Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is a licensee under the respondent with respect to a public convenience (lavatory) situated in the Central Bus Stand in Tirunelveli Junction. In an auction held on 17-5 1989, he was the biggest bidder for a sum of Rs. 2,00,000, and he was granted licence from 6-5-1989 to 31-3-1990. The Municipality has now published a notice announcing fresh auction on 1-7-1990 for the period commencing from 1-4-1990. Challenging the same, the petitioner has come forward with this writ petition with a prayer for direction to extend the lease in bis favour. 2. It is the contention of the petitioner that what was granted to him was a lease of the lavatory and he is in exclusive possession thereof and it cannot be treated as a licence by the Municipality. He places reliance on the terms of the licence agreement, giving exclusive custody to him and permitting him to collect the charges from the persons who use the lavatory. According to him, when exclusive possession of a property is given to a person for a right to collect the benefits arising out of that property, it would amount to a lease. He places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Quadrat Ullani v. BareliMunicipality1 . In that Case, the terms of the document which were being construed by the Supreme Court permitted the appellant therein to lease out the shops which were given to him to sub-tenants. The subject matter comprised of 11 shops. With regard to those 11 shops, the appellant was given possession and he was empowered to let them to sub-tenants on rents mutually settled between him and the Municipality. On those tacts, the Supreme Court held that it was a case of lease. Learned counsel places reliance on the following observations of the Supreme Court— “The bazar does constitute a benefit arising out of the land and may be immovable property which can be leased out (vide S. 3(26) General Causes Act. 1897) I.L.R. 15 Luck. 191—A.I.R. 1940 Oudh 409.” The above observations of the Supreme Court shall be read and understood in the context of the facts before the Supreme Court. As I have pointed out, the terms of the document under which the appellant therein got the right clearly permitted him to enter into lease transactions with others and sublet the shops. 191—A.I.R. 1940 Oudh 409.” The above observations of the Supreme Court shall be read and understood in the context of the facts before the Supreme Court. As I have pointed out, the terms of the document under which the appellant therein got the right clearly permitted him to enter into lease transactions with others and sublet the shops. Hence, those observations made in the context of those facts cannot have any bearing on the present case. 3. By the very nature of the property involved being a lavatory, there cannot be a lease as such in favour of the petitioner. The conditions of the auction under which the petitioner became the highest bidder in 1989 as well as the form of licence agreement under Art. 176 make it clear that it is only a licence for a specific period namely from 5-6-1989 to 31-1-1990. Having agreed to these conditions and taken the licence right in the auction, it is not open to the petitioner now to raise a contention that it is a lease and that he cannot be disturbed. 4. Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently held in Bareily Development Authority v. Ajay Paul Singh 2 , that non-statutory contracts cannot be enforced under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. In the circumstances, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.