JUDGMENT 1. - All these appeals involve common questions. They were heard together and can, therefore, be disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The plaintiff in all the civil suits was common. These cases relate to the sale of land in village 2-H, Bada, Tehsil Ganganagar. Except the names of the defendants and the property sold in their favour, the facts are similar. The following table would show the names of the defendants and the property involved in these appeals Civil Appeal No. Arising out of Civil Suit No. Name of the Defendant Date of the sale deed, executed earlier by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant Property sold Date of agreement for re conveyance in respect of which specific performance is claimed. 154 of 1989 63 of 1983 Ranveer Singh 20-8-80 Muraba No. 24 Kila Nos. 4, 512, 6, 711, 712, 8, 1911, 1912 (Total land measuring 3 Bighas 18 Biswas) for Rs. 22,500/- 11-2-1982. 155 of 1989 64 of 1983 Kalwant Singh 19-8-80 Muraba No. 24 Kila Nos. 8, 9, 12, 1311, 1312 and 14 (Total land measuring 3 Bighas 18 Biswas) for Rs. 22,500/- 6.3.1982 156 of 1989 65 of 1983 Smt. Lichhma S/o Rampratap (1) 19-8-80 (2)20-8-1980 Muraba No. 24 Kila Nos. 14, 15 to 18 and 23 to 25 (Total land measuring 7 Bighas 7 Biswas) for Rs. 45,000/- 11.2.1982 157 of 1989 66 of 1983 Ram Pratap (1) 19-8-80 (2) 20-8-80 Muraba No. 23 Kila Nos. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20. Muraba No. 56 Kila Nos. 21, 22 Muraba No. 19 Kila Nos. 2312, 24, 25 (Total land measuring 7 Bighas 3 Biswas) for Rs. 45,000/- 11.2.1982 158 of 1989 67 of 1983 Subash Chandra S/o. Ram Pratap. (1) 19-8-80 (2) 20-8 80 Muraba No. 23 Kila Nos. 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25. Muraba No. 24 Kila Nos. 2 to 5 and 19. (Total land measuring 3 Bighas 12 Biswas) for Rs. 45,000/- 11.2.1982 3. It would be sufficient if I set out, in brief, the facts of Civil Suit No. 63 of 1983, Balu Ram v. Ranjeet Singh , the facts whereof alone have been referred to by the counsel for the parties at the time of arguments. (Total land measuring 3 Bighas 12 Biswas) for Rs. 45,000/- 11.2.1982 3. It would be sufficient if I set out, in brief, the facts of Civil Suit No. 63 of 1983, Balu Ram v. Ranjeet Singh , the facts whereof alone have been referred to by the counsel for the parties at the time of arguments. The facts are: By a registered sale deed dated the 20th August, 1980, Balu Ram, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, sold the suit land to Ranveer Singh, referred to as the defendant, for a sum of Rs. 22,500.00. The defendant was not in a position to pay the amount of Rs. 22,500.00 and, therefore, he executed a pro-note for Rs. 22,500.00 in favour of the plaintiff, promising to pay the said amount with interest at the rate of Rs. 0.50 paise per cent per month. The defendant failed to pay anything despite demands by Balu Ram. Therefore a fresh agreement was executed between the parties on February 11, 1982. As per this agreement, the defendant promised to pay the aforesaid amount by July 31, 1983 and, if he failed to pay the same, to reconvey the land to the plaintiff at the same price. In case of failure by the defendant to execute the registered said deed, the-plaintiff was given the right to get a sale deed executed and registered in his favour through Court. It was also mentioned in the agreement that this amount would have a charge over the land. The defendant failed to make the payment by the due date. A notice was then sent to the defendant on. August 2, 1983, who in reply to the same, declined to execute the sale deed. On August 17, 1983 the present suit was filed by the plaintiff against the defendant for specific performance of the contract for the sale of the land in favour of the plaintiff. In the written statement, the defendant admitted the execution of the sale deed. It was also admitted that no payment whatsoever was made to the plaintiff. The execution of the agreement dated February 11, 1982, was also admitted. It was also not denied that the amount of the pro note was not paid by the stipulated date i.e. July 31, 1983. It was, however, pleaded that the agreement dated February 11, 1982 was executed under pressure. The execution of the agreement dated February 11, 1982, was also admitted. It was also not denied that the amount of the pro note was not paid by the stipulated date i.e. July 31, 1983. It was, however, pleaded that the agreement dated February 11, 1982 was executed under pressure. The defendant never agreed to resale the land to the plaintiff. The agreement was merely to assure the payment to the plaintiff. It was also alleged that July 31, 1983 was not the essence of the contract. It was also pleaded that the defendant was ready and willing to pay the amount of the pro-note but the plaintiff did not accept the same. The plaintiff got a revenue suit filed by his son Prem Prakash in the Court of Assistant Collector, Sri Ganganagar, for partition, on May 23, 1983, and got a receiver appointed on July 18, 1983. 