A. Raghuvir, C.J.— The above batch of writ petitions are filed by a partnership firm run in the name and style of M/s P. K. Himatsingka & Co. The firm consisted of four partners. One among them is Gauri Sankar Himatsingka. The firm was registered on June 5, 1969 as a dealer in Transport vehicles of scooters and three wheelers under the Assam Finance (Sales Tax) Act- II of 1956. The issues raised in the batch of cases relate to re-assessment of assessment orders completed relevant to the period ending with September 30, 1969, March 31 and September 30, 1970, March 31 and September 30, 1971 March 31 and September 30, 1972, March 31 and September 30,1973 and March 31 and September 30, 1974. The Books of Accounts of the firm after the assessment order in 1975 were seized by the Vigilance Cell of the Sales Tax Department and were tendered before the First Class Magistrate at Gauhati in two criminal cases launched against the firm, On February 17, 1976 the Superintendent of Taxes served a notice to the firm (which is one of the two impugned notices) to show cause as to why the assessment orders referred earlier be not revised. The notice recited in the year 1968-69 the turnover escaped affecting vehicles 256 (Nil), 1969-70-531 (Nil), 1970-71-630 (40), 1971-72-374(158), 1972-73-377(188), 1973-74-374(34) and 1974-75-408(80). The figures in the brackets relate to three wheelers and the other figures relate to scooters. On receipt of the notice on April 24, 1976 the firm sought three months' time for compliance as their Books of Accounts were seized by the Vigilance Cell Thereupon time was granted and extended till June 9, 1976. On June 8 the firm represented the Vigilance Cell be directed to produce the Accounts Books for verification. On September 20, 1978 and on October 17, 1978 G. S. Himatsingka, a partner of the firm was ordered to produce the accounts. On January 10, 1979 the Super­intendent of Sales Tax served another notice (the second impugned notice) under section 11 to G. S. Himatsingka in continuation of the earlier notice on February 17, 1976 to furnish turnover parti­culars for periods before January 31, 1979 and to produce accounts on January 31,1979. Latter the inquiry was postponed to February 8,1979. In the second impugned notice the firm was asked to submit turnover particulars pertaining to September 30, 1970 and March 31, 1971. Latter the inquiry was postponed to February 8,1979. In the second impugned notice the firm was asked to submit turnover particulars pertaining to September 30, 1970 and March 31, 1971. When Account Books were not produced and returns were not submitted the re-assessments were completed on February 28, 1979. Aggrieved thereby the firm filed appeal before the Assistant Comm­issioner of Taxes (Appeals), Gauhati and in that appeal it was urged re-assessments for periods ending with September 30, 1968, March 31, 1969 and September 30, 1969, March 31, 1970 and September 30, 1970 were barred in limitation. For the period ending September 30, 1968 to September 30, 1974 numerous other grounds were advanced like re-assessment orders should not have been made without the Books of Accounts. The notices on February 17, 1976 and on January 10, 1979 inter-alia were assailed as illegal. While proceedings are pending registration of the firm was cancelled on January 10, 1980 in a separate proceeding. The Appellate Authority in the order on September 10, 1984 had regard to the fact that in the absence of books, the firm could not submit explanation by January 31, 1979 giving only 20 days' time. Thus the firm was 'handicapped' therefore orders under appeal were set aside. The two notices dated February 17, 1976 and January 10, 1979 were however held not invalid in law. The re-assessment proceedings were thus remanded for de novo inquiry. The instant batch of writ petitions were filed in this Court on May 24, 1985. The firm in the batch of petitions seeks to quash the remand order and the impugned two notices. The issues relevant, to first notice dated February 17, 1976 may now be considered. Sections 8 and 11 of the Act are referred and the learned counsel for the firm argued the first impugned notice does not conform to the requirements of the two sections of the Act. We see in sub-clause (1) of section 8 a form is to be prescribed and to date the form is not prescribed. Sections 8 and 11 of the Act are referred and the learned counsel for the firm argued the first impugned notice does not conform to the requirements of the two sections of the Act. We see in sub-clause (1) of section 8 a form is to be prescribed and to date the form is not prescribed. Section 8 is incorporated by reference in section 11 of the Act and the latter section recites that if assessment has been wrongly made the authorities may "at any time within eight years issue notice to the dealer containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 8 and may proceed to assess the dealer..," Learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the