ORDER 1. This writ petition coming on for orders as to admission on this day upon perusing the petition and the affidavit filed in support thereof, and upon hearing the arguments of Mr. Ashok Menon Advocate for the petitioner, the Court made the following order :-- The petitioner has challenged in this writ petition an order passed by the Estate Officer under S. 5 of the Tamil Nadu Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1976. The content ion of the petitioner is that the order cannot be treated as one falling under S. 5 as no notice was given to him for personal heaving under Form 'B'. Learned counsel submits that the order directs the Authorised Officer to evict the petitioner herein on 5-2-1990, while the order itself was passed only on 29-1-1990. According to him, when the Act provides for art appeal and the time for an appeal is prescribed as thirty days, the order cannot cut short that time, by directing eviction within a period of one week. It is also stated that the order was sent by Registered Post from Hesur on 29-1-1990 and received by the petitioner actually on 2-2-1990. 2. I do not agree with the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner. Even assuming that the facts stated by him are true, the order still falls under S. 5 of the said Act. The remedy of the petitioner is to file an appeal against that order under the provisions of the Act. It is statutory remedy and there is nothing on record to show that it is not efficacious or too dilatory to grant quick relief to the petitioner. 3. The petitioner brings to my notice that at an earlier stage, when a notice was issued to him by the Estate Officer, he filed W.P. No. 1242 of 1990 for a writ of prohibition and get an order of injunction restraining the respondents from dispossessing him. I had passed that order in W.M.P. No. 1912 of 1990 in W.P. No. 1242 of 1990, while ordering notice of motion, in the writ petition. The order was made by me on 2-2-1990, granting injunction till 21-2-1990, and it expires today. That does not affect the appealability of the impugned order. 4. I had passed that order in W.M.P. No. 1912 of 1990 in W.P. No. 1242 of 1990, while ordering notice of motion, in the writ petition. The order was made by me on 2-2-1990, granting injunction till 21-2-1990, and it expires today. That does not affect the appealability of the impugned order. 4. However, in the circumstances pointed out by learned counsel for petitioner, this is a fit case in which the petitioner should be given sufficient time, as that he could prefer the statutory appeal within the time limit prescribed under the Act and also seek an order of stay from the Appellate Authority. 5. However, before giving the conclusion in this matter, I must refer to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court, cited by learned counsel for the petitioner, that being Brindha Muthnuswany v. Tamil Nadu Small Industries Development Corporation Limited, . In that case, without passing an order under S. 5 of the Act, notice was issued under S. 6, after the notice under S.4, to which a reply had been sent by the petitioner. The Bench pointed out that without passing an order under S. 5, no notice could be issued under S. 6. Consequently, the Bench entertained the writ petition and quashed the notice. In that judgment, the Bench had pointed out the various provisions contained in the Act, relating to the procedure to be followed for passing orders under the Act and the provisions relating to filing of appeal. Learned counsel states that unless an order is passed after following the procedure prescribed under the Act, it cannot be said to be an order within the meaning of S. 5 of the Act and consequently he cannot file an appeal against the said order. Hence, it is submitted that he can approach this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. I do not agree. The observation made by the Bench was in the context of the facts of that case and it cannot be extended beyond that, I am of the view that once an order is passed which purports to be under S. 5, even if it is a wrong order, that has to be challenged before the Appellate Authority and the fact that the proper procedure was not adopted by the Authority concerned, may be one of the grounds to be urged before the Appellate Authority. 6. 6. Learned counsel also refers to the aspect of maintainability of the writ petitions, which was considered is the judgment cited above. There, the question of maintainability was raised because the respondent was a Corporation. The single Judge took the view that the respondent being a Corporation, as writ will lie under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, because he was of the opinion that it could not be a 'State' within the meaning of Art. 12. That view was negatived by the Bench relying upon the other earlier judgments. That part of the judgment has nothing to do with the present case. 7. As already pointed out, the petitioner has to be given sufficient time to prefer an appeal and ask for stay before the Appellate Authority. According to the petitioner, he received the order on 2-2-1990 and he has got 30 days lime to prefer an appeal under the Act. The last date of preferring the appeal will be 4-3-1990, which happens to be a Sunday. Hence, the petitioner will have to prefer the appeal on or before 5-3-1990. There will be a direction against the respondents preventing them from dispossessing the petitioner until 9-3-1990. The petitioner shall file the appeal before the Appellate Authority within the time prescribed therefor under the Act and also apply for stay. He must move the Appellate Authority for passing orders on the stay application well in time, so that the Appellate Authority may pass orders on or before 9-3-1990 in the stay applications. With the above directions, this writ petition is dismissed. 8. Petition dismissed.