4. By the judgment dated October 23, 1989, the District Judge, Sri Ganganagar, decreed , the plaintiff's suit, directing the defendant to execute a sale deed of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff. It was also decreed that the plaintiff would be entitled to get the possession of the land from the defendant. The learned District Judge has found that it could not be said that the plaintiff was not ready or willing to have the sale of the land in his favour; that it was difficult to hold that the agreement dated February 11, 1982 (in Civil Suit No. 64/1983, agreement dated 6.3,1982) was the result of undue pressure brought on the defendant by the plaintiff; that the agreement was beneficial to the defendant, and, therefore, he was liable to make the payment of the money by July 31, 1983; that the dale July 31, 1983, for payment of money fixed in the agreement was the essence of the contract and on the expiry of this date, the defendant was bound to resale the land to the plaintiff; that the defendant had failed to prove that he tendered or made any attempt to pay the amount of the pro-note to the plaintiff; that the defendant failed to show that there was anything which disentitled the plaintiff to recover compensation to disentitle him to the relief of specific performance of the contract under section 16 (a) of the Specific Relief Act. The learned District Judge, after discussing the various aspects of the case held that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree against the defendant for the execution and registration of a sale deed for the suit land in his favour in performance of the contract dated February 11, 1982 (in suit No. 64/1983, contract dated 6.3.1982). The learned District Judge also awarded costs to the plaintiff. 5. Against the judgment of the District Judge, the defendants, in all the aforesaid suits, have filed separate appeals. Shri N.P. Gupta, counsel for the appellants, has advanced common arguments in all the appeals.Shri Gupta has contended that the agreement dated February 11, 1982, is not a contract which can be specifically enforced. Elaborating, he has submitted that primarily it was an agreement for payment of money by July 31, 1983 and the condition of re conveyance was only a default clause; that the agreement, being an agreement essentially for payment of money, could be adequately compensated in terms of money and, therefore, it was not enforceable by virtue of section 14 (1) (a) of the Specific Relief Act; that the stipulation for re conveyance was penal in nature within the meaning of Section 74 of the Contract Act; that the stipulation for re conveyance in the agreement docs not provide for any entitlement to the plaintiff to any damages in case of its breach and hence it could not be specifically enforced under Section 16 (a) of the Specific Relief Act; and, that the agreement lacked mutuality - a requirement for the contract to be specifically enforced. Mr. Gupta has also contended that the suit, as framed, was not a suit for specific performance of the con tract, as it does not disclose 'a cause of action, and was liable to be dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11, C.P.C. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff amended the plaint by deleting prayers 4,6 and 7 and on account of this also, the suit had become not maintainable. Mr. Gupta has further urged that the plaintiffs conduct in getting the Revenue Suits filed by his son Prem Prakash even before the stipulated date for payment in the agreement ought to have been taken into account by the learned District Judge to hold that he was not entitled to any equitable relief under the Specific Relief Act. Mr. Mr. Gupta has further urged that the plaintiffs conduct in getting the Revenue Suits filed by his son Prem Prakash even before the stipulated date for payment in the agreement ought to have been taken into account by the learned District Judge to hold that he was not entitled to any equitable relief under the Specific Relief Act. Mr. Gupta has also challenged the correctness of the findings of the District Judge on issues Nos. 1 to 4.Shri B.L. Purohit, counsel for the respondent,raised a preliminary objection that the appellant should not be allowed to raise new points, which he failed to urge in the trial Court. Mr. Purohit has contended that the points now raised in this Court involve questions of fact or in any case mixed questions of fact and law which ought not to be permitted to be urged for the first time in this Court. Mr. Purohit has submitted that the findings arrived at by the learned District Judge on issues Nos. 1 to 4 are correct. In answer to the various contentions of the counsel for the appellants, mentioned above, Mr. Purohit has argued that the agreement dated February 11, 1982 was a contingent contract. Essentially it was an agreement for the sale of immovable property contingent on the happening of the condition of non-payment by July 31, 1983. As the defendants failed to make the payment by the date stipulated, the plaintiff became entitled to the specific performance of the contract. Mr. Purohit has submitted that money was ; ready due to the plaintiff even before the agreement was entered into and, therefore, there