JUDGMENT 1. Petitioner is a tenant of a shop situate in Mohalla Singhan, Kashipur, district Nainital. 2. The present writ petition arises out of the proceedings under section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972) here-in-after referred to as the Act. The shop was purchased by opposite party no. 3 on 23rd October, 1980 from one Shyam Behari. The petitioner was already in occupation as a tenant. The landlord needed the accommodation for his own use. On 17-10-1981 he gave a notice to the tenant for vacating it. It was not done so. This led to the filing of present release application alleging that he was a resident of Thakurdwara, district Moradabad, which was at a distance of about 10-12 Kms. from Kashipur. Thakurdwara is a small rural colony. There was no scope for expansion of any business. He was unemployed and wanted to establish the business of bangles and general merchandise. The tenant did not need the shop. He was employed in L. H. Sugar factory. The tenant has also constructed a shop on Drona Sagar road in the same city after taking the present shop on rent. It was further stated that his need was bonafide and genuine. He would suffer greater hardship in case the shop was not released. 3. The petitioner filed his written statement. His case was that he was a tenant at the rate of Rs. 200/-per year. His tenancy was annual. It was denied by him that there was no scope for business at Thakurdwara or it was a small rural colony. It was a good commercial centre and a developed town. THEre was good scope for the business at Thakurdwara which the landlord wanted to set up in the disputed shop at Kashipur. 4. The tenant further stated that the applicant was already engaged with his father in his ancestral business and was not unemployed. Age of the father of the applicant was 60-70 years and he was not fit to look after his business. It was necessary for the applicant to be engaged in his father's business. He had no need to start a new business. He (the tenant) was only a seasonal employee of Sugar factory at Kashipur and remained out of job for 7-8 months in a year. It was necessary for the applicant to be engaged in his father's business. He had no need to start a new business. He (the tenant) was only a seasonal employee of Sugar factory at Kashipur and remained out of job for 7-8 months in a year. His son, Ganesh Kumar had been doing the business of tea and Namkin in the said shop after his school hours. He was to retire from service within 7-8 months and had no means to earn livelihood for his family. The shop at Drona Sagar Road has been constructed about 8 years back. In this shop Anil Kumar and Nand Kishore, his sons were doing business. This shop at Drona Sagar Road was situated at 1 km. away from Kashipur colony. There is no market in the vicinity. He had been doing business in the disputed shop for the last 30 years and had earned a goodwill. Due to non-availability of shop, his other son Madan Lal transacted his business of Namkin etc. on a Thela for the last five years. 5. The tenant's case further was that the family of the landlord got released two shops from their old tenants and in place of these shops a very big shop has been constructed and let out to another person. This fact has been denied by the landlord stating that this shop has been constructed by his brother Vinod Kumar from his own funds who alone was transacting business in the said shop. THE applicant had nothing to do with it. 6. The prescribed authority allowed the application for release holdings- That need of the landlord was bonafide and genuine ; on comparing the hardship, it was held that in case the shop was not released greater hardship would be caused to the applicant. Against the said order of the Prescribed Authority the tenant filed an appeal before learned District Judge, Nainital. It was dismissed on 4-5-88 Against this order he has filed the present writ petition. 7. Heard Sri K. M. Sinha, for the petitioner and Sri Sunil Gupta appearing for opposite party no. 3. 8. Against the said order of the Prescribed Authority the tenant filed an appeal before learned District Judge, Nainital. It was dismissed on 4-5-88 Against this order he has filed the present writ petition. 7. Heard Sri K. M. Sinha, for the petitioner and Sri Sunil Gupta appearing for opposite party no. 3. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised three points for consideration :- (i) The finding of the appellate authority as well as of the prescribed authority on the question of bonafide need is erroneous ; (ii) The finding on the question of comparative hardship has also been wrongly decided, and (iii) Before the appellate authority by means of a supplementary affidavit the petitioner has brought on record subsequent events which have not been considered by it while dismissing the appeal According to him it was a fit case to be remanded to the learned District Judge, Nainital to reconsider the subseqnent events and record his own findings afresh. 