above two sections argued that in all cases of re-assessment a notice under section 8 must be served and if not served the notice is turns defective. In the instant case the notice addressed to the firm on February 17, 1976 does not conform to the requirements of the section 8 therefore it is argued notice is non est and illegal. This contention over looks the words emphasised portion of section 11 of the Act. The counsel however argued that without a notice to file a return within the meaning of section 8 read with section 11 the assessee cannot avoid payment of interest and penalties which otherwise the assessee may be mulcted. Precisely for that reason the impugned first notice is argued to be defective in law. No case however is cited to support the contention. Learned counsel relied on the decision in 35 ITR 388, Y. Narayana Chetty vs. ITO to support the contention. That was a case of re-assessment under the Income Tax Act. The Court in that case held that proper notice on an assessee is a condition precedent for re-assessment. If there is no proper notice or notice is defective consequential orders of re-assessments it was held were inoperative. To a like effect is the decision of the Calcutta High Court in 27 ITR 54, CIT vs. Ramsukh Motilal and of the Bombay High Court in 30 ITR 439, R.K.Das & Co. vs. CIT. Another decision of the Calcutta High Court, AIR 1967 Ca), 348, Rama Guha vs. ITO is also to the same effect. To a like effect is the decision of the Calcutta High Court in 27 ITR 54, CIT vs. Ramsukh Motilal and of the Bombay High Court in 30 ITR 439, R.K.Das & Co. vs. CIT. Another decision of the Calcutta High Court, AIR 1967 Ca), 348, Rama Guha vs. ITO is also to the same effect. In that case it is held proper notice should be addressed to proper person to avoid "confusion". That was a case where a notice to partner was held not a notice to the firm, A Full Bench decision of this Court in AIR 1961 Assam 35, M/s Tansukhrai vs. ITO, is also to the same effect where it is held proper notice is a condition precedent for re-assessment proceedings. A proper notice cannot be waived. This Court held once defect in the notice is detected the assessment orders cannot be allowed to continue. In another decision in 65 ITR 607, CIT vs. Adinarayana Murthy it was held HUF is a unit of assessment and an individual is different from HUF. When notices are to be issued correct status of the person on whom it is served should be shown by the authorities as notice alone invoked jurisdiction of the authorities. The decision in 40 ITR 178, Calcutta Tanneries (1944) Ltd vs. CIT and 15 ITR 430, CIT vs. K.M.N.N. Swaminathan Chettiar, 48 ITR 262, Kananilal Gotani vs. CIT are also to the same effect. On consideration of the contentions, we hold the impugned notice on February 17,1976 suffers from no vice whatever. The next argument raised is with respect to the notice dated January !0; 1979. It is argued the notice conforms to the requir­ements under the Act. But is not addressed to the firm therefore the notice is defective. The appellate authority made a reference in the order referred to earlier Gauri Sankar Himatsingka was representing the firm in the re-assessment proceedings. The second impugned notice besides recites a continuation of the first impugned notice. In this case the firm however avers that the firm was not aware of the second impugned notice. We are unable to give any .credence to such an averment as Gauri Sankar is shown to be representing the firm in the re-assessment proceedings. The second impugned notice besides recites a continuation of the first impugned notice. In this case the firm however avers that the firm was not aware of the second impugned notice. We are unable to give any .credence to such an averment as Gauri Sankar is shown to be representing the firm in the re-assessment proceedings. In a case reported in 55 ITR 1, Prabhudas Jagjivandas -vs. ITO the Gujarat High Court held at page 11 "We would not, however, place emphasis on the description of the parties to whom the notice is addressed, for in construing a notice of this kind regard must be had to the notice as a whole and no one part of the notice should be allowed to overweigh the other part. It is quite possible that even though a notice may be addressed to a partner, the body of the notice may show that it is in effect and substance a notice against the firm for re assessment of the income of the firm." That case on all fours applies (o the facts relevant to the second impugned notice. The second impugned notice is a conti­nuation notice therefore does not suffer any illegality. Learned counsel for the dealer as well as for the Sales Tax Department referred only to the facts in Civil Rule -109/85 and repre­sented that the decision in that case governs all other cases. Because of this representation we have not adverted to the facts in other cases. For the aforesaid reasons we dismiss the above Civil Rules. No costs.