Y. B. SURYAVANSHI, J. ( 1 ) THE order passed in this petition No. 382 of 1990 shall also govern the disposal of M. P. No. 386 of 1990 (Satpalsingh and others v. State of M. P. and others) and M. P. No. 383 of 1990 (Hokemsingh v. Nagar Palika through Administrator / Chief Executive Officer, Shajapur and another) since they involve identical questions of facts and law. ( 2 ) IN all three aforesaid petitions, the petitioners were the bidders in auctions held by the Municipal Council for collection of terminal/passenger tax as envisaged under R. 12 of M. P. Municipalities Terminal Tax on Passengers (Regulations of Assessments and Collection) Rules 1988. All the petitioners abovesaid have deposited the requisite amounts as required under the agreements besides security deposit/earnest money. In M. P. No. 382 of 1990 the auction was for collection of passengers tax at the Naka and it related to the Municipal Council, Shajapur. In M. P. No. 383 of 1990 the auction and the agreement relate for collection of terminal tax at Naka No. 1, Shajapur. In M. P. No. 386 of 1990 the auction and the agreement related to the collection of the abovesaid tax at Naka belonging to the Nagar Palika, Khargone. Suffice it to state that all the petitioners in the above petitions have paid the amounts payable under the agreement and had executed the contracts, which were to commence from 1-4-1990 for the period ending 31-3-1991. Their common grievance is that having accepted their final bids and they having paid the amounts as per agreement and further having executed the bilateral contract with the Nagar Palika concerned, these could not have been suddenly cancelled, which the Nagar Palika/respondent had done. The concerned Nagar Palika in context of the orders of the State Government had intimated those petitioners that the agreements have been cancelled and they may take away the amount deposited in the concerned Nagar Palika. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel Shri K. L. Sethi appearing in M. P. No. 383 of 1990 and M. O. No. 382 of 1990 heard. The learned Counsel Shri Dalal appearing for the petitioner in M. P. No. 386 of 1990 also heard. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel Shri K. L. Sethi appearing in M. P. No. 383 of 1990 and M. O. No. 382 of 1990 heard. The learned Counsel Shri Dalal appearing for the petitioner in M. P. No. 386 of 1990 also heard. ( 4 ) ACCORDING to Shri Dalal, the impugned orders cancelling the contracts have been passed without hearing the petitioner and, therefore, they are in contravention of the principles of natural justice; that they are discriminatory; that the action has been taken due to political considerations because the former political party in power had adopted the policy of auctioning the check post for realisation of Yatri Kar; that the impugned auction is in violation of the rights of the petitioners to carry on their trade and business. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel in the other two petitions Shri K. L. Sethi urged, that the rejection of the auction bid/contract is contrary to the statutory rule and is, therefore, illegal; that on ground of promissory estoppel as applicable against the Government in the exercise of the governmental public or executive functions the action taken by the respondents is illegal and the petitioners are entitled by issuance of a writ of mandamus against the Nagar Palika entitling the petitioners for collection of passenger tax till the end of contractual period 31-3-1991. ( 6 ) HAVING heard both the learned Counsel, we are of the view that the contract period is yet to commence from 1-4-1990. Rule 12 of the M. P. Municipalities Terminal Tax on Passengers (Regulation of Assessments and Collection) Rules, 1988 is as follows: -"the Council may, with the previous sanction of the State Government by public auction or private contract, lease the assessment collection of the said tax. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Provided that the State Government shall have power to determine the conditions of lease. "the word 'may' occurring in the above provision in our view is not mandatory, but only directory. The contentions of the petitioners indicate that for some years the Policy of the State Government was to auction the Nakas, just because the political party in power may have changed the policy it does not necessarily mean that as alleged in the petition represented by Shri Dalal, that it has been done out of political motives. The contentions of the petitioners indicate that for some years the Policy of the State Government was to auction the Nakas, just because the political party in power may have changed the policy it does not necessarily mean that as alleged in the petition represented by Shri Dalal, that it has been done out of political motives. The policy changes from time to time according to the exigencies of the situation and it is the executive which is the best judge to determine the policies. From the above provision it cannot be said that in the change of policy there is any contravention of any provisions of law. ( 7 ) THE Constitution envisages three wings of the State, namely, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, which have to function in their own spheres and any transgression of functions by one body into the sphere of another body would not be proper. If the executive has taken certain steps according to its policy it is answerable to the legislature, and the legislature is answerable to the people. In the instant case no case for discrimination has been made out. Individual cases have not been picked or chosen but the State Government had issued general orders taking a policy decision that the collection of terminal tax would not be by way of auctions. To reiterate no case of want of bona fides or malice, or violation of Art. 14 or Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution of India appears to have been made out. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel Shri Sethi referring to AIR 1987 SC 1794 (S. D. Navinchandra and Co. v. Union of India) and Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. ( AIR 1986 SC 806 : 1986 Tax LR 2002) urged that on principles of promissory estoppel the petitioners have made out a prima facie case for interference by this Court. The facts in the decisions cited before us are quite distinguishable. In the instant case, as a matter of policy the contracts which are yet to be executed and which would be commencing from 1-4-1990 have been cancelled as a matter of uniform policy, the principle of promissory estoppel is not attracted in the peculiar circumstances of the case. The matter ultimately can be said to be concerning contractual obligations of the parties. The matter ultimately can be said to be concerning contractual obligations of the parties. Therefore, if the parties so feel aggrieved they are at liberty, if so advised, to claim damages to approach the Civil Court for redressal of their grievance. We decline to interfere in writ jurisdiction. Just because in this contract State is one of the parties, it cannot be a ground to enforce contractual obligations between the parties. ( 9 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any substance for interference in these petitions and accordingly they are dismissed in limine. Petitions dismissed. .