JUDGMENT - I.G. SHAH, J.:---The State has come in appeal against the order of acquittal of the present respondent in Regular Criminal Case No. 2 of 1981 on the file of J.M.F.C., Malvan, in respect of the offence punishable under section 7(i) and 7(v) read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. 2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to this appeal are as under :-- The present respondent was prosecuted by the Food Inspector, who is the complainant, on an allegation that on 8-3-1979 when the Food Inspector gave a visit to Malvan at about 8.15 a.m., he found the accused carrying a milk kettle on a cycle and then on learning from the accused that he was having buffalo milk for sale, the Food Inspector after disclosing his identity and intention of drawing the sample of milk purchased 660 ml. of buffalo milk from the respondent for the purposes of analysis. The Food Inspector gave intimation to the accused in Form V and also paid Rs. 1 32p being the cost of the sample as milk price and obtained the receipt from the accused. Thereafter the Food Inspector divided the sample of milk into three equal parts and put the same in dry clean empty glass bottles. He added 18 drops of Formaline in each of the bottles as preservative. The bottles were then tightly corked and lac seal was affixed at the mouth of the each bottle. Signatures of the accused and the panch were obtained on the labels and they were pasted on the said sample bottles. Each bottle was then wrapped in brown paper bag and ends of those bags were gummed and then closed. Paper slip of L.H.A. Malvan was also affixed on each of the packet of bottles and then the said packets were tied with string as required by the rules. A panchanama was also prepared and then one sample bottle along with the memorandum in Form VII in sealed packet was sent to Public Analyst, Pune by registered post A.D. on the very same day for analysis. Copy of memorandum in Form VII and specimen impression of the seal were also sent to the Public Analyst by registered post A.D on the same day separately. Copy of memorandum in Form VII and specimen impression of the seal were also sent to the Public Analyst by registered post A.D on the same day separately. The remaining two bottles and two copies of the memorandum in Form VII and specimen impression of these seals in sealed packet were then deposited with the Local Health Authority. The Public Analyser reported after analysing the sample that the sample contained 34.4% of added water and it did not conform to the standard of buffalo milk. The Food Inspector thereafter obtained consent of the Joint Commissioner to launch prosecution against the present respondent and thereafter filed the complaint against the respondent. 3. On the strength of the evidence led before the learned Magistrate, he found that on 8-3-1979 at about 8.15 a.m. the accused sold buffalo milk which was adulterated, but acquitted the respondent accused of the offence punishable under section 7(i) and 7(v) read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act on the ground that rule 20 framed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was not complied with and therefore, the present respondent was entitled to an acquittal. Being aggrieved by the said order of acquittal, the State has come in appeal to this Court. 4. It appears that the learned Magistrate relied on the decision reported in (Pati Ram v. State)1, 1982 Cri.L J. 387 of the High Court of Allahabad, wherein it was observed "Taking into consideration the fact that the strength of Formalin was not disclosed by the Food Inspector and that the Public Analyst found fat contents 14% as against 6%, it would not be incorrect to say that the result of the analysis is not accurate and that the report of the Public Analyst could not be implicitly accepted and as that there was no other report of analysis of milk in question. As soon as the report of the Public Analyst in the instant case is ignored there remains no material to find that the milk was adulterated." In the instant case, there was only evidence that 18 drops of formalin were added in the sample, but the strength of formalin was not stated in the deposition and, therefore, there was no evidence that the formalin that was added was of the required strength. Similarly, reliance was also placed in the ruling reported in (Sohan v. State)2, 1963 Cri.L.J. 221 to hold that non-mentioning of the date of analysis in the report of the Public Analyst was fatal to the prosecution. 5. Before I proceed to consider the said evidence and the view taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate, it is necessary to state that it appears that one sample out of the two preserved was also sent to the Director of Central Food Laboratory, Mysore by the accused and the Director also reported that the sample was fit for analysis and it did not conform with the standard of buffalo milk laid down in Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The said sample was sent to the Director of Central Food Laboratory at the instance of the accused. 6. Now on behalf of the State, it is contended that in view of the fact that the Director of Central Food Laboratory. Mysore has informed by his report that the sample was fit for analysis and that the sample did not conform with the standard of buffalo milk is sufficient to hold that the milk sample which was collected from the respondent was adulterated. Even if there was some lacuna in following rule 20 while collecting the sample, it would not make much difference. It is also contended that rule 20 is not mandatory and if there is substantial compliance of the said rule, it is sufficient. To support the said contention, reliance is placed on the ruling reported in 3 (State of Maharashtra v. Sewaram Aaildas Aamesar), 19 9 Cri. L.J. 1463 of this Court. Pratap, J, in the said decision held that rule 20 is directory and, therefore, substantial compliance of the same is sufficient. It was also contended that in the said