was no occasion for entering into a fresh agreement for the payment of money. By this agreement, only the date for the payment was fixed as July 31, 1983. This date for payment was made the essence of the contract. The agreement was not for payment of money but it was simply an agreement for sal c of lands contingent upon the non-payment of money by July 31, 1983. Mr. Purohit has next urged that the present suits were not for enforcing tire payment of money, but for enforcing the stipulation for the sale of immovable property and as such Section 14 (1) (a) of the Specific Relief Act was not applicable, as it was excluded by the explanation to Section 10. It was further argued by Mr. Mr. Purohit has next urged that the present suits were not for enforcing tire payment of money, but for enforcing the stipulation for the sale of immovable property and as such Section 14 (1) (a) of the Specific Relief Act was not applicable, as it was excluded by the explanation to Section 10. It was further argued by Mr. Purohit that the stipulation for the sale of land in the agreement was not by way of penalty and in could not, therefore, be termed as a default clause. It had only the effect of restoring the lands to the plaintiff, on the contingent condition of non-payment by the due date being fulfilled. In any case, argues Shri Purohit, in the absence of a specific plea in the trial Court to the effect that the defendants were entitled under Section 74 to be relieved of the rigours of penal provision, the defendants should not be permitted to raise this point in this Court as the plaintiff had no opportune y to meet the defendants case in this regard. Mr. Purohit has submitted that the defendants have paid nothing towards the price of the land. They want, dishonestly, to retain the land and, therefore, they are not entitled to any equity - relief in their favour. Mr. Purohit has also controverted other points, raised by Mr. Gupta, regarding lack of mutuality, bar of Section 16 (a) and the effect of the suits filed by the son of the plaintiff. Mr. Purohit has pointed out that there was no evidence on the record to establish that the plaintiff got the suits filed by his son. Ram Pratap, who appeared as D.W. 1 in all the cases, has not stated that the suit were got filed by the plaintiff through his son. In any case, argues Mr. Purohit, the revenue suits filed by Prem Prakash son of the plaintiff, does not affect the rights of the parties in the present suit. 6. First, I propose to deal with the challenge to the findings of the District Judge on issues Nos. 1 to 10. Before that I may set-out the facts which are undisputed. The defendants do not dispute the fact that when the sale of the land was made in their favour, only a promissory note in favour of the plaintiff was executed and nothing, whatsoever, in cash or cheque was paid to him. 1 to 10. Before that I may set-out the facts which are undisputed. The defendants do not dispute the fact that when the sale of the land was made in their favour, only a promissory note in favour of the plaintiff was executed and nothing, whatsoever, in cash or cheque was paid to him. It is also not disputed that subsequently, also, till this day, nothing has been paid by them towards the price of the land or as payment of the promissory' note. It is also admitted by the defendants the at they got the possession of the land pursuant to the sale and enjoyed the fruits thereof. Further, it is not in dispute that the defendants executed the agreement on February 11, 1982 (in suit No. 64 of 1983 on 6.3.1982), hereinafter to be referred as the agreement, wherein the date for payment of money was stipulated as July 31, 1983. The execution of the agreement and the non-payment of money by July 31, 1983 is not in dispute. Having premised the undisputed facts, I may, now, proceed to deal with the questions which the counsel for the defendants has termed as controversial. The crucial question for determination is what essentially are the terms of the agreement and whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree of specific performance in respect of the same. For that purpose, it would be necessary to read the agreement as a whole.(Matter being in Hindi language omitted).The terms of the agreement in all the suits are similar except the particulars of the land etc. The important contents of the agreement, which need specific mention, are:- (1) That the plaintiff had executed a sale deed of the suit land in favour of the defendant but as at that time the defendant had no cash money with him, he had, there form, executed a pro note and a receipt in favour of the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant failed to pay the amount to the plaintiff, who was pressing for the same; (3) that the defendant would pay the plaintiff the said amount with interest by July 31, 1983; (4) that in case the defendant failed to pay the same, he would execute the deed of re conveyance of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff at the same price and would get it registered. The expenses would be borne by the defendant. The expenses would be borne by