This defendant's appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 29.3.82 passed by the learned District Judge, Gauhati, whereby the plaintiff's appeal against the judgment and decree dated 30.1.80 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge No. 1, Gauhati was allowed and the plaintiffs suit for money was decided. 2. The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 in this appeal had filed suit against the defendant No. 1, a Co-operative Society, the present appellant, hereafter referred as 'the Society' and two others, respondents No. 2 and 3 in this appeal for recovery of Rs. 5,000/- together with interest, on the allegations that plaintiff was a member of the Society, that the Society had on 30.1.75 borrowed Rs. 5,000/- from the plaintiff as loan on the understanding that the amount shall be repaid as early as possible. The amount had not been repaid. The suit for the principal amount of Rs. 5,000/- and Rs.l718/-as 12% interest was filed. The defendants No. 1 and 2 filed joint written statement. The defendant No. 3 had filed separate written statement. It was pleaded that the plaintiff's husband Arbinda Baisya was the Chairman of the Society and he had shown in the accounts one amount of Rs. 5,000/- as loan; which was " subsequently taken by the husband of the plain iff on 30.6.75 by furnishing a receipt, that the plaintiff had no locus standi to claim anything as the principal amount or interest. The learned trial Court had framed issues and held that the Society defendant had taken the loan of Rs. 5.000/- as stated by the plaintiff but the same had been repaid to the plaintiff's husband. The suit was dismissed. In appeal by the plaintiff the learned appellate Court below by the judgment and decree impugned in this appeal held that the finding of the learned trial Court that the amount of Rs. 5.000/- had been repaid was erroneous and accordingly the appeal was allowed and the suit was decreed. 3. Aggrieved, the Society defendant No. I has come in appeal and Shri N. Chakravarty, learned counsel appearing on its behalf has submitted that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and further that the learned appellate Court below was wrong in not accepting the evidence for re-payment produced by the appellant defendant. 3. Aggrieved, the Society defendant No. I has come in appeal and Shri N. Chakravarty, learned counsel appearing on its behalf has submitted that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and further that the learned appellate Court below was wrong in not accepting the evidence for re-payment produced by the appellant defendant. Shri B. K. Deka, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff on the other hand has submitted that the finding of the appellate Court below that no payment had been made has been recorded after due consideration of the entire evidence produced by the parties and that the said finding of fact could not be re-opened in second appeal. 4 I have considered the respective submissions made on behalf of the parties and the judgments of the leaned Courts below. 5. In so far as the first submission of Shri N. Chakravarty, learned counsel for the appellant was concerned it may be noted that there was no plea in the written statement that civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, which was for recovery of money given as loan with interest. The learned trial Court and the lower appellate Court have not considered the matter because it was not raised. 6. Shri Cbakravarty has submitted that the question being of law could be raised in second appeal and has cited The Commissioner of Taxes vs. Golok Nath Kataki & another, AIR 1979 Gaubati 10, where this Court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in AIR 1971 SC 2018 and held that question of maintainability of suit being question of law could be raised in second appeal. The principle laid down however is not attracted on the facts of the present case. A question of law relating to maintainability of suit or jurisdiction of the Court may be raised in second appeal where it is apparent from the plaint itself but where the question depends upon proof of some facts, i. e. where some question of fact have to be gone into in order to determine whether on such facts established the suit was maintainable or the Court had jurisdiction it cannot be considered apparent from the plaint that the suit is not maintainable or the Court had no jurisdiction, such a plea cannot be entertained in second appeal. In the present case the contention on behalf of the appellant is that the plaintiff was a member of the Society and the suit related to a dispute between a member of the Society and the Society and consequently had to be referred to the Registrar under section 63 of the Assam Co-operative Societies Act 1949, hereinafter referred as the Act, and since the dispute had to be referred to the Registrar, the jurisdiction of the civil Court under section 79 of the Act was barred. The bar contemplated under section 79 of the Act relates to jurisdiction of the civil Court in regard to, under its clause C, a matter which has been referred to the Registrar. In the present case admittedly no matter has referred to the Registrar relating to the claim by the plaintiff and accordingly the provision of section 79 of the Act was not attracted. Siiri Chakravarty has submitted that the dispute ought to have been referred to the