JUDGMENT M.P.Singh, J. 1. Petitioner is a prospective allottee. By means of the impugned order the court below has allowed the revision of the opposite parties, who are the landlords and remanded the case to Rent Control and Eviction Officer for fresh decision 2. Disputed accommodation is a part of house No. 474, Khurbura, Dehradun, consisting of three rooms, kitchen, store, bath-room and latrine. Short Facts : The accommodation was declared vacant under Section 12 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 on 3-1-1986 on account of the death of the sitting tenant. It was followed by the proceedings for allotment initiated on the application filed by Smt. Krishna Rani (petitioner). The landlords also filed application for release under Section 16 (1) (b) of the Act. Their case was that they were co-owners and were carrying on transport business in partnership under the name and style of M/s. Highway Motor Company. The office of the said transport company and the office of M/s. Dehra Auto Finance and Rajiv Transport Company which also belonged to them, were situated in a part of property No. 69, Gandhi Road, Dehradun. Son of applicant no. 1 Ajay Gurg was carrying on wool combing business from the said premises. The above accommodation was wholly insufficient for their business. It was also alleged that most of the routes on which their vehicles were plied, were hilly routes and many of the employees of the applicants were residents of either district Uttarkashi or Chakrata Tehsil. Neither these employees owned nor possessed any property in Dehradun. The applicants were bound to provide accommodation to them for their nignt shelter and rest. The applicants had no other accommodation except the accommodation in question. The need of the applicants was alleged to be bona fide and genuine. 3. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer while considering the release application, had also given an opportunity to the prospective allottee to contest the same and to support his application for allotment. 4. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer vide a composite order dated 24th March, 1986 rejected the release application and passed an order of allotment in favour of the petitioner. This order was challenged by the landlords by means of a revision under Section 18 of the Act. 4. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer vide a composite order dated 24th March, 1986 rejected the release application and passed an order of allotment in favour of the petitioner. This order was challenged by the landlords by means of a revision under Section 18 of the Act. Before the revisional court the only point which was argued was that the order of Rent Control and Eviction Officer was bad in law in as much as he has committed the prospective allottee to participate in the proceedings while dispensing off the application for release. 5. In the case 1986 (1), A. R. C.- 1 Talib Hasan v. 1st Additional District Judge, Nainital. A Full Bench of this Court had considered the right of a prospective allottee in the matter of release of the accommodation under Section 16 (1) (b). IN this case, it has been held :- "The right of a prospective allottee is not an absolute right. It is contingent upon firstly, the accommodation being vacant and, secondly, the building being available for allotment. Rule (13) (4), as it stands, at present reinforces this conclusion. It provides that no allotment in respect of a building covered by an application under Section 16 (1) (b) shall be made unless such application is rejected. The right of a prospective allottee to have his application considered hence arises only after the rejection of the landlord's application under Section 16 (1) (b) A fortiori the prospective allottee comes into the picture only after the disposal of the landlord's application for release under Section 16 (1) (b), and, only if the same is rejected. 6. So far, therefore, as the scheme of the Act and the rules framed thereunder is concerned, the same, in our opinion, clearly points to the conclusion that a prospective allottee has no right of objection against the release application filed under Section 16 (1) (b). As mentioned above, this right to have this application considered for allotment accrues only after the rejection of the release application. Indeed the consideration of the applications for allotment is taken up only after the rejection of the application under Section 16 (t) (b). Neither the Act nor the rules framed thereunder thus postulate any right in a prospective allottee to file objections against the release application. Indeed the consideration of the applications for allotment is taken up only after the rejection of the application under Section 16 (t) (b). Neither the Act nor the rules framed thereunder thus postulate any right in a prospective allottee to file objections against the release application. The prospective allottee has also no right or interest in the property or claim against the landlord so as to be entitled to any hearing in the disposal of the release application on general principles or doctrine of audi alteram partem. This settled view of law has been followed in a number of cases subsequently. Reference may be made to the case 1988 (1) ARC 556, Munna Lal v. Vth A. D. J. Agra. 7. In the instant case, admittedly the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has permitted the prospective allottee to participate in the proceedings under Section 16 (1) (b). He has considered his objection also. This has vitiated the entire proceedings. He should have independently, without any objection from the prospective allottee and without hearing him, considered whether the claim of the landlord is covered under the provisions of Section 16 (1) (b) or not. The prospective allottee has no locus standi to be heard. It is only after rejection of the release application that the authority gets jurisdiction to consider the allotment application. 8. In my opinion, the impugned order of the revisional Court gets full support from the Full Bench decision in the case of Talib Hasan (supra). It does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record or any other legal infirmity. Since I am affirming the order of remand passed by the revisional Court directing the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to decide the application for release afresh in the light of observations made in the judgment, to need not consider any other point at this stage. The entire matter remains open for consideration by Rent Control and Eviction Officer inaccordance with law. 9. The writ petition has no merit and is accordingly dismissed in limine without any order so as to costs. Petition dismissed.