the defendant. The defendant would deliver the possession of the land also; (5) that in case the defendant fails to execute the same, the plaintiff would have a right to get the sale deed registered through Court and the defendant shall be liable for its costs and consequences; and, (6) that the aforesaid amount shall have a charge over the suit land. Issue No. 1 - "Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract", has been answered by the District Judge in favour of the plaintiff; and, in my opinion, rightly so. What specific part the plaintiff was required to perform in terms of the agreement? He was to wait for the payment of the sale price till July 31,1983, and this he undeniably, did. Everything else was to be done by the defendant and he failed in all respects. He got the possession of the land, enjoyed its fruits thereof and paid nothing till day. The plaintiff served a notice to the defendants demanding execution of the sale deeds and on refusal, immediately, filed the present suits. The circumstances irresistibly show that it were the defendants who were not prepared to perform their part of the contract and were guilty of its breach and the learned District Judge was wholly correct in holding that the defendants had failed to establish that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to get the land re-sold in his favour. This also disposes of Issue No .4, which was to the effect "Whether the defendant was ready and willing to pay the amount of the pro note and it was the plaintiff who did not accept the same." In this connection it may be pointed out that the defendants never tendered the money either in cash or through Bank. Even in reply to the plaintiffs notice, they did not tender it to the plaintiff. It is difficult to accept the statement of Ram Pratap that he had gone to die plaintiff with a sum of rupees one lakh rightly thousand. In my opinion, the decision of the learned District Judge on issue No. 4 is correct. As regards issues Nos. It is difficult to accept the statement of Ram Pratap that he had gone to die plaintiff with a sum of rupees one lakh rightly thousand. In my opinion, the decision of the learned District Judge on issue No. 4 is correct. As regards issues Nos. 2 and 3, defendant Ram Pratap, who has been examined by the defendants in all the five suits in Court has, in terms, admitted in his statement: (Matter being in Hindi language omitted). This admission negatives the plea of the defendants that the agreement was executed under pressure just to the formal satisfaction of the plaintiff. Further, a bare perusal of the agreement shows that the date July 31, 1983 fixed for the payment of the money was an important term of the agreement and the learned District Judge was fully justified in holding that it was an essence of the contract between the parties. Thus, issues Nos. 2 and 3 have also been rightly decided in favour of the plaintiff. 7. The aforesaid discussion is enough to dispose of the present appeals. However, learned counsel for the appellants has raised several contentions as noted above and I deem it necessary to deal with them now. 8. What exactly is the nature of the Contract? - is the crucial question. In essence, the agreement between the parties is that the defendant shall re-sale the property if he failed to make the payment by July 31, 1983. The failure on the part of the defendant to make the payment by July 31, 1983, is a condition on the happening of which tire plaintiff acquires a right to have the sale of the land in his favour. As already held, the defendant failed to pay the money by the date stipulated in the agreement and, therefore, the plain tiff became entitled to have the deed of re conveyance executed and registered in his favour. What was to be done after July 31, 1983, was the execution of the deed of sale by the defendant and as he was unwilling to do so, the plaintiff was fully entitled to get a decree for specific performance. 9. There is nothing in the agreement to bifurcate it, into two parts - primary or secondary, as urged by the counsel for the defendants. Read as a whole, the contract is a contract of re conveyance of the property. 9. There is nothing in the agreement to bifurcate it, into two parts - primary or secondary, as urged by the counsel for the defendants. Read as a whole, the contract is a contract of re conveyance of the property. True, it was contingent on the happening of the event of non-payment of the money by the defendant by the stipulated date i.e. July 31, 1983, but, since the payment was not made up to this date, the contract for the re-sale of the property became legally enforceable. There is no force in the argument of the counsel for the appellants that the agreement was primarily for the payment of money and that the agreement for sale was only secondary . The obligation to pay the money was existing even prior to the date when the agreement was entered into. This was pure and simple agreement to have the land re-sold in favour of the plaintiff on the failure of the defendant to make the payment by July 31, 1983. I have already held that the date July 31, 1983 was the essence of the contract. 