decision Pratap, J found that where there was total non-compliance of the rule, it could not be said to be of no consequence. But the said ruling had clearly laid down that rule 20 is only directory, if the prosecution can show that there is substantial compliance of the rule, it would not affect the prosecution adversely. But the said ruling had clearly laid down that rule 20 is only directory, if the prosecution can show that there is substantial compliance of the rule, it would not affect the prosecution adversely. Based on this decision, it is tried to be contended before me on behalf of the State that there is evidence to show that formation was added and merely because it was not stated as to what was the strength of formalin that was added, it would not make much difference. Similarly, it was also contended that formalin is only added for the purpose of preservation and when the Director of Central Food Laboratory Mysore found that the sample was fit for analysis, question of not mentioning about the strength of preservative in evidence cannot assume much importance. The very fact that the sample was found fit for analysis is sufficient to show that the formalin that was added must have been of necessary strength. Now under these circumstances, there is a force in this contention tried to be raised before me. It was also pointed out that merely because the date was not put in the report of the Public Analyst, it would not also make any difference in this particular case when there is the report of the Director of Central Food Laboratory, Mysore which is definitely considered as a conclusive report. In view of this, the learned Magistrate, it appears, was in error in relying on the decision of the Allahabad High Court while acquitting the accused. 7. On behalf of the respondent- the original accused, it is tried to be contended that in the present case there is also lacuna in the sanction and in view of the decision of this Court report in (Gahininath Bhimrao Patekar v. State of Maharashtra and others)4, 1998 Cri.L.J. 48 the sanction order suffers from lacuna and therefore, is bad. As against that on behalf of the State, it is tried to be contended before me that from the judgment of the Lower Court, it does not appear that the sanction was ever challenged before the trial Court and , therefore now it does not lie in the mouth of the accused respondent to contend that the sanction order is not in accordance with the law. It was also tried to be contended that it is necessary to reconsider the decision reported in 1998 Cri L.J. 48. However, in view of the fact that no challenge was even made at the time of the trail to the sanction order it is not necessary to consider the said point now. If the accused wanted to challenge the sanction it was necessary for him to at least make some grievance in respect of that at the trail Court to show that the sanction order was proper and was given after applying the mind by the authority concerned. In view of this, at least in this case, it is not necessary to consider as to whether the view taken by my brother Kantharia, J, in the decision reported and quoted above, is necessary to be reconsidered or not. 8. Therefore, I will proceed on the basis that the consent order passed by the Joint Commissioner, Food and Drugs Administration is proper. In view of the earlier discussion, in the present case there is sufficient material on record to hold that the sample which was taken from the respondent was not in conformity with the standard laid down in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and, therefore, was adulterated and consequently the respondent had committed the offence punishable under section 7(i) and 7(v) read with 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Therefore, the order of acquittal; passes by the trail Court will have to be reversed and the respondent will have to be convicted of the said offence. 9. On behalf of the respondent, it is contended that admittedly the said offence is alleged to have taken place on 8-3-19 9 and now we are in 1990 and more than 11 years have passed and , therefore, even if the order of acquittal is to be set aside, it would not be proper to send the accused to jail after a lapse of so many years. It was also contended that when the offence took place the accused was hardly 21 years of age and, therefore, it is a fit case in which the present respondent should be only inflicted with fine. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the ruling reported in (Ramdas Bhikali Chaudhari v. Sadanand and others)5, 1980 Cri. It was also contended that when the offence took place the accused was hardly 21 years of age and, therefore, it is a fit case in which the present respondent should be only inflicted with fine. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the ruling reported in (Ramdas Bhikali Chaudhari v. Sadanand and others)5, 1980 Cri. L. J. 111, wherein the Supreme Court while setting aside the order of acquittal passed by this Court had taken a similar view and the accused was sentenced only to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-. It does appear from the said ruling cited on behalf of the respondent that the Supreme Court while reversing the order of acquittal after a lapse of considerable years in respect of the offence had taken a view that it would not be proper to send the accused to jail again, therefore, I am also inclined to take the same view and inflict only the penalty of fine on the respondent. 10. In the result, the appeal preferred by the State is allowed. The order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is set aside. The respondent-original accused is convicted of the offence punishable under section 7(i) and 7(v) read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and he is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- in default R.I. for 6 months. The accused is given time of 3 weeks to pay the fine amount. Fine amount be paid in the trial Court. Appeal allowed. -----