9. The contention raised has no merit and is rejected for the following reasons. Bonafide Need 10. The expression 'bonafide required' used in Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act has been the subject matter of interpretation in a number of judicial pronouncements. It has a significance of special need and not just mere desire on the part of the landlord. Element of need is the first requirement and then the landlord has to show that he genuinely required the accommodation for non-residential purposes and starting his own business. Mere assertion on the part of the landlord that he needed the accommodation for his own use, is not conclusive. He has to lead evidence to prove that his need was bonafide. The test which has to be applied is an objective one and not subjective. 11. In the case reported in 1984 (1) ARC 113, N. S. Datta v. VIIth Addl. District Judge, Allahabad relying upon Supreme Court decision in AIR 1974 SC 1596 and another case reported in 1979 ARC 73, Ajit Prasad v. IVth Addl. District Judge, Meerut and in 1979 UPRCC 599 at page 601 it was held :- "It would suffice to mention that a person is said to need a premises bonafide if he requires it honestly. District Judge, Meerut and in 1979 UPRCC 599 at page 601 it was held :- "It would suffice to mention that a person is said to need a premises bonafide if he requires it honestly. Similarly, the word 'required' has also been interpreted in several cases, and the connotation of the said word shows that the landlord must need the premises in order to succeed in such an application, it is not necessary that the landlord must be on the streets. The connotation of the word 'need' or 'requirement' should not be unnecessarily or artificially extended so as to give it a meaning that a landlord cannot get a premises released unless his requirement is absolute. No doubt, the question of need of a landlord is to be decided objectively and its decision should not be based on the ipsi-dixit of a landlord, but that does not mean that he must stand on extreme need before he could succeed" 12. In the case of Jayant Kumar v. Prescribed Authority reported in 1979 UPRCC 132, Court took the view :- "It is, however, not necessary that the landlord must stand in absolute need of the property. The requirement of law is that the need of a landlord must be honest and in good faith. It is not correct that a landlord cannot succeed unless he is found in an extreme need" A Full Bench of this Court in 1976 AWC 50 Chandra Kumar Sah v. District Judge, Varanasi, construed this phrase to mean "to genuinely" or "in good faith" and conveying an idea of absence of any intent to deceive. 13. The above mentioned cases are based on ratio of the case reported in 1979 (1) SCC 275, Smt. Baqa Bequm v. Abdul Ahad Khan. 14. In the present case, in order to establish his bonafide need, the landlord filed his own affidavit (19-C) and affidavits of Ram Kishore (20-C), Krishna Autar Rastogi (21-C), Virendra Kumar (22-C), Ashok Kumar (23-C) Aman Ullah (24-C), Anuj Kumar (32-C), Ram Kishore (44-C), Bhikhari Lal (47-C), Gajendra Kumar (48-C), Anuj Kumar (4th affidavit 50-C). From these affidavits, it has clearly come on record that business of Ram Kishore, father of the applicant was very small and there was no scope for the applicant to work alongwith him at Kotdwara which was a small place with no scope of a good business. From these affidavits, it has clearly come on record that business of Ram Kishore, father of the applicant was very small and there was no scope for the applicant to work alongwith him at Kotdwara which was a small place with no scope of a good business. Even if one shop was available at Thakurdwara, the landlord has got a right to start a new business at a different place where there is better possibility for expansion of the same. With this point in view, he purchased the shop in dispute at Kashipur. In the affidavit of Rajendra Kumar it has been stated that there is no scope for starting business of general merchandise at Thakurdwara. 15. The landlord has also proved that the tenant has got his own shop at Dronasagar road where he could run his business. This fact alone is a strong point to indicate that the tenant's need is not pressing. THE finding of both the authorities that need of the landlord is bonafide and genuine. It does not suffer from any legal infirmity, and the same is accordingly affirmed by this Court. Comparative Hardship 16. It has come on record that the tenant is in occupation of another shop at Drona Sagar Road in the same city from where he could transact his business. This established fact alone is sufficient to reject the case set up by the tenant. Moreover the nature of his business was such which did not need any special accommodation. He was running very small shop of tea and Namkin. There was no question of earning any goodwill so far as this shop and the said business is concerned. In the case of Baqa Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan reported in 1979 SC 272 while considering the scope of section 11 of Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shop Rent Control Act, Hon'ble Supreme Court held :- "Act is a piece of social legislation aimed at easing the problems of accommodation protecting the tenants from evictions inspired by profit, hunting motives and providing certain safeguards for the tenants and saving them from great expense, inconvneience and trouble. But the Act does not completely overlook the interest of the landlord and has under certain conditions granted a clear right to the landlord to seek eviction on proof of the grounds mentioned in section 11 of