10. I also do not agree with the counsel for the appellants that the stipulation in the agreement for re conveyance of the property amounts to a default clause and being penal in nature, it could riot be specifically enforced. On a true interpretation of the agreements, it is difficult to hold that the stipulation to re-sale the property was penal in nature and amounted to a default clause. Nonpayment of money by July 31, 1983 was only a condition precedent, an event, on the happening of which the contract could be enforced by law. The contract envisaged was a contingent contract which became enforceable under section 35 of the Contract Act when the defendants failed to pay the amount by July 31, 1983. 11. Nonpayment of money by July 31, 1983 was only a condition precedent, an event, on the happening of which the contract could be enforced by law. The contract envisaged was a contingent contract which became enforceable under section 35 of the Contract Act when the defendants failed to pay the amount by July 31, 1983. 11. As regards the contention of the appellants' counsel that the contract could not be specifically enforce on account of the bar of Section 14(1) (a) of the Specific Relief Act it may be pointed out that the present suit was for the enforcement of a contract for the sale of land, the possession whereof had been obtained by the defendants long back, and in my view, the compensation in money could not afford an adequate relief to the plaintiff Section 10 (b) of the Specific Relief Act permits enforcement of a contract when money compensation does not afford an adequate relief for the act agreed to be done under the agreement. The defendants failed to establish that the breach on their part not to sell the property to the plaintiff could be compensated by money, They failed to rebut the presumption arising out of the explanation appended to Section 10 which provides that until and unless the contrary is proved, the court shall presume that breach of a contract to transfer immovable property cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money. There is thus no substance in the submission of the counsel for the appellants that the present contract could not be enforced on account of the bar of Section 14 (1) (a) of the Specific Relief Act. 12. There is also no substance in the contention raised by the counsel for the appellants that She agreement was not specifically enforceable under section 16(a), as the stipulation in the agreement for re conveyance did not provide entitlement to damages in case of its breach. That Section 16 (a) says is that specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who would not be entitled to recover compensation for its breach. I do not find any disability in the plaintiff to disentitle him to recover compensation. Section 16(a) is wholly inapplicable to the present case. 13. That Section 16 (a) says is that specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who would not be entitled to recover compensation for its breach. I do not find any disability in the plaintiff to disentitle him to recover compensation. Section 16(a) is wholly inapplicable to the present case. 13. As regards the argument of the appellants counsel that the agreement lacked mutuality and was not, therefore, enforceable, suffice it to say that sub-section (4) of Section 20, now furnishes a complete answer to the counsel's argument. Further, I do not agree with the learned, counsel that the agreement lacked mutuality. I also do not find any substance in the argument of the counsel for the appellants that the present suit did not disclose a cause of action. The plaintiff was read to me. The suit, as framed, was certainly a suit for specific performance of the contract and it fully discloses a cause of action. There is also no force in his argument that, on account of the amendments made in the plaint, the present suit could no more survive. I fail to understand how the amendment could bring about such a consequence when there was a specific prayer for a relief to decree the plaintiffs suit for the sale of the property in his favour. 14. As regards the revenue suits filed by the son of the plaintiff, I do not think that the filing of the said suits for partition by the son of the plaintiff would disentitle the plaintiff to maintain the present suits. The present suits are based on agreements entered into between the plaintiff and the defendants and the revenue suits for partition would not disentitle the plaintiff to maintain the present suits for specific relief flowing from the agreement. 15. There is, thus, no substance in the present appeals either on facts or in law. The equity is also not in favour of the defendants but on the side of the plaintiff. The defendants have derived benefits under the agreement. They cannot, now, be allowed to wriggle out of their obligation arising out of the same agreement. They cannot be permitted both to approbate and reprobate. 16. In the result, the appeals have no merit and the same are dismissed with costs in favour of the plaintiff.Appeal dismissed. *******