Registrar. Whether or not the dispute should have been referred to the Registrar is not the question. The bar to the jurisdiction of the civil Court under section 79 of the Act could be operative only when the matter had been referred to the Registrar. There was no such reference to the Registrar hence the question of operation of the bar contemplated under section 79 of the Act did not arise. Moreover, just because the plaintiff was a member of the Society it did not follow that she had given the loan as member and consequently it could not be said that the suit related to a dispute between a member and the Society touching or relating to affairs or business of the Society. It may also be noted that the defence plea was that the plaintiff had no locus standi to file the suit. Hence, as stated before, all such questions required to be considered, on evidence produced by the parties before it could be said that the civil Court had jurisdiction or not and so such a question should not be allowed to be raised for the first time in the second appeal. I hold accordingly. 7. A consideration of the judgment of the learned Courts below shows that it was established that the plaintiff had advanced a loan of Rs. 5.000/-to the defendant-appellant. I hold accordingly. 7. A consideration of the judgment of the learned Courts below shows that it was established that the plaintiff had advanced a loan of Rs. 5.000/-to the defendant-appellant. The only question therefore was as rightly observed by the learned appellate Court below that whether the loan amount had been repaid to the plaintiff. The learned appellate Court below has held below that on the evidence on record it could not be accepted that the said amount had been repaid to the plaintiff. I his finding of fact is binding on this Court in second appeal unless it can be shown to be perverse or unsustainable in evidence on record. 8. Shri Chakravarty, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the amount had been paid to the plaintiff's husband Arbinda Baisya, who was at the time also the Chairman of the Society and has referred to Ext. G(2) and G(3), which are entries in the Account Book of the Society relating to payment of Rs. 5,000/- and Rs. 420/- interest respectively. Shri Chakravarty has also referred to Ext. 'Ka' and Ext. 'K.ha', Caih Vouchers which are stated to have been signed by the plaintiff's husband Arabinda Baisya on behalf of the plaintiff. The learned appellate Court below has considered the above evidence and has come to the conclusion that the said evidence was not reliable to prove that the plaintiff had been paid the amount. Shri Chakravarty has submitted that the learned appellate Court below vas wrong in rejecting the above evidence and that because the documents were exhibited the contents were admitted and could not be questioned. Shri Chakravarty has also submitted that the observation of the learned appellate Court in the course of its finding that P.W.I, the plaintiff's husband who had been examined as witness on her behalf had not been confronted with his alleged signature on Ext. 'Ka' and Ext. 'Kha' was wrong and has referred to statement of P.W. 1, Arabinda Baisya in cross-examination where it appears that towards the close a suggestion was made to the witness about the payment on the basis of Exts. 'Ka' and 'Kha' which suggestion had been denied by him to contend that he bad been so confronted. 'Ka' and Ext. 'Kha' was wrong and has referred to statement of P.W. 1, Arabinda Baisya in cross-examination where it appears that towards the close a suggestion was made to the witness about the payment on the basis of Exts. 'Ka' and 'Kha' which suggestion had been denied by him to contend that he bad been so confronted. It may be noted that the defendant had examined only one witness who had joined the service in the Society in the year 1978 and obviously therefore had no personal knowledge of events of the year 1975. Exts. 'Ka' and 'Kha' had not been written in his presence and signatures stated to be of plaintiff's husband had not been made in his presence. In this state of evidence, the view taken by the lower appellate Court, that the bare suggestion to the plaintiff's witness Arabinda Baisya which was denied could not be considered as establishing the fact that Ext. 'Ka' and 'Kha' had been proved to have been executed by the plaintiff's husband, cannot be considered perverse. 9. The fact that a document is exhibited only means that it can be read in evidence. But unless it has been admitted, it should not be said that the contents thereof were admitted by the party against whom the document was sought to be used. Hen e just because Exts. 'Ka' and 'Kha' had been marked as exhibits it did not mean that its contents had also been accepted or that the fact sought to be established had been proved. The defendant had not produced any other evidence. As a matter of fact the defendant Society had in its written statement had not even taken the plea that the plaintiff had been paid through her husband. On careful considera­tion of the matter I am unable to accept the contention made on behalf of the appellant that the learned appellate Court below had committed any error in appreciation of the evidence produced by the parties. I, therefore, see no reason to re-open the said finding of fact recorded by the learned appellate Court below. 10. For the aforesaid reasons the appeal fails and dismissed.