J and K Houses and Shope Rent Control Act. Thus, the Act appears to have struck a just balance between genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and great inconvenience and trouble of the tenants on the other" 17. Hon'ble Supreme Court was further of the view that in every case of release some inconvenience or hardships are boud to be caused to the tenants. The Court will have to weigh on its own score on the facts of each case. 18. It is always the choice of the landlord to decide as to what business he may start and at what place. After looking into the findings on the question of comparative hardship recorded by the authorities below, I am satisfied that it is based on evidence and good reasons. It is difficult for me to take a contrary view while exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 19. Both the findings on the question of bonafide need and comparative hardship are thus affirmed by this Court. 20. Now I come to the third and last point argued by the counsel for the petitioner. Subsequent Events Before the appellate authority an affidavit was filed by the petitioner' whose copy has been filed as annexure-2 to the writ petition. He stated that during the pendency of the appeal, Ram Kishore, father of opposite party no. 3 died at Thakurdwara where he was carrying on a grocery shop. This shop now was being run by opposite party no. 3. In view of this changed circumstance, the need of the landlord if any has come to an end. 21. In reply the landlord has also filed his affidavit before the appellate- authority (annexure-3 to the writ petition) stating that his father had been running a very small grocery shop. Now, he is dead. He has got nothing to do with the shop of his father. This fact he has already stated in the earlier affidavits filed before the prescribed authority. His case from the very beginning was that he has no concern with the business of his father. He wanted to establish his own independent business at Kashipur. 22. Now, he is dead. He has got nothing to do with the shop of his father. This fact he has already stated in the earlier affidavits filed before the prescribed authority. His case from the very beginning was that he has no concern with the business of his father. He wanted to establish his own independent business at Kashipur. 22. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the subsequent event of death of father of the applicant will have absolutely no bearing to the result of the case inasmuch as from the very beginning he has been stating that he wanted to set up a new business at Kashipur. He has nothing to do with the business of his father. I find force in the submission. This subsequent event was absolutely irrelevant to the real controversy involved in the case which was whether the applicant's need of setting up his own independent business at Kashipur which was a better place, was genuine and bonafide. It was not the availability of the shop but was the suitability of the shop which was to be taken into consideration. The landlord's case was that the shop of his father was not suited for his business. Even if the said shop was available to him at Kotdwara he cannot be compelled to go and start his business at a place where he did not find a good future. 23. I have looked into the order passed by the appellate authority. He did make a reference to the affidavit filed as additional evidence, but of course he has not discussed it in detail. In order to test the merit of the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner. I looked into the affidavits (annexures-2 and 3 to the writ petition) and found that nothing substantial has been said by the tenant which may change the result of the case. The subsequent event (death of the father of the applicant) will not at all be a material event for considering the need of the landlord. 24. I do not find any justification in the prayer of the counsel for the petitioner for remanding the case to the appellate authority to decide it afresh. It will be just a futile exercise. The subsequent event (death of the father of the applicant) will not at all be a material event for considering the need of the landlord. 24. I do not find any justification in the prayer of the counsel for the petitioner for remanding the case to the appellate authority to decide it afresh. It will be just a futile exercise. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred a decision reported in 1979 ARC 392=1979 AWC 687, Smt. Damyanti Devi v. Brindaban, wherein a guideline has been given in paragraph 11 of the said judgment. It runs as under :- "(i) Where the judgment of the appellate Court is of reversal the court should consider all the relevant and material evidence on record and thereafter give reasons for the said decision. (ii) Where the judgment of the appellate court is of affirmance it is not necessary that every piece of evidence is considered once again but there must be sufficient discussion to show that the court has applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. The appellate court should further state the reason why it finds itself in agreement with the prescribed authority." 