LJ 630) those basic materials are not included in the grounds yet to be served on the petitioner. The detention order, therefore, suffers from that infirmity and accordingly deserves to be quashed. Moreover, the detaining authority appears to have formed the subjective satisfaction in the backdrop of communal riots, which situation is non-existent. On this ground also, the impugned order of detention dt. 28-1-89 is invalid. The detention order, therefore, suffers from that infirmity and accordingly deserves to be quashed. Moreover, the detaining authority appears to have formed the subjective satisfaction in the backdrop of communal riots, which situation is non-existent. On this ground also, the impugned order of detention dt. 28-1-89 is invalid. ( 12 ) IN the result, in the facts and the circumstances of the case, the order of detention dt. 28-10-89 passed by the District Magistrate, Indore is hereby quashed. Order accordingly. .