25. He referred to another decision reported in 1988 (1) ARC 348, Bhairo Prasad Misra v. IInd Additional District Judge, Varanasi, where it has been held :- "It is true that where the judgment of the appellate authority is of affirmance, it is not necessary that every piece of evidence be considered once again, but there must be sufficient discussion to show that the Court had applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. The appellate authority should further state the reasons why it found in agreement with the prescribed authority" 26. The appellate authority should further state the reasons why it found in agreement with the prescribed authority" 26. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is not exactly inconsonance with the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in 1975 AWC 1, Nanha v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Kanpur, where it has been held :- "If it appears that a Court of fact has in substance based its findings on no evidence or that its finding is perverse in the sense that no reasonable person could possibly come to that conclusion or that it erroneously ignores a vital plea or material evidence which affects the result, a manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record leading to failure of justice can be said to be established. But if a court or a tribunal bases its finding on a consideration of all relevant evidence, but an appellate or a revisional court or tribunal while affirming the finding does not refer to some material or contrary evidence in its order, it cannot be said that it has been ignored from consideration so as to entitle the High Court to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution" Relying upon this Full Bench decision, I hold that in the instant case the appellate authority while affirming the finding of the prescribed authority though has not given its own reasons but has applied its mind to the death of the father of the applicant. The subsequent event was not material for the case. The appellate authority has rightly not devoted much of its time on this question. The omission, if any, does not vitiate the impugned order. 27. Learned counsel for the opposite party has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1988 SC 1422, Ram Dass v. Iswar Chander. Paragraph 10 of the said judgment is as follows :- "CMP No. 33347 is filed by the appellant seeking to bring certain subsequent events on record. The alleged subsequent event is that pursuant to an agreement for purchase of another residential building entered into by respondent 1 and his wife, a sale deed had subsequently come to be executed in favour of first respondent's wife. The alleged subsequent event is that pursuant to an agreement for purchase of another residential building entered into by respondent 1 and his wife, a sale deed had subsequently come to be executed in favour of first respondent's wife. The contention of that having regard to this subsequent acquisition, the present claim for additional accommodation does not survive We are afraid, this circumstance, even if true, will not tilt the balance in favour of the appellant. Even if the need of the other three brothers who are co-owners is taken into account, the order of eviction is supportable on the basis of their need. CMP is, therefore, of no practical assistance to the appellant" 28. Relying upon this decision of Ram Das (supra), I hold that the subsequent event, the death of the father of the applicant, would not have tilted the fate of the appeal before the appellate authority since the case of the applicant from the beginning was that he wanted to establish his own business at Kashipur where there was possibility of expansion of his business. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon another decision reported in 1987 SC 2131, Dr. Saroj Kumar Das v. Sri Arjun Prasad Jogani. In that case the landlord who was a doctor, filed a suit for recovery of possession on the ground that he required the premises for his own occupation as no other suitable accommodation in the town was available to him. The trial court decreed the suit. The first appellate court affirmed the same. A second appeal was filed in the High Court. During the pendency of the appeal, the tenant filed an application for consideration of subsequent event, acquisition of another accommodation, and therefore prayed that the decree for eviction should be set aside. The High Court accepted the additional evidence and allowed the appeal. 29. On appeal by the landlord, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal holding that another accommodation acquired by the landlord was not reasonably suitable for him. 30. According to this judgment, it is the suitability of the accommodation and not the availability which should be a guiding factor in deciding the controversy. For the reasons given above, I am in full agreement with the findings recorded by the two authorities below. 30. According to this judgment, it is the suitability of the accommodation and not the availability which should be a guiding factor in deciding the controversy. For the reasons given above, I am in full agreement with the findings recorded by the two authorities below. Non consideration of the subsequent event, which was not at all material to the facts of the case, will not make the order bad in the eyes of law. 31. I do not find any merit in the petition. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.